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The main objective of this research project was to evaluate and critically analyze the 
United States Department of Justice’s (USDOJ) effort to reform the Seattle Police 
Department through the use of a “Consent Decree,” pursuant to the provisions of 42 
U.S.C. Section 14141. By examining the history, origin and use of Section 14141 with 
respect to other jurisdictions in general and Seattle in particular, an understanding of the 
effectiveness of this externally mandated reform effort emerged. Data compiled from 
interviews, court filings, public reports and media accounts support the conclusion that 
substantive, sustainable reform has been achieved as a result of the adoption of the 
federal Consent Decree between the City of Seattle and the USDOJ, at least as it relates 
to updated policies and practices involving police use-of-force, “stop and frisks,” and 
biased policing, as well as investigations of uses-of-force and reviews of those incidents. 
However, questions remain as to the long-term effectiveness of the reform effort on the 
culture of the Seattle Police Department and its ability to sustain the reform efforts into 
the future. Further, the data support that there is great potential for future DOJ 
externally-imposed reform efforts to be successful if the USDOJ enhances its efforts to 
engage in a holistic approach to police reform and if the DOJ uses police use-of-force 
theory in its application and enforcement of Section 14141 investigations, findings and 
litigation efforts. The research also indicates benefits to USDOJ reform efforts through 
the creation of a new “Police Reform Section” within the Civil Rights Division to replace 
the USDOJ’s reliance on its Special Litigation Section to enforce Constitutional policing 
on a systemic level within the United States. 
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In 1994, in the aftermath of the beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles police 
officers, the United States Congress passed legislation that gave the United States 
Department of Justice (USDOJ or DOJ) the authority to file civil law suits against local 
law enforcement agencies that were found to have engaged in “a pattern or practice of 
conduct” that deprived persons of their federal civil rights (42 U.S.C. §14141)1 
(Livingston, 1999; Bobb, 2003; Jerome, 2004; USDOJ, 2017b). Over the next 24 years, 
the Civil Rights Division of the USDOJ has negotiated twenty “Consent Decrees”, and 
twenty “Settlement Agreements” (also known as “Memorandums of Agreement” (MOA) 
or “Memorandums of Understanding” (MOU) with a variety of police and sheriff 
departments nationwide (USDOJ, 2017b).2 Since the initiation of the first DOJ 
investigation (in Torrance, California) which did not result in a “pattern or practice” 
finding, there have been 69 federal investigations completed, with 61% of those 
 
1 Section 14141 provides in relevant part: “It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or 
any agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a 
pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers…that deprives persons of rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States” 
(Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCLA), 42 U.S.C. §14141(a) (1994)). Section 
14141 has recently been reclassified and renumbered as 34 USC §12601. Due to its long history 
as Section 14141, this paper will generally refer to the statute as per its prior designation. 
2 See, Appendix A for a list of jurisdictions which have entered into Consent Decrees and 
Appendix B for a list of jurisdictions which have entered into either Memorandum of Agreement or 
Memorandum of Understanding with the USDOJ. The USDOJ has defined a “Consent Decree” as 
“a negotiated agreement that is entered as a court order and is enforceable through a motion for 
contempt.” A “Settlement Agreement” is defined “as an out-of-court resolution that requires 
performance by the defendant, including a Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) or Memorandum 
of Understanding (“MOU”) enforcement of which requires filing a lawsuit for breach of contract.” 
U.S. Attorney General Memorandum, “Principals and Procedures for Civil Consent Decrees and 
Settlement Agreements with State and Local Government Entities,” signed November 11, 2018, 
n. 2. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1109681/download. 
An article in the UCLA law review offered the following, more dramatic definition of the difference 
between a Consent Decree and an MOA: “Although both consent decrees and MOA are 
settlements, there are some important differences between the two instruments. When the DOJ 
uses a consent decree to settle its 14141 investigation, it files a legal order with the federal district 
court to approve the Consent Decree. A consent decree serves as a court-ordered and court-
enforceable settlement. When an MOA is used to settle the DOJ's claim, there is no judicial 
oversight. The DOJ must hold out the threat of a future consent decree or litigation to ensure 
compliance. Essentially, a consent decree is an MOA with teeth” (Silveira, 2004, p. 614).  
2 
investigations finding pattern or practice violations of constitutional rights (Devi & Frier, 
2020).3 
The federal legislation authorizing pattern or practice law suits was passed 
during the Clinton Administration (Democrat “D”) with three Consent Decrees and one 
MOA filed during Clinton’s presidency (between 1997 and January 2001). Three 
Consent Decrees and nine MOAs were filed under the Bush Presidency (Republican 
“R”) (between January 2001 and January 2009). However, the vast majority of Consent 
Decrees and Settlement Agreements were filed during the course of the Obama 
Presidency (D) (twenty-five in all, including fourteen consent decrees, one Settlement 
Agreement and ten MOAs) between January 2009 and January 2018 (USDOJ, 2107b; 
see also, Civil Rights Division website, at justice.gov/crt).4 
There has been substantial debate in the United States, and throughout the 
world, as to the best means to ensure humane and effective policing in democratic 
societies (Armacost, 2004; Ikert & Walker, 2010; Wolf & Piquero, 2011; Alpert et al., 
2017). The passage of the “pattern or practice” legislation took place after the U.S. 
Congress concluded that internal and external oversight practices being used on the 
federal and local levels (even in conjunction with the existence of the right to sue police 
departments for violations of civil rights through the state and federal courts and the 
existence of the “exclusionary rule” upon a judicial finding of unlawful search and 
 
3 A wide diversity of police departments exist within the United States: As noted by Bobb (2003), 
“indeed there are more than 16,000 local law enforcement agencies in the United States. Of this 
total, 13,524 are local police departments; the rest are sheriff’s departments. There are about 
436,000 full-time, sworn officers in these 13,000 police departments, and about 186,000 full-time, 
sworn employees in the sheriff’s departments. Of the 436,000 full-time police officers, slightly 
more than one-third work in an agency having 1000 or more officers, even though these agencies 
account for only 0.3% of the total number of police departments. While departments with 100 or 
more full-time police officers account for only about 4% of the total, they employ three-fifths of the 
full-time officers. The great majority of the police departments, about 77% (more than 10,000), 
have fewer than 25 police officers, while about 52% have fewer than 10 officers. There are only 
about 1300 police departments, about 10%, with more than 50 police officers” (p. 153). Other 
numbers have been reported as well: 17,000 police departments were reported in 2004 (Jerome, 
2004); Walker & Macdonald (2009), reported that “the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 
in 2000 there were 17,784 local, state and special jurisdiction agencies and 2,867 additional 
federal agencies” (p. 484, emphasis added); Rushin, (2015) reported a total of 17,985 state and 
local polices agencies employing a total of 765,246 officers (at Fig. 1.1). In 2017, the USDOJ 
reported that “there are more than 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the country” 
(USDOJ, 2017b, p. 1). 
4 Terms of office for U.S. Presidents can be found at: 
https://historyinpieces.com/research/presidential-inauguration-dates. 
3 
seizure), were insufficient tools to ensure Constitutional and effective policing in the 
United States (Livingston, 1999).5 
The initiation of these pattern or practice investigations and lawsuits by the 
federal government, however, has not been without controversy. In fact, not only did the 
Trump Administration (R) virtually abandon the use of this legislation as a substantive 
means of police reform,6 in 2018, the then-United States Attorney General took the 
extraordinary step of formally objecting to the issuance of a state-based Consent Decree 
negotiated between the Illinois State Attorney General and the Chicago Police 
Department. This was after the U.S. Department of Justice abandoned its own efforts to 
reform the CPD upon the conclusion of a USDOJ investigation finding a pattern or 
practice of excessive force.7 Even so, Settlement Agreements were reached on June 4, 
2018, between the Trump DOJ, the Ville Platte Louisiana Police Department and the 
Evangeline Parish Sheriff’s Office, as a result of an investigation concluded by the 
Department of Justice during the Obama administration, on December 19, 2016.8 
On July 27, 2012, the USDOJ entered into its eighth Consent Decree; this one 
involving the Seattle Police Department (SPD). This dissertation project uses original 
data to evaluate the impact of the Seattle Consent Decree on the Seattle Police 
Department and its practices, looking to determine to what extent reform efforts have, or 
have not, been successful overall. 
 
5 As noted by Rushin (2015), “Prior to the passage of § 14141, there existed three major 
mechanisms by which the federal government regulated local police agencies: the exclusionary 
rule, private civil litigation, and criminal culpability” (p. 18). 
6 See, March 31, 2017, Memorandum from the Attorney General: “Supporting Federal, State, 
Local and Tribal Law Enforcement.” Retrieved from 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3535148-Consentdecreebaltimore.html. 
7 Hinkell, D. (2018 October 10). Attorney General Sessions plans to weigh in against Chicago 
Police Consent Decree. The Chicago Tribune. Retrieved from 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-sessions-chicago-consent-decree-
20181009-story.html. 
8 See, Settlement Agreements, located at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
reaches-agreements-ville-platte-police-department-and-evangeline-parish. However, those 
settlement agreements did not include the appointment of a monitor to ensure compliance with 
their terms which was a key feature of consent decrees and settlement agreements negotiated by 
Department of Justice under prior Presidential administrations. 
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On January 10, 2018, US District Court Judge James Robart found the City to be 
in “full and effective” compliance with the Consent Decree,9 meaning that the federal 
monitoring of the SPD was intended to enter into its final phase – ensuring that 
compliance was sustainable for a two-year period prior to the anticipated dismissal of the 
federal court’s jurisdiction over the agreed-upon reforms.10 On December 3, 2018, 
however, Judge Robart, on his own motion, issued an “Order to Show Cause” as to 
whether the court should find that the City had failed to maintain full and effective 
compliance. This order was based, in large part, on issues and concerns regarding 
Seattle’s police discipline process that allowed a decision by the Police Chief to 
terminate an officer for excessive force to be overturned by a private arbitrator.11 On May 
21, 2019, in an unprecedented move, Judge Robart found the City to be partially out of 
compliance with the Consent Decree as it related to the City’s police accountability 
system, even in the face of opposition from both parties (the USDOJ and the City of 
Seattle).12 
Although the City and the DOJ filed a stipulated joint motion to dismiss 
substantive paragraphs of the Consent Decree on May 7, 2020, that motion was 
withdrawn by the City on June 4, 2020 after days of protest and civil unrest relating to 
issues of police accountability as the result of the May 25, 2020 killing of George Floyd 
by Minneapolis police officers. 
The research underlying this paper examined the process under which the 
reform of the Seattle Police Department took place and evaluates the overall impact of 
the reform effort on police officers, police managers and policing practices over a period 
of the 8-year term of the Consent Decree. I then compared the experiences of Seattle to 
the experiences of other police agencies based upon a review of the existing academic 
and evaluation literature.13 After conducting interviews with a diverse group of Seattle 
 
9 SPD Blotter. Retrieved from http://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2018/01/10/chief-bests-statement-on-
spds-compliance-with-the-consent-decree/ 
10 See, website of the Seattle Police Monitor at http://www.seattlemonitor.com/overview. 
11 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 439, filed January 10, 2018. 
12 U.S. v. Seattle, Document 562 (Court Order filed, 5/21/19). 
13 The jurisdictions previously evaluated and examined using original data include, Pittsburgh 
(Davis, et al., 2002 & 2005; Chanin, 2012), Los Angeles (Stone, et al., 2009; Rushin, 2015; 
Phillips & Jiao, 2016), Washington D.C. (Chanin, 2012; Bromwich 2016), Cincinnati (RAND 2005-
2009; Chanin, 2012) & Prince George's County, Maryland (Chanin, 2012). 
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stakeholders, reviewing the available reports relating to the implementation of the 
Seattle Consent Decree, and comparing Seattle’s experience to those of other 
jurisdictions, I have concluded that, in the future, the DOJ should adopt police use-of-
force theories in its enforcement of §14141 and create a new “Police Reform Section,” 
within the Civil Rights Division, using a holistic and multidisciplinary team approach to 
police reform. Such new practices would help to ensure that any future reforms initiated 
under the incoming Biden presidential administration would be both effective and 
sustainable. 
1.1. Research Questions & Working Hypotheses 
The research in support of this paper examined the history, experiences and 
substantive results of the Consent Decree process as it relates to the City of Seattle 
using the following research questions: 
• What is the potential, and what are the limitations, of externally-imposed 
reform efforts on police departments in the United States? 
• Are formal Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements an effective tool for 
facilitating significant and sustainable reform in United States police 
departments? 
• To what extent has the Seattle Police Department has been able to achieve 
desirable reform outcomes as a result of the adoption of the federal Consent 
Decree, despite a police culture that did not reflect core reform values? 
• Does it appear that substantive, sustainable reform has been achieved as the 
result of the adoption of the federal Consent Decree between the City of 
Seattle, Washington and the United States Department of Justice and at what 
cost? 
• To what extent have the views of police stakeholders and the perceptions of 
community stakeholders changed over the course of the Seattle Consent 
decree? 
The Seattle data established that the dynamics of City politics and the specific 
personalities of community, political and police leaders had a direct and substantial 
impact on reform efforts. In addition, community engagement in Seattle is unusually 
active and sophisticated and had a substantial and ongoing impact on the ongoing 
reform efforts pursued by the federal monitoring team and, eventually, the police 
leadership, over the course of the Consent Decree process. In fact, although the 
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Community Police Commission (CPC), a body created by the Consent Decree 
negotiation process and consisting of numerous representatives of activist groups in the 
city, was denied its request to become a party to the litigation between the USDOJ and 
the city, on November 26, 2013, the CPC was granted amicus curiae status, which 
allowed it to become an active participant in the adjudication of the Consent Decree with 
an agenda that was sometimes different than the named parties.14 
Over the course of the research project, I paid particular attention to the 
hypothesis previously suggested by Chanin that sustainability of reform efforts can be 
determined by three “components:” “(1) the department’s ability to sustain changes 
made to policy and accountability systems; (2) the symmetry between department 
culture and the goals of the reform effort; and (3) relevant outcomes” (Chanin, 2012, p. 
v). 
1.2. Findings 
Seattle data supported the conclusion that to the extent the Seattle experience 
was successful, it was the result of a change in Mayoral administration and police 
leadership that sent a clear message to command staff and the rank and file that 
compliance with the Consent Decree was a Department priority. In addition, changes to 
SPD policies, data collection efforts and training appear to have provided a strong 
foundation for sustainable improvements in the way officers engage in and are 
supervised in their work. 
However, there are also reasons for concern: recent events have shown an 
inclination for the SPD to revert back to prior poor practices in policing when under 
 
14 For example, see CPC Motion requesting extension of time for Monitor to approve SPD use-of-
force policy (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 82, filed August 20, 2013); CPC letter identifying 
continuing community concerns regarding the SPD at the time of the court’s finding of “full and 
effective compliance” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 421, filed October 13, 2017); CPC 
Response to Order to Show Cause supporting finding of lack of compliance with Consent Decree 
(U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 531, filed February 20, 2019); and, CPC motion for Oder to Show 
Cause why City should not be found “further out of compliance” with Consent Decree (U.S. v. 
Seattle, Document No. 622, filed on June 9, 2020). 
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stress and likely as a result of reform “fatigue” due to the seemingly endless nature of 
the federal reform effort.15 
At the same time, however, civilian oversight functions appear to be stronger 
than ever, with a respected Inspector General conducting audits of police practices,16 an 
active and vocal Citizen Police Commission with the ability to broadcast its message 
broadly17 and an improved Office of Police Accountability. Finally, continuing pressure 
from well-organized civil rights groups puts additional pressure on the City Council and 
the Mayor’s Office to ensure both Constitutional and effective policing.  
One particular area of weakness was identified, however.  For a number of 
reasons, the SPD rank and file were never sufficiently engaged in the reform effort and 
many study participants questioned to what extent the reforms truly impacted the culture 
of the SPD. In one particularly glaring example of concern, the then-police Chief, the first 
African American female to ever serve in that position, who reportedly had strong 
 
15 Although at least four other jurisdictions (New Jersey (9.8 years), Washington D.C. (10.7 
years), Detroit (11.1 years) and Los Angeles (11.9 years) have all involved longer periods of 
reform than Seattle (at least at the time of this writing), virtually all study participants described 
some form of exhaustion with a process where there is no foreseeable end in sight (See Rushin, 
2015, at Fig. 4.2, for “Length of Monitored Reform for Completed Cases”). 
16 As of August 2020, the Seattle Office of Inspector General had published one annual report 
(2019); two “work plans” (2019, 2020); a quarterly review of the Office of Professional 
Accountability (1st Quarter, 2020); four audit reports (“Firearms Inventory Control Review” (May 
23, 2019), “Audit of SPD Compliance with Chapter 14.12 of Seattle Municipal Code, Collection of 
Information for Law Enforcement Purposes” (June 21, 2019), “Force Review Board Assessment” 
(July 31, 2019), and “Audit of SPD Patrol Canine Teams” (June 24, 2020)); an “Interim OPA 
Auditor Final Report” (May 31, 2019); a “policy” report (“Interim OPA Auditor Final Report” (March 
18, 2019); a roadmap to the SPD Disciplinary Process; and eight memoranda designed to make 
recommendations to the SPD and the City on a variety of issues (“Peer Intervention Program 
Recommendation” to Chief Best (September 26, 2018), “SPOG Contract Impacts Memo” to 
Council Member Gonzalez (October 26, 2018), “Crime Stoppers Memo” to Chief Best (April 29, 
2019), “SPMA Contract Recommendations” to Mayor, Council and City Attorney (co-authored 
with OPA Director) (December 5, 2019), “SPOG Contract Negotiations Feedback” to Council 
Member Herbold (January 27, 2020), “IA Pro Information memo” (May 8, 2020), “Accountability 
Mass Demonstration” to Mayor, City Council, Chief Best, City Attorney, Court-Appointed Monitor 
and DOJ (co-authored with CPC, OPA Director and Community Representatives) (June 5, 2020), 
and “Less Lethal Weapons Usage in Protests” (June 12, 2020). See, website of Seattle Office of 
Inspector General, located at http://www.seattle.gov/oig. 
17 It must be noted, however, that a number of former members of the CPC strongly believe that 
the CPC experiment was ultimately a failure and that it was in the process of being co-opted by 
Mayor Durkan with its recommendations largely ignored and its overall impact on police practices 
to be minimal. 
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support amongst the minority communities, complained shortly after the City was found 
to be partially out-of-compliance with the Consent Decree in 2019 that:  
I don’t need another survey or another exit interview to know that one of 
the issues is that we really need the support of our public officials and our 
public for the officers… We are losing good people, and we know that it’s 
because they feel like they are not supported.18 
That statement was ominously similar to the types of statements that were 
uttered by Chiefs prior to, and immediately after, the DOJ investigation and the 
implementation of reform and were in accord with statements made by the Seattle Police 
Guild,19 a police union commonly referred to as a major impediment to the overall reform 
process.20 
With respect to the original research questions, the research data supports the 
following conclusions:  
First, with respect to the potential, and limitations, of externally-imposed reform 
efforts on police departments in the United States and the question of whether §14141 
can be an effective tool for facilitating significant and sustainable reform in United States 
police departments:  
 
18 King5.com (2019, July 15). Seattle City Council ‘disappointed’ in mayor’s approach to police 
reform. King5.com. Retrieved from https://www.king5.com/video/news/local/seattle-city-council-
disappointed-in-mayors-approach-to-police-reform/281-74bb7be0-ce36-405e-98d1-
41cbc011e793. 
19 See, for example, comments made by Sgt. Rich O’Neill, the Vice President of the Seattle Police 
Officers’ Guild to Q13 Fox TV (KCPQ) that “I have never seen the number of officers who are 
leaving and the way they are leaving,” [“contending many officers are afraid to do their jobs”]. 
According to O’Neill, “It’s just depressing to serve in a place where many City Council members 
who are coming out at times with negative comments about the police” (Miletich, S. (2018, July 
10). Police official disputes officer-exodus claims. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
www.seattletimes.com). 
20 See, for example, statement of US District Judge James Robart, who declared in court that 
“[t]he court and the citizens of Seattle will not be held hostage [by the police union] for increased 
payments and benefits.” Also, see, Seattle Police Monitor 1st Semi-Annual report (2013) wherein 
the Monitor reported that the police unions “thus far have failed to play a constructive role in word 
and deed (pp. 2-3); the Monitor continued that “[a] part of the SPD, mostly but not exclusively 
within the union- organized ranks, remains “dug in” and continues to resist the force and 
implications of the Settlement Agreement” (p. 5). In addition, it was the police union’s decision to 
appeal the disciplinary decision against an officer for a video-taped excessive force incident that 
ultimately resulted in the SPD being found partially out-of-compliance with the Consent Decree on 
May 21, 2019 (U.S. v. Seattle, Docket No. 562). 
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There is great potential for future DOJ externally-imposed reform efforts to be 
successful if the DOJ enhances its efforts to engage in a holistic approach to police 
reform. Specifically, it is recommended that the DOJ Special Litigation Section (which 
enforces the provisions of §14141) use police use-of-force theory in conducting its work. 
In other words, the Special Litigation Section (SLS) should officially recognize that it will 
use only that level of force necessary to achieve the goals of reform.  
In addition, it would be appropriate for the USDOJ, particularly with the upcoming 
change in U.S. presidential administrations to have §14141 (now §12601) enforcement 
switched over to a new “Police Reform Section” (PRS) that would also formally adopt a 
process of “Collaborative Reform,” previously used by the Community Oriented Policing 
Section (COPS) of the DOJ.21 Voluntary “collaborative reform” projects could be applied 
to those agencies that are willing to recognize their deficiencies and cooperate in reform 
efforts as an alternative to formal §12601 litigation. The new PRS would also need the 
ability to alternatively use “carrot” and “stick” approaches to police reform, by having the 
ability to offer financial grants and free or at-cost technical assistance to departments in 
need.  
Just as officers should only use intermediate less-than-lethal weapons or deadly 
force when no other reasonable options are available, the new PRS should only be 
using the Section 12601 litigation process when alternative means to reform a police 
department are unavailable. In addition, just as the police need to be transparent with 
their communities and engage in community-oriented and problem-oriented policing, the 
DOJ also needs to be transparent in their work and in their negotiation processes.22 
 
21 See Cole, Collins, Finn & Lawrence, 2017. The Collaborative Reform Initiative Process. 
COPS/Crime & Justice Institute; see also, Collins, Cole, Finn & Lawrence, 2017, Assessment of 
the Collaborative Reform Initiative in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department: A Catalyst 
for Change, p. 5 [“The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) at the U.S. 
Department of Justice launched the Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance for 
Technical Assistance (CRI-TA) in 2012 with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
(LVMPD) as the first site … In sum, we found that the CRI-TA has been an important catalyst for 
meaningful and sustained change at the LVMPD”]. 
22 As discussed in Chapter 7.3, the DOJ’s refusal to share the methodology underlying their 
findings with respect to the SPD investigation report is an example that study participants 
passionately identified as a transparency and procedural due process violation which negatively 
impacted early efforts to negotiate and implement the Seattle Settlement Agreement. 
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Second, in answer to the question of whether the SPD has been able to achieve 
desirable reform outcomes as a result of the adoption of the federal Settlement 
Agreement, despite a police culture that reportedly did not reflect core reform values:  
Unfortunately, the question of whether the DOJ reform effort was able to actually 
change the culture of the SPD remains unanswered. Recognizing that it is difficult to 
even define the amorphous culture that is the SPD, there was a wide disparity of beliefs 
amongst study participants as to what impact, if any, the Consent Decree had on what 
has been perceived as a long-standing culture within the SPD to engage in an insular 
form of policing that does not meet community expectations. And, in fact, even the 
definition of who should represent the community and whose expectations the SPD 
should be serving was a question of some debate.23 The Seattle Police Officer Guild 
(SPOG) newspaper reportedly continued to publish inflammatory articles by reactionary 
officers over the course of the Consent Decree process (Seattle Times, 2/20/2011,24 The 
Stranger, 9/23/2015)25; and its newly elected President ran on a platform that was 
unabashedly anti-reform (Seattle Times, 1/27/2020, 2/4/2020).26 
On the other hand, however, the research data do support the conclusion that 
substantive, sustainable reform has been achieved as the result of the adoption of the 
federal Consent Decree between the City of Seattle and the USDOJ, at least, as it 
relates to updated policies and practices involving police use-of-force, “stop and frisks,” 
and biased policing, investigations of use-of-force and reviews of those incidents. In 
addition, although there is disagreement as to whether the SPD would have been able to 
be successful in the implementation of a Crisis Intervention Program, with a number of 
participants suggesting that this success may have been “in despite of” the federal effort, 
 
23 See, for example, comments of then-U.S. Attorney, Jenny Durkan to the Seattle Community 
Police Commission, Footnote 34. 
24 Westneat, D. (2011, February 20). Wary police may step back service. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from www.seattletimes.com. 
25 Herz, A. (2015, September 23). Seattle’s police union newspaper continues streak of anti-
reform rhetoric and racism. The Stranger. Retrieved from www.thestranger.com. 
26 Miletich, S. & Beekman, D. (2020, January 27). Police union candidates offer differing styles. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from www.seattletimes.com; Miletich, S. & Beekman, D. (2020, 
February 4). Seattle police union elects hard-line candidate as president in landslide vote. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from www.seattletimes.com; See also, Election Ad for SPAG President Mike 
Solan, November 6, 2019, referring to “the anti-police activist agenda that is driving Seattle’s 
politics” (Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6cJQ1XBH8M). 
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substantial improvements in SPD’s handling of persons in crisis have clearly taken 
place. Finally, the Department now has to tools necessary to evaluate, track and 
manage use-of-force; tools that did not exist prior to the Consent Decree and which were 
clearly the result of the federal intervention.  
The cost of these reforms, however, was high. The City has paid up to $1 million 
per year to the federal monitor in conjunction with an overall negative impact on police 
morale and local perceptions of DOJ aggressiveness and over-reaching (at least at the 
beginning of the process) and perceptions that the federal court also “over-reached” over 
the course of consent decree implementation.27 The City was also required to spend 
millions of dollars on training, overtime and management information systems to come 
into compliance with the Consent Decree.28 Cost savings are also substantial however: 
the number of uses of force are down without any apparent increase in police injuries or 
crime (see, Seattle Monitor, 9th Systemic Assessment, 2017) and theoretically, at least, 
the SPD is much better situated to engage in risk management strategies to reduce 
liability than it was prior to the time of the Consent Decree. 
With respect to the views of police stakeholders and the perceptions of 
community members, surveys conducted prior to the George Floyd protests supported 
the conclusion that perceptions of the SPD had improved over the course of the federal 
reform process (see, Seattle Monitor, Third Systemic Assessment, 2016). 
This research project also led to the following conclusions and recommendations: 
The DOJ needs to continue its progress in moving beyond short-term litigation 
strategies in favor of transparency and procedural due process and avoid the use of 
“unnecessary or excessive force” in imposing police reform;29 
 
27 See Table 3.5 showing total billed costs to the city from the Seattle Monitoring Team. See 
Rushin, 2015, Fig. 4.1 for approximate average yearly cost of monitoring services for Seattle and 
other jurisdictions. However, Rushin’s Fig. 4.1 appears to understate Seattle’s actual monitoring 
costs, which were generally about $1 million per year, apparently similar to the costs associated 
with the monitoring of Prince George’s County and Washington D.C. 
28 Although it is arguable that this is money that the city should have been spending in the first 
place in order to ensure that it was not engaging in unconstitutional policing patterns or practices.  
29 In 2017, the DOJ acknowledged that: “In many cases, police unions have pointed out the link 
between officer perceptions of a lack of fairness and procedural justice within police 
accountability and disciplinary systems and the lack of procedural justice in police-community 
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Prior to publishing the results of any DOJ 14141 investigation, the DOJ should 
follow the practices described in Government Auditing Standards, Section 8.31,30 which 
recommends that “one of the most effective ways to ensure that a report is fair, complete 
and objective is to obtain advance review and comments by responsible officials of the 
audited entity and others, as may be appropriate.” This does not mean that city officials 
or police command staff should be given the opportunity to censor the DOJ investigation 
report; just that they should be given the opportunity to identify factual errors and opine 
on the report’s tone and balance with the DOJ being the ultimate and sole arbiter of the 
final version.31 
A holistic approach to police reform, in conjunction with consent decree 
enforcement should be the public face of the DOJ police reform effort. This should 
include providing technical assistance from within the DOJ (to include the Community 
Oriented Policing Section (COPS), Office of Justice Programs Diagnostic Center, 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Community Relations Service (CRS) and Office of Justice 
Programs (OJP), and obtaining technical assistance and support for police departments 
from groups such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the Police 
Executive Research Forum (PERF), and the Major Cities Chiefs Police Association 
(MCCA). 
Seattle lesson learned - The DOJ should seek to engage police unions at an 
early and ongoing stage, without allowing union opposition to hijack the reform process; 
in appropriate cases, the DOJ may want to join a union in the case as a party. 
Seattle lesson learned – Settlement Agreements needs to involve all significant 
related issues – to avoid allegations of mission creep and ensure a holistic approach to 
 
encounters. These examples illustrate concretely how incorporating the perspective of police 
officers has strengthened the Division’s reform work” (DOJ, 2017b, p. 12). 
30 Retrieved from U.S. GAO - The Yellow Book. 
31 In the case of Seattle, it appears highly likely that much of the drama that surrounded the 
release of the DOJ investigation report could have been averted had the DOJ shared a 
confidential draft of the report with SPD and City leadership and solicited input prior to the public 
release of the report. This is a widespread practice followed by local and federal auditors in 
accord with GAO standards. The only argument against following such a practice would be in 
support of a short-term litigation strategy intended to force a City into a more vulnerable position 
with respect to Consent Decree negotiations. The Seattle experience, however, appears to 
support a long-term risk management approach over any short-term benefits that may result from 
what has been described by Seattle officials as a “surprise attack” from the DOJ. 
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reform. (It was likely a mistake not to specifically include the issue of “police 
accountability” in the Seattle Settlement Agreement); and, 
The DOJ, court-appointed monitors, and affected cities will need to recognize, 
respect and embrace the inherent tension between community activists, police reform 
“professionals,” police command and police unions when taking into account community 
involvement and working to support collaborative solutions to community-police issues.32 
1.2.1. Police use-of-force theory applied to Section 14141 actions. 
Overall, this research project supports the finding that most of the issues and 
solutions regarding federal oversight of police can be found in policing theory itself, to 
include use-of-force theory and the multi-disciplinary team approach to reducing and 
fighting crime. Specifically, I recommend that for future DOJ-sponsored reform efforts, 
the DOJ apply police use-of-force theory to its application of §14141 (now § 12601) 
against local law enforcement agencies.  
Although the concept of using police use-of-force theory and applying it to the 
DOJ’s §14141 interventions would seem to be a common-sensical approach to 
externally mandated police reform, it has not been previously applied by any of the many 
academics and commentators who have studied the application of §14141. Ironically, 
the closest application of police use-of-force theory to police reform was suggested by 
the now-former court-appointed monitor for Seattle, who oversaw the reform process 
from its inception in 2012 through September 2020. Bobb (2003) recommended that 
jurisdictions considering creating police oversight mechanisms use the “least intrusive” 
form of oversight required to “assure the integrity of a self-regulating police agency.” 
 
32 Seattle research participants discussed ongoing conflicts between the CPC and the City, to 
include conflicts with the DOJ, the Monitor and the Court as reason to believe that there was a 
lack of understanding of the role of the CPC and how it should be involved in the Consent Decree 
process. See, Miletich, S. (2019, August 9). Citizen panel rejects Durkan plan to address SPD 
accountability flaws. Seattle Times; Kamb, L. (2019, September 21). Mayor accused of interfering 
with Panel. Seattle Times; Carter, M. (2013, December 12). Durkan: Commission’s police-reform 
role is limited. Seattle Times. [Wherein then-U.S. Attorney Durkan told the CPC: “You don’t own 
the community … And you are not the only people getting community input”]; Herz, A. (2015, 
June 30). Federal Judge, Decrying Attempts to ‘Grab Power’ Says He’s the Boss of Police 
Reform. The Stranger; Miletich, S. (2015, July 7). Judge’s Review Board Harangue on Video. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com & https://www.thestranger.com.  
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Bobb’s application of police use-of-force theory in that regard was explained as it related 
to the creation of civilian oversight for a police agency:  
…for any particular situation, all the alternatives should be considered, and 
only the most fitting alternative selected. In some sense, the prescription 
advocated here mirrors the best practice in the use of force by the police: 
force employed by the police should be narrowly and precisely calculated 
to overcome the resistance of the suspect. In some instances, that amount 
of force may be minimal, just enough to handcuff the suspect. In other 
cases, e.g., where the suspect wields a gun, the force used may need to 
be more severe. Just as an officer confronted with a resistant suspect 
needs to carefully select a level of force commensurate with the situation 
presented, the response to a law enforcement agency's resistance to 
accountability and responsibility for managing the risk of misconduct needs 
to be carefully measured, and overcome by the least intrusive option that 
works. (p. 165) 
Bobb’s recommendation in this regard was subsequently used by Deangelis, 
Rosenthal and Buchner (2016) to suggest that  
[j]ust as the police are expected to use only that amount of force that is 
proportionate, necessary and reasonable to accomplish their task, so it can 
be argued that jurisdictions creating or reforming an oversight function 
should similarly accomplish the feat of ensuring police accountability. (pp. 
11, 52) 
In this paper, I take the concept to its next logical step by concluding that both police 
oversight agencies and the USDOJ, as an agency that uses external control 
mechanisms to ensure constitutional policing, can use police use-of-force theory as a 
means to ensure a better understanding of its methods and tactics and also ensure more 
effective communication with the police community. 
One of the best current applications of police use-of-force theory is visualized by 
Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in its “Incident Management/ 
Intervention Model” (IMIM) which “is a visual aid that helps [an] officer picture an event 
and explain why the officer used the intervention methods he or she did.” As further 
described by the RCMP, “[t]he RCMP’s IMIM aligns with the Canadian Association of 
Chiefs of Police (CACP)'s National Use of Force Framework and contributes to a 
common vocabulary approach to the use of force by police agencies across Canada.”33 
 
33 A description of the IMIM model can be found at: https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/incident-
management-intervention-model-imim. The RCMP further describes the IMIM as “the framework 
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Figure 1.1. RCMP “Incident Management/Intervention Model” Graphic 
A version of the IMIM could be used by the DOJ as described herein and will be 
referred to hereafter as the “Pattern & Practice Management Intervention Model” 
(PPMIM). The PPMIM can be used as a visual aid that can help the USDOJ and affected 
police departments picture a DOJ intervention and explain why the USDOJ used specific 
intervention methods. The model can be used as an aid for impacted cities to 
understand how their reaction to a UDDOJ Pattern & Practice investigation will impact 
DOJ follow-up actions where patterns & practices of violations of constitutional law have 
been identified.  
  
 
that RCMP officers use to assess and manage risk through justifiable and reasonable 
intervention. The IMIM builds from the actual situation outward. The circular representation of the 
graphic is designed to reflect the rapidly evolving and dynamic nature of police work. Unlike a 
continuum or linear pathway, the IMIM does not lead the officer through a stepped progression of 
intervention options. The officer instead selects an appropriate option to control the situation, 















Figure 1.2. Pattern & Practice Management Intervention Model Graphic 
Graphic Design by Greg Holoboff | SFU Centre for Educational Excellence 
 
The PPMIM can be used as a framework to assess and manage risk through 
justifiable and reasonable intervention as it relates to unconstitutional policing practices 
exercised by state and local police agencies. The PPMIM builds from the actual situation 
outward. The circular representation of the graphic is designed to reflect the evolving 
and dynamic nature of police reform. Unlike a continuum or linear pathway, the PMIM 
does not attempt to lead the USDOJ through a stepped progression of intervention 
options. USDOJ personnel would instead select amongst the appropriate options to best 
manage the local situation and support a sustainable reform effort. 
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Just as police officers are expected to explain intervention strategies chosen to 
manage a use-of-force incident, the USDOJ should be transparent in how it uses its 
police reform tools in a reasonable and proportional way. Any DOJ action must take into 
account the entire situation, including:34 
• “Tactical considerations,” such as: the level of public engagement, support for 
police reform amongst the community and the level of organization and 
engagement by civil rights organizations; 
• The USDOJ’s perceptions, based on media accounts and meetings with the 
public and police officials and members of the police rank-and-file; 
• “Situational factors,” such as: the state of the local economy, the adequacy or 
inadequacy of the local police budget, and the level of equipment and training 
currently available; and, 
• “Subject behavior,” such as: the level of cooperation amongst local and police 
officials, and the level of resistance or support from police unions and rank & 
file officers. 
As described in Chapter 7.3 and Chapter 9 of this paper, the issues of police 
use-of-force and USDOJ enforcement of §14141 are remarkably similar in that they 
involve the same issues and concerns of those upon whom the force is used; to include 
expectations that the amount of force used will be “appropriate, reasonable and 
proportionate,”35 and that an officer or agency provide procedural due process and 
transparency in their enforcement of the law. Further, cities that become subject to 
§14141 enforcement can reasonably expect that the USDOJ will act in accordance with 
 
34 The PPMIM model described herein replicates the following description provided by the RCMP 
to describe explanations required to describe use-of-force intervention strategies by police 
officers: “The RCMP Police officers are also expected to explain the intervention strategies 
chosen to manage an incident. The explanation must take into account the entire situation, 
including: 
• tactical considerations, such as: low light, presence of backup, availability of cover, 
distance from the subject. 
• the officer's perceptions, such as: the size of the person, weapons nearby, previous 
encounters with the person, the person's emotional state. 
• situational factors, such as: weather, time of day, location, number of people present 
compared to number of police officers present. 
• subject behavior, such as: cooperative, resistant, assaultive.” 
See, https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/incident-management-intervention-model-imim. 
35 See, http://www.thealiadviser.org/policing/proportional-use-force/ 
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USDOJ expectations that police departments engage in “Community Oriented Policing”36 
and Problem Oriented Policing.37 Specifically, in order to obtain the type of cooperation 
necessary to achieve sustainable reform, the USDOJ needs to work “in a proactive 
partnership with [the affected department] to identify and solve problems,” and engage in 
“identification of [] specific problem[s], through analysis to understand the problem[s], the 
development of a tailored response and an assessment of the effects of the response” 
(see, footnotes 38 & 39). 
The research supporting organizational and culture change and the application of 
§14141 litigation to affect change commonly identifies the importance of collaboration in 
order to obtain sustainable change (Livingston, 1999; Simmons, 2008; Walker & 
Macdonald, 2009; Simmons, 2010; Chanin, 2014; Rushin, 2015). In those exceptional 
cases where there is no willingness on the part of a law enforcement agency to engage 
in Constitutional policing,38 the USDOJ would be justified in using force over and above 
that required in cases where collaboration and cooperation would otherwise be 
possible.39 
 
36 “Community Oriented Policing” has been defined as “a philosophy of full service personalized 
policing, where [police] work[] in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify and solve 
problems” (Ferreira, 1996, [Defining Community Policing], Retrieved from ncjrs.gov, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/policing/use139.htm). 
37 “Problem-orientated policing (POP), also known as problem solving policing, is an approach to 
tackling crime and disorder that involves the identification of a specific problem, thorough analysis 
to understand the problem, the development of a tailored response and an assessment of the 





38 See, for example, the case of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department (Harmon, 2012, pp. 
48-50; Chanin, 2014, at n. 2; Rushin, 2014, at footnotes 289 & 290; Rushin, 2015, pp. 15-16; 
Chanin, 2017a, pp. 254-255 (also describing opposition to USDOJ reform efforts by the Sheriff of 
Alamance County, NC); Walker, 2018, at n. 156 (describing opposition to USDOJ efforts by 
Maricopa and Alamance Counties);  
39 The “lethal force” option of the proposed PPMIM model [described as “receivership” would be 
reserved for jurisdictions, such as possibly Oakland, California, which has an established record 
of failure in the face longstanding attempts at reform, through a third-party litigation-induced 
Consent Decree that has lasted for more than 15 years (PERF, 2013, p. 2; Rushin, 2017a, pp. 
234, 240; Walker, 2018, n. 168; Jaio, 2020, p. 5). 
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1.3. Contribution to Existing Literature 
Although there have been a substantial number of articles about §14141 litigation 
published in legal and academic articles,40 comprehensive evaluation studies have been 
limited to those conducted as a result of the Pittsburgh and Los Angeles Consent 
Decrees. With respect to those evaluation studies: the first related to a Consent Decree 
imposed on the City of Pittsburgh in 1997 conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice 
(Davis et al., 2002) with a follow-up report three years later (Davis et al., 2005); and the 
second related to a Consent Decree imposed on the Los Angeles Police Department in 
2001 conducted by the Harvard-Kennedy School (Stone, Foglesong & Cole, 2009). 
In addition to the aforementioned evaluation studies, two PhD dissertations have 
been published relating to consent decree experiences and results (Chanin, 2012; 
Rushin, 2015). Both dissertations included stakeholder interviews which provided 
additional data as to implementation efforts in Pittsburgh, Washington D.C., Cincinnati, 
Prince George’s County and Los Angeles. Chanin primarily discussed and compared the 
Consent Decree experiences in Pittsburgh, Washington D.C., Cincinnati and Prince 
George's County MD. Although Rushin discussed consent decree experiences in 
multiple cities, he subsequently placed an emphasis on the experiences of the Los 
Angeles Police Department. Additional evaluations of consent decree experiences 
through the use of original data (with publications by Chanin and Rushin leading the 
pack) are discussed in Chapter 4. 
In this dissertation, I have used methodologies similar to those used by Davis, et 
al. (2002), Stone et al. (2009), Chanin (2012) and Rushin (2015), relying on original 
stakeholder interviews, court filings, monitoring reports and media articles to provide a 
basis for evaluation of the successes and failures that can be attributed to the Seattle 
consent decree reform process. 
The results of these evaluation studies can be used to evaluate the extent to 
which the Consent Decree process has been used effectively by the federal government 
in other cities and has been compared to the experiences in Seattle. As such, this 
 
40 Clarke (2011) reported “more than 80 articles about § 14141 litigation hav[ing] been published 
in legal and other academic journals” as of the time of its publication in September 2011 (p. 6). 
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dissertation has built upon prior research involving the implementation of federal §14141 
interventions in multiple cities and is intended to bring the research up-to-date. 
1.4. Dissertation Organization 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation thesis I identify the data sources used in this 
project, how the data were evaluated, as well as ethical considerations and the 
challenges and limitations faced over the course of this research project. Data sources 
used included interviews with key stakeholders, extensive media reports relating to the 
Seattle Police Department and efforts at police reform in Seattle, reports published by 
the court-appointed Monitor, and court filings by the parties and amicus to the litigation 
between the City of Seattle and the USDOJ. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss the legislative history and application of §14141, the 
history of consent decree monitoring efforts and provide a detailed description of 
consent decree monitoring experiences in jurisdictions throughout the United States. 
In Chapter 4, I summarize the literature on police reform, to include U.S. 
Commission reports and their discussions of the causes and consequences of police 
misconduct. I further evaluate police conduct control mechanisms, as they currently 
exist, to include external and internal control mechanisms. I also include discussions of 
“de-policing” as a limit to police reform efforts, the sustainability and costs of police 
reform, the importance of city and police leadership in reform efforts, the significance of 
community and constituency engagement, and USDOJ resourcing limitations. I conclude 
Chapter 4 with a discussion of consent decree “success stories” and future research 
needs. 
In Chapter 5, I compare the arguments for and against policing-related structural 
reform litigation, and apply police reform theory and the police use-of-force theory used 
during this project to evaluate the legitimacy of the USDOJ reform effort in Seattle. 
In Chapter 6, I discuss some of the primary challenges faced to externally 
mandated police reform due to resistance from police unions, police cultures that tend to 
support the status quo, and the lack of USDOJ resources to enforce systemic reform in 
U.S. policing. 
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In Chapter 7, I use interview and court data to evaluate and discuss the Seattle 
consent decree implementation process. I include an introduction into the history and 
context of police practices in Seattle and summarize the DOJ investigation into the SPD 
as well as the negotiation of the Seattle consent decree. I compare the academic 
literature to the Seattle implementation experience, and then describe the 
implementation experience from the perspective of the different stakeholders involved in 
the implementation process. 
In Chapter 8, I assess the sustainability of the Seattle reform effort and compare 
the Seattle experience to implementation experiences in other jurisdictions.  
And finally, in Chapter 9, I identify the implications of the Seattle reform effort on 
future efforts by the USDOJ to reform police through structural reform litigation and 





Methods & Methodology 
As with the evaluations (Davis, et al., 2002; Davis, et al., 2005; Stone, et al., 
2009), dissertations (Chanin, 2012; Rushin, 2015), and research projects (Chanin, 2014; 
Chanin, 2015; Chanin, 2016), referenced above, this project involved the completion of 
individual stakeholder interviews, reviews of litigation filings, public reports from the 
court-appointed monitor, citizen and officer survey results, media reports and reviews of 
evaluations of SPD data relating to use of force, arrest rates and complaints. Although 
this dissertation research, when first proposed, included focus groups (to obtain 
additional input from community members, SPD commanders and rank and file officers), 
that portion of the research effort had to be abandoned as a result of the COVID-19 
pandemic.41 
Prior to beginning my research, underlying evaluations of Seattle Police 
Department data had already been completed by Seattle’s court-appointed monitor 
using both qualitative and quantitative assessment methods. This study built on these 
analyses and conclusions by conducting individual interviews with a diverse group of 
stakeholders and comparing those reports with court filings and media reports. 
In addition, a review of the academic and professional literature and public 
reports relating to other consent decrees assisted in answering my research questions 
regarding the effectiveness of consent decrees and settlement agreements in general 
and applying those facts, more specifically, to the Seattle reform process. 
 
2.1. Data sources 
Data were drawn from the following sources: 
 
41 The U.S. Canadian Border was closed as of March 21, 2020, making cross-border travel for 
this project impossible (Morello, V. (2020, September 6). Land border between Canada and the 
U.S. to remain closed until October 21. Radio Canada International. Retrieved from Land border 
between Canada and the U.S. to remain closed until Oct. 21 – RCI | English (rcinet.ca). 
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1. Seven semi-annual reports, filed by the Independent Monitor from 
2013 through 2016;42 
2. Ten Systemic Assessment Reports, filed by the Independent Monitor 
from 2015 through 2017;43 
3. Annual Monitoring plans filed by the Monitor from 2014 through 
2016;44 
4. 239 court filings, filed by the Parties (and amicus curiae) to the Civil 
Action initiated by the Department of Justice against the City of 
Seattle, to include court orders, and select transcripts of court 
proceedings conducted during the course of the implementation of the 
Consent Decree (as made publicly available by the US District Court); 
5. A review of the results of community surveys conducted from 2013 to 
2016;45 
6. Policies and Training plans initiated as the result of the 
implementation of the Seattle consent decree; 
7. Three hundred and eleven (311) news articles relating to community 
perceptions and the actions of the Seattle Police Department before 
and during the course of the investigation by the Department of 
Justice and the implementation of the Consent Decree (between June 
1999 and January 2021), forty-nine (49) national (U.S.) news reports 
relating to the application of consent decrees in multiple jurisdictions, 
to include Seattle (between July 2009 and July 2020), twenty-eight 
(28) news articles relating to the tenure of Seattle Police Chiefs 
(between June 1985 and August 2020), and five (5) news articles 
relating to allegations of “depolicing” in Seattle (between June 2001 
and November 2011); and, 
8. Academic and professional literature relating to the investigation, 
application, and underlying theory of policing-related structural reform 
litigation (including three (3) comprehensive evaluation studies and 
two (2) PhD dissertations), as well as academic literature relating to 
organizational change challenges in policing. 
In addition, targeted semi-structured interviews were conducted with forty-three 
stakeholders, to include: members of present and past City and police leadership, 
relevant City government personnel, court-appointed monitors, attorneys involved in the 
 
42 Retrieved from: http://www.seattlemonitor.com/reports-resources/. 
43 Retrieved from: http://www.seattlemonitor.com/reports-resources/. 
44 Retrieved from: http://www.seattlemonitor.com/reports-resources/. 
45 Retrieved from: http://www.seattlemonitor.com/reports-resources/. 
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Seattle investigation and litigation, and community leaders of organizations actively 
involved in the reform process. 
2.2. Data evaluation 
The federal monitor, Merrick Bobb, was appointed by U.S. District Court Judge 
James Robart after he was nominated to act in that capacity by the parties. The 
Monitor’s role was to act as an objective evaluator of SPD compliance with the Consent 
Decree. As such, the documents filed by the Monitor were used to evaluate the progress 
of reform over the reporting period. However, criticisms and concerns of participants 
were taken into consideration while reviewing and evaluating these reports and they 
were also evaluated with an eye towards identifying any areas where the Monitor and/or 
the Department of Justice may have been coopted by the police due to possible 
“regulatory capture” (Chanin, 2012, p. 139, citing, Bernstein, 1955; Kohlmeier, 1969), 
resulting from sometimes collaborative work between the parties and the Monitor and/or 
where honest opinions of the parties and the Monitor may have diverged. 
Pleadings filed by the parties, amicus curiae filed by the Community Police 
Commission, and statements made to the media by various stakeholders assisted in 
evaluating the objectivity and accuracy of the Monitor’s reports and assisted in better 
understanding the positions taken by the City and the Department of Justice within the 
context and over the period of the Consent Decree. 
The Consent Decree and a MOU between the Department of Justice and the City 
of Seattle identified certain qualitative and quantitative thresholds necessary for the 
Seattle Police Department to come into compliance with the agreements and engage in 
sustainable Constitutional policing practices. These data became the starting point for 
determining the extent to which the Seattle consent decree may have had a positive (or 
negative) impact on policing in Seattle and, as such, a review and evaluation of the 
following Systemic Evaluations conducted by the federal Monitor was required:46 
1. Hybrid Quantitative-Qualitative Analysis of Force Investigation & 
Reporting (First Systemic Assessment – September 2015 & Seventh 
Systemic Assessment – January 2017); 
 
46 Systemic reports retrieved from http://www.seattlemonitor.com/reports-resources/. 
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2. Qualitative Analysis of Force Review Board Policies and Practices 
(Second Systemic Assessment – November 2015); 
3. Qualitative Assessment of Public Confidence (Third Systemic 
Assessment – January 2016); 
4. Hybrid Quantitative-Qualitative Analysis of Administrative 
Investigations of Internal and Public Complaints Against the Police 
(Fourth Systemic Assessment – January 2016); 
5. Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Use of Force in Crisis 
Incidents (Fifth Systemic Assessment – February 2016); 
6. Qualitative Analysis of Officer Supervision (Sixth Systemic 
Assessment – December 2016); 
7. Qualitative Analysis of SPD Early Intervention System (Eighth 
Systemic Assessment – March 2017); 
8. Quantitative Assessment of SPD Use-of-Force Data (Ninth Systemic 
Assessment – April 2017); and, 
9. Quantitative and Qualitative Evaluation of SPD Compliance with the 
legal and policy requirements related to stops, searches, and seizures 
(Tenth Systemic Assessment – June 2017). 
Media reports (print, online and television) relating to the SPD reform effort were 
identified by gaining access to the online archives of the Seattle Times and searching for 
relevant newspaper articles using a variety of search words. In addition, I searched the 
Seattle Times database and conducted “Google” searches for news articles relating to 
significant dates where the court, the DOJ, the Monitor or City officials took actions or 
made statements, to find additional news resources.47 
Media reports were used to identify community perceptions over the course of 
the period of the implementation of the Consent Decree. In addition, an evaluation of 
news reports assisted in determining to what extent the media may have played a role in 
influencing public opinion (as well as Department of Justice and Court positions) with 
 
47 I was able to identify a total of 341 news articles specifically related to the Seattle reform 
process from a variety of news sources, with the Seattle Times articles constituting a majority of 
those articles. When I compared the Seattle Times articles to data from the Monitor’s reports, 
court filings and interviews, I found that the articles appeared to be highly reliable and accurate 
representations of what took place over the course of the decree to include comprehensive 
statements made by a diverse group of public stakeholders.  
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respect to the initial investigation and over the course of the Consent Decree 
implementation efforts. 
I was also granted access to the Seattle City Attorney’s Sharefile database 
which, as of January 6, 2021, contained all 652 docket items filed in the case of the U.S. 
v. Seattle, which initiated the Seattle consent decree reform process. 
I researched the history of reform at the SPD by accessing the City Archives 
online to locate the Seattle commission reports identified in Chapter 7.1 and by 
reviewing the Seattle Times archives. I supplemented that research with an interview of 
an SPD officer who was an expert in the history of the SPD and have made extensive 
references to a book written by a former Seattle prosecutor as it related to the history of 
the SPD (Bayley, 2015). 
2.3. Interviews 
I conducted semi-structured interviews among multiple stakeholders involved in 
the Seattle Consent Decree reform process. These stakeholders included 
representatives of civil libertarian and police accountability groups, members of the 
Seattle Police Department (to include command staff and supervisory officers), elected 
and appointed officials from the City of Seattle, lawyers involved in the Consent Decree 
litigation, and members of the federal monitoring team. While some participants were still 
working on the Consent Decree and/or were still employed in similar positions from 
which they were involved in the reform process, others had retired or were employed in 
new or different positions. 
In-person interviews were preferred and phone interviews were only conducted 
when a participant was no longer located in the Seattle metropolitan area and, towards 
the end of the data collection period, after the U.S.-Canadian border was closed. 
Forty-three (43) participants were interviewed (all participants were stakeholders 
directly involved in issues relating to the implementation of the Seattle consent decree). 
Thirty-two (32) in-person interviews were conducted between January 7, 2020 and 
March 12, 2020. In addition, over that same period of time, three (3) telephonic 
interviews were conducted with participants who were no longer living in the Seattle 
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metropolitan area. An additional eight (8) interviews were conducted by telephone 
subsequent to the U.S.-Canadian border closure. 
The interviews were conducted with the assistance of an Interview Protocol (see 
Appendix C.) The interview questions were designed to be open-ended so that they did 
not limit response options available to the participants. Leading questions were avoided 
and the opportunity to provide simple “yes” or “no” answers was avoided (see, Jacob & 
Furgerson, 2012). Probing follow-up questions were required where stakeholders 
appeared to have personal biases or interests that may have affected the extent to 
which they may have represented a more general population. In some cases, when a 
participant expressed an opinion that appeared to be inconsistent with the facts 
collected, published reports or other objective criteria, the participants were presented 
with those facts and given an opportunity to explain their positions or opinions. 
The interview process began by asking participants about their general 
experiences with respect to the Consent Decree and then delved into participant 
opinions regarding the successes and failures of the reform effort overall. Given that the 
questions were generally open-ended I was able to allow the individual participant 
responses to guide the interview process. Depending on the participant’s answers, I 
allowed the participants to drive the interviews and did not generally ask all the 
questions in the protocol, instead asking those questions that were most related to the 
issues identified as important by the individual participant.  
The interviews generally took approximately one-hour each; however, in some 
cases, relating to participants who had particularly central roles in the process, the 
interviews continued for up to three hours. Three interviews were conducted with a 
group of participants from the same agency, at the interviewees’ request. I did not find 
those interviews any less robust than the one-on-one interview format used in the vast 
majority of cases. 
A large diversity of opinions was obtained, and some opinions were unexpected 
depending on the roles of each individual participant. For example, some SPD officers 
diverged from the Department’s position that a consent decree was not needed to 
ensure reform. In addition, some community members opposed DOJ intervention 
techniques that might otherwise have been expected to garner community support 
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and/or were supportive of SPD efforts towards reform even in the face of public criticism 
of those efforts. 
Interviews were not recorded to better ensure participants would feel comfortable 
sharing potentially confidential information and personal thoughts and impressions. This 
decision meant there was no potential for word-for-word transcription of the interviews. 
To satisfy the need to ensure accuracy, I took copious notes at the time of each 
interview and then edited and supplemented those notes within a few hours after each 
interview. Particularly interesting quotations were transcribed word-for-word. 
Some stakeholder interviews led to the identification of additional individuals who 
needed to be interviewed to include additional police, government or community 
stakeholders.48 The variety of participants, each with different roles and (potentially) 
values, allowed for identification as to where stakeholders tended to be in general 
agreement or where divergent opinions or values existed. 
Given that many of the participants were still employed in positions of trust and 
sensitivity, all participants were promised confidentiality. Participants were assured that 
they would not be identified as having participated in the research and that I would not 
use any quotes or comments that could be attributed to any one specific person. 
The individual interviews provided data to determine the impact of the Consent 
Decree on the culture (and perceived culture) of the Seattle Police Department. 
Questions related to opinions on the culture of the SPD; to what extent the culture was 
(or is) dysfunctional and resistant to change; to what extent officers and the public have 
(and have had) confidence in the supervision and internal discipline of the organization; 
and, officer and public perceptions of the leadership of the Department over the course 
of the Consent Decree. Part of the research effort considered the extent to which the 
culture of the police department has actually changed or if the SPD is likely to revert 
back to prior practices based on philosophies and beliefs that have been maintained, 
even in the face of the external pressure of the Court, the Monitor and the Department of 
Justice. Further, the research identified to what extent positions or viewpoints of 
 
48 As such, the project involved “snowball sampling:” “sometimes referred to as network, chain 
referral, respondent driven or multiplicity sampling” which was used, as necessary, to ensure 
sufficient data was collected via the proposed targeted interview methods (Palys & Atchison, 
2014, p. 115). 
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stakeholders have changed over time. Perceptions relating to culture change and the 
sustainability of reforms were used to measure to what extent the impact of the Consent 
Decree was good, bad or indifferent. 
In general, I concluded that the robust data available allowed for data 
triangulation by “employing multiple methods to overcome the deficiencies and biases 
that may result form employing a single method approach” (Palys & Atchison, 2014, p. 
392). 
2.4. Coding and Analysis 
Data analysis was conducted using NVivo software. With respect to reviews of 
the academic and professional literature, news reports and court documents, those 
portions of the text that contained information relevant to the research questions were 
highlighted and coded. Similarly, the notes of each participant interview were individually 
highlighted, reviewed and coded. With respect to the participant interviews, comparisons 
were made amongst and between the opinions of a diverse group of police, community 
and governmental representatives (to include many parties to the litigation) and 
representatives of the Monitoring Team. 
Seven data sources49 were individually coded, identifying relevant nodes for each 
data source as appropriate (see, Appendix D). Using an interative process, the data 
sources were coded using a mixed approach of a priori coding (“where codes are 
created beforehand and applied to the text”) and emergent coding (“where codes are 
drawn from the text” (Blair, 2015, p. 16). Data were compared to identify similar and 
dissimilar themes and ideas. I first organized the information and then conducted 
“qualitative thematic analysis,”50 applying text to nodes (for support for this technique, 
see, Rossman & Rallis, 1997, Chapter 10, pp. 227-263). 
 
49 1) Consent Decree Literature; 2) Organizational Change Literature; 3) Seattle Consent Decree 
Court Documents; 4) Seattle News Reports; 5) National News Reports; 6) Evaluation Studies; 
and, 7) Participant Interviews. 
50 Defined as “a common general approach to analyzing qualitative data that does not rely on the 
specialized procedures of other means of analysis such as grounded theory methodology, 
discourse analysis, and semiotic analysis. In this exploratory approach, the analyst codes (marks 
or indexes) sections of a text (e.g., a transcript, field notes, and documents) according to whether 
they appear to contribute to emerging themes” (Schwandt, 2007, p. 290).  
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I chose to first identify and code the academic and professional literature relating 
to consent decrees followed by the public reports and court filings that related 
specifically to Seattle. I used an “open coding” process, as described by Blair (2015), to 
allow themes to emerge from the data and then used those themes to inform my 
interview protocol. I subsequently coded the participant interview data, using themes 
similar to those identified in the literature and then used my knowledge of the literature 
and news reports to further refine my interview protocol. As noted by Glesne, 2011, 
subsequent to the interviews, I went back to re-code the literature material as new 
themes were identified; this allowed for “categories [to] emerge from the data” (Fabian, 
2010, p. 101). 
2.5. Reflexivity & Dealing with Bias 
It is well established that personal biases may influence the research process, to 
include how interviews are conducted and then evaluated (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, pp. 19-
38). As such, I attempted to take on a “stance of neutrality,” and avoid attempting to “set 
out to prove a particular perspective or manipulate the data to arrive at predisposed 
truths” (Patton, 1990, p. 55). 
I spent 15 years as a civilian oversight of law enforcement practitioner and I have 
served as a member of a federal monitoring team working to reform the Cleveland 
Division of Police since 2015. I also have had professional working relationships with 
members of the Seattle monitoring team as well as some Seattle city officials and 
oversight professionals. Consequently, prior to evaluating the Seattle consent decree 
reform effort, I had preconceived opinions as to “best practices” in police reform and had 
already developed personal opinions as to the abilities and credibility of some Seattle 
reform participants. 
As such, in conducting my interviews, I tried to be aware of my potential biases 
and ensure they would not influence how I entered into or later evaluated any particular 
interview. I generally found I listened carefully to the different perspectives expressed 
and tried to understand each perspective, even when that perspective was inconsistent 
with my own professional world-view. I reflected on those opinions and found myself 
persuaded in a number of areas that surprised me and changed my initial thoughts 
regarding what I would find as a result of the interviews. To remain reflective throughout 
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the project, I documented my own insights and concerns within my interview notes 
shortly after each interview and considered those notes as I coded each interview.  
2.6. Ethical Considerations 
As required by Simon Fraser University, I obtained human ethics research 
approval from the Office of Research Ethics approval for this project prior to conducting 
any interviews. 
Signed consent was required from all Seattle participants. This type of consent 
was deemed appropriate given that most of the participants were government officials or 
police officers and community stakeholders who were generally sophisticated members 
of the community and who had visibly involved themselves in the reform of the SPD. All 
participants were informed of their right to request the withdrawal of their data at any 
time; and, in fact, none of the participants did so. Consent forms included the research 
questions for the project and a brief explanation of the topics to be covered and were 
emailed to each participant at least forty-eight hours before each interview. Further, 
signatures were obtained on each consent form prior to beginning each interview. 
Finally, each participant was aware that I was taking copious notes during the interview 
process as I had my laptop exposed and in use during in-person interviews and I 
announced that fact with respect to all telephonic interviews. 
Specific interview questions were not shared with participants prior to any 
interview and none of the participants requested the specific questions ahead of time. 
Although many of the participants had suffered stress as a result of their participation in 
the Consent Decree process, many of those participants expressed that the interview 
itself had been cathartic; as such, there was no reason to be concerned that the 
interview could have a traumatic impact on the participants. 
Many of the participant-stakeholders were bound by rules of confidentiality, and 
potentially liable for any intentional or inadvertent disclosure of confidential information. 
However, due to the very public nature of the reform process (to include the filing of a 
multitude of public reports and court briefs), the vast majority of the data needed to 
analyze and evaluate the process was already in the public realm and subject to fair 
public comment. Even so, during interviews, I was careful not to facilitate the production 
32 
of confidential information and did not find that the failure to obtain such information 
interfered with the project given that almost all of the information needed was publicly 
available in one way or the other.51 
I did not seek specific approval from the City of Seattle, the Department of 
Justice or the Seattle Police Department on behalf of any research participant. Instead, 
participants were contacted and assured confidentiality with respect to their participation 
in the study. To the extent that government and police participants were required to 
obtain approval from their appointing authority, each participant was expected to be 
aware of such requirements and then expected to decide for themselves to what extent 
they would obtain approval from their appointing authorities. Over the course of the 
project, however, it became clear that high-level members of the City and the SPD were 
aware of the participation of members of their Departments and, in fact, appeared to 
condone their participation. 
I was, of course, aware that participation in the study may have resulted in 
participants providing opinions on certain potentially controversial subjects which, if 
made public, could impact their professional or personal reputation or even their 
employment status. In addition, as previously mentioned, the governmental actors had 
access to confidential information relating to police department personnel histories and 
practices as well as decision-making processes that, if shared could have subjected 
them to civil liability as well as loss of employment. Although the risks of participating in 
this study were no greater than the normal risk faced by these employees in the course 
of their continuing employment, I was careful not to disclose the participation of any 
participant in this study and have tried to ensure that no quotation in this paper obtained 
from a participant interview can be attributed to any particular person. In cases where 
the information provided was publicly available (which was the case with respect to 
many high-profile SPD incidents), such information was attributed to the public record as 
opposed to an individual participant. 
 
51 As noted by more than one participant, “the city leaks like a sieve.” This fact meant that almost 
all information that might have been confidential at some point in time was eventually publicly 
reported in the media and was the subject of fair comment by research participants. 
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2.7. Challenges & Limitations 
A principal challenge in conducting this research was obtaining the cooperation 
of the necessary stakeholders, particularly given that, even though the City had been 
found in initial compliance, the Seattle consent decree was still in place at the time of 
data collection and the conduct of interviews. Since interviews were conducted prior to 
the dismissal of the DOJ lawsuit against the City, there was some hesitancy (particularly 
with respect to currently serving elected and appointed officials) in cooperating with the 
project or providing honest appraisals of the process, the status of compliance, and the 
sustainability of the reform effort. However, the fact that this dissertation was not 
expected to be published until after the anticipated date of dismissal of the law suit 
seemed to help ameliorate these potential concerns on the part of some of the parties 
and the police.52 In addition, as I was an experienced professional in the area of police 
oversight,53 my past professional relationships with some city officials and members of 
the Monitoring team allowed for introductions that appeared to increase the willingness 
of some governmental, community and institutional stakeholders to participate in the 
research. 
As previously noted, promises of confidentiality were required to ensure the 
cooperation of some of the participants, to the extent that some participants were 
concerned about the publication of their points-of-view or potential criticisms of the 
reform process and its ultimate sustainability. As anticipated, however, as a result of the 
recent and ongoing public debate regarding the USDOJ’s use of the Consent Decree 
reform process, stakeholders ultimately appeared to have a strong interest in having 
 
52 At the time the interviews were conducted, there was an overall belief that the City would be 
found in overall compliance with the Consent Decree shortly thereafter; although it was 
recognized that the status of issues relating to police discipline and accountability were still open 
to question.  
53 I am a former Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney who worked in the Special 
Investigation Division, investigating and prosecuting police and public officials, to include being 
involved in the investigation of the LAPD “Rampart Scandal” in 1999-2000. I also worked as a 
civilian oversight of law enforcement practitioner, having served as the Director of the 
Independent Police Review Division of the Portland City Auditor’s Office (2001-2005), the 
Independent Monitor for the City and County of Denver (with jurisdiction over the Denver Police 
and Sheriff Departments) (2005-2012) and the Chief Civilian Director of the Independent 
Investigations Office of British Columbia (2012-2016). I have also been a Deputy Monitor for the 
City of Cleveland’s Monitoring Team since 2016. My biographical information is easily accessible 
on the internet and a number of participants commented that they had “Googled” me prior to 
participating in their interview. 
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their point-of-view represented in this research study. Even so, the study results are 
limited by my inability to specifically identify participants and their potential interests or 





Section 14141: Consent Decree Monitoring & 
Experiences 
This chapter uses the academic and professional literature relating to police 
reform and compares that literature with Seattle data to discuss and compare consent 
decree monitoring experiences nation-wide. Section 3.1 covers the origin of federal 
police pattern and practice enforcement, the history of the use of Section 14141, the 
scope and coverage of Consent Decrees in general and evaluation metrics used to 
determine the success or failure of reform efforts. Section 3.2 presents issues specific to 
Consent Decree monitoring, identifying issues and concerns regarding court appointed 
monitors, the selection of the monitor and the composition of the monitoring teams, the 
role and importance of the monitors, and challenges with respect to monitoring and 
measuring consent decree compliance. Finally, Section 3.3 summarizes other City 
experiences based on a review of the academic and professional literature and news 
reports as they relate to consent decree enforcement activities on a nation-wide basis. 
3.1. Legislative History & Application of Section 14141 
The legislative history of Section 14141 gives some insight into the origin of the 
legislation and its application over the years provides further insight into the extent to 
which these decrees have been successful or unsuccessful. 
3.1.1. The Origin of Federal Police Pattern and Practice Enforcement 
Section 42 U.S.C. §14141, which finally gave the United States Department of 
Justice the authority to civilly sue local law enforcement agencies for engaging in 
“patterns or practices” of violations of civil rights, was passed in 1994 as part of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA). §14141 made it 
unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any 
person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern 
or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers ... that deprives persons 
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution 
or laws of the United States. 
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The statute gave the United States Attorney General the power to file a civil 
action to require departments to change practices that led to ongoing violations of the 
statute.54 
Although the statute has been referred to as “the most important legal initiative of 
the past twenty years in the sphere of police regulation” (Stuntz, 2006, p. 798), §14141 
garnered little media attention at the time of its passage (Rushin, 2015, p. v).55 This lack 
of public attention was even though the passage of this new provision amounted to a 
“dramatic shift in policing law.” (Rushin, 2015, p. 48)56 
 
54 “Prior to the enactment of 14141, police abuse experts had frequently charged that the Justice 
Department ‘plays virtually no active role in holding local police accountable for abiding by the 
Constitution’” (Gilles, 2000, n. 81, citing Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 211). 
55 Although Section 14141 would go on to be one of the most impactful long-term provisions of 
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, it was the other, more law 
enforcement friendly provisions of the Act (which included an Assault Weapons Ban, funding for 
100,000 new community police officers, funding for new prison construction ($9.9 billion), funding 
for federal law enforcement agencies ($2.6 billion), as well as “truth in-sentencing” rules, life 
sentences for repeat violent offenses, additional penalties for “hate crimes” and an extension of 
the death penalty, that garnered national headlines. The VCCLEA also included provisions 
banning assault weapons and banning juvenile ownership of handguns. (Rushin, 2014, p. n. 183, 
citing Windlesham, Politics, Punishment, and Populism (1998), Shahidullah, Crime Police in 
America: Laws, Institutions, and Programs (2008) and Meiners, Right to be Hostile, Schools, 
Prisons, and the Making of Public Enemies (2007)). Section 14141, however passed “undebated 
by Congress” and “uncommented upon by the press” even though the Section “greatly 
augmented the power of the federal government to fight systematic misconduct within local police 
departments” (Miller, 1998, p. 150). See, also, Rushin, 2015, p. 32, [“Even the legislative record 
from the VCCLEA includes no significant mentions of SRL”]. “The overall tone and content of the 
VCCLEA was remarkably conservative and punitive… [Section 14141] was one of the few 
politically progressive measures that found its way into the final version of the VCCLEA” (Rushin, 
2015, p. 37). 
56 In his 2015 Dissertation, Rushin offered two reasons for how Section 14141 became part of the 
VCCLEA legislation with so little recognition: “First, many of the other initiatives in the VCCLEA 
were tied to pricey investments. For example, the VCCLEA required additional investment in 
prisons at a price tag of around $10 billion dollars. [Structural Reform Litigation] SRL creates no 
clear financial beneficiaries, nor does it come with the same sort of astronomical price tag as 
many of the other components of the VCCLEA. This had a couple possible consequences. It 
meant that there were few groups with a strong financial stake to lobby and testify before the 
Congress about the measure. It also made the measure more palatable as a comparatively low 
cost add-in to the VCCLEA to gain some additional support from liberal legislators. Second, the 
perceived risk of passing SRL was relatively low. The measure did not put any affirmative duty on 
all police agencies broadly, but instead gave the DOJ a limited right of action against only 
agencies engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct. Major police agencies likely viewed the 
perceived risk of SRL post-VCCLEA as relatively low. Combined, these two conditions allowed 
Congress to pass the VCCLEA with relatively little fanfare and no public debate” (Rushin, 2015, 
p. 47). 
37 
Prior to the passage of §14141, the federal courts had blocked USDOJ attempts 
to sue police departments to address systemic issues of police misconduct. In the late 
1970s, during the Democratic administration of President Jimmy Carter, the U.S. 
Department of Justice conducted an investigation into allegations of systemic corruption 
on the part of the Philadelphia Police Department. The DOJ ultimately concluded that  
Philadelphia police officers engaged in widespread abuses, including 
physical abuse and brutality, unjustified shootings, illegal stops, searches, 
seizures, arbitrary arrests, forced confessions, and verbal abuse, including 
racial slurs. Further, the Justice Department claimed that the policies and 
practices of the police department … deliberately encouraged such 
practices. (Hoffman, 1993, at p. 1502)  
After the USDOJ filed a pattern and practice lawsuit to enjoin the Philadelphia 
police from engaging in unconstitutional policing, the federal courts found that the 
Justice Department lacked the authority to bring such an action without specific statutory 
authority to do so.57 The court found that  
Congress had three opportunities between 1957 and 1964 to authorize the 
Attorney General to bring [pattern and practice] lawsuits []. It refused on 
each occasion because this authority would permit a dramatic and 
unnecessary shift of power from state and local governments to the 
Attorney General. (644 F.2d 187, 197 (1980); Hoffman, 1993, at n. 197; 
see also, Miller, 1998, pp. 157-161)58 
 
57 United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 1980). 
58 Shortly after the Philadelphia decision was published, “[i]n 1981, the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights identified City of Philadelphia as establishing a gap in the regulatory approach to police 
misconduct. The Commission recommended the adoption of legislation to remedy the judicial 
limitations placed on the use of structural police reform. The Commission observed that ‘the 
volume of complaints of police abuse received by the Commission has increased each year . . . 
and . . . [p]atterns of complaints appear to indicate institutional rather than individual problems.’ 
The Commission also recognized that one of the best possible ways to address these institutional 
problems was through some type of structural reform litigation that would incentivize police 
departments to change their behavior. The Commission reached this conclusion in part because 
previous attempts to file for injunctive relief against American police departments had failed. With 
that in mind, the Commission recommended the enactment of pattern or practice litigation similar 
to § 14141, stating that ‘Congress should enact legislation specifically authorizing civil actions by 
the Attorney General of the United States against appropriate government and police department 
officials to enjoin proven patterns and practices of misconduct in a given department.’ Thus, the 
Commission saw this proposed measure as a novel way to address systemic wrongdoing in 
police agencies. Nonetheless, the Commission did not offer model language, nor did it thoroughly 
expound on the proposal. This novel proposal did not gain traction in Congress until the following 
decade” (Rushin, 2014, pp. 50-51). 
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Over a decade after the Philadelphia decision, and shortly after the beating of 
Rodney King and the publication of the Christopher Commission Report in July 1991 
(Christopher, 1991, [finding systemic use of excessive force by Los Angeles police 
officers]), the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 
1991, which contained provisions “nearly identical” to §14141.59 However, the Act was 
not ultimately approved by the Senate and failed to become law (Levenson, 2001). 
Prior to the introduction of §14141 into the VVCLEA, the House Subcommittee 
on Civil and Constitutional Rights had held two days of hearings. These hearings 
collected evidence specifically relating to the beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles in 
1991,60 as well as alleged misconduct within the Boston and New York police 
departments. The clear goal of the legislation was “to fill in gaps in the ability of existing 
laws to address the underlying policy problems in police departments” (Levenson, 2001, 
at 26).61 
 
59 A committee report accompanying the 1991 proposed legislation discussed the Rodney King 
incident and the subsequent findings of the Christopher Commission as a background for the 
passage of the proposed new authority for the U.S. Attorney General (Livingston, 1999, n. 5).  
60 “As President Bush told the nation, he immediately directed the U.S. Attorney General to send 
lawyers from the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division to Los Angeles, but in 1992 these 
lawyers did not yet have the power to sue the city or the Department to stop any pattern of 
misconduct. All the Justice Department could do then was to seek criminal indictments against 
the individual police officers for violating Rodney King’s civil rights. And that is what they did, 
winning convictions against two of the four officers, including the supervising sergeant, in April 
1993” (Stone et al., 2009, p. 4). 
61 As noted by a USDOJ report entitled: Taking Stock – Report on the 2010 Roundtable on the 
State & Local Law Enforcement Police Pattern or Practice Program, “A number of events 
preceded enactment of 42 USC § 14141 as part of the 1994 Crime Act. The Kerner Commission 
report in 1968 highlighted the need for change in police practice involving citizens. A number of 
other commissions and reports focused on police practices, culminating in the 1981 publication of 
Who is Guarding the Guardians? A Report on Police Practices by the Civil Rights Commission. 
The Commission put forward recommendations to improve law enforcement in the United States 
and suggested the need for federal law to facilitate change in police agencies similar to the 
federal laws and litigation that had changed other social institutions such as education and 
corrections. This sentiment gained momentum subsequent to the 1991 Rodney King incident and 
the riots that followed in Los Angeles. A series of congressional hearings regarding police 
misconduct garnered testimony from around the country, and it became apparent that the federal 
government had limited capability to address civil rights violations by police agencies. In United 
States v. City of Philadelphia (644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980), on appeal the Third Circuit ruled that 
the government had no standing to litigate allegedly unconstitutional police practices. In Los 
Angeles v. Lyons (461 U.S. 95 (1983)), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an individual was not 
entitled to prospective injunctive relief because it was not possible to demonstrate that he or she 
would be the subject of excessive force again. These and other events led to the introduction of 
federal legislation referred to as the Police Accountability Act of 1991 (H.R. 2972). Some 
provisions of the bill were incorporated in the Crime Act of 1994 in an effort to fill the gap in 
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An important distinction between §14141 and the 1991 legislation, however, was 
the omission of any provision that would allow third parties, other than the U.S. Attorney 
General to seek injunctive relief under its provisions (Miller, 1998). Congress’ decision to 
preclude private plaintiffs from taking advantage of the provisions of §14141 would later 
require the USDOJ to balance the needs for community involvement against the 
government’s role in objectively advocating for the community, but not necessarily acting 
as an advocate for community-held expectations or desires.62 
The passage of §14141 was a recognition by Congress that individual 
prosecutions of police officers were an inadequate tool in addressing systemic patterns 
of police misconduct. There was also a recognition that the use of the exclusionary rule 
to enforce police behavior and the ability of victims of police abuse to sue individual 
officers for damages were not adequately controlling police actions.63 
3.1.2. History of Use of Section 14141 
After the passage of §14141, the DOJ put the responsibility for pattern or practice 
enforcement in the Special Litigation Section (SLS) of the Civil Rights Division. It was not 
until January of 1997, “following a year-long investigation,” that the DOJ made its first 
formal finding of a police pattern or practice violation, against the Pittsburgh 
(Pennsylvania) Police Department (DOJ, 2017b, p. 3). 
 
existing law and require DOJ to hold law enforcement agencies responsible when individual 
officer actions formed a ‘pattern of misconduct’ or were part of ‘systematic practices underlying 
the misconduct’” (Clark, 2010, pp. 1-2). 
62  Both before and after the passage of Section 14141, numerous academics and commentators 
have argued that Congress needed to grant private parties the equitable right (or a limited 
equitable right subject to DOJ review) to bring forth ‘pattern or practice’ suits when appropriate 
(Hoffman, 1993; Gills, 2000; Rushin, 2014). It has been suggested that allowing third parties to 
file such suits, which then can be reviewed and dismissed by the DOJ, as appropriate, would 
allow for a more robust use of the legislation, particularly given the lack of DOJ resources to 
prosecute pattern or practice cases (Gilles, 2000, pp. 1417-1418; Rushin, 2014, p. 3241). 
63 The academic literature is replete with examples and findings identifying the weaknesses in 
non-equitable means for controlling police misconduct. (See, Jeffries & Rutherglen, 2007, at 30, 
noting that civil “[d]amage[] actions are notoriously unsuccessful in vindicating police abuse;” See, 
Silveira, 2004, pp. 604-605, noting that Section 14141 was passed as the result of Congress’ 
realization that the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 1983, which allow victims of police misconduct to sue 
police officers in federal court, was not effective in controlling police misconduct; See Jerome, 
2004, p. 3, which noted that federal criminal prosecutions pursued under 42 U.S.C. Sections 241 
and 242 “address only the misconduct of the individual officers prosecuted, and do not address 
systemic agency problems”; See, also, Chanin, 2012, p. 14. 
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Over the course of the next 14 years, the DOJ initiated “more than 125 
preliminary inquiries, [and] pursued investigations of more than 56 state and local law 
enforcement agencies” (Clark, 2010, p. 1). By 2009, the DOJ had entered into six 
Consent Decrees64 and ten “Memorandums of Agreement”65 with a diverse group of 
local (and one state) law enforcement agencies (USDOJ, 2017a, p. 25).66 
According to a recent review of DOJ pattern and practice litigation,  
[s]ince the first pattern or practice investigation … in 1997, the CRT [the 
DOJ’s Civil Rights Division] has opened 69 formal investigations. Of those 
investigations, 41 have resulted in reform agreements between the federal 
government and the local agency and 21 resulted in consent decrees. (CJI, 
2019, p. 40) 
The application of §14141, however, has not been consistent and has been 
greatly impacted by federal politics and the political philosophies of the various 
presidential administrations. While the statute was passed during the presidential 
administration of William Clinton, the DOJ took some time to be able to staff up and 
determine how best to use the law as an enforcement tool (Rushin, 2015, n. 145). By the 
second term of the Bush administration, a more collaborative approach to enforcement 
of the statute began to take place, with a preference on issuing technical assistance 
letters at the conclusions of investigations rather than taking more formal enforcement 
 
64 Involving the Pittsburgh Police Department (1997), the Steubenville OH Police Department 
(1997), the New Jersey State Police (1999), the Los Angeles Police Department (2001), the 
Detroit Police Department (2003), and the Prince George’s County (MD) Police Department 
(2004). 
65 Involving the Montgomery County (MD) Police Department (2000), the Highland Park (IL) 
Police Department (2001), the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (2001), the 
Cincinnati Police Department (2002), the Buffalo (NY) Police Department (2002), the Columbus 
(OH) Police Department (2002), the Mount Prospect (IL) Police Department (2003), the Villa Rica 
(GA) Police Department (2003), the Prince George’s County (MD) Police Department (2004) [in 
addition to a Consent Decree], and the Cleveland Division of Police (2004). 
66 As reported by the DOJ: “Since [the enactment of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994], … the Special Litigation Section (SPL) of CRT has initiated more than 
125 preliminary inquiries, pursued investigations of over more than 56 state and local law 
enforcement agencies, provided technical assistance, and entered into a number of settlement 
agreements (including memorandums of agreement and consent decrees) in which law 
enforcement agencies agreed to implement changes to remedy alleged patterns or practices of 
police misconduct” (Clark, 2010, p.1). “Since § 14141‘s enactment, SPL has officially initiated 
more than 50 investigations resulting in nine memorandums of agreement (MOA), two letter 
agreements, and eight consent decrees. Of the total, eight investigations were closed after 
providing the jurisdiction with technical assistance; 15 were closed after investigations concluded 
that the allegations could not be sustained, and 16 investigations were ongoing at the time of this 
meeting” (Clark, 2010, p. 3). 
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actions.67 However, after President Obama took office, a more aggressive approach was 
used, with the number of 14141 investigations increasing over time as well as the 
appointment of more federal monitors at the conclusion of DOJ investigations (Rushin, 
2014; Frontline, 11/13/2015).68 
The use of §14141 (now 34 USC §12601) was largely been brought to a halt by 
the Trump administration, which took office in 2017.69 Although implementation 
 
67As explained by Frontline in 2015: “The investigations can have a number of different outcomes. 
Officials may issue technical assistance letters recommending voluntary reforms during the 
investigation and close the case without any formal findings. That was often the approach during 
the George W. Bush administration, which opened roughly the same number of investigations as 
other administrations, but shied away from forcing reforms, preferring a more collaborative 
approach to inquiries and the agreements it brokered” (Frontline, 2015). 
     In an essay entitled: Police Reform, A Job Half Done, Richard Jerome, a former Deputy 
Associate Attorney General, commented that by 2005 (nearing the end of President Bush’s first 
term in office), “the only new actions listed on the [DOJ’s] website were the technical assistance 
letters sent to the Virgin Islands and two small police departments (Beacon, NY, Police 
Department and Alabaster, AL, Police Department). If any new investigations were opened in 
2005, they have not been made public. Another telling sign is that the number of lawyers 
assigned to the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division section bringing these cases has 
dropped dramatically since the beginning of 2005.” Jerome also pointed to a change in the time 
periods of the agreements reached by the Bush administration, as opposed to those reached by 
the Clinton Administration: “Early agreements [under Clinton] had a termination provision to end 
the Consent Decree or Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in five years, but only if the agency 
was in substantial compliance with the agreement’s provisions for at least two years. This was 
changed in later agreements to a definite five-year term, with early termination if there was 
substantial compliance for two years. The most recent agreements were entered with the Prince 
George’s, MD, Police Department, where both a consent decree and a separate MOA terminate 
after only three years, with no requirement that substantial compliance be reached” (Jerome, 
2005, at p. 6 & n. 7). 
     As noted by Walker & Macdonald (2009), “Under the Bush Administration, the Special 
Litigation Section made greater use of Letters rather than consent decrees or MOAs, and to a 
large extent the investigation of law enforcement agencies virtually ceased” (p. 503). 
68 Kelly, K., Childress, S. & Rich, S. (2015, November 13). What Happens When Police are 
Forced to Reform? Frontline. Retrieved https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-happens-
when-police-are-forced-to-reform/. 
69 See for example, police reform efforts in Chicago and San Francisco: 
San Francisco: “In early 2018, [] the Attorney General of California agreed to serve as the Monitor 
of a settlement agreement involving the San Francisco Police Department. The settlement 
agreement was the result of a Justice Department Collaborative Reform investigation of the 
police department that could not be implemented when the Trump Administration cancelled the 
Collaborative Reform program … The Mayor of San Francisco and the Chief of Police were 
determined to pursue reform of the department and, consequently, requested that the State 
Attorney General serve as the Monitor of the implementation process” (Walker, 2018, p. 1789). 
Chicago: In December 2015, the Obama DOJ opened an investigation into the Chicago Police 
Department (DOJ, 2017b, p. 48). A report finding the CPD subject to the provisions of Section 
14141 was published on January 13, 2017 (https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download), 
one week before the inauguration of the Trump administration. In August 2017, the Attorney 
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processes have continued under Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements reached 
during the Obama Administration (and already under the jurisdiction of federal judges),70 
only one new investigation has been undertaken and two settlement agreements 
reached, without the appointment of any third-parties to monitor or audit compliance with 
those agreements (Washington Post, 5/14/2019).71 Shortly after taking office, in a memo 
dated March 31, 2017, Trump’s first Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, ordered a review of 
the Consent Decree process, which ultimately resulted in a November 7, 2018 memo 
outlining new “Principles and Procedures for Civil Consent Decrees and Settlement 
Agreements” to ensure that police-related Consent Decrees were only to be used in 
“limited circumstances” and instructing federal prosecutors to “exercise special caution” 
before entering into such agreements  (Sessions, 11/7/2018).72 
In 2019, the Trump administration took the extraordinary action of attempting to 
block a Consent Decree agreement between the City of Chicago and the Illinois Attorney 
 
General of Illinois, recognizing that the Trump administration did not intend to pursue an action 
under Section 14141, sued the Chicago police department to obtain federal court jurisdiction over 
the reforms identified in the USDOJ investigation report (Smith, M. (2017, August 29). Illinois 
Attorney General sues Chicago over police practices. New York Times, retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com). A consent decree was negotiated and eventually approved by a U.S. 
District Court Judge on January 31, 2019 
(https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/cpb/supp_info/ConsentDecreeComplete.pdf). 
As recognized by Walker (2018), “[i]n seeking its own consent decree with the Chicago Police 
Department, the Illinois Attorney General stepped into the void created by the termination of the 
pattern or practice program by the Trump Administration” (p. 1789). 
70 Specifically, in Seattle (2012 Agreement), New Orleans (2013 Agreement), Puerto Rico (2013 
Agreement) [although the first Puerto Rico court-appointed monitor resigned in 2019 alleging 
misspending and a failure on the part of either the DOJ or the court to act (Coto, D. (2019, May 
14). Official Over Puerto Rico Police Reform Resigns in Protest. Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/], Portland, OR (2014 Agreement), LA County Sheriff (2015 
Agreement), Albuquerque NM (2015 Agreement), Cleveland OH (2015 Agreement), Miami (2016 
Agreement [although the court-appointed monitor resigned in 2019 after being elected as Mayor 
of Tampa, FL and was “replaced” by a DOJ lawyer, [Iannnelli, J. (2019, September 6). Justice 
Department Appoints New Police-Misconduct Monitor to Oversee Miami PD, The Miami New 
Times, retrieved from https://www.miaminewtimes.com/], Ferguson MO (2016 Agreement),  
Newark, NJ (2016 Agreement), and Baltimore MD (2017 Agreement). 
71 Lowery, W. & Zapotosky, M. (2019, May 14). Democrats demand documents on Justice Dept. 
Police reform efforts under Trump. Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/. 
72 Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-releases-memorandum-
litigation-guidelines-civil-consent-decrees-and. Although this memo was eventually rescinded by 
the Biden administration in a memo dated April 16, 2021 by Attorney General Merrick Garland. 
Retrieved from full.pdf (nyt.com). 
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General’s Office (Associated Press, 10/10/2018;73 New York Times, 6/13/202074) which 
was based on findings made by the Civil Rights Division against the Chicago Police 
Department upon completion of a §14141 investigation on January 13, 2017, one week 
before Trump took office.75  
Of all of the DOJ interventions, only two instances exist where local agencies 
refused to enter into Settlement Agreements with the DOJ: the Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Office, led by the notorious Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who was ultimately convicted of 
criminal contempt of court for refusing to cooperate with the DOJ investigation (and later 
pardoned by President Trump) (ABC News, 8/25/2017)76 and the Alamance County 
Sheriff (North Carolina) who won his litigation against the DOJ in federal District Court, 
but eventually settled the case with the DOJ while that dismissal was on appeal (Rushin, 
2016).77 
Although the DOJ’s limited application and underutilization of §14141 has been 
criticized, applying its provisions to only “a small fraction” of all police departments in the 
United States (see, Jerome, 2005; Harmon, 2009; Rushin, 2014), it has also been 
recognized that by applying §14141 to some of the largest police departments in the 
country, “nearly one in five Americans lives in a jurisdiction that is served by a law 
enforcement agency that has been subject to a §14141 investigation” (Rushin, 2015, pp. 
32-33; see also, Walker, 2017).78 
 
73 Trump administration opposes Chicago police reform plan. (2018, October 10). Associated 
Press. Retrieved from https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-administration-opposes-chicago-
police-reform-plan/ 
74 Dewan, S. & Baker, M. (2020, June 13). Rage and Promises Followed Ferguson, but Little 
Changed. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/13/us/unrest-
ferguson-police-reform.html. 
75 See investigation report, at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download. 
76 Kelsey, A. (2017, August 25). Trump pardons controversial former Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio, 
ABC News. Retrieved from https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/controversial-arizona-sheriff-joe-
arpaio-pardoned-president-trump/story?id=49426093. 
77 See Settlement Agreement, dated August 17, 2016, between the United States and Alamance 
County Sheriff Terry Johnson. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/886406/download. 
78 In 2009, Harmon noted that: “Since 1994, the Justice Department has conducted thirty-three 
public full investigations under § 14141. The relative frequency investigation for large police 
departments is therefore 1.4% over those fifteen years” (Harmon, 2009, p. 21). However, as 
noted by Rushin (2015), “many of the nation’s largest police agencies have undergone, or are 
currently undergoing, SRL via § 14141. Combined, the police departments that have been subject 
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3.1.3. Scope and Coverage of Consent Decrees 
With respect to the Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements reached by the 
Special Litigation Section, although they have varied in scope and substance, they have 
usually covered issues relating to the use of excessive force, unlawful search and 
seizure, unlawful or inappropriate arrests and/or interrogations, biased policing and 
management and supervision of officers (Jiao, 2020). Over the course of the Obama 
years, however, biased policing issues were expanded to include gender bias and 
sexual orientation. Agreements also began to include interactions with persons with 
mental illness and by-standers’ rights to observe and record officer conduct (PERF, 
2013; DOJ, 2017a; DOJ, 2017b; Jiao, 2020).  
 As noted by Walker (2018), 
The learning curve of the SLS [USDOJ Special Litigation Section] … ended 
with an entirely different vision of accountability-related police reform than 
the one that the Section began with in 1997 with the Pittsburgh consent 
decree … [which] was strictly limited to matters related to a then-
conventional view of reform: the management and control of officer 
conduct, particularly with regard to use of force, searches, traffic stops, 
racial bias, citizen complaints, officer performance evaluations, and 
“community relations.” The second generation of SLS settlements, … by 
contrast, sweep broadly into a host of new issues: far greater detail 
regarding the reporting and review of uses of force, the need to build 
greater public understanding of police problems and the reform process, 
the need to develop formal arrangements for formal community input into 
police policy-making, the need for engagement with community social 
service agencies on relevant social problems, and the need for greater 
involvement of rank-and-file officers and their unions in police policy-
making. (p. 1818) 
In 2017, the USDOJ provided a list of the areas covered by Consent Decrees up 
to that point in time which are summarized in Table 3.1:  
 
to some sort of DOJ action via § 14141 serve a combined population of over 56 million 
Americans” (p. 32).  
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Table 3.1. DOJ Areas of Reform 1997-2017 (DOJ, 2017a)* 
Area of Reform Number of Consent Decrees & Years of 
Implementation 
Handling Public Protests & Demonstrations 4 Agreements between 2013 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
11) 
Continuous Improvement of Policies & 
Procedures 
9 Agreements between 2003 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
14) 
Comprehensive Training Reform 17 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
15) 
Citizens Recording Videos, Observing & 
Commenting on Police Activities 
7 Agreements between 2012 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
17) 
Specialized Teams & Officers to Handle Mental 
Health & Crisis Intervention 
8 Agreements between 2012 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
20)79 
Crisis Intervention Training 11 Agreements between 2001 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
21) 
Collaboration with Community Mental Health 
Services 
5 Agreements between 2013 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
22) 
General Policies & Training Relating to Use 
of Force 
19 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
28) 
Reporting & Data Collection Re: Use of 
Force 
19 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
29) 
Investigating & Reviewing the Use of Force 20 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
30) 
De-escalation & Proportionality 19 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
31) 
Use of Retaliatory Force 5 Agreements between 2015 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
32) 
Use of Chokeholds & Neck Holds 12 Agreements between 2002 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
33) 
Use of Firearms 13 Agreements between 2001 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
34) 
Use of Tasers & Electronic Controlled 
Weapons 
9 Agreements between 2012 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
35) 
Use of Pepper Spray (OC or Oleo Capsicum) 8 Agreements between 2001 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, 
p.36) 
Use of Canines (Police Dogs) 5 Agreements between 2001 & 2016 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
37) 
Head Strikes 7 Agreements between 2003 & 2016 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
38) 
Treatment of Handcuffed Suspects 9 Agreements between 2012 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
39) 
 
79 A typographical error in the DOJ report resulted in a failure to specifically identify the 2017 
Settlement Agreement with Baltimore as containing these provisions. 
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Area of Reform Number of Consent Decrees & Years of 
Implementation 
Vehicle Pursuits 2 Agreements between 2013 & 2015 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
40) 
SWAT/Tactical Units 4 Agreements between 2001 & 2015 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
41) 
Giving Medical Help After the Use of Force 9 Agreements between 2001 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
42) 
General Policies for Bias Free Policing 15 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
43) 
Reducing Gender Bias in Policing 5 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
44) 
Policing and the LGBTQ Community 3 Agreements between 2013 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
45) 
Reducing Language Barriers in Policing 5 Agreements between 2012 & 2016 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
46) 
General Policies for Reducing Stop, Search, 
Arrest Practices 
16 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
48) 
Reporting & Data Collection Re: Stops, 
Searches & Arrests 
16 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
49) 
Officer Wellness and Support 9 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
50) 
Enhancing Transparency 13 Agreements between 1999 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
51) 
Systems to Improve Officer Supervision 17 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
54) 
Early Intervention Systems 21 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
55) 
Body Worn Cameras 5 Agreements between 2015 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
56)80 
In Car / Dashboard Cameras 8 Agreements between 1999 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
58) 
Recruitment, Hiring & Promotions 6 Agreements between 2013 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
60) 
Complaint Systems 22 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
62) 
Civilian Independent Oversight & Review 10 Agreements between 2001 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
63) 
Officer Disciplinary Systems 17 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
64) 
Data Collection, Compliance Reviews & 
Internal Audits 
14 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
65) 
 
80 Although the Seattle Settlement Agreement did not specifically cover the issue of Body Worn 
Cameras, the federal monitor aggressively pushed for their implementation by the SPD (Seattle 
Monitor, Seventh Systemic Assessment, 2017, p. 2).  
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Area of Reform Number of Consent Decrees & Years of 
Implementation 
Community and/or Problem-Oriented Policing 13 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
67) 
Community Outreach Plans 14 Agreements between 1997 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
69) 
Community Committees and Councils 10 Agreements between 2001 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
71) 
Community Surveys 9 Agreements between 2012 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
73) 
Community Mediation Programs 3 Agreements between 2013 & 2017 (DOJ, 2017a, p. 
75) 
* Areas included in 15 or more Agreements highlighted in bold) 
As acknowledged by the DOJ in 2017, and commented on by academics, a 
“learning curve” developed whereby settlement agreements changed over time, growing 
more detailed and taking on more areas of concern (Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 516; 
USDOJ, 2017b; Walker, 2017; Walker, 2018; Jiao, 2020). In addition, while the first 
consent decrees emphasized the need to improve substantive use of force policies, later 
agreements recognized the importance of ensuring agency force investigations were 
robust. These later consent decrees also included requirements for appropriate 
accountability enforcement processes (Walker, 2013). 
While excessive force issues “remain[ed] front and center” with respect to the 
“second generation” of consent decrees, more recent decrees included provisions 
relating to community-oriented policing, problem-oriented policing and community 
engagement. In addition, later decrees included specific requirements for outcome 
measures and compliance conditions (Walker, 2018; Jaio, 2020). 
Starting with Seattle in 2012, DOJ consent decrees with larger police 
departments have also addressed issues of “community engagement.” “Community 
engagement provisions required the creation of structures involving the community for 
the purpose of assisting with the Monitoring and reform of police departments during the 
Consent Decree process” (Patel, 2016, p. 816; Walker, 2017).81 In addition, as noted by 
 
81 See for example: Seattle Settlement Agreement, filed July 7, 2012, Section I.A (creating Seattle 
Community Police Commission); Portland Settlement Agreement, filed December 17, 2012, 
Section IX (creating Community Oversight Advisory Board); New Orleans Consent Decree, filed 
January 11, 2013, Section X (“Community Engagement”) and Section XVIII (creating Police-
Community Advisory Board); Puerto Rico Settlement Agreement, filed July 17, 2013, Section XII 
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Chanin (2017a), Obama-era settlement agreements involved a “concerted effort to adopt 
a more publicly minded approach” resulting in an increase of agreements requiring 
departments to adopt community-oriented policing strategies and to create community 
based committees to assist in implementation of the settlement agreements (p. 258). 
Obama-era agreements also required jurisdictions to conduct public satisfaction surveys 
(p. 258). These agreements were also “more likely to include provisions to address 
departments’ approaches to handling interactions involving people experiencing mental 
health crises” (Chanin, 2017a, p. 259).82 
Also, noted by Chanin (2017b), was the fact that “[t]hough the reform process is 
clearly designed to address officer misconduct, the DOJ has recently begun to use the 
process to promote other outcomes, including ‘increased [department] transparency,’ 
‘community–police partnerships,’ and ‘community confidence in law enforcement’” (p. 
263, citing, USDOJ, Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section website).83 
At the same time, although the DOJ has actively solicited input from various 
community and police stakeholders relating to the content of negotiated consent 
decrees, there has been substantial criticism that those important stakeholders have not 
been given a “place at the table” during the course of those negotiations (Simmons, 
2008, p. 494; Chanin, 2012; Patel, 2016).84 
Although many of the more recent consent decrees provided for community 
engagement strategies and involved representatives of affected communities and police 
rank and file in the implementation process, the negotiation process has traditionally only 
 
(creating Community Interaction Councils); Albuquerque Settlement Agreement, filed November 
14, 2014, Section XII (creating Community Policing Councils and Civilian Police Oversight 
Agency); Cleveland Settlement Agreement, filed May 26, 2015, Section III (creating Community 
Police Commission and District Policing Committees); Ferguson Consent Decree, filed April 9, 
2016, Section III (creating the Neighborhood Policing Steering Committee, continuing the 
Ferguson Youth Advisory Board and creating Apartment Neighborhood Groups); and Baltimore 
Consent Decree, filed January 12, 2017, Section III (“Community Policing & Engagement”). 
82 The Seattle Settlement Agreement contained both public survey provisions and requirements 
to reduce the risk of use of force against people in crisis (See Section B. (“Crisis Intervention”) 
and MOU paragraph 13). 
83 Located at: https://www.justice.gov/crt/conduct-law-enforcement-agencies. 
84 Chanin (2012) recommended that the DOJ “include union representatives and key civil rights 
organizations in the settlement negotiation process.” In addition, Chanin recommended using 
focus groups and conducting community outreach “to develop settlement content,” and “include 
union and community group representatives in the implementation process by inviting group 
leaders to regular status meetings” (Chanin, p. 351). 
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involved community and police unions through their consultation with the DOJ. In 
Portland, Oregon, however, the court also conducted a “fairness hearing” to give 
community and police stakeholders the opportunity to comment on whether the 
settlement agreement was “fair, adequate, and reasonable.”85 
3.1.4.  Evaluating Success 
The §14141 process has been “criticized for, among other reasons, intruding into 
local police governance, imposing extreme financial costs on local governments, 
polarizing rather than resolving local police-community relations, and (in the view of its 
critics) failing to demonstrate its effectiveness” (Walker, 2018, p. 1782). In addition, the 
length of the Monitoring terms has been problematic, with some cases lasting more than 
a decade (See Table 3.2 below) and questions regarding whether shorter terms have 
actually resulted in sustainable reforms (see, Chanin, 2012, [questioning whether there 
was true reform as a result of the Prince George’s County Settlement Agreement].86  
Table 3.2. Examples of Length of Monitoring Terms in Selected Cases 
Jurisdiction Length of 
Monitoring 
Dates of Monitoring 
Cincinnati 5.0 years April 12, 2002- April 12, 2007 
Washington D.C. 6.8 years June 13, 2001 – April 2008 
Prince George’s County 7.5 years Jan. 22, 2004 – Jan. 13, 2009 
Steubenville, OH 7.5 years Sept. 3, 1997 – March 3, 2005 
Seattle, WA 8.0 years July 27, 2012 - Current 
New Jersey State 9.8 years Dec. 29, 1999 – Oct. 26, 2009 
Detroit, MI 11.1 years July 18, 2003 - August 25, 2014 
Los Angeles, CA 11.9 years June 15, 2001 – May 15, 2013 
See Rushin, 2015, at Figure 5, for “Length of Monitored Reform for Completed Cases;” Seattle & Detroit information 
added; Washington D.C. information supplemented (DOJ, 2017b). 
 
85 Patel (2016) suggested that the Portland fairness hearing increased the legitimacy of the 
process within the community by giving all stakeholders the opportunity to be heard (pp. 843-
844). 
86 “In Prince George’s County, an approaching deadline appears to have prompted the monitor 
team to find the Police Department (PGPD) in substantial compliance and terminate the 
agreement, despite signs that the department may not have been ready to operation without DOJ 
oversight” (Chanin, 2014, p. 45). 
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Even so, at least in the short term, monitoring reports have often been effusive in 
their declarations of success at the conclusion of their terms. 
• In Washington D.C., six years after the reform period began, the Monitor 
reported that the department had become “substantially reformed” and 
recommended the termination of the MOA (Final Report of the Independent 
Monitor for the Metropolitan Police Department, June 13, 2008).87 
• In New Jersey in 2007, it was reported that the New Jersey State Police had 
become “self-monitoring and self-correcting” (Monitor’s 16th Report, August 
2007)88 [see, also, Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 480; Walker, 2012, pp. 63-
64]. 
• After seven years of monitoring, even after a rocky start, the Cincinnati 
Monitor reported that the Section 14141 reform in that city was “one of the 
most successful police reform efforts ever undertaken in this country” (PERF, 
2013, p. 3). 
• In Los Angeles, the final monitoring report concluded that “[w]e believe the 
changes institutionalized during the past eight years have made the LAPD 
better at fighting crime, at reaching out to the community, in training its 
officers, in its use of force, in internal and external oversight, and in effectively 
and objectively evaluating each of the sworn members of LAPD” (Clark, 2010, 
p. 9). 
There have been questions of sustainability, however. In Pittsburgh, where an 
independent evaluation found that mandated reforms were successfully implemented, 
the City elected a new Mayor, two years after the termination of the Consent Decree, 
who immediately fired the reform-minded Chief who led the implementation effort, with 
the support of the police union which “had aggressively opposed the Consent Decree” 
(Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 525). Moreover, by 2015, Chanin found that advances in 
Pittsburgh had “eroded” since the implementation of the reform agreement (Chanin, 
2015, p. 170). Chanin also noted concerns regarding the sustainability of reform in 
Prince George’s County concluding that: “[t]aken together, the existing quantitative and 
qualitative information seems to suggest a wide gulf between where Prince George's 
 
87 Retrieved from http://www.policemonitor.org/MPD/reports/080613reportv2.pdf. It was also 
reported that “Attorney General Ashcroft [a Republican appointee] observed that ‘these reforms 
have been implemented without impairing the ability of the police department to fight crime. In 
fact, last year we saw a decline in the number of murders and in the crime indexed in the District 
of Columbia’” (Kim, 2002, p. 777).  
88 Retrieved from https://www.nj.gov/oag/monitors-report-16.pdf. 
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County appears to be and where the Justice Department would have wanted them to be 
seven years after the MOA was signed” (Chanin, 2016, p. 101).  
On a positive note, however, Chanin’s study also concluded that the reforms in 
Cincinnati had accomplished “significant and lasting change within the CPD,” and noted 
that the agency had “experienced little or no backsliding, a finding supported by 
consistent reductions in undesirable outcomes, including use of force incidence and 
allegations of abusive or unlawful behavior” (Chanin, 2015, pp. 179-180). 
As observed by Rushin “successful organizational reform requires continual 
support from municipal leaders, dedication by executives within the targeted agency, 
and buy-in by frontline officers” (Rushin, 2015, pp. vi & 1; see, also, Walker & 
Macdonald, 2009). In recognition of the issues and concerns raised about issues of 
sustainability, the DOJ has included provisions in consent decrees to create programs to 
replicate the mission of the DOJ and court appointed monitors in order to increase the 
potential for reforms to continue in the long term.89 
Ultimately, in 2017 Walker, reached the following conclusion: 
for the most part, court-ordered settlements of DOJ investigations have 
been successful in transforming seriously troubled law enforcement 
agencies. The phrase “for the most part” is deliberately used here to allow 
for the variations in outcomes that exist. It would be unreasonable to expect 
that all settlements would be completely successful. There are, however, 
no cases where a consent decree is believed to have completely failed. 
(Walker, 2017, p. 4) 
3.1.5. Evaluation Metrics 
The question as to how to evaluate compliance has challenged DOJ, the 
involved agencies and the court-appointed monitoring teams since the time of the first 
attempts to implement §14141 reform processes. Early on in the process, it was noted 
that: 
 
89 See, for example, the creation of the Inspector General’s Office in Cleveland (Cleveland 
Consent Decree, Section X.A.), the Civilian Police Oversight Agency in Albuquerque 
(Albuquerque Settlement Agreement, Section XII.D.) and the LAPD Audit Unit (Los Angeles 
Consent Decree, paragraph 124) (DOJ, 2017b). 
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the Justice Department’s general approach appears to focus remedial relief 
upon the implementation of particular policies rather than the attainment of 
statistical goals… Nothing in either decree [Pittsburgh & Steubenville] 
specifically requires the defendants to reduce the frequency of rights 
violations by their police officers. Thus, in order to terminate the decrees, 
the defendants must demonstrate not that they have reduced the number 
or frequency of rights violations, but that they have in good faith installed 
and implemented the required procedures. (Miller, 1998, p. 190) 
And, given the DOJ’s core responsibilities, it is not surprising, that the DOJ “frames each 
agreement in legal terms, using the language, goals and enforcement strategies typical 
of a binding contract in order to bring the affected department into compliance with the 
law” (Chanin, 2012, p. 108). The result of this legalistic point-of-view, however, has the 
potential to minimize the need for there to be accompanying cultural change and 
achievement of specific outcome-based goals. 
Interestingly, Chanin’s review of the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Prince George’s 
County and Washington D.C. reform efforts noted that “despite some variation in their 
data collection and oversight method, each monitor team applied the 95% substantial 
compliance threshold very similarly, regardless of the substantive nature of the provision 
under review or the considerable subjective authority maintained by each team” (Chanin, 
2012, p. 110). In Seattle, however, the Monitor chose only to use the 95% substantial 
compliance threshold in his systemic assessments but only in conjunction with more 
subjective evaluation criteria.90 The Seattle Monitor also evaluated compliance through a 
review of systemic metrics, including police uses of force, citizen complaints, and 
detention and arrest rates. As recognized by Chanin “these kinds of indicators are 
perhaps the most effective means of evaluating whether the changes brought on by the 
reform effort have yielded desirable performance levels” (Chanin, 2012, p. 234). 
A 2013 PERF study concluded that “[d]efining compliance is difficult,” particularly 
when attempting to evaluate areas that “do not lend themselves to evaluation on a 
numerical scale” (for example, the quality of an investigation). However, PERF noted 
that “a number of consent decrees have defined substantial compliance as showing that 
 
90 See section 3.2.6 for a discussion of challenges with measuring compliance and section 7.3.2 
for relevant portions of Seattle Monitor reports explaining criteria used to determine “full and 
substantial compliance.”  
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a given requirement is met 95 percent of the time” over a period of time (PERF, 2013, p. 
7).91 
By 2017, the USDOJ publicly addressed its progress in more effectively 
measuring outcomes: 
In more recent years, the Division has built outcome measures into its 
police reform agreements in order to measure not only whether the 
processes required by the Division’s reform agreements are actually 
implemented but also whether those processes lead to improvements in 
the quality of policing and reductions in patterns of misconduct … Outcome 
measures vary from case to case, as they are tailored to the particular 
outcomes the reform agreement is trying to reach in that place. But certain 
outcome measures can be found in almost every reform agreement. For 
example, the Division routinely incorporates a community survey into its 
reform agreements to establish a baseline for and, over the course of 
reform, to measure improvements in community trust and how changes in 
police culture are reflected in the responses of affected communities. (DOJ, 
2017b, p. 24) 
  
 
91 “In Pittsburgh, the monitor interpreted “substantial compliance” to require 95 percent 
compliance with all terms in the Consent Decree. Monitors in other cities that entered consent 
decrees after Pittsburgh, including Los Angeles, Cincinnati, and Washington, DC, adopted the 95-
percent compliance standard. Detroit adopted a 94-percent compliance standard” (PERF, 2013, 
p. 32). The PERF report went on, however, to quote the Deputy Chief of the Special Litigation 
Section (Christy Lopez) as making the following comments regarding the 95% requirement: 
“Substantial compliance requires a department to have to have a policy in place, to train people, 
and to make sure that the policy is implemented and practiced. A very widely accepted auditing 
practice to ensure that something is done is to demonstrate compliance 95 percent of the time, 
plus or minus 5 percent. That is how I believe the 95-percent requirement started. It is not a 
perfect application in every context. It works very well for some things, but not well for others. So 
yes, I agree [] that it would not make sense to say it’s good enough if 95 percent of your officer-
involved shootings are properly investigated and 5 percent are not. DOJ’s more recent decrees 
focus on outcome measurements, rather than process measurements. And we are making efforts 
to be more qualitative than quantitative” (PERF, 2013, p. 33). 
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The DOJ went on to describe specific outcome measures used for common 
issues addressed in recent Settlement Agreements: 
Stop, Search and Arrest Outcome Measures (In agreements addressing stops, searches, and 
arrests, the Division typically tracks data such as: 
• The rate of stops, searches and arrests, including by location and by the subject’s 
race, ethnicity, gender, and age;  
• “Hit rates” – i.e., how often stops and searches lead to citations, arrests, or the 
discovery of contraband; 
• How often stops, searches, and arrests are accompanied by sufficient 
documentation of suspicion;  
• The number of civilian complaints regarding stops, searches, and arrests and how 
often those complaints are sustained or substantiated;  
• How often prosecutors decline to prosecute charges following arrests. 
“For such data, the Division’s reform agreements require that the Monitor develop a 
methodology for tracking such data and analyzing it in a manner that controls for factors that 
could explain or justify certain rates of stops, searches or arrests. 
The Division’s reform agreements also may track qualitative data to allow the independent 
monitor to assess how often stops, searches, and arrests are supported by the required level 
of reasonable suspicion or probable cause”  
(DOJ, 2017b, p. 24). 
Use of Force Outcome Measures (In agreements addressing use of force, the Division typically 
tracks data such as): 
• The rate of use of force—overall, by type of encounter (i.e., street stop, traffic stop, 
arrest, call for service); by type of force; by location; and by subject’s race, ethnicity, 
gender, and age;  
• The number of civilian complaints regarding use of force and how often those 
complaints are sustained or substantiated;  
• How often force reviews reveal that a use of force violated agency policy or the law;  
• The number of officers who have had more than one instance of force found to 
violate agency policy or the law;  
• How often officers or members of the public are injured during police encounters. 
“As with stop, search, and arrest data, the Division’s reform agreements require that the 
monitor develop a methodology ensuring that analysis of such data controls for factors that 
could explain or justify certain rates of force”. 
(DOJ, 2017b, p. 25) 
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 [T]he Division’s current generation of reform agreements focuses on defined 
outcome measures to ensure that the court and the independent monitoring 
team have concrete, objective benchmarks for assessing whether a law 
enforcement agency has effectively implemented an agreement. Those 
outcome measures are designed to eliminate guesswork and reduce 
subjectivity in the determination of whether an agency’s reform efforts are 
resulting in constitutional policing. They are also designed to validate the 
reforms mandated by an agreement, and ensure that new policies, training, 
and organizational change accomplish the underlying goals of eliminating 
patterns of police misconduct 
(USDOJ, 2017b, p. 35). 
 
Given the DOJ’s recognition of the need for objective, defined outcome 
measures, Settlement Agreements reached after 2012 have generally included 
requirements for the court-appointed monitor to conduct outcome assessments as part 
of their evaluation of Consent Decree compliance.  
For example, the 2016 Newark, New Jersey agreement requires the 
Monitor team to review department data on officer pedestrian and traffic 
stops, post stop searches and arrests, and use of force, in an effort to 
assess the effectiveness of each policy change (Newark Consent Decree, 
2016, para. 174). This development is an attempt to address the criticism 
that early pattern or practice agreements overlooked the importance of 
substantive evaluation. (Chanin, 2017a, p. 259, citing, Chanin, 2012; 
PERF, 2013; Clark, 2010) 
In addition, the Cleveland Consent Decree requires “qualitative and quantitative 
assessments to measure whether implementing the Agreement has resulted in 
constitutional policing.”92 
In a 2017 article, the federal Judge overseeing the New Orleans consent decree, 
in collaboration with the Deputy Superintendent of the NOPD Compliance Bureau and 
the NOPD Director of Analytics, wrote an article praising the use of “data-driven 
management” as a means to evaluate NOPD progress with its §14141 reform process. 
In the article the authors commented that: 
In New Orleans, the reform process started slowly as the court and the 
court’s monitors struggled with identifying and quantifying the reforms 
mandated by the 492 paragraphs of the decree and determining how to 
measure incremental compliance over time. The first measurable progress 
 
92 Cleveland Consent Decree, at paragraph 367. Retrieved from https://perma.cc/4FBT-VPG5. 
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was noted when the Monitors began developing audits, often using 
checklists, to identify with specificity what was expected of the NOPD in a 
particular area, such as photographic lineups, and using the audit results 
to gauge compliance. (Morgan et al., 2017, p. 276) 
Morgan et al. (2017) went on to explain how the department began to use “a more 
holistic data-driven management framework to address all facets of management.” This 
included updating the NOPD’s Comstat model to include data relating to accountability, 
not just crime. As such, data were added to include consent decree compliance, 
misconduct trends and measurements, uses of force, and community policing (p. 287). 
Even with the move towards more objective compliance measures, it is still true 
that “there is [still] no universal measure of compliance or sustainability” (Alpert et al. 
2017, p. 243).93 In addition, it has been recently noted that “[m]easurement criteria used 
to measure police compliance with [] consent decree[s] remain inadequate…” (Jaio, 
2020, p. 6). Defining “compliance” continues to be difficult, as many consent decree 
issues cannot be evaluated using quantitative measures (PERF, 2013; Jaio, 2020). Jaio 
argues that “[r]ecent consent decrees have included outcome measures but they have 
not been empirically determined or widely accepted” (Jaio, 2020, p. 6). 
3.2. Consent Decree Monitoring 
In the cases in which the DOJ identifies serious systemic issues and concerns 
relating to unconstitutional policing practices, the DOJ will often obtain the appointment 
of an “independent monitor” to provide technical assistance to the impacted agency and 
monitor and report on the agency’s progress towards implementation of the reforms 
required by a Consent Decree or a Memorandum of Understanding. In 2017, the DOJ 
reported that “the appointment of an independent monitor – or, more accurately, an 
independent monitoring team – is a nearly universal feature of the Division’s reform 
agreements. Of 18 currently open reform agreements, all but four are overseen by 
independent monitoring teams” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 21). 
 
93 Even though numerous Obama-era Settlement Agreements include provisions requiring 
independent monitors to conduct outcome assessments as part of their evaluations of 
compliance. (For example, Seattle Consent Decree, retrieved from https://perma.cc/N425-DPB8; 
Ferguson Consent Decree, retrieved from https://perma.cc/AXP6-DMFG; Cleveland Consent 
Decree, retrieved from https://perma.cc/4FBT-VPG5; and, New Orleans Consent Decree, 
retrieved from https://perma.cc/T5FZ-XXPB). 
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A review of all consent decrees, MOA’s and Settlement Agreements, however, 
tells a slightly different picture. Out of the 40 agreements previously identified, 26 
(67.5%) involved the appointment of some form of outside monitors or auditor (“Monitor” 
(n=18), “Auditor” (n=2), “Researcher” (n=2), “Compliance Expert” (n=1), “Compliance 
Officer” (n=1), “Consultant” (n=1), and “Technical Compliance Advisor” (n=1). Two 
agreements required the jurisdiction to assign an “Internal Compliance Officer.” Another 
twelve agreements provided for either DOJ monitoring, access to information, or self-
reporting by the involved agency.94 
While the criteria for the decision to require an independent monitor (or 
monitoring team) appears to change over the course of the various Presidential 
administrations (with Republican administrations tending towards reaching agreements 
that were more informally monitored and Democratic administrations tending towards the 
appointed of independent monitors), those cases involving the appointment of 
independent monitors appear to involve departments that the USDOJ does not believe 
are capable of achieving reform without formal assistance and ongoing public 
reporting.95 
Table 3.3, below, shows, for each Presidential term in office, the number of 
investigations, negotiated settlements and monitors appointed. As previously discussed, 
the Clinton (D) administration used its first term to open investigations and its second 
term to pursue the first generation of consent decrees and settlement agreements. While 
 
94 Although there has been criticism of the Bush administration for not aggressively pursuing 
Section 14141 and the Obama administration for being overly aggressive in pursuit of cases (see 
e.g., Jerome, 2005; Harmon, 2009; Rushin, 2015; and, Walker, 2018), the wide variety of 
dispositions, particularly during the Obama administration (See Table 3.4), appears to suggest 
that, as of 2017, the USDOJ was already on the road to the type of holistic approach to police 
reform that is suggested in this paper. 
95 As observed by Walker, “Among critics of the Justice Department’s pattern or practice program, 
judicial enforcement of settlements has been a major issue … with respect to two law 
enforcement agencies, Cleveland, Ohio, and Miami, Florida, the SLS initially investigated and 
resolved the investigations with non-enforceable Findings Letters. In both cases, police abuses 
continued, and the Section returned several years later to investigate again and reached judicially 
enforced consent decrees” (Walker, 2018, n. 159). 
In Seattle, the DOJ insisted on a formal consent decree with a court-appointed monitor; this 
position appeared to based, at least in part, on the fact that the then-United States Attorney for 
the Western District of Washington had previously participated in two different citizen 
commissions whose reports and recommendations had previously failed to bring about the 
necessary reforms (See, infra, Chapter 7.2 [“The DOJ Investigation & Negotiation of the Seattle 
Consent Decree”]. 
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the Bush (R) administration opened a similar number of investigations as the Clinton 
administration, the percentage of monitors appointed to oversee settlement agreements 
dropped, in support of a less intrusive form of enforcement of the agreements. Under 
President Obama, however, the number of Section 14141 investigations, negotiated 
settlements and court-appointed monitors increased noticeably over and above prior 
Presidential administrations. 
Table 3.3. DOJ Investigations, Negotiated Settlements and Appointment of 
Monitors96 
Administration Investigation Negotiated Settlements Monitors Appointed 
Clinton – Term 197 
(Jan. 1993 – Jan. 1997) 
10 0 0 
Clinton – Term 2 
(Jan. 1997 – Jan. 2001) 
12 3 3 
Bush – Term 1 
(Jan. 2001 – Jan. 2005) 
13 11 7 
Bush – Term 298 
(Jan. 2005 – Jan. 2009) 
8 0 0 
 
96 Table 3.3 based upon Rushin, 2015, Figure 3.3, DOJ ACTION UNDER §14141 BY 
PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION; supplemental Obama Term 2 and Trump Term 1 
information obtained from Rushin, 2017a, Table 3.4 & https://www.justice.gov/crt/conduct-law-
enforcement-ag.encies. The figures in this table differ slightly from Rushin, 2015, Figure 3.3, and 
Rushin 2017a, Table 3.4, in that I have included all external Monitors, Auditors, Consultants, 
Reviewers, Compliance Officers and Experts in the “Monitors Appointed” column. 
97 Section 14141 became law in 1994. As noted by Rushin, however, “[t]he lack of negotiated 
settlements and monitor appointments before 1997 probably does not represent any 
administrative unwillingness to use these remedies. After § 14141’s passage, the DOJ needed 
time to develop internal implementation strategies after the passage of § 14141. Enforcement 
was not fully underway until about a year after Congress passed the VCCLEA. See, e.g., 
Interview #14, supra note 209, at 5 (stating that ‘it’s hard getting a new statute implemented’ and 
detailing the challenging process facing the DOJ in implementing the statute initially in 1994 and 
1995). This likely explains the lack of negotiated settlements and monitor appointments during the 
first Clinton Administration” (Rushin, 2014, n. 294). See also, Rushin, 2015, Chapter 3, for an 
excellent chronical of the administrative implementation of Section 14141, [Rushin included 
interviews of DOJ Civil Rights Division personnel as part of his research. In detailing the start-up 
required for the DOJ in Section 14141 enforcement, he quoted one DOJ litigator as saying: 
“’there really hadn’t been much structural reform litigation [of any kind] involving police 
departments’ before the passage of §14141 in 1994.” Rushin noted that “[t]his lack of previous 
structural reform litigation against police departments was due in part to court decisions in the 
Lyons and City of Philadelphia cases, where a federal circuit court and the U.S. Supreme Court 
blocked attempts by private litigants and the DOJ to intervene into problematic police agencies. 
Thus, the DOJ had to develop a plan to enforce § 14141 from scratch. This took time” (Rushin, 
2015, p. 67). 
98 No Settlement Agreements were signed during the second term of President Bush (between 
2005 and 2008) (Rushin, 2017, citing USDOJ, 2017b). 
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Administration Investigation Negotiated Settlements Monitors Appointed 
Obama – Term 199 
(Jan. 2009 – Jan. 2013) 
12 8 6 
Obama – Term 2 
(Jan. 2013 – Jan. 2017) 
5 16 8 
Trump – Term100 
(Jan. 2017 – Jan. 2021) 
1 2 1101 
 
Table 3.4  shows the jurisdictions with court-appointed Monitors and Auditors and 
highlights, using color coding, which Presidential administration was resonsible for 
entering into each Consent Decree (or MOU/MOA), as well as the identity and title of 
each court-appointment monitor/auditor. Once again, this Table reflects that the Obama 
administration used Section 14141 more aggressively than prior Presidential 
administrations. 
 
99 “[T]he Obama DOJ appears to have been significantly more aggressive than previous 
administrations in interpreting evidence to support a pattern or practice finding” (Chanin, 2017a, 
p. 259). 
100 According to Walker: “The Trump Administration is not the first presidential administration to 
back away from Justice Department efforts to investigate civil rights violations by local police 
departments and seek judicially enforced settlements. The administration of President George W. 
Bush, following its conservative agenda on civil rights issues, substantially reduced the Justice 
Department pattern or practice program between 2001 and 2009, reducing the number of 
investigations and reaching no new settlement agreements between 2004 and 2008 ... In short, 
Democratic Party presidents (Bill Clinton and Barack Obama) have pursued accountability-related 
police reforms, while Republican Party presidents (George W. Bush and Donald J. Trump) have 
not” (Walker, 2018, n. 6). 
101 Although the Baltimore Monitor was appointed on October 3, 2017, well after the beginning of 
the Trump administration (https://www.bpdmonitor.com/), the Baltimore Consent Decree was 
entered into on January 12, 2017, eight days before Trump’s inauguration (https://perma.cc/9Z7J-
JM87), placing the case within the jurisdiction of the federal court and precluding the Trump 
administration from abandoning it without the support of the City of Baltimore and the approval of 
the assigned federal judge (See, Stolberg, S. & Lichtblau (2017, April 3). Sweeping Federal 
Review Could Affect Consent Decrees Nationwide. New York Times, retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com [for statements made by the Mayor of Baltimore indicating the belief that 
the Trump DOJ was attempting to interfere with the implementation of the Baltimore Consent 
Decree]; see also, Op-Ed piece by then Attorney General Jeff Sessions: “,” commenting on an 
increase in violent crime in Baltimore and a reduction of arrests and arguing against the overall 
usefulness of consent decrees) (Sessions, J. (2017, April 17). Our first priority must be to save 




Table 3.4. Jurisdictions with Court Appointed Monitors/Auditors102 
[Clinton Term II, Bush Term I, Bush Term II, Obama Term I, Obama Term II, Trump Term I] 
Jurisdiction Year Name & Title of Monitor 
Pittsburgh PD, PA 1997 Dr. James Ginger, Monitor (Consent Decree)  
Steubenville PD, OH 1997 Charles Reynolds, Auditor (Consent Decree) 
New Jersey State Police 1999 Dr. James Ginger & Alberto Rivas, Monitors (Consent 
Decree) 
Montgomery County PD, MD 2000 “Consultant” per MOA 
Highland Park PD, IL 2000 DOJ provided access to documents and records to ensure 
compliance (MOA) 
Washington D.C. PD 2001 (Michael Bromwich, Monitor) (MOA) 
http://www.policemonitor.org/MPD/MPDindex.html 
Los Angeles PD, CA 2001 Michael Cherkasky, Monitor (Consent Decree) 
Cincinnati PD, OH 2002 Alan Kalmanoff (2002) > Saul Green (2002-2008), Monitor 
(MOA) 
Buffalo PD, NY 2002 Reviewer appointed per MOA 
Columbus PD, OH 2002 DOJ provided with “access” to ascertain compliance (MOA) 
Detroit PD, MI 2003 Sheryl Wood (2003-2009) > Robert Warshaw (2009-2016), 
Monitor  
(Consent Decree) 
Mt. Prospect PD, IL 2003 Semi-annual status reports required (MOA) 
Villa Rica PD, GA 2003 Independent Monitor per MOA 
Prince George’s County 2004 Eduardo Gonzales, Monitor (MOA) 
Cleveland PD, OH 2004  DOJ provided access to assess compliance (MOA)103 
Virgin Islands PD 2009 Fried, Frank, Harris Shriver & Jacobson, LLP, Independent 
Monitor (Consent Decree) 
http://www.policemonitor.org/VI/VIindex.html 
Beacon PD, NY 2010 DOJ provided with “reasonable access” to ascertain 
compliance (MOA) 
 
102 For information on federal monitors, see: Rushin, 2012, Table 6; Rushin, 2014; USDOJ, 
2017b; Rushin, 2017a, Appendix A & B; and, https://www.justice.gov/crt/special-litigation-section-
cases-and-matters/download#police. List of cities where DOJ investigations resulted in a Consent 
Decree or MOA can be found at: 
https://github.com/themarshallproject/doj14141/blob/master/data/doj_data.csv#L52. As noted by 
Chanin: “Several Obama-era agreements, including those in Seattle, Ferguson, Baltimore, and 
Albuquerque, include provisions requiring independent monitor teams to conduct outcome 
assessments as a part of the oversight process (USDOJ, 2017b). For example, the 2016 Newark, 
New Jersey agreement requires the monitor team to review department data on officer pedestrian 
and traffic stops, post stop searches and arrests, and use of force, in an effort to assess the 
effectiveness of each policy change (Newark Consent Decree, 2016, para. 174). This 
development is an attempt to addresses the criticism that early pattern or practice agreements 
overlooked the importance of substantive evaluation,” (Chanin, 2017a, p. 259, citing Chanin, 
2012; PERF, 2013; & Clark, 2010). 
103 Eleven years later (in 2015), the Cleveland Division of Police was identified as having 
continued to engage in a variety of unconstitutional policing practices that resulted in the 
enforcement of a formal Consent Decree. 
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Jurisdiction Year Name & Title of Monitor 
Easton PD, PA 2010 Self-reporting of non-compliance required (MOA) 
Orange County Sheriff, FL 2010 Internal Compliance Coordinator (MOA) 
Seattle PD, WA 2012 Merrick Bobb (2012-2020) > Dr. Antonio Oftelie, Monitor, 
(Consent Decree & MOA) http://www.seattlemonitor.com/ 
East Haven, CT 2012 Kathleen O’Toole (2012-2014) > Rafael Ruiz (2014-2017), 
Joint Compliance Expert (Consent Decree) 
Warren PD, OH 2012 DOJ monitoring (Consent Decree) 
New Orleans PD, LA 2013 Jonathan Aronie (Primary Monitor) (Consent Decree) 
http://consentdecreemonitor.com/ 
Puerto Rico PD 2013 Arnaldo Claudio, Technical Compliance Advisor (resigned – 
May 2019) >John Romero (Consent Decree) 
https://puertoricofederalmonitor.com/ > 
https://fpmpr.org/ 
Missoula PD / University of 
Montana PD, MT 
2013 Thomas R. Tremblay, Independent Reviewer (MOA) 
Portland PD, OR 2014 Dr. Dennis Rosenbaum, Compliance Officer and Community 
Liaison (Consent Decree) https://www.portlandcocl.com/ 
Albuquerque PD, NM 2014 Dr. James Ginger, Monitor (Consent Decree) 
https://www.abqmonitor.org/ 
Suffolk County PD, NY 2014 Internal “Compliance Coordinator” (MOA) 
Cleveland PD, OH 2015 Matthew Barge (2015 – 2019) > Hassan Aden, Monitor 
(Consent Decree) http://www.clevelandpolicemonitor.net/ 
Los Angeles County Sheriff, 
CA, (Antelope Valley 
Stations)104 
2015 Dr. Angie Wolf and Joseph Brann, Lead Monitors (Consent 
Decree) http://antelopevalleysettlementmonitoring.info/ 
Meridian PD / County of 
Lauderdale, MI 
2015 Rodney Monroe & the Police Foundation, Independent 
Auditor (Settlement Agreement) 
Maricopa County Sheriff, AZ 2015 MCSO to grant “reasonable requests” for information from 
DOJ (Consent Decree & MOA) 
Ferguson PD, MO 2016 Natashia Tidwell, Lead Monitor (Consent Decree) 
https://fergusonmonitor.com/ 
Newark PD, NJ 2016 Peter Harvey, Monitor (Consent Decree) 
https://www.newarkpdmonitor.com/ 
Yonkers PD, NY 2016 Compliance Reviews by DOJ (MOA) 
Miami PD, FL 2016 Jane Castor (2016-2019) > Corey Sanders (CRT lawyer), 
Independent Reviewer (MOA) 
 
104 On April 28, 2015, the USDOJ and the County of Los Angeles entered into a Consent Decree 
as it related to policing conducted by the Sheriff’s Antelope Valley Stations, policing the areas of 
Lancaster and Palmdale (US v. County of Los Angeles - Settlement Agreement - April 28, 2015 
(justice.gov)). On August 5, 2015, the DOJ and the County of Los Angeles entered into a second 
Settlement Agreement, as it related to the administration of the Los Angeles County Jails (United 
States v. County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Sheriff - Settlement Agreement - 
August 5, 2015 (justice.gov)). This research project was limited to Consent Decrees relating to 
policing as opposed to corrections. As such, only the first Settlement Agreement fell within the 
scope of this research. 
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Jurisdiction Year Name & Title of Monitor 
Alamance County Sheriff NC 2016 Internal contact required for DOJ inquiries (MOA) 
Baltimore PD, MD 2017 Kenneth Thompson, Monitor (Consent Decree) 
https://www.bpdmonitor.com/105 
Ville Platte PD, MI 2018 DOJ assessment & monitoring (Settlement Agreement) 
Evangeline County Sheriff, MI 2018 DOJ assessment & monitoring (Settlement Agreement) 
 
3.2.1. Issues and Concerns Regarding Court-Appointed Monitors 
The appointment of independent monitors has been described by many 
commentators as an essential measure to ensure agency compliance and ensure the 
sustainability of §14141 reforms (Davis et al., 2002; Davis et al., 2005; Walker & 
Macdonald, 2009; Clark, 2010; Chanin, 2012;106 PERF, 2013;107 Chanin, 2014;108 
 
105 Although the Baltimore monitor was appointed during the Trump administration, credit here is 
given to the Obama administration as the Trump administration actually attempted to delay the 
enforcement of the Consent Decree in the face of the City’s insistence that it go forward. (See 
Section 3.3.3, infra) 
106 According to Chanin (2012), “[a]s with remedial cases (see, e.g., Cooper 1988; DiIulio 1990) 
and other court‐based reform initiatives (see, e.g., Sandler and Schoenbrod 2003), the presence 
of a substantive expert who carries the authority of the court is thought to enhance 
implementation efforts” (p. 97). 
107 “The choice of a court-appointed federal monitor is essential. Police departments under 
consent decrees have varying experiences with federal monitors; some good, others not so good. 
Good federal monitors do much more than just ‘monitoring’ the implementation of a consent 
decree. They have substantive knowledge of policing issues, are efficient and effective in 
achieving goals, and serve as strong mediators and problem-solvers. In addition to the federal 
monitor, experts are often hired in the Consent Decree implementation process. When this 
happens, the experts should have knowledge in current police policies and practices as well as 
experience in the Consent Decree process in similar jurisdictions” (Jaio, 2020, citing PERF, 
2013). 
108 Chanin (2014) was effusive in his comments regarding the importance of court-appointed 
monitors: “[t]he importance of the independent oversight these monitor teams provide cannot be 
overstated. In all five jurisdictions [evaluated by Chanin, to include: Pittsburgh, PA, Detroit, MI, 
Washington D.C., Cincinnati, OH, and Prince George’s County, MD], monitor teams established 
the parameters for compliance and set the agenda, pace, and tone of the reform process. In this 
capacity, they provided to department leadership both technical advice and objective information 
about the department’s progress. Monitor teams also served as the conduit between the DOJ and 
the affected department, establishing a necessary link between a top-down, “DOJ-driven” effort 
and the goals, priorities, and day-to-day operational emphases that define a bottom-up approach 
to organizational change…The value of the monitor seems to square with the existing theory on 
the import of actors capable of working entrepreneurially bridge implementation challenges and 
those who provide external accountability. What is more, these results further emphasize the 
values of flexibility and adaptability, as well as an understanding between both monitor and 
agency leadership that collaboration is a key to successful implementation” (Chanin, 2014, p. 48, 
citing Barcach, 1978; Majone & Wildavsky, 1979; Cooper, 1988). 
63 
USDOJ, 2017b).109 However, the concept of using outside monitors has also been 
criticized for the significant expenses associated with monitoring efforts (Walker, 2003, 
p. 22; Ross & Parke, 2009, p. 204; Chanin, 2012; PERF, 2013; Rushin, 2015, p. 103) 
and for the perception that monitors have unfettered authority (PERF, 2013, pp. 2-3, 31 
[Discussing the question of “Who Monitors the Monitors?”].110  
In Seattle, Michael McGinn, the Mayor serving at the time of the DOJ 
investigation report, and who personally negotiated the City’s Settlement Agreement with 
the DOJ, publicly questioned the potential for a court-appointed Monitor to become “a 
shadow mayor” (Seattle Times, 5/15/2012)111 and as per fears of SPD command staff, “a 
shadow chief” (Seattle Times, 5/10/2012,112 7/17/2012).113  
 
109 As referenced by Walker & Macdonald, “one of the major shortcomings of many past reform 
efforts has been the lack of any mechanism to ensure implementation” (Walker & Macdonald, 
2009, p. 511) 
110 The Police Executive Research Forum report was the result of a forum, including police chiefs, 
DOJ personnel, academics and monitors to discuss “lessons learned” from implementation of 
Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements from 1997 through 2010. While the report noted 
the essential functions that the court-appointed monitors had played in the implementation of 
Section 14141 reforms, it also identified criticism of the use of monitors, noting that “[s]ome even 
say there is an inherent conflict of interest on the part of the monitors who are designated in each 
case to oversee the reforms, because they believe the monitors have a financial interest in 
keeping the cases going.” The PERF report also represents, however, that “[o]thers say that 
monitors are people of integrity who do not delay completion of consent decrees for personal 
gain” (PERF, 2013, p. 2).  
The PERF report noted the following exchange between the Executive Director of PERF and the 
DOJ: PERF Executive Director Chuck Wexler: “Yes, that raises the question: Who monitors the 
monitor?” DOJ Deputy Section Chief Christy Lopze: “The monitor is accountable to three parties. 
There is the judge, whom the monitor reports to. There is the defendant, who is paying the bills 
and has the responsibility to review the bills to ensure that they are proper. And there are the 
plaintiffs, who are responsible for making sure that the agreement is structured and that the 
monitor is doing what the agreement requires him to do. Some of the monitoring bids that come 
across our desks seem high, but we attempt to select monitors that have high integrity and are 
trying to do their job right. Also, most monitoring agreements have caps that prevent the monitor 
from charging more than a certain amount. The Monitors are like the chiefs in this room – people 
who want to fix a problem and help improve the practices of officers on the street” (PERF, 2013, 
p. 31). 
111 Miletich, S., Thompson, L. & Sullivan, J. (2012, May 15). Mayor’s math questioned on cost of 
police overhaul. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
112 Carter, M. & Miletich, S (2012, May 10). Deadline looming for accord to fix SPD. Seattle 
Times, retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
113 According to a letter sent by the Seattle City Attorney to the Mayor while the City was 
negotiating the Consent Decree with the DOJ, “A troubling victim narrative has emerged at SPD, 
in which DOJ is cast as a 'bully' seeking to impose a 'shadow chief' at an unverified, speculative 
cost,” (Miletich, S. & Carter, M. (2012, July 17). City Attorney Rebuke’s Mayor’s DOJ Strategy. 
Seattle Times, retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com). 
64 
3.2.2. The Selection of the Monitor & Composition of the Monitoring 
Team (Seattle) 
The selection of the court-appointed monitor in Seattle ended up being 
significantly more difficult than experienced in other cities. Like other Settlement 
Agreements, the DOJ and the City were required under the Consent Decree to agree on 
a monitor to be submitted to the federal court for approval. If the parties could not agree 
on a single choice, they had the option of submitting three candidates each, for the judge 
to consider in making an appointment (Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Seattle, Document 
No. 3-1, 7/27/2012, para. 171).  
The Consent Decree, as negotiated, allowed the parties to identify a monitor for 
selection. Unfortunately, for the Mayor, however, the city’s approval was determined by 
the City Attorney to be actionable by the City Council and the Mayor was at odds with 
the Council with respect to issues relating to the DOJ intervention.114 Ultimately, the City 
Council, with the support of the elected City Attorney (who had previously served on an 
SPD oversight board that had been critical of the SPD),115 settled on the choice of 
Merrick Bobb, the President of the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC), based 
in Los Angeles (Seattle Times, 10/17/2012116 & 10/18/2012)117. Bobb, had previously 
served as Deputy General Counsel to the Christopher Commission, which examined the 
LAPD for systemic excessive force after the beating of Rodney King in 1991, and as 
Staff Counsel for the Koltz Commission which conducted a similar review in 1992 as to 
the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office. Bobb had been serving as the Special Counsel 
 
114 In fact, by the end of March, 2012, the Mayor had abandoned all pretext of trying to work with 
Council members on the DOJ negotiations, leading Seattle Times to publish an article with the 
following sub-headline: “A “collaborative effort” between the mayor, city attorney and City Council 
to create a unified response to a U.S. Department of Justice investigation into the use of force by 
Seattle police has unraveled, according to sources familiar with the talks” (Carter, M. (2012, 
March 29). Seattle panel to fix police sharply split, sources say. Seattle Times, retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com). 
115 See http://www.seattle.gov/cityattorney/about-us/about-pete-holmes. 
116 Miletich, S. (2012, October 17). Police officials have doubts about monitor candidate. Seattle 
Times, retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
117 Miletich, S. (2012, October 18). Mayor rebuked for rejecting monitor. Seattle Times, retrieved 
from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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for the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, monitoring the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff, since 1993.118 
While Bobb came with extraordinary experience as a police monitor, he 
engendered a great deal of suspicion from the SPD command (and, thus, Mayor 
McGinn). Even though the Mayor and the SPD indicated a willingness to pick another 
candidate also supported by the DOJ (the former Washington D.C. monitor), the City 
Attorney and City Council insisted on the appointment of Bobb, who was also a top 
choice for the DOJ (Seattle Times, 10/17/2012 & 10/18/2012). When the City Council 
voted almost unanimously to support Bobb’s appointment (supported by the City 
Attorney), Mayor McGinn “reluctantly agreed” to accept him as the Monitor (Seattle 
Times, 10/23/2012).119 The stage was set, however, for the SPD to claim a lack of 
procedural due process and fairness and ultimately led a rocky start to the relationship 
between the Monitor and the SPD (Mynorthwest.com, 2/21/2013120 & Seattle Times, 
11/16/2013).121 
The Seattle experience became problematic largely because the City 
government was divided and there was a refusal to give either faction (the Mayor and 
the SPD on the one hand and the City Council and the City Attorney on the other) the 
right to “veto” the choice of the Monitor (Seattle Times, 10/18/2012). Although the DOJ 
had intentionally set up the selection process to be collaborative between the parties, the 
fact that City leadership would be divided by the process did not appear to occur to the 
 
118 See https://www.parc.info/staff-2. 
119 Miletich, S. (2012, October 23). McGinn bows to council, backs L.A. monitor for SPD. Seattle 
Times, retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. Shortly after Council’s vote, Mayor McGinn 
released the following statement: “We know from the experience of other cities that reform efforts 
are successful when the police force buys in to the effort. Our office and others expressed 
concerns that Mr. Bobb would not be seen as an impartial monitor ... We are disappointed that 
the Council did not listen to those concerns and that our reform efforts may prove more difficult as 
a result of their vote… We believe that their vote was a mistake, but respect that this is now the 
City's position. Going forward, the mayor will roll up his sleeves and continue to work with all 
stakeholders to implement reform in our police force” (quoted in the Seattle Times, 10/23/2012). 
Unfortunately, Mayor McGinn’s statement, being critical of Council’s decision, did nothing to 
alleviate the concerns of SPD command staff and instead, exacerbated SPD issues and concerns 
with respect to how the Department was being treated overall by the entirety of the process. 
120 Kruse, B. (2013, February 21). Seattle police monitor blasts City for ‘humiliating’ him. 
Mynorthwest.com. Retrieved from https://mynorthwest.com/30270/exclusive-seattle-police-
monitor-blasts-city-for-humiliating-him/. 
121 Miletich, S. & Carter, M. (2013, November 16). Monitor blasts SPD foot dragging. Seattle 
Times, retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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DOJ or the Mayor while he was negotiating the agreement. As a result, the Mayor was 
forced by a vote of City Council to accept Merrick Bobb as the City’s preferred 
candidate, even over his own objection and the objections of SPD Command Staff 
(Seattle Times, 10/23/12). 
This ultimate result was likely disappointing to the DOJ who had a policy of 
proffering settlement agreements that generally made the selection of a monitor a 
collaborative process. As represented by the DOJ in 2017:  
Selection of a monitor generally begins as a joint process between the 
Division and the local jurisdiction. Usually following a public solicitation 
process, the parties screen and interview candidates and endeavor to 
make a joint recommendation for approval by the court. The Division has 
found that respecting the input of the local jurisdiction in selecting a monitor 
bolsters the Monitor’s credibility and increases stakeholder confidence in 
the Monitor. Beginning with the Pittsburgh case in 1997, the Division has 
largely succeeded in coming to agreement with local jurisdictions and the 
court on the identity of the Monitor. When the Division is unable to come to 
agreement, however, the parties typically will ask the court overseeing the 
Consent Decree to resolve the dispute and select the Monitor, thus 
ensuring that the Monitor is beholden only to the court. (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 
23) 
The process was so disturbing that in September 2020, Monitor Bobb thought it 
necessary to comment on the experience at the time of his resignation from his 
Monitoring position, after more than seven years on-the-job: 
When I was nominated as Monitor, I was immediately seen as a threat and 
was strongly opposed by the Mayor, the SPD, as well as by the police 
officers’ union. Led by Tim Burgess, Sally Clark, Nick Licata, Bruce Harrell, 
and others, the City Council, by an eight to one vote, nonetheless approved 
my selection on behalf of the City and, with the strong backing of City 
Attorney Pete Holmes and DOJ, I was nominated and ultimately selected 
by Judge Robart as Monitor. For a while, I was watched by the 
Administration hoping to find something to make me look bad, but those 
efforts soon stopped. (Bobb, 2020, p. 3)122 
Regardless of one’s opinion on the quality of the work performed by Monitor 
Merrick Bobb, it certainly appears that his selection as Monitor, having been imposed on 
 
122 Bobb, M. Seattle Consent Decree, 2013-2020. On file with author. In a footnote to his report, 
Bobb threw in a bit of sarcasm relating to criticism he faced as it related to monitor-related 
expenses: “There were those Egyptian cotton sheets I bought at Costco and a corkscrew that I 
purchased, not realizing that anything that facilitated the drinking of wine with the monetary 
support of Seattle was impermissible” (n. 5). 
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Mayor McGinn and the SPD by the City Council and the City Attorney, was likely 
misguided. While City Attorney Holmes and four members of Council acknowledged the 
objection of SPD command staff to the selection of Bobb, recognizing that those 
opinions “deserve our attention and consideration,” they also argued that the SPD 
should not be given “veto authority” over the selection process (Seattle Times, 
10/18/2012). Given that, in this case, there was a candidate who appeared on both the 
DOJ selection list and the SPD list (the former monitor for the Washington D.C. MOA), 
one has to wonder whether it was worth two years of conflict for the City Council and 
City Attorney to get their first choice, when there was a clear second choice in the wings 
who would have more likely been able to engage the SPD in a collaborative manner in 
support of a more seamless start to the reform process. 
3.2.3. Other City Experiences 
Interestingly, while the first monitor selection process, in Pittsburgh, was reported 
to have been generally successful, the selection of the Monitor in New Orleans about 
eight months after the appointment of the Seattle Monitor123 suffered its own challenges, 
albeit for different reasons. In the case of New Orleans, there were two impediments to a 
collaborative choice: first, the City balked at the proposed cost for monitoring by the 
team that was eventually selected, arguing for a lower priced alternative;124 and second, 
the City and the DOJ disagreed on the importance of having monitors with law 
enforcement backgrounds (Rushin, 2017a, pp. 152-153).125 
 
123 The Seattle Monitor was appointed by the court on October 30, 2012 (U.S. v. Seattle, 
Document No. 35, filed 10/30/2012); the New Orleans Consent Decree Monitor was appointed on 
July 5, 2013. Retrieved from http://consentdecreemonitor.com/faq. 
124 In Rushin’s evaluation of the New Orleans Monitor selection process, he observed that “[t]he 
New Orleans monitor selection process illustrate[d] the tension over allocating costs and burdens. 
There, the City and the DOJ sharply disagreed on the appropriate choice of monitor, due in large 
part to substantial difference in cost between the two options; New Orleans advocated for a 
cheaper monitor, while the DOJ supported the bid from a more expensive team. Ultimately, the 
Court sided with the DOJ” (Rushin, 2015, p. 104) 
125 As previously illustrated by Rushin, “Police agencies frequently push for monitors with law 
enforcement background… Conversely, the DOJ has indicated that while monitoring teams 
should include some individuals with law enforcement experience, lawyers should play an 
important role in the process. As one DOJ litigator explained, ‘in all of these cases there are 
complicated issues of constitutional law [and] criminal procedure involved’ including ‘evidence 
gathering, data collection, [and] document review that needs to happen…attorneys are trained to 
do that kind of work’” (Rushin, 2015, p 104). 
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The experiences in Seattle and New Orleans stand in stark contrast to 
Pittsburgh’s reportedly positive experience: the selection of the Monitor was described 
as “a joint process between city and DOJ officials” which allowed the city to play a 
“primary role” in the selection process which “likely increased the confidence of city 
officials in the Monitor and facilitated his work” (Davis, et al., 2002, p. 11). As further 
described by Davis et al. (2002): 
The selection of the Monitor by city and DOJ officials was a critical choice, 
and, by all indications, the successful candidate facilitated the change 
process. The Monitor played a [sic] early, vital role after the signing of the 
decree by helping officials to develop a plan of action. He operationalized 
imprecise standards in the decree, avoiding potential differences between 
the city and DOJ in interpreting the decree. He produced a compliance 
manual that gave city officials an exact idea of what milestones he 
expected them to achieve at each stage to meet his standard of 
compliance. His early meetings with community leaders helped reassure 
them that real reform was afoot. He developed a relationship with city 
officials that was more collaborative than adversarial, making it easier for 
them to accept some of the more difficult terms of the decree. (p. 64) 
Given the general confidential nature of the Monitor selection process, there has 
never been any research evaluation of that process as a whole. As mentioned by 
Rushin, “No research into federal intervention into local police departments has ever 
evaluated the Monitor selection process…Generally, this selection process happened 
through a confidential negotiation process behind closed doors” (Rushin, 2017a, p. 150).  
Even so, the experiences of a number of different cities in choosing a monitor 
have been documented. As previously noted, Rushin reported on a “transparent” 
process ordered by the federal judge assigned to the New Orleans Consent Decree, 
who required the public disclosure of each applicant monitoring team’s proposals, 
negotiations involving a panel of officials from DOJ and the City and public hearings 
regarding the options. Even so, however, the process ended up forwarding two different 
choices to the judge, who ultimately chose the applicant supported by the DOJ, the law 
firm of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton (Rushin, 2017a, p. 150).126 
 
126 The New Orleans Monitor’s website provides the following description of the selection 
process: “After reviewing the several competing proposals as well as the Parties' memoranda, the 
public’s letters, and the transcripts and audio records of the public hearings, the Court selected 
Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP as the Monitor on July 5, 2013. In selecting the 
Sheppard Mullin team to serve as Monitor, the Court explained its reasoning as follows: First, the 
duties of the Monitor closely track the kinds of activities that are the bread and butter of legal 
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The choice of a monitor in 2016 for Ferguson, MO, also involved a collaborative 
process: As reported by Patel (2016),  
On May 23, 2016, the Ferguson Collaborative called on officials to engage 
the community in the process of establishing and selecting a monitoring 
team. This team would be composed of a community liaison - someone 
already trusted by the community stakeholders - and other members of 
diverse backgrounds possessing expertise in racial justice and an 
understanding of municipal court practice. On July 12, 2016, a public 
hearing was held where community members, advocates, and residents 
could question the final four monitor candidates. Questions arose 
concerning each candidate's goals and how each would properly address 
community engagement. The public was given several days to provide 
feedback to the city or the DOJ on the final selection. Ultimately, the law 
firm of Squire Patton Boggs was selected as the Monitoring team and was 
approved by the court on July 25, 2016 (pp. 865-866). 
3.2.4. Composition of the Monitoring Team 
There is “widespread disagreement” about the best composition for a monitoring 
team (PERF, 2013; Rushin, 2015; Rushin, 2017a). In Seattle, the City Council’s choice 
was a lawyer with extensive experience in police oversight who was working with two 
“police experts,” one who worked with the DOJ on the original DOJ investigation. While 
study participants noted that the Mayor and the SPD would have preferred a monitoring 
team that would have consisted of monitors with law enforcement backgrounds, they 
were willing to accept a number of alternative candidates, rather than the ultimate choice 
who had been described to them as “uncompromising” with respect to his views on 
police reform. 
 
practice. The Monitor is not primarily responsible for formulating policies-that task falls to the City 
and the New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD") in the first instance. The Monitor is instead 
primarily responsible for reviewing the policies that the City and NOPD draw up to ensure that 
they comport with the requirements of the Consent Decree and constitutional policing-precisely 
the kind of advisory role that lawyers are accustomed to playing. Similarly, the Monitor is not 
primarily responsible for implementing policies. The Monitor instead has the obligation of 
assessing compliance with the policies. That kind of institutional investigation and assessment, 
which involves the collection, review, and synthesis of large amounts of information, is also a task 
that lawyers, particularly lawyers at firms like Sheppard Mullin, routinely perform. The Monitor 
also has the responsibility to report to both the Court and the public in clear and concise terms. It 
goes without saying that lawyers are trained to communicate with and report to courts, and the 
Sheppard Mullin team makes a strong case for its competence in communicating with the public 
as well (New Orleans police monitor website, located at http://consentdecreemonitor.com/). 
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The composition of monitoring teams varies across the US, although most teams 
are led by lawyers and also include former police chiefs, with some including academics, 
information technology experts, and community members as well (Alpert et al., 2017, pp. 
241-242). As described by DOJ (2017b): 
Sometimes the named monitor is a person, who works with a team; other 
times it may be an organization, firm, or corporate entity. Monitoring teams 
generally include diverse perspectives, including team members with real-
world policing experience reflecting both a management and rank-and-file 
perspective. For example, in New Orleans and Cleveland, the Monitoring 
teams comprise a diverse group of former police executives and officers, 
academics, attorneys, and community organizers. The Cleveland 
monitoring team includes a former legal counsel to police unions and a 
consultant with technical expertise in law enforcement information 
technology, appropriate to that agreement’s focus on that department’s 
data and technological capacity. The independent monitoring team is 
generally the agent of the court overseeing the reform agreement and is 
independent from the Department of Justice and the local jurisdiction, 
although, as discussed further below, most monitoring teams are jointly 
agreed upon by the Division and the local jurisdiction before being 
appointed by the court (p. 21). 
3.2.5. Role & Importance of the Monitor 
In 2017, the DOJ extensively reported on the role and importance of “the 
Monitoring team” stating that the “core of the Monitoring team’s role is to: 
• “Assess and report on the law enforcement agency’s progress in implementing 
the reform agreement;  
• Assist the agency in developing a plan to implement reforms and address any 
barriers to implementation, including by providing technical assistance;  
• Evaluate whether the reforms mandated by the agreement are working and, if 
not, to recommend changes;  
• Constructively engage communities and stakeholders in the reform process; 
and  
• Assist the local jurisdiction and the United States in resolving any differences 
that might arise over the particulars of implementing the reform agreement.” 
(DOJ, 2017b, p. 21)127 
 
127 The role of the monitors in Section 14141 implementation is also discussed by Walker & 
Macdonald, 2009, n. 167. In addition, see, Walker, 2018, pp. 1822-1823 [“The monitoring process 
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The DOJ went on to extensively comment on the importance of the role of the 
Monitor and the Monitoring team with respect to the implementation of §14141 reforms: 
Each of these aspects of the Monitoring team’s role is critical to the overall 
success of the Division’s reform agreements. Monitors act as an 
intermediary between the Division, the local jurisdiction, and the court and 
assist in resolving disputes. In this role, the independence of the Monitoring 
team is key. The Monitoring team’s credibility allows it to play the role of 
neutral broker and mediator, to ensure that disagreements over the 
meaning of a provision or the significance of a new initiative do not become 
distractions from the overall goal of achieving effective, constitutional 
policing. The independence of the Monitoring team also bolsters the 
credibility, in the eyes of the public, of the final court determination that the 
reform agreement has been implemented. 
At the most basic level, the Monitoring team’s job is to monitor and report 
on progress under the agreement. To that end, the Division’s reform 
agreements ensure that the Monitoring team has necessary access to the 
agency’s documents and data, as well as the ability to conduct on-site 
inspections and site visits without prior notice. Monitoring teams are 
empowered to conduct audits and reviews on all the topics covered by a 
reform agreement. And they are required to issue public reports detailing 
the status of implementing the reform agreement, usually on a quarterly or 
biannual basis. In the Division’s current generation of reform agreements, 
the Monitor’s assessment of implementation is an objective task that turns 
on the achievement of specific, defined benchmarks and outcome 
measures. The Monitoring team also assists the law enforcement agency 
in developing a framework for implementing the agreement, ensuring that 
deadlines are met and reforms are accomplished. The Monitoring team 
advises and supports the law enforcement agency to define terms, refine 
outcome measures, develop specific plans for implementation, and 
address any barriers to compliance. Monitors also support law enforcement 
agencies by, where appropriate, lending independent credibility to 
departments’ and advocates’ efforts to obtain the community and political 
support necessary to implement reforms … Monitoring teams also carry 
forth the community and stakeholder engagement necessary to build public 
confidence in the implementation of consent decrees. In the current 
generation of reform agreements monitoring reports are required to be 
public documents, which the Division generally posts to its website, and 
many agreements contain further provisions requiring the release of critical 
data—such as data about stops, searches and arrests or rates of use of 
force—that allow communities to participate in assessing the law 
enforcement agency’s progress toward reform. Many reform agreements—
 
involves an independent team observing on a regular basis the various reforms. Monitors report 
the degree of progress made to the district court and to the public through regular reports. 
Monitors have played a variety of roles in this process: monitor, goad, counsellor, tough-grading 
school teacher, and resource person”]; See also, Cleveland Monitoring Team website: “The 
Monitoring Team has many roles- including arbiter, advisor, and facilitator,” Retrieved from 
http://www.clevelandpolicemonitor.net/about. 
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including those in Ferguson, Albuquerque, Cleveland, Puerto Rico, New 
Orleans, and Seattle—require that the Monitor hold regular public meetings 
to directly engage communities in the Monitoring process. The Division’s 
most recent consent decree, in Newark, additionally requires the Monitor 
to hold regular meetings with representatives of rank-and-file officers, 
further ensuring that the Monitor remains responsive to a broad range of 
critical stakeholders in reform. (DOJ, 2017b, pp. 22-23) 
It seems well established that independent, court-appointed monitors serve a 
“critical and unique role…[in] overseeing the [§14141] reform process” (Chanin, 2012, p. 
iv). As aptly described by Walker & Macdonald (2009):  
The Monitor typically involves a team of professional consultants with prior 
law enforcement management experience, involvement in pattern or 
practice litigation, or involvement in overseeing management reforms in 
other areas of business or professional life. Monitors do more than simply 
report on the progress of consent decree and MOA implementation. 
Because of their capacity to investigate and to report both to the district 
court and to the public any implementation shortcomings, they are active 
agents of implementation. Their role in this regard encompasses 




The Vera Institute evaluation of the Pittsburgh Consent Decree identified the 
Monitor as one of “two key factors [that] enabled the city quickly to comply with the terms 
of the decree.” Similarly, experiences in Cincinnati and Washington D.C. showed 
noteworthy roles for the Monitor in moving initially recalcitrant departments towards 
eventual success and consent decree compliance (Davis et al., 2002; Walker & 
Macdonald, 2009). 
In addition, the existence of monitoring reports has been lauded for providing a 
level of transparency into otherwise closed police bureaucracies (Walker & Macdonald, 
2009, p. 515 [“Taken as a whole, the reports of all the court-appointed monitors provide 
 
128 Similarly, Chanin (2012) identified the role of the court appointed monitor as “serv[ing] both as 
objective reviewers as well as intermediaries between the DOJ and the police department 
leadership. They attend every important planning meeting, communicate regularly with all critical 
staff, and follow closely progress towards the goals outlined in each clause of the settlement 
document. In addition to their assessment responsibilities, monitors are charged with managing 
the process and helping each side overcome obstacles that threaten successful implementation. 
A key feature of this job is the quarterly reports each monitor is required to file in order to 
document the implementation process” (p.109). 
73 
a revealing picture of the difficulties involved in bringing about change in a law 
enforcement organization”]. 
In 2010, the DOJ hosted a roundtable of more than 100 policing professionals to 
“take stock” on “the DOJ’s implementation of the State & Local Law Enforcement Pattern 
or Practice Program.” In an ensuing report, which summarized the content of the overall 
conversations regarding the use of court-appointed monitors, it was observed that: 
[t]here seemed to be agreement that the ―right monitor can make a 
significant difference and that some monitors do a disservice in prolonging 
the process. One person suggested the development of a procedure to 
‘monitor the Monitors.’ Another suggested that there be some way to limit 
the power of the Monitor, with some consideration given to the role and 
authority of monitors in §14141 consent decrees during negotiations. 
(Clark, 2010, p. 5) 
In Seattle, the initial composition of the Monitoring Team was described as 
consisting mostly of litigation attorneys with the appearance that DOJ and the Monitor 
were expecting resistance to consent decree implementation and were readying 
themselves for a fight in court. According to one Seattle study participant: “You had to 
wonder how much DOJ was ‘we’re going to have a fight, so we’re going to make sure we 




129 In fact, when Matthew Barge, the Deputy Director of the Police Assessment Resource Center 
(whose Executive Director, Merrick Bobb, served as the Seattle Monitor), was chosen as the 
Monitor for the Cleveland Division of Police in 2015, the composition of that team was 
significantly different than the original composition of the Seattle Monitoring Team. The Seattle 
Team was composed of six lawyers, with three serving as Monitor, Deputy Monitor and Assistant 
Monitor. Supplementing the team of lawyers were two “police experts,” a “Chief of Staff,” a 
“Director of Research” and a PhD. (See, Seattle Monitor, 1st Semi-annual Report, April 2013). 
The Cleveland Team, on the other hand, consisted of an executive team of one lawyer (the 
Monitor), two retired police Chiefs (the Deputy Monitor and the “Director of Implementation”) and 
two “civilians,” serving as “the Director of Community Engagement” and “the Director of Outcome 
Measures.” The rest of the Cleveland Team consisted of a mixture of subject matter experts, to 
include a union lawyer, a local law professor, two PhD’s, and a retired police Captain amongst 
others. (See Cleveland Monitoring Team, 1st Semi-annual Report, June 2016. Retrieved from 
http://www.clevelandpolicemonitor.net/resources-reports). 
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3.2.6. Challenges with Measuring Compliance 
One repeated criticism of the Seattle reform process was a purported lack of 
clarity with respect to how compliance would be measured. Paragraph 184 of the 
Settlement Agreement defined “full and effective compliance” as follows: 
“Full and effective compliance” with a material requirement of the 
Settlement Agreement requires that the City and SPD have: (a) 
incorporated the requirement into policy; (b) trained all relevant personnel 
as necessary to fulfill their responsibilities pursuant to the requirement; and 
(c) ensured that the requirement is being carried out in practice. 
Paragraph 187 further stated: 
 
Three years after the Effective Date of the Settlement Agreement, the City 
and SPD may demonstrate “full and effective compliance” by showing that 
the standard and established practice of SPD officers is to use force within 
constitutional limits and that no pattern or practice of the use of excessive 
force exists, as demonstrated by the outcome assessments set forth in the 
Settlement Agreement. (Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Seattle, Document 
3-1, filed July 27, 2012)) 
In his First Systemic Assessment Report (September, 2015), the Seattle Monitor 
went to great lengths to try to explain what “full and effective compliance would look like: 
“As ordered by Judge Robart, the Monitor will… insist that there is clear 
evidence that the various requirements of the Consent Decree are in fact 
“being carried out in practice” and are sufficiently manifest throughout the 
Department and across Seattle’s diverse communities. “Full and effective 
compliance” requires clear, sustained evidence that SPD is where it needs 
to be not just in a few instances or temporarily across some of the Consent 
Decree’s provisions – but that it has reached and maintained the 
appropriate outcomes and compliance with the whole of the Consent 
Decree, that the reforms are “baked in,” and that SPD has reset its culture 
and relationship with all the diverse communities it serves, particularly the 
African-American community. Our examination of individual cases or data 
will therefore be done with an eye toward determining what those individual 
instances say, in the aggregate and overall, about the performance of SPD 
and its officers.” (First Systemic Assessment Report, 2015, p. 5) 
“However, all readers must be cautioned to note that the general numbers 
themselves may not tell the entire story. There is no single threshold 
number that SPD must reach across each and every area that represents 
initial compliance. For example, an assessment might judge 70 percent of 
a given type of investigative report as sufficiently thorough and accurate as 
consistent with compliance – because the quality of the remaining 30 
percent of cases leaving room for improvement but being relatively close 
to where it should be. On the other hand, even if 90 percent of reports were 
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judged to be sufficiently thorough and accurate, there still might not be 
initial compliance with the relevant provision of the Consent Decree 
because the remaining 10 percent of investigative reports were wholly 
inadequate, disturbingly biased, or insufficiently documented. Thus, initial 
compliance with provisions of the Consent Decree depends not just on the 
number of percent of instances where SPD is adhering to requirements but 
also on the quality or nature of those instances where SPD is falling short.” 
(First Systemic Assessment Report, 2015, p. 6) 
“The true test has been and will remain whether SPD has the systems, 
policies, structures, and culture in place to manage for itself the risk of 
unconstitutional policing – and whether, through those systems, SPD holds 
officers and supervisors rigorously accountable through fair and 
transparent processes, critically analyzes officer and departmental 
performance based on unbiased evidence and objective data, and 
proactively identifies and seriously addresses performance issues and 
trends.” (1st Systemic Assessment Report, 2015, p. 6) 
The Seattle Monitor’s attempt to apply the definitions of “full and effective” 
compliance to the policies and practices of the SPD differed from prior Monitoring efforts 
in other cities, where the Monitors tended to try to use quantitative methods to establish 
compliance levels, applying a requirement that the affected police department comply 
with each paragraph of the Settlement Agreement to a 95% level of certainty (a level 
generally used by social scientists to reach conclusions that are not likely the result of 
mere chance).130 
In Pittsburgh, the Monitor developed a  
three-tiered framework for analyzing compliance… Primary compliance 
involves the development of a formal policy on a particular aspect of police 
operations. Secondary compliance involves evidence that the department 
has incorporated the policy into training and supervision. Operational 
compliance, the third level, involves evidence that officers comply with the 
policy in their routine activities. (Walker, 2003, p. 45) 
 
130 As described by Chanin in his review of four jurisdictions wherein court appointed monitors 
were required to determine whether full and effective compliance had been achieved: “Despite 
some variation in their data collection and oversight method, each monitor team applied the 95% 
substantial compliance threshold very similarly, regardless of the substantive nature of the 
provision under review or the considerable subjective authority maintained by each team” 
(Chanin, 2012, p. 110). 
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In Cleveland, the Monitor determined compliance with the use of the following 
terms: “non-compliance,” “partial compliance,” “operational compliance” and “general 
compliance.”131  
Study participants on the City-side complained that the Monitor would 
subjectively evaluate compliance levels and suggested that he would only find the City in 
full compliance based on his own personal “gut feelings.” As stated by Rushin, however, 
“Ultimately, measuring compliance is an inexact science that puts considerable authority 
in the hands of external monitors” (Rushin, 2015, p. 108; Rushin, 2017a, p. 157). 
3.2.7. Costs 
Perhaps the most controversial part of the use of a court-appointed monitor to 
assist in the implementation of a §14141 reform effort has been the direct cost of paying 
for the time and expenses of the Monitoring team; expenses which the DOJ has always 
imposed exclusively on the City.132 In the case of Seattle, the ultimate cost of Monitoring 
ended up exceeding $1 million per year.133 Even so, when the Judge overseeing the 
Seattle Consent Decree compared the anticipated monitoring costs with other cities, he 
opined that it was akin to the purchase of a new automobile: saying that Seattle was 
“neither paying for an expensive foreign car or a cheap one, but was getting a ‘nice solid 
American car’ in the middle of the cost range” (Seattle Times, 11/29/2012).134 
 
131 See, Cleveland Monitor Semi-annual reports. Retrieved from 
http://www.clevelandpolicemonitor.net/resources-reports. 
132 See for example, Seattle Settlement Agreement paragraph 209 that required the City of 
Seattle to deposit $100,000 to the “Registry of the Court as interim payment of costs incurrent by 
the Monitor.” The City is required to “replenish the fund” as needed, to pay the costs associated 
with the monitoring effort throughout the life of the Consent Decree (U.S. v. Seattle, Document 
No. 3-1, filed 7/27/2012). 
133 Total monitoring team costs for the period from November 2012 through January 2017 are 
available on the Seattle Monitoring Team website, at http://www.seattlemonitor.com/monthly-
statements. Although statements for February through May 2017 are available as well, not all 
invoices for those months are retrievable from the website. Although monitoring has continued 
through 2020, the Monitoring Team has not published its invoices since May 2017. Total annual 
costs reported were, $837,260 for 2013, $1,109,829 for 2014, $1,091,570 for 2015 and 
$1,011,172 for 2016. See Table 3.5, infra. 
134 Miletich, S. (2012, November 29). Police monitoring to cost city $880,000 in first year. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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The judge’s description belied some of the actual costs of the initial monitoring 
budget, which described a highly paid team of professionals, including lawyers and 
some police professionals. As noted by the Seattle Times, the Monitoring Team’s initial 
budget called for one of the police consultants to be paid a princely sum of “$75,000 for 
75 days of work.” The Monitor and four members of his staff at the Los Angeles-based 
Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) were reportedly budgeted for an average 
of $80,000 for the first year; a local lawyer was budgeted for a much lower cost of 
$35,000 for working as the Deputy Monitor (Seattle Times, 11/29/2012). 
The charges billed by the Monitor caused much consternation amongst those 
research participants associated with the city and the Seattle community. City concerns 
publicly manifested themselves shortly after monitoring began when the Monitor, in an 
attempt to reduce hotel costs for out-of-town team members, rented an apartment for the 
team and made purchases for that apartment to include such minor items as a 
corkscrew and a $35 “Egyptian cotton pillow sheet.” Specifically, the city budget office 
challenged the Monitor for what it described as "’alcohol and alcohol-related expenses,’ 
expensive meals, toilet paper and a $35 Egyptian cotton pillowcase” (Mynorthwest.com, 
2/21/2013).  
Shortly after attending a meeting with city budget staff, the Monitor reportedly 
sent an email to the City (copied to the DOJ) stating that:   
we decline in the future to go through the humiliating, time-consuming, and 
obstructionist process we went through this morning where we were 
required to justify each pillowcase in the Seattle apartment, a toolkit to put 
together furniture bought at IKEA, or a $5.99 corkscrew, among other 
trivialities.  
The email went on to criticize budget staff by stating that “[a]lthough we are 
happy to answer legitimate inquiries, we cannot abide being treated as if we were 
suspects being grilled about theft from the city, ... We are professionals and expect to be 
treated as such.” The Monitor further noted that any delays in approving his December 
2012 invoice (which billed $52,152 for “billable hours” and $6,664 for “overhead”) “would 
put ‘unnecessary roadblocks and obstacles’ in his path and that the City was putting its 
agreement with the DOJ in jeopardy.” He concluded by writing that: “I’m not certain that 
we can currently say we are getting cooperation from the city regarding the Monitoring or 
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movement toward full and effective implementation of the Consent Decree” 
(Mynorthwest.com, 2/21/2013).  
Although the Monitor later told myNorthewest.com that the City and the 
Monitoring Team “each took a tone we later regretted, followed by mutual apologies,” a 
source from the City stated that city officials were afraid to speak openly and honestly on 
the matter and a source stated that s/he was “paralyzed with fear” about the potential 
ramifications for criticizing the Monitor (Mynorthwest.com, 2/21/2013). At the same time, 
however, numerous research participants including many from the community, the City 
and SPD continued to question the costs associated with the Monitoring team. 
According to one participant, a city staffer was regularly sending the Monitor’s billings to 
the City’s Ethics Department and it was alleged that the Monitor moved from hourly 
billing to flat rate billing “to avoid scrutiny.” According to one community member, who 
was particularly dismissive of the work of the Monitoring Team: “the amount of money 
spent for the Monitor was in and of itself a shocking expenditure for what we got back.” 
Table 3.5, below, provides a summary of the Seattle Monitoring Team’s 
expenses for the period between November, 2012 and May, 2017 as per the invoices 
which have been published on the Monitor’s website, 
http://www.seattlemonitor.com/monthly-statements. Invoices for June, 2017 to present 
have not been posted by the Monitor. 
Table 3.5. Seattle Monitoring Team Expenses (Nov. 2012-May 2017)135 







November, 2012 69,695  14,814 84,489 
December, 2012 52,152  6,664 58,375* 
January, 2013 60,720  9,127 69,847 
February, 2013 52,016 10,750 7,998 60,014 
March, 2013 69,870 23,000 6,072 65,942 
April, 2013 59,032 10,450 10,354 69,386 
 
135 Information obtained from Seattle Monitoring Team website, 
http://www.seattlemonitor.com/monthly-statements. No monthly statements available on website 
after May, 2017. 
136 Estimated worth of “pro bono” hours reportedly donated by members of Monitoring Team. 
137 Per Monitoring Team invoices, “Overhead” includes: Travel & Per Diem, Accommodations 
/Cable & Equipment and Supplies. 
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May, 2013 45,255 12,912 9,316 54,571 
June, 2013 40,435 27,162 4,457 44,892 
July, 2013 42,402 29,550 9,107 51,510 
August, 2013 42,707 14,437 7,619 50,027 
September, 2013 90,872  8,382 99,254 
October, 2013 80,245  7,612 87,377* 
November, 2013 85,302 11,750 8,889 94,191 
December, 2013 81,745  8,504 90,249 
2013 Totals: 750,601 128,261** 97,437 837,260 
January, 2014 100,867  7,963 108,830 
February, 2014 82,505 16,337 7,846 90,351 
March, 2014 88,792 18,754 10,758 99,550 
April, 2014 96,955 86,450 12,510 109,465 
May, 2014 85,540 83,690 7,077 92,617 
June, 2014 73,732  81,815 8,961 82,693  
July, 2014 77,248  86,479 6,517  83,766  
August, 2014 81,775  31,150 9,398  91,173  
September, 2014 80,867  36,596 11,378  92,245  
October, 2014 79,203  89,015 10,659  89,862  
November, 2014 79,472  75,677 7,879  87,351  
December, 2014 73,905  26,900 8,021  81,926  
2014 Totals: 1,000,861 632,863 108,967 1,109,829 
January, 2015 90,477  36,550 9,000  99,478  
February, 2015 79,050  3,447 7,828  86,878  
March, 2015 85,173  3,475 5,073  90,247  
April, 2015 88,920  21,900 10,639  99,559  
May, 2015 95,437  21,589 0 95,437  
June, 2015 87,077  36,200 11,180  98,257  
July, 2015 79,547  13,154 8,173  95,220* 
August, 2015 85,226  28,075 6,300  99,526* 
September, 2015 87,937  16,217 5,545  99,982* 
October, 2015 43,949 35,028 5,681 75,431* 
November, 2015 72,450  11,025 3,463  75,913  
December, 2015 71,445  4,196 75,642 
2015 Totals: 966,688 226,660 77,078 1,091,570 
January, 2016 76,367 375 4,022 91,839* 
February, 2016 *** N/A N/A N/A  N/A 
March, 2016 103,592 275 9,079  112,671 
April, 2016 85,277  6,055  6,990  92,267  
May, 2016 54,000 12,325 10,493 64,492 
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June, 2016 97,445  12,987  2,497  99,942  
July, 2016 104,047 14,350 5,569 109,616 
August, 2016 # 62,465  3,675  2,754  65,219  
September, 2016 87,862  3,140  8,394  96,257  
October, 2016 101,237 4,150 8,548 124,286* 
November, 2016 96,087  5,225  3,096  99,184  
December, 2016 52,687   2,711  55,399  
2016 Totals: 921,066 62,557 64,153 1,011,172 
January, 2017 110,467 1,515 7,909  118,377 
February, 2017 # 87,030 1,870 5,823 92,853 
March, 2017 # 30,497  1,595  0 30,497  
April, 2017 133,457  3,265  2,711  136,139  
May, 2017 # 99,750  0 99,750 
Grand Total 4,220,064 1,058,586 385,556 4,670,311 
*Total billing differs from subtotals due to credits or additional charges as described in invoice; ** Total Pro Bono hours 
for Monitoring Year #1 as per October 2013 invoice; *** February 2016 invoice could not be accessed on website; # 
Not all invoices for the month could be accessed on website. Acknowledgement to Kevin Rosenthal (B.S., 2020) for 
compiling the data for this table. 
As indicated above, the costs associated with the Seattle Monitoring Team were 
extensive and are well in excess of the amount reported as monitoring activities have 
continued to the present day. Even so, the Monitoring Team did report more than $1 
million in pro bono services provided over the course of a five-year period. 
Costs of monitoring have been controversial in virtually every jurisdiction where 
court-appointed monitor teams have been put into place. The teams tend to contain 
members from outside the geographic region where the impacted agency is located. For 
example, as shown in Table 3.6, for Consent Decrees reached in 2012-2015, where 
Monitoring Teams were put in place, the lead Monitor either resided or worked well 
outside of the region where the work needed to be done: 
Table 3.6. Locations of Monitors Compared to Jurisdictions Monitored 
Jurisdiction Monitor Based out of: 
Seattle, Washington (2012) Merrick Bobb, Police 
Assessment Resource Center 
Los Angeles138 
 
138 Information obtained from https://www.parc.info/. 
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Jurisdiction Monitor Based out of: 
New Orleans, LA (2013) Sheppard Mullin Richter & 
Hampton 
Washington D.C.139 




Portland, OR (2014) Dr. Dennis Rosenbaum Chicago, IL142 
Albuquerque, NM (2014) Dr. James Ginger (Public 
Management Resources, Inc.) 
Pamplico, SC143 
Cleveland, OH (2015) Matthew Barge (PARC) 
Hassan Aden 
New York, NY144 
Washington D.C.145 
Los Angeles County (2015) Dr. Angie Wolf (National Council 
on Crime & Delinquency) 
Oakland, CA146 
 
As a result, cities must not only pay for the work of the Monitors (often averaging 
$250 per hour),147 but also, costs associated with travel and lodging. There are many 
arguments for and against these types of arrangements. Arguments for paying these 
types of expenses recognize that “you get what you pay for;” subject matter experts who 
can be considered to be independent of local policing tend to be located all over the 
country and their expertise is in high demand. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
people with the necessary expertise should be able to be located closer to an affected 
jurisdiction and that “pro bono” rates should apply.148 
 
139 Information obtained from https://www.sheppardmullin.com/jaronie. 
140 Information obtained from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/district-court-approves-selection-
arnaldo-claudio-technical-compliance-advisor-oversee. 
141 Personal linked-in communication with member of monitoring team. 
142 Information obtained from https://nij.ojp.gov/bio/dennis-rosenbaum. 
143 Information obtained from https://www.justice.gov/usao-nd/file/764261/download. 
144 Information obtained from http://www.clevelandpolicemonitor.net/ 
145 Information obtained from The Aden Group LLC. 
146 Information obtained from http://antelopevalleysettlementmonitoring.info/ 
147 As charged by the Seattle and Cleveland Monitoring Teams per the invoices on their websites 
(although research participants claimed that the Seattle Monitor was charging up to $400 per 
hour at times). 
148 For example, the Baltimore Consent Decree includes a team that is more localized than in 
other cases. The lead monitor is a local Baltimore Attorney 
(https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-kenneth-thompson-profile-
20170919-story.html) and the Deputy Monitor is located in Washington D.C., approximately 40 
miles from Baltimore. Other members of the Monitoring Team, however, are located in the far 
reaches of the country, including Memphis, Chicago, Seattle and Los Angeles. Retrieved from 
https://www.bpdmonitor.com/resources-reports). 
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Table 3.7. Costs of Monitoring Services for Select Cities* 
Jurisdiction Annual Cost of Monitoring 
Prince George’s County $900,000 
Seattle, WA $1.0 million 
Washington D.C. $1.0 million 
Detroit, MI $1.75 million 
New Orleans, LA $2.0 million 
Los Angeles, CA $2.2 million 
Costs from Rushin, 2015, Fig. 4.1; Seattle costs increased from Rushin’s estimate of $880,000 based on data from 
Table 3.5. 
As indicated in Table 3.7, the costs of monitoring for the Seattle consent decree 
actually appear to be lower than for other major metropolitan areas. If these costs were 
compared on a per capita basis, however, the cost of the Seattle reform effort appears to 
have been substantially in excess of that of other cities.149 
 
149 In 2020, the Seattle PD was budgeted for 1,422 officers (Beekman, D. (2020, October 16). 
Seattle has seen 110 police officers depart this year, department says. Seattle Times. Retrieved 
from Seattle has seen 110 police officers depart this year, department says | The Seattle Times; 
In comparison, the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department reported 3,929 sworn 
officers in the employ of that department (See, D.C. Metropolitan P.D. 2018 Annual Report, p. 30. 
Retrieved from MPD Annual Report: 2018 | mpdc. The Detroit Police Department reports on its 
website employing 2,200 officers in 2021 (See, Police Department | City of Detroit 
(detroitmi.gov)).  
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Objections to the high cost of monitoring activities have been made in 
Cincinnati,150 Detroit,151 New Orleans, Los Angeles,152 New Orleans,153 Albuquerque,154 
and Seattle (PERF, 2013; Marshall Project, 4/23/2015;155 Frontline, 11/13/2015). In 
addition, critics have suggested that court-appointed monitors have an incentive to drag 
out reform efforts due to the high level of compensation provided through the Settlement 
Agreements (Clark, 2010; PERF, 2013; Frontline, 11/13/2015). 
At the same time, the DOJ has argued that costs associated with police reform 
may not be cheap, but that the costs of unconstitutional policing comes at an even 
greater costs, particularly in the settlement of lawsuits, community mistrust and lack of 
cooperation and negative impacts on the criminal justice system (PERF, 2013; Marshall 
Project, 4/23/2015; Clark, 2010; USDOJ, 2017b; Jaio, 2020).156 In addition, evidence 
 
150 The original Cincinnati monitor was replaced in 2002, after the city complained that the original 
monitor was “nickel and diming us to death” (Chanin, 2012, p. 173, citing Anglen, R. (2002, 
November 6). New Monitor Demanded: Officials Want Reform Overseer Replace. The Cincinnati 
Inquirer. Retrieved from http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2002/11/06/loc_kalmanoff06list0.html). 
151 Detroit has been described as “a worst-case scenario” where the first monitor was accused of 
lying about fees and expenses “to the tune of millions of dollars” The Monitor was later replaced 
after it was disclosed that she became involved in an inappropriate sexual relationship with the 
City’s Mayor (Chanin, 2012, pp. 173-174). 
152 “In Los Angeles, the reform agreement was set to take five years. Police provided budget 
records showing about $115 million in spending. But Sharon Tso, the city’s chief legislative 
analyst, estimated actual costs were about $300 million. The agreement took nearly 12 years, 
making it the longest and costliest reform by the Justice Department to date” (Kelly, K., Childress, 
S., & Rich, S. (2015, November 13). What happens when police are forced to reform? Frontline). 
Retrieved from https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-happens-when-police-are-forced-
to-reform/. Also, as reported by Rushin, “Towards the end of the Consent Decree monitoring [in 
Los Angeles], the then-President of the Police Protective League [] argued publicly that the [court-
appointed monitor] was “wast[ing] taxpayer dollars [with] incessant, meaningless auditing that 
does nothing to enhance public safety or ‘reform’ the LAPD.” Political critics of the Consent 
Decree also focused their attacks on the high cost of monitoring services. Council member 
Dennis Zine publicly criticized the cost of things like airfare and food paid to monitors who needed 
to travel from out of state to perform their duties (Rushin, 2015, p. 161). 
153 In New Orleans, even though the DOJ was invited into the city by Mayor Mitch Landrieu, he 
later sought to have a federal judge block the Justice Department consent decree, arguing that it 
would cost the city at least $10 million (Marshall Project, 4/23/2015). 
154 In Albuquerque in 2017, the City Council asked for an audit of the work of the court-appointed 
monitor, concerned about the expenditure of more than $3 million dollars of public funds over the 
first three years of the monitoring period (Uyttebrouck, O. (2017, November 21). City Council 
votes to audit APD monitor. Albuquerque Journal. Retrieved from 
https://www.abqjournal.com/1095808/city-council-votes-to-audit-apd-monitor.html). 
155 Weichselbaum, S. (2015, April 23). Policing the Police. The Marshall Project. Retrieved from 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/23/policing-the-police. 
156 In 2017, the DOJ justified the costs in their report outlining Section 14141 work over the last 
20 years: “The local jurisdiction generally bears the costs of supporting the monitoring team, but 
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suggests that the costs of monitoring may pay for itself in the long-term through a 
reduction in civil lawsuits in payouts for instances of police misconduct (Rushin, 2015, ft. 
24, [quoting a Detroit official as claiming that “the amount of money that we have saved 
on lawsuits that we had endured for years, particularly for deaths in our holding cells, 
have paid for the cost of implementation of the Monitoring 2 or 3 times”]).157  
In Seattle, community research participants noted that the while the presiding 
judge was lauding the Monitoring Team for donating “pro bono hours” to the Seattle 
project, they were still billing the City at $250 per hour, “while we were working for free.” 
Some community members believed that the amount of money paid to the Monitoring 
team was “shocking” in comparison to what the community “got back” for the Monitoring 
Team’s work. Within the City, it was suggested that the DOJ should consider getting a 
new Monitor every three years to reduce the potential for a monetarized conflict of 
interest; it was also suggested that the DOJ should consider providing a bonus to the 
Monitor for finishing the project early or on-time. SPD research participants were 
particularly harsh about the costs of monitoring. One well-placed SPD member claimed 
that not only were the billings excessive (as they related to the costs of the Monitoring 
team’s private apartment and travel expenditures), but also claimed there were “bogus 
billings” (for consultations that did not happen between SPD personnel and the 
Monitoring team) that went unchallenged by the City. 
From the perspective of local members of the Monitoring team, however, one of 
the lawyers noted that “I knew every time I woke up and worked on the Monitoring 
Team, I would be losing money.” 
 
the Division takes steps to ensure that the cost is reasonable and sustainable. In some cases—
for example, in Cleveland, Ohio and Meridian, Mississippi—the monitoring team itself absorbs 
some of the administrative costs and contributes significant amounts of time free of charge. The 
Division has made cost estimates a critical part of its screening process for selecting monitor 
candidates. The current generation of reform agreements emphasizes objective measures and a 
gradual narrowing of the scope of the agreement to ensure that the monitoring team remains 
focused and works efficiently. Where cost issues have arisen as a legitimate barrier to necessary 
reform, the Division has worked with the monitoring team, the local jurisdiction, and the court to 
address those concerns” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 23). 
157 See also, Rushin, 2015, at Chapters 4-5, providing data supporting a reduction in payouts for 
civil liability in Los Angeles as the result of a successful implementation of the Los Angeles 
Consent Decree; see also, Powell (2017) exploring data from 27 jurisdictions and concluding that 
preliminary evidence “indicates that consent decrees may reduce civil rights violations, as 
operationalized by section 1983 litigation, an indicator of police misconduct” (p. 575). 
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3.3. Other City Experiences 
With 40 different jurisdictions having experienced the implementation of some 
form of Consent Decree or Settlement Agreement over the past twenty-plus years, the 
different experiences of many of the jurisdictions have been either the subject of 
evaluation studies, academic journal articles, and/or media reports. As a comparison to 
the Seattle experience, this Chapter describes some of those experiences as described 
in the academic and professional literature, as well as through evaluation studies and 
media reports. 
Even though §14141 was passed by Congress in 1994, and, as such, has been 
in effect for more than 25-years, there have only a limited number of evaluation studies, 
looking at the long-term effectiveness of reforms initiated as a result of USDOJ pattern 
or practice law suits. In addition, only two comprehensive studies have evaluated the 
effectiveness of individual consent decrees: the first, a two-part study, relating to the City 
of Pittsburgh (Davis et al., 2002 & 2005) and the second relating to the City of Los 
Angeles (Stone et al., 2009).158  
By 2014, however, more data driven discussions of the relative successes and 
failures that could be attributed to §14141 litigation began to appear. The most prolific 
authors, Chanin and Rushin, used various forms of data to conduct limited evaluations of 
Pittsburgh and Los Angeles, as well as Cincinnati, Detroit, Prince George’s County and 
Washington D.C. (Chanin, 2012; Chanin, 2014; Rushin, 2014; Chanin, 2015; Rushin, 
2015; Chanin, 2016; Rushin, 2016).159 
In other studies, academics (including Chanin and Rushin) evaluated data 
obtained from a wide swath of police agencies involved in DOJ investigations and 
 
158 As explained by Chanin (2014): “The majority of the field’s empirical knowledge derives from 
case studies of reform in Pittsburgh and Los Angeles. Stone, Foglesong, and Cole’s (2009) 
examination of LAPD’s experience under federal oversight provides a description of the reform 
effort and a substantive evaluation of the twelve-year process (2001–2013)” (p. 39). 
159 The PhD dissertations written by Chanin, Negotiated Justice: Legal Administrative and Policy 
Implications of Pattern or Practice Police Misconduct Reform (2012) and Rushin, Structural 
Reform Litigation in American Police Departments (2015) contributed significantly to the literature 
on Section 14141; both dissertations conducted original research (semi-structured interviews with 
a diverse group of stakeholders) and evaluated multiple data points (including crime and arrest 
rates, citizen complaints, use of force incidents and the like) to draw conclusions on the levels of 
success of Section 14141 consent decrees and address issues of sustainability. 
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Settlement Agreements (Rushin & Edwards, 2017; Powell et al., 2017; Chanin, 2018; 
Devi & Fryer, 2020; Jaio, 2020). Some of the research looked into issues such as de-
policing, §14141 investigation impacts on crime rates, and the sustainability of reform 
(Rushin & Edwards, 2017; Chanin & Sheets, 2018; & Devi & Fryer, 2020). 
Additional, but more limited, evaluation studies have also been conducted, 
including a 2007 study evaluating “police-community relations” in Cincinnati the same 
year that the DOJ-Cincinnati MOU was terminated (Schell, Ridgeway, Dixon, Turner & 
Riley, 2007), and a study of police uses of force, before and after the imposition of the 
Consent Decree in Washington D.C. (Bromwich, 2016).160 
Section 3.3.1 presents the experiences of those agencies subject to the various 
evaluation studies, based on the available academic and professional literature to 
include the Pittsburgh Police Department (1997-2002), the Los Angeles Police 
Department (2000-2009), the Metropolitan Police Department (Washington D.C.) (2001-
2008), the Cincinnati Police Department (2002-2008), the Detroit Police Department 
(2003-2014), and the Prince George’s County Police Department (2004-2009). 
Section 3.3.2 provides examples of experiences of additional cities where 
agencies have been found in compliance with their Settlement Agreements with the 
USDOJ (including the Steubenville Police Department OH (1997-2005), the New Jersey 
State Police (1999-2009), the Columbus Police Department, OH (2002-2004), the Detroit 
Police Department, MI (2003-2014) and the East Haven Police Department, CN (2012-
2017) based largely on media and independent monitoring reports.  
Section 3.3.3 summarizes experiences of various cities which are still operating 
pursuant to Consent Decrees or Memorandums of Understanding, and which have been 
mentioned in some limited evaluation studies and media accounts: to include the 
Portland Police Bureau, OR (2012-ongoing),161 the New Orleans Police Department, LA 
 
160 The report was conducted by the then-former Washington D.C. court-appointed Monitor. As 
indicated by USDOJ (2017b), the independent monitorship in Washington D.C. was terminated in 
2008, although under a transition agreement, the Metropolitan police force provided on-going 
reporting on certain provisions of the MOA until February 2012. (p. 42). 
161 I served as the first Director of the Independent Police Review Division for the Portland, 
Oregon, City Auditor’s Office from 2001 through 2005, completing my service six years before the 
DOJ investigation finding the Portland Police Bureau subject to the provisions of Section 14141. 
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(2013-ongoing), the Puerto Rico Police Department (2013-ongoing), the Albuquerque 
Police Department, NM (2014-Ongoing), the Cleveland Division of Police, OH (2015-
ongoing),162 the Ferguson Police Department, MO (2016-ongoing), the Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Department, Arizona (2015-ongoing), the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office, NC 
(2016-ongoing), the Miami Police Department, FL (2016-ongoing) and the Baltimore 
Police Department, MD (2017-ongoing). 
3.3.1. Evaluated City Experiences 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (1997-2002). 
Pittsburgh had the dubious distinction of being the first city where the DOJ took 
action on a sustained pattern or practice violation.163 The DOJ investigation took place 
against the backdrop of the 1996 death of an African-American businessman and a 
subsequent class action lawsuit, brought by the ACLU and community leaders against 
the Pittsburgh Police Bureau. (Gilles, 2000, p. 1405). 
As previously noted, Pittsburgh was the subject of the first evaluation studies 
relating to the implementation of §14141 reforms – the first in 2002, the same month that 
the Consent Decree was terminated (Davis, et. al, 2002) and the second in 2005 (Davis 
et al., 2005). The studies, conducted under the auspices of the Vera Institute of Justice, 
described their methodology as follows: 
In support of a follow-up evaluation report, researchers reported 
conducting, “both before and after the decree for the Bureau was lifted in 
2002” observations of “police in [the] field,” interviews with “key officials and 
community leaders,” “focus groups with police officers,” citizen and officer 
surveys, and “conducted original analyses of police data.” (Davis et al., 
2005, Executive Summary, para. 2) 
… We used a variety of methods to abstract lessons from the Pittsburgh 
experience. Our primary means of gathering information was through in-
depth interviews with police officials, the Monitor, police officers, union 
members, OMI staff, human rights activists, and community leaders. Where 
 
As such, I have no personal knowledge relating to the experiences of Portland as reported in this 
paper.  
162 Although I have been a member of the Cleveland Monitoring Team since 2016, no information 
obtained herein is based on my personal experiences or any information (confidential or 
otherwise) obtained over the course of my monitoring activities. Instead, all information herein 
has been obtained from academic literature, published information and media reports. 
163 The Pittsburgh Consent Decree is located at: https://perma.cc/D4BK-EHCZ. 
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we could, we also examined trends in measures of police accountability 
and activity, trends in the filing and investigation of citizen complaints, and 
crime indicators. Finally, we surveyed 400 Pittsburgh residents to ascertain 
what they knew about the Consent Decree and their perceptions about 
changes in policing since the decree was signed. (Davis et al., 2005, p. 8) 
… The bulk of our data came from interviews with police administrators, 
police officers, police union members, the federal police monitor, OMI 
officials, and community leaders. Information from these sources was 
sometimes in conflict. Therefore, we gathered data on trends in police and 
OMI performance and conducted a citizen survey to determine what 
citizens thought of the decree and its effect on policing in Pittsburgh. (Davis 
et al., 2002, p. 62) 
The 2005 evaluation report described a similar methodology: 
Vera researchers have studied the Pittsburgh Police Bureau since 2001. 
Both before and after the decree for the Bureau was lifted in 2002, the 
researchers observed police in field and management settings, interviewed 
key officials and community leaders, conducted focus groups with police 
officers, surveyed citizens, reviewed the federal monitor’s reports, and 
conducted original analyses of police data. In 2003, researchers also 
surveyed more than 100 front-line officers. (Davis et al., 2005, Executive 
Summary) 
In the year before the decree ended, we measured several important 
indicators of police performance and civilian satisfaction and trust, 
providing baselines for comparison with the period after the decree. We 
continued data collection in the post-decree phase, allowing us to compare 
the figures before and after the lifting of the decree. (Davis et al., 2005, p. 
5) 
Our main source of information was in-depth interviews with key informants 
including police command staff, union officials, OMI staff, and leaders of 
community organizations. We interviewed police and OMI administrators at 
regular intervals throughout the project. We interviewed leaders of 
community organizations in the final year of the decree and again in the 
year after it ended. 
We used two methods to gauge the effects of the decree-related reforms 
on police officers and first-level supervisors in the year after the decree 
ended. We conducted focus groups with officers and supervisors in all six 
of Pittsburgh’s police zones. (Davis et al., 2005, p. 6) 
In addition, Pittsburgh has been the subject of a number of additional more limited 
evaluation studies (Chanin, 2012; Chanin, 2014; Chanin, 2015; Chanin, 2016; Devi & 
Freyer, 2020) and academic comment (Gilles, 2000; Walker & Macdonald, 2009; 
Walker, 2012; Rushin, 2017a). 
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Pittsburgh officials have been described as having been “angry over being 
singled out” for the first §14141 enforcement action (Chanin, 2012, p. 40).164 The former 
City Solicitor was quoted as alleging that, in its investigation, the DOJ failed to interview 
even one police officer, instead, relying solely on complainant allegations (Chanin, 2014, 
ft. 7).165 
In Pittsburgh, an explicit decision was made to exclude the police union from the 
negotiation process. According to Chanin, “[t]he union opposed the process from the 
outset and to the extent possible, fought the implementation of reforms throughout.” 
Chanin was unable to determine though his research to what extent a decision by the 
reform-minded police chief to exclude the union from the negotiation process might have 
exacerbated the union’s opposition to Consent Decree implementation (Chanin, 2012, p. 
178).166 
Although the City initially considered fighting the DOJ action, they eventually 
decided against litigation and in favor of a settlement agreement with the DOJ (Chanin, 
2012, p. 40). As reported in the Vera Institute evaluation of the Pittsburgh consent 
decree, conducted the same year that the Consent Decree was terminated, there were 
“three main factors in the city’s decision” to settle with the DOJ: 1) the arrival of a new 
reform-minded Chief who was supportive of many of the DOJ’s recommendations, 2) the 
realization that Police Department record keeping was so deficient as to make it difficult 
 
164 As described in section 7.2, Seattle officials were likewise angry and upset over being singled 
out for a Section 14141 enforcement action, believing there to be many other police departments 
with worse records than the SPD that were more deserving of federal intervention.  
165The reaction of City officials to the DOJ’s Pittsburgh findings mirrored the reaction of a number 
of SPD and City-affiliated research participants. As noted by the 2002 evaluation report: 
“[Pittsburgh] City officials were skeptical that the Justice Department could successfully make its 
case and initially decided to fight the allegations. Neither the mayor, police administrators, nor the 
city solicitor believed that the practices of the Bureau of Police were so abusive of civil rights that 
federal intervention was warranted. City officials were united in their frustration and disbelief that 
Pittsburgh was being targeted. According to one police official, “There was a sense of…why us?” 
(Davis et al., 2002, p. 7). Identical feelings and comments were made by Seattle city and police 
officials over the course of this research.  
166 Although Chanin did comment that “although it is hard to trace such [union] opposition directly 
to McNeilly’s decision to exclude the union from early decision-making, this decision, in 
combination with McNeilly’s combative leadership style does seem to have exacerbated the 
situation” p. 178). 
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to defend the case,167 and 3) the recognition that the new database system that was 
demanded by the DOJ could potentially be used to defend against future allegations of 
police misconduct (Davis et al., 2002, p. 7). 
On September 13, 2002, the Pittsburgh consent decree was terminated. Overall, 
the Pittsburgh evaluation studies (Davies et al., 2002 & 2005) found that implementation 
efforts were successful. The studies attributed the success to the willingness of the city 
to overcome its initial resistance, the work of the court-appointed monitor who produced 
a working “compliance manual” and who consulted with community early-on in the 
process, and the work of a reform-minded Police Chief who developed a working early 
intervention system to identify problematic officer behavior, put an emphasis on 
supervisor accountability and who replaced “indiscriminate drug sweeps with 
intelligence-based enforcement.” The evaluation studies also acknowledged the 
importance of the adoption of new use-of-force policies. Community members 
specifically identified the Consent Decree as “a progressive tool, essential to Pittsburgh’s 
efforts to reform the Police Bureau” (Davies et al., 2002, Executive Summary, pp. 11, 34 
& 64). 
Ultimately, the 2002 evaluation concluded that “[i]t is irrefutable that the Consent 
Decree had led to many positive changes in Pittsburgh policing,” citing new policing 
relating to capturing information on enforcement activities, improved police training, an 
improved process for filing and investigating citizen complaints, and data which did not 
support allegations of increased crime or trend data supporting allegations of 
“depolicing” (Davis et al., 2002, pp. 62, 63 & 65).168 The evaluation further found that “in 
some ways, the Consent Decree was a godsend to the police chief” in that it allowed him 
to “circumvent[] the political battles that he would have had to fight with the union to 
implement reforms. It also ensured the City Council’s commitment to provide funds for 
the reforms” (Davis et al. 2002, p. 12). 
 
167 City officials in Seattle have likewise acknowledged that the SPD’s failure to create or maintain 
a working management information system would have made it very difficult for Seattle to 
successfully defend against a DOJ pattern or practice case. 
168 Although a contrary finding was made after a data analysis conducted by Devi & Freyer in 
2020 [working paper not peer reviewed], which concluded that: “Consistent with our general 
hypothesis, crime in Pittsburgh increased by 306.82 as a result of the [DOJ] investigation” (Devi & 
Freyer, 2020, n. 43).  
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Although the 2002 evaluation noted that positive comments were made about the 
implementation of the Pittsburgh Consent Decree, particularly as it related to training 
and the early intervention system, it also noted that “overwhelmingly, the comments of 
both officers and supervisors about the decree were negative.” However, the evaluation 
did not include a formal survey of officer opinions, and the evaluators were unable to 
determine to what extent strong negative opinions were held by a majority of officers or 
only a vocal minority. In addition, officer claims about the negative consequences of the 
decree on crime and police productivity was largely refuted by the data (Davis et al., 
2002, p. 48). 
By the time the 2005 follow-up evaluation study was conducted, the evaluators 
noted that “[f]or the first time in our experience in Pittsburgh, community leaders seem 
more concerned about the police stopping crime than about whether they violated the 
civil rights of citizens” (Davis et al., 2005, p. 36). Although the evaluation did note that 
there still appeared to be skepticism about the police within the African-American 
community (Davis et al., 2005, p. 41). However, the 2005 evaluation report did identify 
continuing issues with respect to the morale of rank-and-file officers: 
Low morale continued to be the dominant theme in the focus groups, 
reinforced by layoffs, aging equipment, and the Bureau’s policy of annually 
rotating 20 percent of officers in each zone. Resentment about the decree 
still ran strong, with many officers expressing the belief that the rank and 
file had been “sold out” by the administration . . . We continued to hear 
claims that fear of complaints and disciplinary actions for minor infractions 
kept officers from being effective. One sergeant lamented that “police 
officers are afraid to arrest people; they give people too many chances.” 
Officers and supervisors alike continued to complain about the amount of 
paperwork required by the new accountability mechanisms. (Davis et al., 
2005, p. 17)169 
Even considering the police morale challenges that were identified, the 2005 
evaluators found that: “[d]espite recent financial strains, those reforms remain firmly in 
place today, and both community leaders and citizen surveys reflect significant 
 
169 Similar morale problems have been described in Seattle. However, it has to be considered the 
low morale may very well be an issue for all major city urban police officers. As pointed out by 
one Seattle command officer, “the only thing police officers hate more than change, is the way 
things are…” 
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improvements in service” (Davis et al., 2005, Executive Summary).170 As to long-term 
sustainability, the 2005 evaluation report noted that:  
[i]n Pittsburgh, local policing is again a local matter, but its future may 
depend as much on the engagement of citizens and police supervisors as 
it does on senior management’s ability to sustain the procedural 
improvements put in place over the past six years. (Davis et al., 2005, p. 
43) 
The 2005 evaluation report concluded that: “[t]here are strong signs a year after 
most of the decree has been lifted that federal intervention can encourage long-term 
improvements in police accountability” (Davis et al., 2005, Executive Summary).171 The 
2005 evaluation report went even a step further, asserting that the Consent Decree had 
actually changed the culture of the Pittsburgh Police Bureau: 
There is no question that the implementation of the Consent Decree 
requirements in Pittsburgh dramatically changed the culture of the Bureau 
of Police. Since 2001, we have documented the improvements in 
accountability: tracking of use of force, traffic stops, searches and seizures, 
and subject resistance; development of a comprehensive early warning 
system; centralized review of all data tracked in the early warning system; 
creation of a management meeting to review officers who might be headed 
for trouble, and improved training in use of force and cultural awareness. 
(Davis et al., 2005, p. 40) 
Chanin (2012), however, reported finding “mixed” findings with respect to the 
long-term sustainability of the Pittsburgh reform effort, finding “simultaneous[] signs of 
progress and indications of slippage” (p. 32).172 First, Chanin did not agree that the 
Pittsburgh consent decree succeeded in changing officer culture. Chanin noted that, 
 
170 The 2005 evaluation report ultimately concluded that: “[t]he overarching question in Pittsburgh 
was whether a reform process that relies on legitimacy not from local sources, but from a federal 
court, could succeed and continue after the federal court withdrew. The simple answer to that 
question is “yes.” There is no question that the implementation of the Consent Decree 
requirements in Pittsburgh dramatically changed the culture of the Bureau of Police” (Davis, et al., 
2005, p. 40)  
171 Interestingly enough, in Seattle, the DOJ did make efforts to solicit input from community and 
officers to use during the ensuing Consent Decree negotiations and agreed to the creation of a 
Community Police Commission (CPC) to provide both community and union input into the 
implementation process. Even so, the CPC made an effort to intervene as a party and openly 
criticized the DOJ and the City for minimizing their role in the process and rank and file officers 
and the police unions opposed Consent Decree implementation at various stages in the process 
(See Chapter 7.7.3 & 7.8, infra). 
172 Chanin made similar findings with respect to the Washington D.C. Settlement Agreement, 
which had been terminated 4 years earlier (Chanin, 2012, p. 32). 
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 [d]ata from the Vera study [cited herein as “Davis et al.”] indicates that 
though some PBP officers may see the benefit of increased oversight and 
centralized accountability, most continue to resent the loss of discretion 
associated with the reform. Citizen complaint data also shows a fairly clear 
difference between police performance during the implementation effort 
and that following termination. (Chanin, 2012, p. 255) 
Second, Chanin quoted a 2010 interview he conducted with the former PPB Chief of 
Police who led the reform effort, asserting that the police union had “fought long and 
hard to try to negate some of the things that the Consent Decree brought about” and had 
succeeded in some areas by working with sympathetic elected city officials (Chanin, 
2012, p. 311). 
Similarly, by 2012, Walker (2012) was also questioning the extent to which the 
Pittsburgh reform effort had been sustained since the termination of the Consent Decree 
ten years before. Specifically, Walker noted that: 
a [Pittsburgh] police officer remained on duty in 2012 despite three 
separate allegations of attempts to extort sexual favors from women in 
cases between 2008 and 2012. Additionally, in 2011 it was revealed that 
an officer was on duty despite thirty-three citizen complaints and that 
another officer had two-dozen complaints. (Walker, 2012, p. 64) 
Chanin revisited the sustainability of the Pittsburgh reform effort in 2015. He 
noted that “[m]uch has happened in Pittburgh since the [2005 evaluation] study was 
published, including three mayoral transitions, the installation of four new police chiefs, 
and a protracted budget crisis.” After reviewing data regarding use of force incidents and 
assaults committed against PBP officers, Chanin concluded that “[r]ecent data suggest 
that advances in officer accountability and community trust have eroded considerably 
over the past several years.” Chanin also concluded that recent events had appeared to 
“have had a dramatic effect on police-community relations in the city and continue to 
negatively affect public perceptions of the Bureau.” Perhaps most concerning, however, 
was a statement made by Pittsburgh Mayor Bill Peduto who suggested that “a recent 
corruption scandal and several high- profile force-related incidents [had] the department 
‘on the verge of another consent decree’” (Chanin, 2015, p. 183).173 
 
173 Quote obtained by Chanin from Benzing, J. (2014, July 1). Pittsburgh police could face second 
federal consent decree, Peduto says. Public Source. Retrieved from http://publicsource.org/from-
the-source/pittsburgh-police-could-face-second-federal-consent-decree-peduto-says. 
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Chanin stepped back somewhat from his conclusions in a 2016 journal article 
after yet another change in PPB leadership. At that point, he noted that “the current state 
of police-community relations in Pittsburgh may be as strong as it has been since 2002 
when the Consent Decree was dissolved.” Chanin quoted the executive director of the 
Citizens Police Review Board who credited the new police chief for reorganizing the 
Bureau “creating a new identity in the public perspective and keeping everyone safe, 
cops as well as the community.” Chanin concluded that  
While it is still in its early days, at least some of [the new Chief’s] rhetoric 
on accountability and transparency are support by evidence. According to 
a recent analysis of 350 police websites, PBP was the second-most 
transparent department among those sampled. (Chanin, 2016, pp. 85-86) 
In Rushin’s 2017 book, entitled: Federal Intervention in American Police 
Departments, the author also noted that things in Pittsburgh appeared to change in 2006 
when the new Mayor fired the Chief “sid[ing] with local police union leaders, who claimed 
that [the Chief’s] use of excessive disciplinary action hurt officer morale.” Rushin further 
noted that “[i]n the years since this change in leadership, civil rights advocates have 
worried that the Bureau ‘is now sliding back towards where it was’ before federal 
intervention.” Rushin also used the Mayor’s 2014 quote regarding the potential for a 
second consent decree, concluding that “[t]he entire Pittsburgh story demonstrates how 
quickly reforms can unravel without institutional support” (Rushin, 2017a, pp. 241-242). 
Further evidence of reform slippage was seen in 2017, when the New York 
Times ran an article with the headline ‘It Did Not Stick’: The First Federal Effort to Curb 
Police Abuse. According to the article: “By 2002, when the Pittsburgh decree expired, 
the department was considered a model of progressive policing.” However, it was 
identified that  
four years after the Consent Decree ended in 2002, a new mayor, elected 
with union backing, took office and promptly dismissed Chief McNeilly [the 
Chief who backed the reform process] … Over time, various aspects of the 
Consent Decree fell out of use… 
The Times went on to quote a University of Pittsburgh law professor who suggested that 
“the only realistic way to look at this is that it did not stick” (Stolberg, S. (2017, April 9) 
New York Times; see also, Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 525). 
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Los Angeles, California (2001-2009). 
Given that the 1991 beating of Rodney King and the ensuing Christopher 
Commission report finding systemic use of excessive force by the LAPD was a key 
factor in the passage of §14141, Los Angeles, ironically became the fifth City to settle a 
§14141 investigation with the USDOJ in 2001.174 The DOJ investigation was the result of 
publicity surrounding the “LAPD Rampart Scandal,” wherein an LAPD officer, charged 
with the theft of cocaine from the LAPD evidence room alleged systemic “noble cause” 
corruption amongst members of the LAPD Gang Unit (“Community Resources Against 
Street Hoodlums, a.k.a. “CRASH”) (Kupferberg, 2008, pp. 134-135).175 
As commented on by Walker (2012): 
the 2000 Justice Department consent decree settlement with the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD). That settlement was far longer and 
more detailed than, for example, the 1997 consent decree involving the 
Pittsburgh Police Department. A major part of the explanation is that the 
LAPD, unlike the Pittsburgh Police Department, had in place policies on 
the use of force that were at least close to emerging national standards. 
The problem in the LAPD lay with the administration of those policies, and 
the LAPD consent decree contains elaborate requirements designed to 
improve that enforcement. (p. 67) 
Like Pittsburgh, the negotiation of the Los Angeles consent decree left out the 
police union. In fact, in November 2000, the Police Protective League “attempted to 
intervene and block a proposed negotiated settlement between the city and the 
government,” claiming that the union had been “deliberately excluded” from consent 
decree negotiations (Rushin, 2015, p. 145).176 
 
174 The Los Angeles Consent Decree was filed with the court on June 15, 2001 and is located at: 
https://perma.cc/JNG7-G5MY.  As previously noted, Pittsburgh and Steubenville OH negotiated 
the first two consent decrees in 1997; followed by the State of New Jersey in 1999; the 
Montgomery County Police Department, MD, followed with an MOU in 2000 (USDOJ, 2017a, p. 
25). 
175 It was alleged that members of the CRASH unit planted guns and narcotics on gang members 
to facilitate their arrest and incarceration and were involved in covering up “bad” officer-involved 
shootings. It should be noted that I was the Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney 
assigned to investigate, prosecute and debrief Raphael Perez, the officer-turned-informant in the 
case and was assigned to investigate the LAPD Rampart Scandal from its inception in 1999 until 
2001. 
176 Citing, Giordono, J. & Kandel, J. (2000, November 2). Police Union Threatens Suit; LAPD: 
League President Says Officers to File Federal Case About Consent Decree. Long Beach Press-
Telegram. 
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The Los Angeles Consent Decree was eventually terminated in 2009. The final 
monitoring report asserted that  
[w]e believe the changes institutionalized during the past eight years have 
made the LAPD better at fighting crime, at reaching out to the community, 
in training its officers, in its use of force, in internal and external oversight, 
and in effectively and objectively evaluating each of the sworn members of 
LAPD. (Clark, 2010, p. 9) 
As previously noted, the Los Angeles Consent Decree was the subject of a 
comprehensive evaluation study by the Harvard-Kennedy School which was published in 
2009, two months before the LAPD was found in “full compliance” with its consent 
decree (Stone et al., 2009).177 The Harvard study was based on “multiple research 
methods,” including “hundreds of hours of participant observation from patrol to the 
command staff” as well as the analysis of “administrative data on crime, arrests, stops, 
civilian complaints, police personnel, and the use of force.” Survey instruments were 
created and compared to prior survey results of police officers and community members.  
Researchers also conducted “a series of formal focus groups and structured interviews 
with police officers, public officials, and residents of Los Angeles” (Stone, et al., 2009, p. 
i). The researcher’s ultimate conclusion was that the LAPD had undergone significant 
change since the initiation of the Consent Decree process and that the “management 
and governance of the LAPD have also changed for the better under the decree” (Stone 
et al., 2009, pp. i-ii). The Harvard study described the reasons for the success of the 
federal intervention and speculated as to its sustainability: 
In sum, the evidence here shows that with both strong police leadership 
and strong police oversight, cities can enjoy both respectful and effective 
policing. The LAPD remains aggressive and is again proud, but community 
engagement and partnership is now part of the mainstream culture of the 
Department. The Department responds to crime and disorder with 
substantial force, but it is scrutinizing that force closely and it is accountable 
through many devices for its proper use. Will the management and 
oversight improvements persist if the Consent Decree ends? Better yet, will 
management and oversight become still stronger? While we cannot answer 
 
177 The Harvard report was published in May 2009; the LAPD was found to be in full compliance 
with the Consent Decree on July 15, 2009; the Consent Decree was nonetheless continued in 
effect until May 15, 2013, when it was finally terminated after a period of almost 12 years (Rushin, 
2015, p. 106 (Figure 4.2) & Appendix B, p. 178); Rubin, J. (2013, May 16). Federal Judge Lifts 
LAPD Consent Decree. Los Angeles Times, retrieved from Federal judge lifts LAPD consent 
decree - Los Angeles Times (latimes.com); LAPD Consent Decree Over (2013, May 16). ABC13 
News. Retrieved from https://abc13.com/archive/9105879/. 
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those questions in advance, the LAPD appears ready for that test. (Stone 
et al. 2009, p. ii) 
Even more so than Pittsburgh, the Los Angeles Consent Decree has been the 
subject of a large number of more limited evaluation studies (Kupferberg, 2009; Chanin, 
2012; Rushin, 2015a; Rushin, 2015b; Chanin, 2016; Rushin, 2016; Alpert, et. al, 2017; 
Jaio, 2020), as well as academic and practitioner comment (Gilles, 2000; Bobb, 2003; 
Walker, 2003; Walker, 2008; Rushin, 2014; Chanin, 2015; Walker & Macdonald, 2009; 
Clark, 2010; Walker, 2012; PERF, 2013; Walker, 2017; Walker, 2018; Hardaway, 2019). 
Like Seattle, politics played a significant role in the negotiation and 
implementation of the Los Angeles Consent Decree. The then-Mayor, like the Mayor of 
Seattle, argued that while reform was necessary, a “full-scale federal takeover” was not 
necessary and the municipal and police leadership should have been given the 
opportunity to lead any reform efforts. Mayor Riordan argued that “there’s no one better 
to make reforms than the chief, the command staff, the Police Commission, the 
inspector general, the independent task force, the council and myself.”178 On the other 
hand, the City Council appeared to acknowledge that the City had failed to reform the 
LAPD as needed and that outside intervention was required (Rushin, 2015, pp. 144-
145).179 
While Seattle City officials later complained about examples of excessive force 
being taken out of context, misrepresented and not accurately depicting the actual state 
of SPD use-of-force, LA officials complained that the DOJ’s investigation findings letter 
failed to provide any specific examples and provided no supporting evidence for the 
DOJ’s pattern or practice finding. At the same time, however, “city leaders seemed 
resigned to the inevitability of significant federal intervention” (Rushin, 2015, p. 145). 
 
178 See Rushin, 2015, p. 144, citing, Gittrich, G., Barrett, B., & Haussler, A., (2000, May 10). L.A. 
Admits P.D. Problem; LAPD: But, Says Riordan: ‘My Preference is Local Control. Long Beach 
Press-Telegram. 
179 The Harvard Study commented on the reasons for the City settling with the DOJ as follows: 
“Officials involved in the negotiations over the Consent Decree give varying accounts of the 
reasons for the city agreeing to settle the case without litigation, such as the political fallout from 
Rampart, or the Police Department’s failure to follow through on earlier commitments to the 
Department of Justice over the implementation of an officer tracking database. We know of no 
authoritative account” (Stone et al., 2009, n. 3). 
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To some in Los Angeles, it seems as though the DOJ had been lying in wait for 
an opportunity to intervene. This feeling seemed confirmed when the head of the Justice 
Department’s Civil Rights Division publicly stated that “[p]olice reform has been an 
unfinished item on the Los Angeles agenda for almost a decade…This time, reform must 
be at the top of the agenda for as long as it takes to get the job done” (Stone et al., 
2009, pp. 4-5).180 
Many of the Los Angeles experiences, on their face, seemed to mirror the 
experiences in Seattle, to include the fact that new leadership, in the form of the 
appointment of an outside Chief, was credited for the success of Consent Decree 
initiated reforms. As noted by Law Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, the author of an 
Independent report evaluating the LAPD’s response to the Rampart Scandal: “Bratton 
made clear that the culture that tolerated an excess of force, where a code of silence 
was just pervasive, could no longer be tolerated” (New York Times, 8/12/2011).181 The 
Harvard study agreed with the assessment that Bratton’s leadership in the 
implementation of the Consent Decree was an important factor in the success of the 
§14141 reforms (Stone et al., 2009, p. 10). 
Additionally, the Harvard study found wide-spread community support for what 
was perceived as a new LAPD culture that supported a “willingness” to “‘listen to 
criticism,’ ‘admit mistakes,’ and participate in sometimes ‘painful dialogue’ with 
communities.” At the same time, however, some community members worried about 
whether the reforms had truly penetrated deeply into the LAPD culture and whether the 
reforms would outlive the tenure of Chief Bratton. (Stone et al., 2009, p. 47). 
Even so, the Los Angeles experience, although it took a complex decree that 
was in place for almost nine years (with a “transition agreement” in place for another four 
years),182 has been called a great success, both by the Harvard-Kennedy School 
evaluation study and by community leaders.  
 
180 Citing, Bowles, S. (2001, October 3). LAPD agrees to list of reforms; U.S. will be watching. 
USA Today. 
181 Nagourney, A. (2011, August 12). In Los Angeles, a police force transformed. New York 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/13lapd.html?pagewanted=all. 
182 USDOJ, 2017b, pp. 41-42. 
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According to the Harvard evaluation study, “success in terms of implementing the 
decree went hand in hand with improved morale and reductions in crime.” Stone et al. 
(2009) further identified police leadership as having an impact on post-consent decree 
crime levels: 
In the first years, when the Department was led by officials who failed to 
implement the decree (perhaps because they had resisted and resented it 
from the start), crime in Los Angeles increased. Then, when new leadership 
in the Department began to drive implementation of the Consent Decree, 
the crime trend turned and fell. The pattern is unmistakable: recorded crime 
fell after 2002 during the period in which the decree was embraced by the 
leadership of the LAPD, after rising during the period in which 
implementation was stalled. (p. 6) 
In addition, the evaluation study identified decreases in officer involved use-of-force; as 
well as successes in the implementation of an early intervention system and a new 
capacity for the LAPD to conduct internal audits (Stone et al., 2009, pp. 33, 38 & 39). 
The Consent Decree also formalized the role of the Inspector General, allowing for 
independent evaluations of serious uses of force and recommendations for the 
improvement of LAPD practices (Stone et al., 2009, p. 55). 
In a New York Times article published two years after the evaluation study, 
community leaders were effusive in their praise for reforms put in place as the result of 
the federal intervention:183  
“It’s been an amazing transformation,” said John W. Mack, a former head 
of the Urban League who is the president of the Police Commission, the 
civilian board that oversees the force. “The L.A.P.D. of today is very, very 
different than 10, 12 years ago, when I was one of the people who was 
constantly battling them.” Constance Rice, a civil rights lawyer who 
regularly sued the department two decades ago, said, “We’ve gone from a 
state of war to becoming partners here.” 
 
183 As of 2016, positive comments continued. As observed by Chanin: “Much of the response to 
the [LAPD] reform effort has been positive. Attorney Merrick Bobb, who is currently the 
Independent Monitor of the § 14141 process in Seattle and longtime Los Angeles resident, saw 
the LAPD go from ‘an occupying army to being a community partner.’ Critics of the Department 
also have recognized a change. ‘I'm not particularly fond of the police,’ said Clarence Heard, a 
minister in South Los Angeles, ‘but, to be honest with you, I think L.A. is much better since the 
feds took over the LAPD. You know, I think they work harder at trying to defuse a situation as 
opposed to escalating a situation.’ According to the executive director of the ACLU of Southern 
California, the Consent Decree process resulted in ‘serious culture changes’ to the Department” 
(Chanin, 2016, pp. 102-103). 
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… “Bratton took them from the police force with the biggest police 
corruption scandal in the country and the biggest riot in American history 
on its résumé to a police force that was producing declining crime, had won 
the confidence of a liberal police commission and won the respect of the 
black middle class,” Ms. Rice said. “The L.A.P.D. was hated by everybody. 
Bratton didn’t only reduce crime. He created a new policing atmosphere.” 
(New York Times, 8/12/2011) 
One of the most common criticisms of the implementation of externally forced 
reform to police departments is the concern that it will lead to a reduction in the 
productivity of the police (commonly referred to as “depolicing”) and a subsequent 
increase in crime (Rushin & Edwards, 2017; Rushin, 2017a; Walker, 2017; Devi & Fryer, 
2020). The Harvard study specifically found that “there is no objective sign of so-called 
‘de-policing’ since 2002; indeed, we found that both the quantity and quality of 
enforcement activity have risen substantially over that period” (Stone et al., 2009, 
Executive Summary, [Claims of Depolicing, at pp. 19-32]; see also, Rushin, 2015, p. 
166).184 In fact, after an extensive discussion of the issue, the Harvard researchers made 
the following conclusion: 
In sum, our analysis of the volume of arrests confirms what the first part of 
our analysis of stops revealed: the statistics refute any claim of de-policing 
in Los Angeles today as a result of the Consent Decree. Some de-policing 
may have occurred in the first two years of the Consent Decree, when 
 
184 Like the Pittsburgh study (Davis et. al, 2002, p. 42), the Harvard researchers reported hearing 
claims of de-policing “frequently during [their] interviews and focus groups with police officers, 
with many officers insisting that the Consent Decree remains an impediment to effective policing 
as well as a deterrent to the kind of work in communities they consider necessary to reduce 
crime.” The study also noted survey results that indicated “a widespread belief in de-policing 
among LAPD officers, with 79% of officers believing that the Consent Decree harmed the ability 
of the LAPD to reduce crime and 89% of officers believing that LAPD officers were no longer 
“proactive in doing their jobs” (Stone et al., 2009, pp. 19-20). Similar beliefs were expressed 
amongst participants in the Seattle research and were reported as concerns in the Seattle media 
(Seattle Times, 6/26/2011; Tizon, A. & Forgrave, R. (2001, June 26). Wary of racism complaints, 
police look the other way black neighborhoods. Seattle Times; Tizon, A. & Ith, I. (2001, August 2). 
Stats contradict ‘de-policing’ claims. Seattle Times; Young B. (2007, May 1). Oversight office 
criticized in survey of officers. Seattle Times, Westneat, D. (2011, February 20). Wary Police may 
step back service. Seattle Times; Spangenthal, J (2011, November 1). SPD Disputes rumors of 
de-policing Within the Department. Seattlemet.com. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattlemet.com/articles/2011/11/1/spd-disputes-rumors-of-de-policing-within-the-
department). See also, CPC press release, 6/2/2014, “CPC Clarification of Data Presentation,” 
reporting that a presentation made by a member of SPD was not “concrete evidence of de-







recorded crime rose slightly while enforcement activity, both stops and 
arrests, declined; but there is no sign of de-policing since 2002. Indeed, 
enforcement activity has increased, with the increase in arrests 
concentrated on the minor crimes where management policy guides officer 
discretion. (Stone et al., 2009, p. 30) 
Ultimately, the Harvard researchers concluded that the positive changes that had 
been identified and attributed to the Consent Decree could not be explained but for the 
presence of a “strong and effective” police leadership: “At best, federal oversight and a 
consent decree can keep shortcomings in view but only police leadership and strong 
local governance can bring the changes that the parties to such litigation agree they 
want to see” (Stone et al., 2009 [Concluding Observations], p. 68). 
A number of parallels exist between the Los Angeles and Seattle consent decree 
experiences. First, after identifying a pattern and practice of constitutional violations on 
the part of the police force, the DOJ refused to consider any agreement to forestall the 
filing of a civil rights law suit without a formalized consent decree being put into place 
(Kupferberg, 2008, p. 135).185 In addition, like in Seattle, the Mayor and the Police Chief 
were forced to back down on their opposition to the Consent Decree when faced with a 
City Council that was prepared to approve such an agreement, even in the face of the 
opposition of the City’s executive branch (Kupferberg, 2007, p. 135).186 
Second, some of the reports of the Los Angeles and the Seattle monitors are 
startlingly similar in their evaluation of agency responsiveness during the initial periods 
of the implementation effort. By the LAPD monitor’s third quarterly report, the Monitor 
“evinced a growing frustration,” concluding that not only was the LAPD non-compliant 
with various provisions of the agreement, but that there was “the presence of a vocal 
minority inside the LAPD the continues to fight to preserve the insular culture that led to 
the adoption of the Decree” (Kupferberg, 2007, p. 148; LAPD Independent Monitor 
Report, 5/15/2002, p. 29).187 In the Seattle Monitor’s first semi-annual report, he noted 
substantial resistance to reform that was identified at every level of the department 
 
185 Citing, Daunt, T. (2000, June 2). U.S. Presents Demands to LAPD, Los Angeles Times. 
186 Citing Daunt, T. (2000, September 16). Riordan, Parks Give in on LAPD Consent Decree Los 
Angeles Times. 
187 Office of the Independent Monitor of the Los Angeles Police Department, 3rd Quarterly Report 
(2002). Retrieved from http://lapd-
assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/3rd_quarterly_report_02_05_15.pdf. 
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(Seattle Monitor, 1st semi-annual report, p. 5) and he increased his criticism in his 
second semi-annual report, specifically targeting resistance amongst the SPD command 
staff (Seattle Monitor, 2nd semi-annual report, 12/13/2013, pp. 5-6).  
While the LAPD monitor took aim at the department’s inability to implement a 
computerized risk management system (LAPD Monitor, 11th Quarterly report, 
3/31/2004),188 the Seattle Monitor likewise repeatedly criticized the SPD for its failures to 
implement a comprehensive data platform (Seattle Monitor, 2nd semi-annual report, 
12/13/2013; Seattle Monitor, 3rd semi-annual report, 6/16/2014). It was only by the 6th 
Semi-Annual report that the Seattle Monitor began positively reporting on data 
management issues (Seattle Monitor, 6th semi-annual report, 12/15/2015). 
Los Angeles and Seattle also experienced attempts by the parties (the City and 
the DOJ) to reduce the scope of their Consent Decrees only to be rebuffed by their 
respective presiding federal Judges. In Los Angeles, the presiding judge denied the 
parties March 2006 request to amend the Consent Decree and subsequently, in May 
2006, extended it for a period of an additional three years (particularly citing the LAPD’s 
failure to implement a working early intervention system) (Kupferberg, 2007, p. 150).189 
In Seattle, the presiding judge found the City partially out-of-compliance with the 
Consent Decree, against the objection of the parties, as it related to the SPD’s 
accountability mechanisms (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 562). In both cases, the 
 
188 Office of the Independent Monitor of the Los Angeles Police Department, 11th Quarterly 
Report (2004). Retrieved from http://lapd-
assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/LAPD_Q11_Report.pdf. 
189 Citing, McGreevy, P. (2006, March 22). Plan to Change LAPD Consent Decree Rejected. Los 
Angeles Times; McGreevy, P. (2006, March 28). U.S. Oversight of LAPD May Be Extended. Los 
Angeles Times; McGreevy, P. (2006, May, 16). LAPD Faces 3 More Years of Scrutiny. Los 
Angeles Times. 
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presiding judges questioned the DOJ’s commitment to reform when they made their 
rulings (Kupferberg, 2007, p. 150; 190 U.S. V. Seattle, Document No. 562 (5/21/2019).191 
Success in both LAPD and Seattle has also been attributed to the hiring of a new 
reform-minded Chief of Police. In Los Angeles, according to the Monitor reports, the 
appointment of Chief Bratton marked the true beginning of institutional reform in the 
LAPD, in part because “Chief Bratton raised the level of visibility and dedication to the 
Consent Decree” (Rushin, 2015, p. 150). In Seattle, it was the hiring of Chief Kathleen 
O’Toole (a self-described protégée of Chief Bratton) that was credited by the Seattle 
Monitor with ensuring the SPD was on the road towards compliance (Seattle Monitor, 4th 
semi-annual report, 12/15/2014; Seattle Monitor, 5th semi-annual report, 6/15/2015; 
Seattle Monitor, Compliance Status & Seventh semi-annual report, 9/26/2016).  
Both cities also suffered from substantial extensions of the original terms of their 
Settlement Agreements. The LAPD failed to meet the deadlines imposed by its Consent 
Decree, resulting in the aforementioned three-year extension (Kupferberg, 2007; Walker 
& Macdonald, 2009). Seattle found itself “partially out of compliance” with its Consent 
Decree almost seven years after the initial approval of the settlement agreement. In 
addition, the City was forced to withdraw a May 20, 2020 request to terminate 
substantive portions of the Consent Decree after concerns were raised regarding SPD 
responses to protests against the police as a result of the May 2020 death of George 
 
190 Los Angeles Federal Judge Fees was quoted as saying: I have a real question why the 
[Justice] Department, in my view, wants to walk away from parts of this decree.” The DOJ was 
quoted as responding to the Judge’s comment by saying: “We take our responsibility for enforcing 
this decree very seriously, …we believe now its more important to focus on those areas where 
there hasn’t been compliance.” (McGeevy, P. (2016, May 16). LAPD faces 3 more years of 
scrutiny. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-may-
16-me-consent16-story.html). 
191 In making his finding that the SPD had fallen partially out of compliance with the Consent 
Decree, Judge Robarts was critical of the DOJ for “misapprehend[ing] both the import of the 
arbitration process and its intersection with the Consent Decree, as well as the court’s starting 
point for assessing accountability that formed the basis for its finding that the City was in full and 
effective compliance with the Consent Decree.” The judge specifically accused the parties of 
doing so “for the sake of political expediency.” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 562 (5/21/2019), p. 
10). In a later order regarding the City’s submission of a methodology for addressing 
accountability deficiencies, the court was further critical of “the Government’s particularly 
unhelpful response to the court’s order” noting that, instead of participating in the discussion of 
the methodology, the DOJ “reiterated its position that considerations of accountability ‘are outside 
the scope of the Consent Decree.’ The Judge concluded that “the Government’s penchant for 
relitigating the issue is unhelpful to the court and the process of reform” (U.S. v. Seattle, 
Document No. 585 (10/15/2019), p. 3). 
104 
Floyd. In fact, the Los Angeles Consent Decree has been identified as “the beginning of 
a new era in consent decrees, in which the duration expanded far beyond what was 
initially planned” (PERF, 2013, p. 2).192 
Although the cost of the Monitoring of the Los Angeles Consent Decree was 
estimated to be about $2 million a year (Rushin, 2015, p. 106), an LAPD Commander, 
when addressing a 2013 symposium on the Consent Decree process was supportive of 
the costs when he said: 
It cost us a total of $15 million for monitoring. It would have been only $11 
million if we had finished in five years. But I think the money was well spent 
in terms of preventing future litigation and gaining credibility with the 
community. So yes it was a lot of money, but I think we got our money’s 
worth. (PERF, 2013, p. 34) 
With all costs considered, estimates indicate that the total cost of implementing 
reforms, to include the costs of monitoring, “likely surpassed $100 million.” (Rushin, 
2015, p. 106). However, it has also been identified that the total number of civil rights 
claims filed against the LAPD declined over the period of the Consent Decree. “The total 
payouts for civil rights suits based on the date of filing also decreased from $13,187,100 
in 2002 to $3,325,054 in 2006” (Rushin 2015, p. 116).193 
Six years after the Harvard study, in his PhD dissertation, Rushin (2015) found 
that at the conclusion of the Consent Decree process: 
The LAPD was a dramatically different department. Virtually all empirical 
measures suggest that the LAPD is engaged in less misconduct today than 
it was before federal intervention. The LAPD has also seen a dramatic 
reduction in payouts for civil rights violations. And there is no evidence that 
federal intervention made the LAPD less aggressive or effective in fighting 
crime. During the Consent Decree period, officer aggressiveness 
increased and crime fell substantially more than the national average. The 
Los Angeles crime decline is particularly fascinating because there have 
not been any significant socio-economic, legal, or demographic changes in 
 
192 Although the Consent Decree was terminated after nine years, the overall process of DOJ 
oversight was not completed until 3 years later: “In Los Angeles, the transition from DOJ 
oversight to department autonomy was made more gradual by a 2009 Transitional Agreement 
(TA). Under the TA, the federal court maintained jurisdiction over the case and authority to 
mandate continued federal oversight unless and until the LAPD addressed the remaining matters 
to the satisfaction of the presiding judge (LAPD Transition Order, 2009)” (Chanin, 2015, n. 14). 
193 Additionally, as noted by Rushin: “While this total is jarring, in a city as large as Los Angeles, it 
only amounts to between $2 and $3 per resident per year” (Rushin 2015, p. 161). 
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Los Angeles that should explain the unusually dramatic decline in crime 
over the structural reform era. This suggests that the LAPD may have 
played a role in the declining crime rates. (p. 126)194 
Rushin further noted what he referred to as “the single most important change 
made in the LAPD” – the creation of the LAPD Audit Unit. The creation of the ability of 
an agency to conduct internal audits is, arguably, one of the most important means by 
which reform can be sustained. (Rushin, 2015, pp. 158-159; Jaio, 2020, pp. 7-8).195 
Rushin (2017) recognized, however, that the federal monitor had lauded the LAPD’s 
improved use-of-force policies and procedures as “the single most encouraging aspect” 
of the implementation of the Consent Decree (pp. 200-202). 
Washington D.C. (2001-2008). 
The Settlement Agreement between the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police 
Department and the DOJ196 was preceded by an invitation from the then new Chief of 
Police.197 The Agreement was in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding, as 
 
194 See follow-up publications by Rushin: “…once the reforms had concluded, the LAPD was a 
remarkably different agency by virtually any metric” (Rushin, 2016, p. 119); “[b]y virtually any 
measure, the LAPD appears to be a better department today than it was during the Rampart 
scandal” (Rushin, 2017a, p. 165). 
195 Jaio, however, outlined an inauspicious start to the LAPD’s Audit Unit. Initially, the court-
appointed Monitor indicated that audits were “of poor quality and often incomplete.” Jaio 
commented that most of the LAPD Audit Division had no prior training in auditing and only “a 
vague understanding” of audit procedures. Jaio also noted that “the initial relationship between 
the Audit Division and the U.S. DOJ and the federal monitor was poor and contentious…they 
viewed the DOJ as intrusive and their experience with the independent monitor as confusing.” 
Jaio observed, however, that the quality of auditing started to improve in 2002 and that 
“[o]vertime, a change in institutional practice and attitude toward auditing occurred in the LAPD” 
(Jaio, 2020, pp. 7-8). 
196 The Memorandum of Agreement was filed with the court on June 13, 2001 as can be found at: 
https://perma.cc/PXE8-BUEF. 
197 Chief Ramsey was hired in April 1998. Later that year, the Washington Post published a week-
long exposé into MPD police shootings and uses of force that suggested systemic issues and 
concerns and “a weak investigative infrastructure.” The request for federal intervention was made 
less than two months after the Washington Post series had been published (Chanin, 2012, pp. 
48-49). According to the court-appointed monitor for the MPD: “At the time, the request of Mayor 
Williams and Chief Ramsey was unprecedented: although DOJ had previously investigated 
numerous law enforcement agencies under the authority conferred by this legislation, it had not 
previously been invited by the law enforcement agency to conduct the pattern and practice 
investigation” (Bromwitch, 2016, p. 5). Chief Ramsey later told a Police Executive Resource 
Foundation symposium that: “When I was chief at the Metropolitan Police Department in 
Washington, we would not have been able to make the changes we made without the Consent 
Decree. We would have encountered pushback from the union, and we would not have obtained 
the funding needed to develop an early intervention system and underlying technology 
infrastructure to support it” (PERF, 2013, p. 34). 
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opposed to a consent decree and was announced at a June 13, 2001 press conference 
jointly held by the Attorney General, the Mayor and the Chief of Police.198 As reported by 
the DOJ in 2017: 
In February 1999, the Division opened an investigation into the 
Metropolitan Police Department (MPDC) in Washington, D.C. In June 
2001, the Division identified a pattern or practice of excessive force linked 
to inadequate use of force policies and training; deficient supervision of 
officers; and inadequate systems of accountability. The parties entered into 
a memorandum of agreement (MOA), including the appointment of an 
independent monitor. The independent monitorship terminated in April 
2008, although under a transition agreement MPDC provided on-going 
reporting on certain provisions of the MOA until February 2012. (DOJ, 
2017b, p. 42) 
As previously seen with respect to the Pittsburgh and Los Angeles examples, the 
Washington D.C. MOA initially suffered from compliance problems (Walker & 
Macdonald, 2009; Chanin, 2012).199 In his first report, the Monitor found that the MPD 
“ha[d] failed to accomplish virtually all of the milestones identified in the MOA within the 
time periods specified” (Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 515).200 It reportedly took a 
number of years to resolve “underlying management problems that inhibited successful 
implementation.” As a result, the MOA was extended beyond its original five years; 
although it has been suggested that the Monitor played an important role in helping the 
MPD to overcome its initial “almost complete failure to implement the MOA at the outset” 
(Walker & Macdonald, 2009, pp. 513, 521). 
 
198 Then-Attorney General John Ashcroft was quoted as saying: “We are confident that when the 
balance of the reforms contained in this agreement are implemented, the DC Metropolitan Police 
Department will be a model for the nation on how to uphold the rule of law while using force only 
when and to the extent necessary. And, we hope that the cooperative approach adopted by MPD 
and the Department of Justice likewise will serve as a model for how Justice can help police 
agencies fix a problem, rather than merely fix the blame” (Transcript of June 13, 2001 Press 
Conference, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/attorney-general-news-conference-dc-mayor-
anthony-williams-and-dc-police-chief-charlesramsey.) 
199 Chanin observed that “progress toward implementation [in Washington D.C.] did not begin 
until nearly a year after the MOA was signed. Perhaps owing to this slow start and to the 
complexity of the changes mandated, the parties amended the terms of the MOA no fewer than 
four times. Pursuant to these changes, the MOA terminated on June 13, 2008, seven years after 
the MOA was signed and two years after the original June 2006 deadline” (Chanin, 2012, p. 51). 
200 Citing Bromwich, Special Report of the Independent Monitor (2002), pp. 1-2. Retrieved from 
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/PN-DC-0001-0003.pdf. 
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Similar to Pittsburgh and Los Angeles, the police union was not perceived by the 
parties to be a helpful stakeholder in the reform process.201 Chanin reported that there 
was “direct evidence from both Washington D.C. and Pittsburgh that… hostility to the 
pattern or practice initiative persist[ed] among union groups excluded from the process.” 
As an apparent result, “in each city, there [was]… a highly targeted effort by organized 
labor to countermand changes brought on by the settlement reform process” (Chanin, 
2012, pp. 179-180).202 
By June 2008, when the MPD MOA was terminated, the Monitor was praising the 
Department for its reform effort:  
MPD has become a much more sophisticated police agency ... We believe 
that the City’s and MPD’s success in implementing the MOA’s reforms, 
which are now embedded in the Department’s internal policies and 
practices, stands as a model for municipalities and police departments 
across the country. (Independent Monitor Final Quarterly Report, 2008, 
Jun. 13, p. 3) 
As of 2010, MPD leadership was still speaking highly of the success of the 
reform effort. The then-Chief, who was appointed in 2007 after the retirement of Chief 
Ramsey, who solicited DOJ involvement in the first place, believed that “the 
organizational and systemic changes that drove the reform…remain[ed] in place and 
continue to represent the core of MPD’s operational philosophy” (Chanin, 2012, p. 256).  
By the time of the publication of his dissertation, however, Chanin (2012) was 
reporting that “Pittsburgh and Washington, D.C., show mixed results, with both 
jurisdictions demonstrating simultaneously signs of progress and indications of slippage” 
(p. 32).203 Chanin reported that the “outcome-based evidence…[was] decidedly mixed.” 
 
201 In an interview with Chanin in 2010, the D.C. Chief noted that his decision to obtain DOJ 
intervention was made without conferral with the police union – he believed that whatever short-
term costs (“in the form of internal opposition”) that might have been caused by excluding the 
union, that exclusion would be beneficial in the long term and was “a practical necessity” (Chanin, 
2012, p. 178). 
202 As late as 2010, Kristopher Baumann, the former head of the Washington, DC officer’s union, 
told Chanin about his organization’s “intent on undoing the DOJ’s reforms:” “And if you don’t 
respect…the ability of the union to have input, whatever you do is going to be undone ... And 
eventually, even the good things that may have been done by [the reform] process could be 
undone because it wasn’t done the right way. And if you don’t respect the process from the 
beginning, you’re building a house of cards” (Chanin, 2017a, p. 264). 
203 At the same time, Walker (2012) was expressing concern about the sustainability of the 
Washington D.C. reform process: “Recent news reports, however, have raised questions about 
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He concluded that “the citizen complaint data suggest that MPD has regressed 
substantially,” but also noted “dramatic declines in force-based civil litigation and related 
payouts in the last two years of the District’s implementation process” (Chanin, 2012, p. 
323). 
In 2015, the second D.C. Chief to serve under the MOA, Cathy Lanier, was 
interviewed by Frontline. She commented that at the time that the MOA was entered 
into, “the city was bankrupt…and the police department was in shambles.” She was 
quoted as believing that the reforms “led to better training, improved policies and the use 
of less-lethal options in confrontations, including pepper spray and rubber bullets.” The 
Frontline article observed that “[s]ince the agreement ended in 2012, police have 
reported a steady decrease in the use of force and civilian complaints” and a slight 
decrease in the number of fatal shootings by Metropolitan police officers (Frontline, 
11/13/2015). 
Also in 2015, the court-appointed monitor was hired to evaluate the sustainability 
of the reforms created by the MOA, which had been terminated seven years before. The 
Monitor commented that the MOA had been terminated in April 2008, “in large part as a 
result of the strong leadership of [two MPD Chiefs], and their commitment to the 
principles of the MOA,” even though substantial compliance with all provisions of the 
MOS had not been fully accomplished (Bromwich, 2016, p. 9). 
Bromwich reported that his 2015 review of the MPD “focused on whether its 
policies, practices, and procedures have remained consistent with the June 2001 MOA 
and are consistent with current law enforcement best practices.” He described having 
reached “a mixed verdict” (Bromwich, 2016, p. 114). 
On the plus side, Bromwich reported that the “MPD has generally kept in place 
the use of force policies and procedures that brought it into substantial compliance with 
 
whether the reforms in some of the departments where consent decrees or MOA were 
successfully terminated remain viable. In September 2011, for example, it was reported that 
twenty-three officers had been arrested on criminal charges so far that year in Washington, D.C. 
A September 2012 news story, meanwhile, reported that over ninety officers had been arrested 
on criminal charges in the previous three and a half years. Arrest on any charge for a police 
officer is concerning, but the number of arrests in this department - with some of the arrests 
involving sex with a minor, burglary, and shooting of transgendered people - raises very serious 
questions about whether the accountability procedures instituted by the MOA are functioning at 
all” (p. 64). 
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the MOA more than seven years ago,” and that MPD had “successfully reduced its use 
of the most serious types of force, including firearms, even during period of increase 
crime in the District of Columbia.” Overall, he found that “MPD is plainly a very different, 
and much better, law enforcement agency than it was when DOJ began its investigation 
in 1999” (Bromwich, 2016, pp. 114-115). 
However, Bromwich did find “some significant deficiencies in key areas covered 
by the MOA.” He found that some use of force policies were in need of revision, and 
changes that had been made in the requirements for reporting and investigating use of 
force “that we think have gone too far” (Bromwich, 2016, p. 115). He also found that “the 
quality of serious use of force investigations had declined” and that the agency had 
“virtually stopped conducting MOA-related audits and reviews during a five-year period 
(2010-2014)” (Bromwich, 2016, pp. 114, 115). 
Bromwich attributed the deficiencies, not so much to “explicit policy choices or 
conscious decisions to deemphasize use of force issues” and more the result of other 
factors, to include “the transfer and retirement of personnel who played key roles in 
MPD’s system for dealing with use of force issues, an inevitable loss of focus on these 
issues after a period of intense attention to them, and the emergence of competing 
priorities” (Bromwich, 2016, p. 116). 
In the cover letter to the Bromwich audit, the Washington D.C. auditor concluded 
that the “review clearly demonstrates that it is possible to enact and sustain reform when 
a commitment to such action is made at the highest leadership levels.”204 
Chanin (2015), however, took a more moderate approach to issues of the 
sustainability of the reform effort. Chanin noted that: 
The picture in Washington D.C. is…difficult to interpret. Significant 
reductions in force-based civil litigation and related payouts since 2003 
suggest that both the frequency and severity of MPD misconduct has 
declined. A spike in allegations of misconduct complicates the picture, as 
 
204 The D.C. auditor further commented that “[i]n this instance, a mayor and a police chief initiated 
a partnership with the Department of Justice, and the legislature supported that partnership with 
significant funding over a number of years. This review and the recommendations also 
underscore the importance of independent oversight by civilian entities such as the Office of the 
District of Columbia Auditor to ensure that the commitment to policing reform is sustained over 
time” (Browich, 2016, Cover Letter from D.C. Auditor, Kathleen Patterson). 
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does the startling number of MPD officers that have faced criminal charges 
in the postreform years (p. 183).205 
 
Cincinnati, Ohio (2002-2008). 
In April 2001, the City of Cincinnati experienced a riot after the fifteenth shooting 
of a young African-American over a period of six years. At the same time, the 
Department was sued by a coalition of civil rights groups for engaging in a practice of 
racial profiling. This policing crisis led the DOJ to announce a §14141 investigation the 
following month (Walker, 2003, p. 3; Simmons, 2010; Chanin, 2012, pp. 54-57; USDOJ, 
2017b). After a five-month investigation, the DOJ identified a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional policing by the Cincinnati Police Department that required 
“improvements in use of force policies, reporting and review; accountability systems, 
officer discipline, data collection, and transparency; and training.” The DOJ action was 
“integrated with ongoing negotiations regarding a lawsuit brought by private plaintiffs,” 
resulting in a DOJ MOA and a private “Consent Decree” which became known as the 
“Collaborative Agreement” (DOJ, 2017b, p. 42).206 
The federal judge presiding over the private law suit urged the parties to reach a 
settlement (Simmons, 2010; Chanin, 2012, pp. 56-57). The parties ultimately invited the 
local police union to participate and created an “advisory group” “consisting of attorneys 
and key stakeholders” to negotiate the collaborative agreement.207  This unique 
arrangement has been described as “reflecting a more democratic experimentalist 
model, which values deliberation by incorporating community feedback and participation 
in police-reform strategies” (Simmons, 2010, pp. 419-420).208 
 
205 Walker (2018) made the following similar observation: “Washington, D.C. offered a complex 
pattern of trends following the end of the MOA, with uses of force following a “volatile” pattern, 
while civil litigation payouts declined and stayed low” (p. 1805). 
206 The Memorandum of Agreement was filed with the court on April 12, 2002 and can be found 
at: https://perma.cc/8NTK-Z78P. 
207 In 2010, Chanin interviewed the former City Monitor, Richard Jerome, who argued that 
including the union in the settlement negotiations “may have co-opted their support.” According to 
Jerome: “having [the union] at the table, as opposed to kind of outside and criticizing - I mean, I 
remember Pittsburgh very well - helped tremendously” (Interview with author, Mar. 24, 2010) 
(Chanin, 2012, p. 179). 
208 Simmons further described the process used to negotiated the Cincinnati agreements: “As it 
unfolded, Cincinnati's approach to police reform exemplified the ‘bottom-up’ approach 
encouraged by the New Governance paradigm. The advisory group sought participation from 
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The federal court subsequently appointed a monitor to implement the MOA and 
the private Consent Decree simultaneously. The decision to have the court-appointed 
monitoring team manage the implementation of both the private agreement and the 
MOA was “unique.” “Despite their distinct origins and divergent developmental 
processes, [the agreements] were fused in the eyes of the CPD, the Monitor team, and 
the community. Both were inextricably related, complementary pieces of the same 
comprehensive reform effort.”  (Chanin, 2012, p. 315). 
In addition, the MOA included a unique requirement where any revisions to use 
of force policies were first required to be submitted to “Community Councils, and other 
appropriate community groups for their review, comment and education” (Walker, 2003, 
p. 36; Cincinnati MOA, para. II.13).209 The agreement was a precursor to a similar 
requirement in Seattle, which gave a “Community Police Commission,” among other 
things, the jurisdiction to review and comment on SPD policies. 
The start of the reform process was particularly difficult in Cincinnati. In fact, the 
implementation of the reform was reportedly delayed for over a year over billing conflicts 
between the first monitor hired to facilitate the reform process and the City. It was only 
by December 2002, that another monitor was appointed and the process was able to go 
forward (Chanin, 2012, p. 173). However, the relationship between the second monitor 
and the city was challenging as well. Reportedly, the Monitor complained that the police 
were often “uncooperative” and the police accused the Monitoring team of being 
“unrealistic and overly intrusive” (PERF, 2013, p. 3).  
At one point, the federal court found the Department in “material breach” of the 
MOA and converted the MOA into “an Order of the Court.”210 After the MOA was 
 
many constituencies across the city and organized the constituents into eight stakeholder groups, 
including ‘African American citizens, city employees, police and their families, white citizens, 
business/foundation education leaders, religious and social service leaders, youth, and other 
minorities’ (Simmons, 2010, p. 425). 
209 Retrieved from https://perma.cc/8NTK-Z78P. 
210 The Cincinnati Monitor’s Eighth Quarterly report described the City’s position after three years 
of monitoring:  
“In its refusal to abide by the terms of the Agreements, the City complain[ed] that it has already 
implemented the terms of the MOA, that the reporting requirements of the Agreements are overly 
burdensome and a ‘waste of time,’ and that the Monitor Team has focused too much on 
‘outcomes and change’ as opposed to “systems and processes” (City of Cincinnati Independent 
Monitor’s Eighth Quarterly Report” (1/14/2004), p. 8, cited by Chanin, 2012, pp. 174-175). 
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converted into a court order, the judge facilitated meetings with the parties to ensure 
implementation of the agreement (PERF, 2013, p. 3; Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 
512). After interviewing city officials, Chanin concluded that “the depth and pace of 
change [associated with the concurrent agreements] overwhelmed the Department” 
(Chanin, 2012, pp. 162-163). 
The Collaborative Agreement also contained a requirement that there be “regular 
evaluations by an independent consulting firm on the impact of the reform process on 
community and officer attitudes and perceptions and police practices” (Walker & 
Macdonald, 2009, p. 519; Chanin, 2014; Walker, 2016). The RAND Corporation was 
hired “to conduct surveys for five years and produced seven reports covering field stops, 
arrests, searches, uses of force, traffic stops, public attitudes and officer perceptions of 
the reform process” (Walker, 2018, p. 1804). The final report, published in 2009, 
identified improvements in surveyed areas to include resident’s perceptions of the police, 
racial profiling and department record keeping (Ridgeway, 2009; see also, Walker & 
Macdonald, 2009, pp. 525-526; 211 Chanin 2014; Patel, 2016, pp. 813-814; Walker 2018, 
p. 1804). 
The MOA was terminated on April 12, 2007 and the Collaborative Agreement 
was terminated in August, 2008 (DOJ, 2017b, p. 42; Chanin, 2012, p. 60). In support of 
the termination of the MOA, the Independent Monitor reported that: 
Over the course of the Agreements, we have seen vast improvement within 
the Cincinnati Police Department relating to oversight and accountability, 
particularly in the area of force and the investigation of force incidents. 
While a review of the history over the past several years reveals peaks and 
valleys with regard to the Department’s efforts that were undertaken and 
implemented in this important area, the end result is favorable to the 
Department, the City of Cincinnati, and the diverse community they serve. 
(Chanin, 2012, p. 60, quoting Cincinnati Monitor Final Report, December 
2008, p. 37) 
 
Independent Monitor’s Eighth Quarterly Report (2015, January 14). Retrieved from 
http://www.acluohio.org/assets/issues/PolicePractices/CincinnatiAgreement/1.14.05_Eighth_Quar
terly_Report.pdf.  After reviewing monitor reports and conducting “several interviews,” Chanin 
concluded that “judicial intervention not only led to a settlement between CPD leaders and the 
monitor but also prevented any negative effects of the disagreement from metastasizing” (Chanin, 
2014, p. 48, citing Cincinnati Independent Monitor, Final Report, 2008, Dec.). 
211 Walker & Macdonald (2009) further noted that “the RAND evaluations have been generally 
positive, finding no clear patterns of racial bias in policing, and citizen and officer attitudes that 
exhibit some conflicts but are at least not at the crisis stage” (p. 532). 
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The federal reform effort lasted for seven years – at the conclusion of which, the 
Independent Monitor concluded that the Cincinnati project was “one of the most 
successful police reform efforts ever undertaken in this country” (PERF, 2013, p. 3, citing 
Cincinnati Monitor Final Report).212 
By 2009, the RAND Corporation had prepared five evaluations of Cincinnati 
police practices that have been described as “fairly positive to the extent that they did 
not find systematic patterns of racially biased policing or overwhelmingly negative 
attitudes on the part of officers and citizens” (Riley et al., 2005; Ridgeway, Schell, Riley, 
Turner & Dixon, 2006; Schell, et al., 2007; Ridgeway et al., 2009; Ridgeway, 2009; see 
also, Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 526 [describing the first three evaluation studies]).  
As recognized by Walker & Macdonald (2009): “[o[n all of these points, the state of 
police-community relations in Cincinnati appears to be improved over the conditions that 
prevailed in 2001-2002 when violent disturbances erupted in response to a series of 
police shootings of citizens.” Although it was noted that the absence of pre-Collaborative 
Agreement data made it impossible to identify any improvements with any scientific 
certainty, Walker & Macdonald opined that “the evidence strongly suggests that the 
reforms within the police department and changes in police strategy have reduced 
inappropriate officer behavior and introduced police tactics that are both effective and do 
not generate citizen discontent” (pp. 526-527). 
Four years after the termination of the Collaborative agreement, Chanin 
conducted a limited evaluation of the state of the Cincinnati reforms. He found that the 
City “maintains a strong accountability infrastructure and has succeeded thus far in 
maintaining desirable levels of several key outcomes, including citizen complaints and 
police use of force” (Chanin, 2012, p. 32).213 Chanin further reported that one of the 
reasons for the success of the reform effort in Cincinnati was likely the result of “a 
capable, proactive political leadership.” Specifically, a change in the city management 
reportedly helped to overcome resistance on the part of the police (Chanin, 2012, p. 
182). In addition, Chanin (2012) credited much of the success to “the prolonged tenure” 
 
212 Cincinnati Monitor Final Report (December 2008, located at: https://www.cincinnati-
oh.gov/police/linkservid/97D9709F-F1C1-4A75-804C07D9873DC70F/showMeta/0/. 
213 Although Chanin (2012) did report that the President of the Cincinnati Fraternal Order of Police 
“was more circumspect in her analysis of the reform initiative, making clear that the substance of 
the agreement was anathema to the traditional orientation of the union, but that the opportunity to 
take some ownership of [the] reform process superseded those concerns” (p. 60). 
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of the then-Chief of Police and his staff’s “sustained commitment to the MOA and the 
Collaborative Agreement” (p. 296).214 
Comments by a diverse group of community and police leaders, made after the 
termination of the agreement, seemed to support that the reform effort was a success. 
The City Manager, in a 2010 interview with Chanin commented on some of the positive 
results of the reform effort: 
The changes that were made have resulted in ... a significant drop-off in 
the number of instances where citizens are injured as they’re being taken 
into custody. There are a lot fewer injuries to police officers as they’re trying 
to make an arrest. The allegations of excessive force have plummeted. The 
incidents where the use of deadly force is even an issue has plummeted 
… [The DOJ] agreement helped make all that happen. (Chanin, 2015, p. 
168) 
In addition, by the time the Police Executive Research Forum conducted a 
symposium on “Lessons Learned” from “Civil Rights Investigations of Local Police” in 
2013, the then-retired Chief was reflecting positively on the impact of the MOA-initiated 
reforms: “Prior to the Consent Decree in Cincinnati, we paid out $10 to $11 million to 
settle a number of lawsuits. However, since the Consent Decree, the ACLU has not 
sued the Police Department. That is a tremendous savings” (PERF, 2013, p. 35). And 
after a 2014 officer-involved shooting of shooting of a 37-year-old African-American 
man,215 the policy director of the ACLU of Ohio was quoted as crediting the reform 
process with an improvement in Cincinnati policing:  
’I think it's unrealistic to say that there is never going to be another police 
problem or another issue that crops up … But I think what has changed is 
that there are much fewer of them [and CPD officers’ now] have the tools 
and the training and the mutual understanding of how to talk about these 
issues. (Chanin, 2016, pp. 95-96).216 
 
214 Although Chanin (2012) noted the irony here, in that the Chief was also almost held in 
contempt of court for the department’s failure to cooperate with the monitor in year-three of the 
agreement (p. 296). 
215 Baker, J. (2014, August 5). Chief: police-involved shooting ‘a fight for survival.’ Cincinnati.com. 
Retrieved from https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2014/08/05/cincinnati-police-officer-shoots-
man-killed-traffic-stop/13611479/.  
216 Citing, Flatow, N. (2014, September 11). What Has Changed About Police Brutality in 




In 2015, Chanin reported that the reforms in Cincinnati accomplished “significant 
and lasting change within the CPD” and that “[six] years removed from DOJ and monitor 
oversight, [CPD] has experienced little or no backsliding, a finding supported by 
consistent reductions in undesirable outcomes, including use of force incidence and 
allegations of abusive or unlawful behavior” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 39, quoting, Chanin, 
2015, pp. 179-180). Chanin (2015) further noted that: 
the process seems to have had a sustained, positive effect in Cincinnati. 
Numbers of postreform citizen complaints against CPD officers continue to 
decline, as does use of force incidence, and the number of injuries 
sustained by CPD officers. Such progress has contributed to increasing 
trust in the Department among minority community members [citations 
omitted] and a sterling national reputation. (p. 183)217 
Greenberger (2016) reported that “the DOJ/Cincinnati Police Department 
consent decree process provides an excellent recent example of how the DOJ pattern or 
practice process leads to effective and sustainable policing reforms” (p. 204). 
Greenberger went on further to report that 
 [f]ifteen years after the adoption of the Consent Decree, Cincinnati serves 
as a “model of effective reform.” The results were profound: between 1999 
and 2014, police use-of-force incidents declined by 69 percent, citizen 
complaints against police declined by 42 percent, and injuries resulting 
from encounters with police declined by 56 percent. In addition, the number 
of violent crimes dropped from 4,137 in 2002 to 2,343 in 2015. (pp. 205-
206)218 
In 2016, Patel argued that involving the police union in “a consensus driven 
process” was “a key component to the culture shift that purportedly took place during the 
2002 to 2009 reform process” (Patel, 2016, n. 177).219 In a 2017 article, Chanin agreed 
that while including the union in the negotiations “may have exacted some early costs, 
particularly in terms of the length and tone of the negotiation, … the benefits of inclusion 
 
217 Citing, Schuppe, J. (2014, August 30). Blueprint for peace: What Ferguson can learn from 
Cincinnati. NBC News. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michaelbrown-
shooting/blueprint-peace-what-ferguson-can-learn-cincinnati-n191911. 
218 Citing, Semuels, A. (2015, May 28). How to Fix a Broken Police Department. The Atlantic. 
Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/cincinnati-police-
reform/393797/.  




far outweigh[ed] delays to the process” (Chanin, 2017a, p. 265).220 Chanin (2017a) 
concluded by arguing that:  
[w]hat is more, having participated in the negotiation, union leadership in 
Cincinnati had a much less legitimate case to make for criticizing the 
settlement in the press or actively working to dismantle the reform effort, 
either in court or through legislation. (p. 265) 
By 2017, Chanin was identifying the Cincinnati reform effort as “demonstrating 
clearly the power of inclusivity.” He compared the Cincinnati effort positively to 
Washington D.C. and Pittsburgh and identified Cincinnati as having been “widely lauded 
as a model for effective, durable reform” (Chanin, 2017a, p. 265; 221 see also, Walker 
2017; Scott, 2017). 
Detroit, Michigan (2003-2014). 
A Consent Decree between the DOJ and the City of Detroit was entered into in 
July 2003.222 The Consent Decree was not terminated until August 2014, when the City 
and the DOJ entered into a transition agreement under which the DOJ would “continue 
to monitor DPD’s efforts to comply with certain provisions of the prior consent decree 
that had not yet been fully implemented.” The City was found in full compliance in March, 
2016 (DOJ, 2017b, p. 43).  
Although “the process took more than a decade and tens of millions of dollars,” a 
Detroit Assistant Chief was quoted in 2015 as saying: “It was a significant investment, 
there were a lot of lessons learned…But we are a better department” (Frontline, 
 
220 Chanin quoted one of the civil rights attorneys who brought one of the original law suits that 
resulted in the Collaborative Agreement as “argu[ing] that providing union representatives a seat 
at the bargaining table paid dividends in terms of implementation, and set a tone of collaboration 
and cooperation that continues today: ‘That turned out to be a very, very helpful move . . .[] I think 
it was a major aid in getting us off to a good start’” (Chanin, 2017a, p. 265, citing McKee, T. 
(2011, March 6). Ten years later: Cincinnati police/community relations much improved. WCPO9 
Cincinnati. Retrieved from www.WCPO.com. 
221 Citing, Faraj, J. (2016, November 10). Cincinnati’s collaborative police reform effort offers 
model for Milwaukee. OnMilwaukee.com. Retrieved from 
https://onmilwaukee.com/raisemke/articles/nns-cincinnati-reforms.html; Maggi, L. (2011, October 
16). Cincinnati police reform effort notable for ‘collaborative agreement.’ NOLA.com. Retrieved 
from http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2011/10/cincinnati_police_reform_effor.html; and, 
Semuels, A. (2015, May 28). How to fix a broken police department. The Atlantic. Retrieved from 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/cincinnatipolice-reform/393797/ 
222 The Detroit Consent Decree was entered into on July 18, 2003 and can be found at: 
https://detroitmi.gov/departments/police-department/detroit-police-department-office-civil-rights. 
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12/14/2015).223 The same Assistant Chief was quoted during the 2013 PERF symposium 
as saying that, 
 “[t]he Detroit Police Department is a better police department as a result 
of the Consent Decree. Today we have a very specific way of taking a 
citizen’s complaint, and we have a management awareness system 
through which we are able to manage our employees. We used the 
Consent Decree to get some of the tools we needed.” (PERF, 2013, p. 35) 
In 2013, Rushin spoke to a person “with inside knowledge about the Detroit 
Police Department” who asserted that the amount of money saved on lawsuits over the 
years had “paid for the cost of implementation of the Monitoring two or three times over” 
(Rushin, 2015, p. 115). 
Detroit has been described as having explained “ongoing macro compliance 
problems,” which included an “inconsistent and scandal-ridden leadership,” and resource 
shortages resulting from deeply seeded financial trouble (Chanin, 2014, pp. 45, 46; 
Dukanovic, 2016). As Chanin noted, “implementation of wholesale organizational 
changes is a notorious challenge [even under normal circumstances]; in this context 
[Detroit’s case], it…proved to be near impossible” (Chanin, 2014, p. 46).224 At the same 
time, Chanin credited the federal judge overseeing the Detroit reform effort as having 
“been instrumental in helping to address major problems,” citing his “formal authority, 
together with an ongoing attention to the reform effort,” as having helped “to keep a 
process threatened by scandal, leadership uncertainty, and financial calamity” (Chanin, 
2014, pp. 48-49). 
 
223 Frontline further reported that “In Detroit, the Justice Department forced reforms on police after 
officers fatally shot 47 people in five years, including six who were unarmed. The overhaul took 
11 years and eight police chiefs” (Sarah Childress, December 14, 2015, Policing the Police – 
Inside 20 Years of Federal Police Probes, Frontline. Retrieved 11/7/20 from, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/inside-20-years-of-federal-police-probes/). 
224 The challenges with respect to Detroit’s leadership were uniquely problematic. As 
acknowledged by Chanin (2014), “Former mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, elected in 2001, is now 
serving time in a federal prison for charges stemming from a widespread bribery and corruption 
scheme. Kilpatrick’s criminality was more than simply a distraction from the police reform effort; in 
2009, an inappropriate relationship between Kilpatrick and Sheryl Robinson Wood, the 
independent monitor charged with overseeing the implementation of DPD’s consent decree, was 
exposed. Wood was immediately removed from her position, leaving questions about the 
legitimacy of her six years on the job. At the time of her removal, DPD was only 36% compliant. 
Less than two years later, under the oversight of a new monitor team, hired by a newly elected 
Mayor, 72% of the settlement had been implemented” (p. 48).  
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Prince George’s County, MD (2004-2009). 
In January 2004, the Prince George’s County Police Department entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding and a Consent Decree with the DOJ, after a years-long 
investigation, initiated in July 1999 (focusing on the Department’s canine unit) and 
expanded in 2000.225 The Consent Decree (addressing canine use of force) was 
terminated in March 2007; the MOA (addressing broader issues of force) was terminated 
in January 2009 (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 43). 
In 2015, the then-police Chief noted that the period of federal intervention was “a 
painful time,” but he also asserted that “both of those agreements have made us better, 
hands down” (Frontline, 11/13/2015). The head of the Prince George’s County NAACP 
branch also asserted that the department was “more in touch with county residents,” with 
excessive force complaints having been dramatically reduced and an improvement in 
department receptivity to needs for change (Frontline, 11/13/2015). 
Chanin (2012), however, reached different, more disconcerting conclusions. He 
asserted that Prince George’s County “continues to struggle with very basic notions of 
lawful policing” (p. 344-345). Citing a high rate of officer-involved shootings in 2008, 
accompanied by “a series of incidents” involving an attempt to cover up a police beating, 
a cheating scandal and “several criminal indictments of PGPD officers” (pp. 71-72), 
Chanin concluded that “one way or another, it appears that PGPD was not able to 
sustain strong, continuous support for the settlement agreement either during or after the 
implementation” and that as a result, the department has “had trouble achieving 
sustainable reform” (p. 298). In looking at “several outcome-based data points,” Chanin 
ultimately concluded that the federal reform effort in Prince George’s County “did not 
have the same kinds of effects” as it had on other jurisdictions (p. 274).226 
 
225 The Prince George’s County Consent Decree and MOA were filed with the court on January 
22, 2004; the Consent Decree can be found at: https://perma.cc/6AWT-3Y7W; the Memorandum 
of Agreement can be found at: 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/pg_memo_agree.pdf. 
226 Chanin (2012) specifically looked at citizen complaint data which showed that allegations of 
officer misconduct “increased steadily over the lifetime of the five-year agreement;” the 
infrequency of which PGPD leadership agreed with recommendations from Prince George’s 
Citizen Complaint Oversight Panel; a lack of transparency with respect to Department data; 
several recent high profile excessive force allegations; “a wide-ranging federal investigation into 
illegal and corrupt practices within the Department;” and, a cheating scandal with respect to 
police academy exams. Chanin concluded that: “What data does exist…seems to suggest a wide 
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Even so, on January 15, 2009, the Monitoring Team filed its final report, finding 
the PGPD in substantial compliance with all but one provision (Chanin, 2012, pp. 70-71). 
Chanin (2014) suggested that  
an approaching deadline appears to have prompted the Monitor team to 
declare the Prince George’s County Police Department (PGPD) in 
substantial compliance and terminate the agreement, despite signs that the 
department may not have been ready to operate without DOJ oversight. (p. 
45) 
In the 2013 PERF symposium, a PGPD Deputy Chief made the following positive 
observations regarding the federal intervention: 
Our Department was placed under a memorandum of understanding and 
consent decree in 2004, and after coming out on the other end, it was a 
very positive experience for us. I think the key is understanding, going into 
the process, that there are no cut-and-dried answers. As we negotiated 
with the Justice Department, DOJ didn’t say, “You have to do A, B, and C.” 
Rather, they said, “You have to live up to certain Constitutional standards,” 
and we had to find a way to tailor those standards to policing in Prince 
George’s County while remaining effective. So that’s how we approached 
it. Every policy was custom-made and then approved by the independent 
monitors. The outcome was a greater degree of policy and practice clarity 
for our personnel, which we think is contributing to crime reduction. We 
fundamentally explain to our officers where the boundaries are on a variety 
of issues so they are able to aggressively fight crime while policing 
Constitutionally. (PERF, 2013, p. 11) 
Chanin (2016), his most recent evaluation of the state of the Prince George’s 
County reform effort, was somewhat equivocal, but, overall, similar to his original 
conclusions: 
Despite this pattern of unlawful and corrupt behavior among PGPD officers 
and a continued absence of respect for the rule of law among certain 
county officials, it is hard to draw any definitive conclusions about the 
effectiveness or long-term viability of the reform effort. There is simply not 
enough known about the department to make a legitimate assessment of 
efforts to change the department's approach to the use of force and 
external accountability. Further, the lack of available information on the 
PGPD reform effort seems to support the notion that the Prince George's 
County government is either unwilling or unable to make police 
accountability and department transparency a priority, despite claims to the 
contrary. The widespread unwillingness among stakeholders to speak with 
me (either on or off the record) about the process adds weight to this 
 
gulf between where Prince George’s County appears to be and where the Justice Department 
would have wanted them to be seven years after the MOA was signed” (pp. 274-280). 
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conclusion. These impressions become stronger still after even the most 
cursory examination of incidents involving the County and its police 
department since 2010, the first full year after the MOA was terminated. (p. 
101) 
3.3.2. Cities with Completed Consent Decrees 
New Jersey State Police (1999-2009). 
In December 1999, the DOJ found that New Jersey state troopers were engaging 
in a practice of racial profiling by stopping black and Latino drivers at a more frequent 
rate than white drivers. 
The New Jersey consent decree was reportedly “characterized by a friendly and 
mutually complimentary relationship between the State Police and the independent 
monitor” (Kupferberg, 2008, p. 152).  In the Monitor’s first report, it was noted that,  
Members of the Monitoring team were unanimously impressed with the 
commitment, focus, energy and professionalism with which members of the 
New Jersey State Police and the Office of State Police Affairs applied 
themselves and their organizations to implementation of the changes … 
Their commitment to 'doing the job right' is exceptional. (Kuperberg, 2008, 
p. 152, citing Monitor’s First Report (October, 2000), p. v)227 
Still, however, the Monitor’s first report acknowledged that “a great deal of work 
remain[ed] to be done” (Monitor’s First Report, 2000, p. vi). The Monitor’s second annual 
report (January, 2001) found that the State Police had complied with 88% of its first-
phase reform tasks and approximately 50% of the second-phase tasks. Even so, 
however, the percentage of minorities stopped rose from 38 to 40 percent (Kupferberg, 
1998, p. 152-153, citing, Associated Press, 1/11/2001).228 
 





228 Minority Stops Climb on Turnpike (2001, January 11). Associated Press, The Press of Atlantic 





By 2004, the New Jersey State Attorney General’s Office and the DOJ moved 
jointly to terminate court oversight of the internal affairs unit of the State Police. The 
court-appointed monitor agreed, calling the unit “a ‘shining star’ of reform”. On April 8, 
2004, the presiding judge found that the internal affairs unit, “once denounced by 
investigators as slow and ineffective, had met its obligations under the decree and no 
longer required court monitoring” (Kupferberg, 2008, p. 153, citing Newark Star-Ledger, 
4/9/2004, 7/20/2004).229 
In July, 2005, the Monitor in his 12th report (July, 2005) announced “100% 
compliance with all requirements of the decree.” (Kupferberg, 2008, p. 154, citing 
Monitor’s 12th report, p. iv).230 It was not until 2007, however, that the Monitor noted that 
the Department was “fully capable of self-monitoring and self-adaptation” (Monitor’s 16th 
report (August, 2007), p. 7) 231 and recommended the termination of the Consent Decree 
(Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 520). 
The New Jersey State Attorney General, however, declined to petition the court 
to end judicial oversight at the time, “concerned…that matters might slip back to the old 
ways of doing things if the changes have not filtered all down” (Kupferberg, 2008, p. 154, 
citing Newark Star-Ledger, 5/12/2006).232 
The Sixteenth [and next to last] Monitor's Report in August 2007 reported that 
“the New Jersey State Police appear to have reached a watershed moment during the 
last two reporting periods.” The Monitor concluded that the agency had “become self-
monitoring and self-correcting to a degree not often observed in American law 
enforcement." (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 39). In late 2007 that the New Jersey Governor 
announced an intent to “ask the federal government to halt its oversight of the New 
 
229Schuppe, J. (2004, July 20).  Trooper Reforms Working, Feds Say; Major Progress Praised but 
Some Profess Doubt, Newark Star-Ledger; Schuppe, J. (2004, April 9). Judge Eases Monitoring 
of State Police by Court; Minority Leaders Will Fight Ruling on Consent Order, Newark Star-
Ledger.  
230 New Jersey Monitor’s 12th report, located at https://www.state.nj.us/lps/monitors-report-
12.pdf. 
231 New Jersey Monitor’s 16th report, located at https://www.nj.gov/oag/monitors-report-16.pdf. 
232 Hepp, R., (2006, May 12). AG Cautious on Call to End Monitoring of Trooper Stops, Newark 
Star-Ledger. 
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Jersey State Police because of sufficient reforms.” (Kupferberg, 2008, p. 154, citing, 
New York Times, 12/8/2007).233 
During the 2013 symposium organized by the Police Executive Research Forum, 
the former New Jersey Attorney General noted that the development of the “EIS [early 
intervention system] was the most difficult part of the reform to accomplish” and, as a 
result “it took almost 10 years before the Consent Decree was resolved… it was very 
expensive and difficult to develop, but it was the critical component [of accountability and 
consent decree compliance]” PERF, 2013, pp. 17-18). He further commented that:  
Without the force of a court order behind us, I doubt we would have 
obtained the funding that we needed from the state, over a sustained period 
of time, to develop the systems that the New Jersey State Police put in 
place to ensure internal transparency. I think the process was a help to us. 
We did not put anything in place that we were not going to do eventually in 
any case. But putting the force of a court order behind it created a 
momentum that would not have otherwise existed. (PERF, 2013, p. 35) 
As explained by Walker & Macdonald (2009), the State of New Jersey gave 
“serious consideration to the question of what formal arrangement, if any should be 
made following the termination of [the] consent decree to ensure continuity of the court 
ordered reforms.” The Governor subsequently established the New Jersey Advisory 
Committee on Police Standards, which issued a report on December 7, 2007.234 The 
Committee concluded that “the critical component of sustainability” was “continued 
oversight” of the Department and ongoing audits of activities previously reviewed by the 
court-appointed monitor (p. 534, citing New Jersey Advisory Commission on Police 
Standards, p. 89). 
East Haven, Connecticut (2012-2017). 
In December 2012, the DOJ and the City of East Haven, Connecticut entered 
into a Consent Decree after the DOJ identified a pattern or practice of discriminatory 
policing against Latinos (DOJ, 2017b, p. 44).235 The first person appointed to monitor 
 
233 Chen, D. (2007, December 8). Monitoring of Police Should End, Corzine Says, New York 
Times. 
234 See N.J. Advisory Comm. on Police Standards, Report and Recommendations to Governor 
Jon S. Corzine (Dec. 7, 2007). Retrieved from http://www.state.nj.us/acps/njacps final report.pdf. 
235 The East Haven Consent Decree was filed with the court on November 20, 2012 and can be 
found at: https://perma.cc/WQG5-FMGT. 
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compliance (referred to in the Consent Decree as “the Joint Compliance Expert”) was 
Kathleen O’Toole, who served in that capacity until she was appointed the Chief of 
Police in Seattle, with the responsibility to lead the Seattle Police Department towards 
compliance with its Consent Decree. 
The East Haven Police Department employed 50 officers; the DOJ opened an 
investigation in September 2009 after four officers were arrested for federal civil rights 
violations perpetrated against members of East Haven’s Latino community. “In 
December 2011, the Division identified a pattern or practice of discriminatory policing 
against Latinos, particularly in traffic enforcement. In December 2012, the [City and the 
DOJ] entered into a court-enforced consent decree.” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 8, 44). Court 
jurisdiction over the agreement was terminated “on time” and “under budget” in 
December 2017 (WHSU.org, 12/18/2017).236 
According to media reports, over the period of the Consent Decree, the Chief of 
Police and “about half the department” had been replaced; body camera use was 
implemented and the Department prioritized hiring Spanish-speaking officers. According 
to the new Chief:  
Our officers are some of the best trained, both locally and nationally, and 
we take complaints about our own very seriously. We have made great 
strides in bridging the gap with all members of our community, and we hold 
officers accountable for their conduct. (WSHU.org, 12/18/2017) 
By 2015, the U.S. Attorney General was referring to East Haven as a model for 
improving police-community relations. (Police.one, 4/5/2017).237 
 
236 Dunavin, D. & Cioffari, N. (2017, December 18). East Haven Police Fulfill Terms of Consent 
Decree for Anti-Latino Bias. WHSU.org. Retrieved from https://www.wshu.org/post/east-haven-
police-fulfill-terms-consent-decree-anti-latino-bias#stream/0. 
237 Seewer, J. (2017, April 5). How Police Departments with Consent Decrees are Faring. 
Police.one. Retrieved from https://www.policeone.com/doj/articles/how-police-departments-with-
consent-decrees-are-faring-RZ2BCbuGpTQm7NgN/ 
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3.3.3. Cities with Ongoing Consent Decrees 
Portland Oregon (2012-Ongoing). 
After a fifteen-month investigation, in September 2012, the DOJ “identified a 
pattern or practice of excessive force against persons with mental illness,238 which 
resulted in a Consent Decree, which remains in effect” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 44).239 The 
DOJ investigation was initiated, in part, due to a letter sent by a County Grand Jury, 
which concluded that the Portland Police Bureau needed to be held responsible for 
“flawed police policies, incomplete or inappropriate training, incomplete communication, 
and other issues with the police effort” that resulted in a 2010 shooting of an armed 
suicidal man (Grand Jury Letter, 2/10/2010).240 The DOJ was invited to investigate the 
Police Bureau at the behest of the Mayor and the Chief of Police (Patel, 2016, pp. 838-
839). 
The agreement in Portland was limited in scope. This was attributed to Portland’s 
willingness “to cooperate[] with [the] DOJ investigation[] at its outset and immediately 
[begin] instituting suggested departmental changes” (PERF, 2013, p. 4). The Portland 
investigation was the first DOJ investigation to focus exclusively on police interactions 
with persons suffering from mental health crisis. The Portland investigation letter 
acknowledged that the mental health system in Oregon was “in shambles.” As such, the 
DOJ took the position that Portland police needed the appropriate tools to assume the 
burden of dealing with the results of a broken mental health system (PERF, 2013, p. 25; 
Walker, 2018).241 
 
238 Interestingly, while serving as the Director of Portland’s Independent Police Review Division, I 
sat in on a police awards ceremony in 2005 where the Department gave medals to two officers 
involved in a controversial police shooting in the mental health ward of a hospital. The Police 
Bureau gave out the awards even though the shooting was widely reviled within the community 
and without any publicity or acknowledgment that awards were being given out in that case. 
239 The Portland Consent Decree was filed with the court on December 17, 2012 and can be 
located at: https://perma.cc/FSH5-5NHV. 
240 Letter from Grand Jury 1, Session 1, to Michael D. Schrunk, Dist. Att'y, Multnomah Cty. 
Courthouse (2010, February 10). Retrieved from http://media.oregonlive.com/news 
_impact/other/letter-jurors.pdf. 
241 The Portland findings letter can be located at: 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ppb_findings_9-12-12.pdf 
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The Portland example stands out when it comes to the community’s engagement 
in the process even before the approval of the settlement agreement between the City 
and the DOJ. Community leaders were reportedly disappointed that the DOJ findings did 
not include an allegation of racially based policing; however, possibly as a result of 
community advocacy, “the settlement agreement included provisions related to bias-
based policing, data collection on race, and a community engagement and outreach 
(‘CEO’) plan” (Patel, 2016, p. 840). In addition, starting on February 18, 2014, the court 
conducted a two-day “fairness hearing to determine whether the settlement agreement 
was ‘fair, adequate and reasonable” which “provided a platform for a prepared list of fifty-
eight speakers from the community” (Patel, 2016, pp. 842-844). Patel (2016) described 
the “fairness hearing” as “historic for its inclusion of so many community voices” (p. 
843).242 
Lastly, Portland also appears unique in that on February 19, 2013, the court 
granted the Portland Police Association’s (PPA) request to intervene as a party (Patel, 
2016, p. 841). The court held that the PPA had a protectable interest in the litigation 
“because the terms of the proposed settlement agreement conflicted with provisions of 
the labor agreement existing between the city and the PPA.” This decision raises the 
question of whether police unions whose labor agreements could impact the 
implementation of a consent decree should be required to be parties to the litigation, a 
practice which has, thus far, been avoided by the DOJ.243  
By 2020, reports indicate that use of force in Portland declined from being used 
“against nearly 300 people in the first quarter of 2017, to less than 200 in the last quarter 
of 2019 as reforms set in.” Although it was acknowledged that consent decrees are not 
specifically intended to reduce uses of force, the decrease supported the conclusion that 
de-escalation training may have reduced the level of violence between police and the 
community (Politico.com, 6/29/2020).244 Even so, a recent U.S. DOJ report found the 
 
242 Although Patel did not indicate what, if any, changes were made to the Consent Decree as a 
result of the fairness hearing. 
243 As discussed in Chapter 7.8, infra, the Seattle experience has been substantially impacted by 
the substance of the collective bargaining agreements with the police unions as they related to 
police accountability and the imposition of discipline. 
244 Trickey, E. (2020, June 29). The Obama-era Police Reform Biden Can’t Wait to Restart. 
Politico.com. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/06/29/obama-police-
reform-341685. 
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PPB out of compliance with its consent decree, one year after finding the City in full 
compliance and based, in large part, on the PPB’s use of force as the result of anti-
police protests in the Summer and Fall of 2020.245 
New Orleans, Louisiana (2013-Ongoing). 
In March 16, 2011, seven years after closing its first investigation of the New 
Orleans Police, the DOJ found the NOPD had engaged in “a pattern or practice of 
excessive force; unlawful stops, searches and arrests; discrimination on the basis of 
race, national origin and LGBT status; and gender discrimination in the failure to 
adequately respond to, and investigate violence against women.” It took almost two 
years for the parties to negotiate a Consent Decree,246 which was entered into on 
January 11, 2013 (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 45; Rushin, 2015, n. 2).247 The New Orleans 
Consent Decree has been described as “broader in scope and more detailed than any 
other consent decree the DOJ had issued since it was given the authority 18 years 
earlier to investigate local police departments” (PERF, 2013, p. 1) The PERF report 
described the New Orleans Consent Decree as “a 122- page document that mandates 
hundreds of police department policy changes dealing with use of force, searches and 
seizures, arrests, interrogations, performance evaluations, misconduct complaints, off-
duty work assignments, and more” (PERF, 2013, p. 3; Dukanovic, 2016; Jaio, 2020). 248 
 
245 Levinson, J. (2021, Feburary 10). After violent summer, Portland Police once again out of 
compliance with federal oversight. OPB. Retrieved from After violent summer, Portland police 
once again out of compliance with federal oversight - OPB; see, U.S. v. City of Portland, Plaintiff’s 
Notice of Fifth Periodic Compliance Assessment Report, filed February 10, 2021. Retrieved from 
dojcompliancereport21121.pdf (documentcloud.org). 
246 The Rushin dissertation contains a typographical error – asserting a 10-month delay between 
the completion of the DOJ investigation and the entering into of the Consent Decree when, in 
fact, it was actually a 20-month delay (Rushin, 2015, n. 2). 
247 The New Orleans Consent Decree can be found at: https://perma.cc/T5FZ-XXPB. 
248 The New Orleans settlement negotiations have been described as “very complicated.” 
According to PERF (2013), “newly elected Mayor Mitch Landrieu wrote a letter to the Justice 
Department in 2010 asking for assistance in reforming the Police Department. Two years later, 
the Justice Department and the city of New Orleans jointly announced their agreement on a 
consent decree detailing a complicated set of reform measures. However, as of February 2013, 
that agreement was being disputed in court, as the city sought to disengage from the process, 
over the objections of DOJ. City officials argued that they were misled about the costs of the 
agreement, particularly with regard to reforming the city’s jail. DOJ officials said that there are 
Constitutional violations that must be remedied. Both sides continued to move forward, however, 
and by May the Mayor was seeking a tax increase in order to help pay for the Consent Decree 
reform measures” (PERF, 2013, p. 27; Jaio, 2020, citing Winston, A. (2013, August 31). American 
police reform and consent decrees. Truthout/News. Retrieved from http://www.truth-
out.org/news/item/18455-american-police-reform-and-consent-decrees); According to Jaio 
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Notably, the Consent Decree also “focused heavily on a community-oriented policing 
approach and engagement with neighborhood organizations and groups” (Dukanovic, 
2016, p. 921).249 In addition, the New Orleans agreement attempted to deal with the 
concern that “policing problems cannot be isolated and cured” in that “they are 
connected to broader criminal justice and social systems.” As such, the Consent Decree 
required “a regular meeting of law enforcement, public defenders, prosecutors, and 
judges to identify problems in the criminal justice system and develop solutions that 
extend beyond reform of the police” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 34). 
Like the selection of the Seattle monitor,250 the selection of the New Orleans 
monitor was not a seamless process. In the case of New Orleans, concerns over costs 
drove the city to choose a monitor candidate (with more policing experience) that was 
cheaper than the ultimately successful candidate, a Washington D.C.- based law firm 
(Rushin, 2015, p. 104). 
By 2015, the NOPD Superintendent was complaining that the size of the NOPD 
had dropped from 1,500 to 1,150 over the course of the reform period and that police 
recruits were dropping out of the police academy to work for the state police in order to 
both earn more money and avoid the oversight provided by the Consent Decree and the 
implementation of a body-worn camera program (Frontline, 11/13/2015).  
However, in 2017, the federal judge monitoring the reform effort, in conjunction 
with an NOPD Deputy Superintendent over the NOPD Compliance Bureau and the 
NOPD’s Director of Analytics, published a paper lauding the NOPD’s success in the area 
of “data-driven reform.” The paper noted that “over a 2-year span,” the NOPD had 
 
(2020), “[t]he city leadership of New Orleans, [] initially opposed the Consent Decree and related 
police reforms with a negative attitude (Winston, 2013). It was only after the Superintendent was 
replaced that the new leadership worked closely with the monitors and DOJ” (Jaio, 2020, p. 5). 
249 For an excellent description of the events leading up to the NOPD consent decree and the 
challenges associated with community engagement issues, see Patel, 2016, pp. 833-838. 
Ultimately, Patel concluded that “despite improvements in a number of [] areas,” the New Orleans 
consent decree “made little progress in the area of community engagement. [Community initiated 
attempts to intervene in the Section 14141 litigation] suggests discontent on the part of several 
community constituents and government agencies. Moreover, a tracking system of police 
interactions with organized constituents [did] little to change the structure or power dynamic that 
created the cry for DOJ-led reform” (Patel, 2016, p. 838). 
250 See section 3.2.2, supra. 
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“transformed from a department struggling to comply with its expansive consent decree 
to one exploring even broader reforms” (Morgan et al., 2017, p. 290).251 
By 2020, the New Orleans reform process was being described as an 
“astonishing success story” with a decline in police shootings, pursuits and citizen 
complaints and an increase in internal complaints against officers, purportedly indicating 
the department was more willing to hold its officers accountable (Politco.com, 6/29/2020, 
quoting Professor Sam Walker).252 
Puerto Rico PD (2013-Ongoing). 
In September 2011, after a three-year investigation, the DOJ found that the 
Puerto Rico Police Department had been engaging in “a pattern or practice of excessive 
force, violations of the First Amendment right to observe and record police activity and 
unlawful searches and seizures resulting from inadequate policies, supervision, training, 
accountability, and community engagement.” The parties entered into a consent decree 
in July 2013 (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 45). 253 
The Puerto Rico Consent Decree included community engagement provisions 
that required the PRPD to engage the community to “ensure collaborative problem-
solving, ethical and bias-free policing, and more effective crime prevention.” The 
Consent decree also specifically included a requirement to maintain “Community 
Interaction Council’s (CIC’s) with community representatives to facilitate regular 
communication and cooperation between the PRPD and community leaders at the local 
level” (Patel, 2016, p. 828).  
 
251 The authors concluded that “[t]he consent decree, once daunting, presented an opportunity for 
NOPD to build new systems of accountability from the ground up to reshape the future of the 
Department. Now, NOPD has developed a replicable model of data-driven management that has 
produced significant results. NOPD is applying this model across departmental operations to 
institutionalize the many requirements of the Consent Decree and the broader reforms it has 
embraced” (Morgan, et al., 2017, pp. 290-291). 
252 It should be noted that Walker (2018) used the New Orleans consent decree as an example 
“illustrat[ing] the challenge of effecting change on just one seemingly straight forward aspect of 
policing” when he noted that three years into the Consent Decree the Department was still in 
noncompliance with the requirement that supervisors “respond to and investigate uses of force” 
(p. 1822). 
253 The Puerto Rico Consent Decree was filed with the court on July 17 2013, and can be found 
at: https://perma.cc/TBT3-QMM8, at para. 205. 
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By May 27, 2014, however, no monitor had yet been appointed and the 
Settlement Agreement had not yet been translated into Spanish. This state of affairs 
resulted in a court motion being filed by one of the “CICs,” which was quickly dismissed 
by the court for lack of standing, but with comment from the court acknowledging that the 
court “shared” many of the CIC’s concerns (Patel, 2016, pp. 829-830).  
Although a monitor was appointed shortly thereafter, the Monitor’s first six-month 
report (covering the period from June 6, 2014 to December 2014), “addressed the lack 
of steps taken in implementing the Consent Decree due to the long delay in appointing 
[the Monitor]…” (Patel, 2016, p. 830). The Monitor filed a total of seven six-month 
reports, the last of which was filed with the court on June 6, 2018.254 In that report, while 
the Monitor noted that “the PRPD has continued to reach specific milestones in 
compliance with steps in the Action Plans under the steadfast guidance and leadership 
of the Reform Unit Director,” he also “detail[ed] ongoing, persistent challenges and 
recommendations regarding necessary steps to achieve compliance.”  Ultimately, the 
Monitor concluded that the PRPD would “not meet the original four-year capacity-
building timeframe” envisioned when he was first appointed and reached the overall 
conclusion that the PRPD was in “partial compliance with unsatisfactory progress made 
in key compliance areas” (Puerto Rico TCA, Seventh six-month report, 6/6/2018, pp. 3, 
4, 5 & 8).255 
In an unusual move, the court-appointed monitor resigned in May 2019 alleging 
that the reform process was not proceeding effectively and the millions of dollars in legal 
fees associated with the reform effort were “going to waste” (Politico.com, 6/29/2020). 
The Monitor described having submitted “eight reports detailing illegal use of force, 
illegal transfers and violations of constitutional civil rights, among other things, but [had] 
 
254 Seventh Six-Month Report of the Technical Compliance Advisor, June 10, 2017 – March 31, 
2018, located at: https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-PR-0001-0033.pdf, 
255 The monitor specifically concluded that: “The PRPB is for the most part in full or partial 
compliance in meeting policy and procedure development as well training development steps in 
the Action Plans. However, it is in non-compliance in key data collecting and reporting objectives 
as well as implementation objectives defined in the Action Plans. Furthermore, there are areas 
such as Professionalization, Supervision and Management, Administrative Complaints, and 
Information Systems and Technology where the PRPB is non-compliant in key steps and is far 
from making satisfactory progress towards the implementation of the Agreement” (Puerto Rico 
TCA, Seventh Six-Month Report, p. 8). Retrieved from 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-PR-0001-0033.pdf. 
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not received support from federal officials [in the Trump DOJ]” (Washington Post, 
5/14/2019).256 
A then-Deputy monitor was subsequently appointed to succeed the original 
monitor and issued his first report in March 2020, covering the period from October 2018 
to June 2019.257 According to one member of the Monitoring team, Puerto Rico has had 
four to five years of capacity building and as of 2020, they were just starting the 
Monitoring phase.258 
Albuquerque, New Mexico (2014-Ongoing). 
After a 17-month investigation, the DOJ issued a findings letter concluding that 
the Albuquerque Police Department was engaging in a pattern or practice of excessive 
force, including deadly force. 259 Similar to findings made in New Orleans, the DOJ 
specifically found that “[t]he use of excessive force by [Albuquerque police] officers is not 
isolated or sporadic [rather it] stems from systemic deficiencies in oversight, training and 
policy.” (Walker, 2018, p. 1819, quoting USDOJ findings letter, 3/17/2011).260 
A consent decree between the City and the DOJ was filed on November 14, 
2014 (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 45).261 According to the DOJ, in order to assist the department 
in correcting issues relating to the use of excessive force, the Albuquerque Consent 
Decree, “required the integration of community and problem-oriented policing concepts 
 
256 Coto, D. (2019, May 14). Official over Puerto Rico pólice reform resigns in protest. Washington 
Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com. 
257 See “First Report of the Federal Monitor,” retrieved from https://fpmpr.org/reports/2020-03-
cmr-1/Case-3-12-cv-02039-GAG-Document-1435.pdf.  
258 Personal “Linked-in” communication with the author, November 13, 2020. 
259 Patel (2016) reported the discord within the City leading up to the DOJ investigation: “In July 
2011, the Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial Center met with Albuquerque Mayor Richard J. Berry, 
asking him to join it and other activists in inviting the DOJ to investigate the civil rights violations 
of the Albuquerque Police Department (‘APD’). Mayor Berry and APD Chief Ray Schultz then 
tried to stave off investigation for months by instituting a number of reforms and raising hiring 
requirements for incoming cadets. When the City Council passed a resolution requesting that the 
DOJ investigate the APD, the mayor vetoed it. As in other cities, community members challenging 
standing structures of power eventually sparked action; the DOJ ultimately decided to investigate 
the APD after receiving pressure from Albuquerque residents, families of shooting victims, and 
city councillors. The DOJ announced the launch of its investigation into the APD on November 
27, 2012. The parties began settlement negotiations on October 29, 2014” (pp. 851-852). 
260 U.S. DOJ, Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department (2011). Retrieved from 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_report.pdf. 
261 The Albuquerque Consent Decree can be found at: https://perma.cc/4HHZ-C67Q. 
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into management structures, resource deployments, policies and training systems” 
(USDOJ, 2017b, p. 26). The DOJ was also concerned with issues relating to officer 
wellness and support due to its potential impact on officer uses of force. As such, like 
other decrees (including Ferguson, Cleveland, Puerto Rico and New Orleans) the APD 
was required to “provide officers with access to health and wellness programs, physical 
fitness programs, stress management tools, confidential crisis counseling, or other 
support services necessary to address the heavy burdens placed on today’s police 
officers” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 33). 
In November 2015, Frontline reported that since the DOJ investigation began, 
the number of times APD officers used force dropped by 57%. The APD Chief, 
appointed in 2014, was quoted as attributing the drop in uses of force to the fact that 
most APD officers were now trained in crisis intervention: “Our officers are taking more 
time at the calls; they’re taking more time to assess the situation” (Frontline, 
11/13/2015).  
However, by mid-2020, it was being reported that the Albuquerque consent 
decree “is nowhere near completion.” The Monitor was quoted as saying that: 
“Sergeants and lieutenants, at times, go to extreme lengths to excuse officer behaviors 
that clearly violate established and trained [police] policy.” The Monitor further reported 
that the department would “sometimes let violations lie dormant until time limits for 
internal investigations, required in the police union contract, run out” (Politico.com, 
6/29/2020). 
Cleveland, Ohio (2015-Ongoing). 
In March 2013, eight years after the termination of a memorandum of agreement 
between the City of Cleveland and the DOJ (which did not involve the appointment of a 
monitor), the DOJ opened a new investigation into the Cleveland Division of Police. After 
a 21-month investigation, the DOJ “identified a pattern or practice of excessive force, 
and raised concerns about search and seizure practices, resulting from insufficient 
accountability, inadequate training and equipment, flawed policies, and inadequate 
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community engagement.” A consent decree, to include the appointment of a Monitor, 
was filed on May 26, 2015 (DOJ, 2017b, p. 45).262 
The road to Cleveland’s consent decree was discussed in a 2020 online article: 
Cleveland’s clamor for police reform rose up after November 29, 2012, the 
night that 13 officers fired 137 shots after a 60-car police chase, killing the 
unarmed driver and his passenger. Rep. Marcia Fudge, the local NAACP, 
and the Rev. Colvin of Olivet Baptist each asked the Justice Department to 
investigate the police department’s use of deadly force (Cleveland’s mayor 
followed suit a few weeks later). 
[By] December 4, 2014, Cleveland was in turmoil. Just days before, a white 
police officer had killed a 12-year-old boy playing in a park with a toy gun. 
The city was outraged at its police department, which many said was ill-
trained, poorly supervised, and deeply troubled. On that day, Attorney 
General Eric Holder arrived in town with a report that seemed to bear out 
those complaints. 
“In recent days, millions of people throughout our nation have come 
together, bound by grief and bound by anguish,” Holder said, mentioning 
Tamir Rice’s death and the killings earlier that year of Eric Garner in New 
York City and Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. 
With that, Holder announced the results of the Justice Department’s 1½-
year investigation in Cleveland. “There is reasonable cause to believe that 
the Cleveland Division of Police engages in a pattern and practice of using 
excessive force,” he declared. The report Holder delivered was a scathing 
indictment of Cleveland police for “poor and dangerous tactics,” pistol-
whippings, guns fired at “unarmed or fleeing suspects,” and of supervisors 
“all the way up the chain of command” who usually “approved the use of 
force as appropriate.” (Politico.com, 6/29/2020)263 
A significant aspect of the Cleveland Consent Decree was the creation of a 
Community Police Commission, similar to the identically-named Commission created in 
Seattle.264 Additional requirements of the Consent Decree included  
the development of policy designed to regulate mental health encounters 
(para. 131) as well as the creation of officer teams specifically charged with 
responding to mental health calls (paras. 145–152). Further, all Cleveland 
Police Department (CPD) officers must receive crisis intervention training 
 
262 Cleveland Consent Decree can be found at: https://perma.cc/4FBT-VPG5. 
263 See also, Chanin, 2016, pp. 67-68 & 111-112; and, Patel, 2016, pp. 847-848, for descriptions 
of the events leading up to the DOJ investigation and negotiation of the Cleveland Consent 
Decree. 
264 See Cleveland Consent Decree, paragraphs 15-22. 
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(paras. 143–144), while the CPD is tasked with developing collaborative 
partnerships with community mental health service providers (paras. 153–
159). (Chanin, 2017a, p. 259) 
At the time of the filing of the Consent Decree, the President of the Cleveland 
Police Patrolmen’s Association “denounced” the decree and subsequently endorsed 
Donald Trump for President. By late 2017, the succeeding PPA President took “a less 
defiant public tone,” but still called the DOJ investigation report “one-sided,” and called 
the Consent Decree “unnecessary,” but acknowledged: “it’s here and we gotta deal with 
it” (Politico.com, 6/29/2020; Cleveland.com, 5/28/2015).265 
The cost of the reform effort has been estimated by the City of Cleveland to be 
as much as $4 million per year (Cleveland.com, 11/21/2019),266 and has been reported 
as requiring an increase in the City income tax in 2016 (Cleveland.com, 12/29/2016; 
Politico.com, 6/29/2020).267 
By 2020, the police reform effort was being described as “still a work in process.” 
It was noted that the CDP had rolled out new policies, training and disciplinary rules and 
that use of force incidents “are not only down, they’re less likely to result in injuries to 
police and civilians” (Politico.com, 6/29/2020). Even so, in a July 2020 report, the court-
appointed monitoring team described ongoing challenges, to include a  
lack[] [of] the technology and data necessary to allow officers to report 
basic information necessary to evaluate the Department’s performance 
with respect to stops, searches, and arrests; interactions with individuals in 
behavioral crisis; and community policing and problem-solving; failures to 
hold officers accountable for misconduct 
and a failure on the part of the city to “engage productively” with the Consent-decree 
created Community Police Commission. The Monitor concluded with a warning that: 
 
265 Macdonald, E. (2015, May 28). Cleveland Police Union Says Justice Department Reforms 
Would Endanger Police. Cleveland.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/05/union_head_says_aspects_of_cle.html. 
266 Heisig, E. (2019, November, 21). Tamir Rice, officer use of force and Cleveland’s high cost of 
fixing its police department. Cleveland.com. Retrieved from 
https://www.cleveland.com/cityhall/2019/11/tamir-rice-officer-use-of-force-and-clevelands-high-
cost-of-fixing-its-police-department.html. 
267 Krouse, P. (2016, December 29). Cleveland income-tax hike to take effect Jan. 1. 
Cleveland.com. Retrieved from https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2016/12/cleveland_income-
tax_hike_to_t.html. 
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“redoubled urgency is necessary for the Department to reach full and effective 
compliance.” (Cleveland Police Monitor, Eighth Semi-annual Report, pp. 2-3, 8-9).268 
Ferguson, Missouri (2016-Ongoing). 
The City of Ferguson found itself in the middle of a political and social maelstrom 
as the result of the August 9, 2014 shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed 18-year-old 
African-American man.269 Shortly after the shooting, which resulted in protests 
throughout the country (Patel, 2016, p. 856-857), the DOJ initiated an investigation; only 
six months later, on March 5, 2015, the DOJ concluded that the Ferguson Police 
Department had engaged in “a pattern or practice of unlawful stops and arrests, 
including violations of the First Amendment right to observe and record police activity; 
excessive force; and discriminatory policing.” In addition, the DOJ concluded that the 
Police Department and the City’s Municipal court had “focused on revenue generation at 
the expense of public safety and constitutional law enforcement” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 46; 
Dukanovic, 2016, pp. 931-932). 
Like other city experiences, the negotiation of the Ferguson Consent Decree was 
not seamless. After City negotiators and the DOJ worked out an initial agreement, on 
February 9, 2016, the Ferguson City Council, concerned about the costs associated with 
the proposed reform effort, approved the Decree but with the proviso that the DOJ adopt 
several revisions, to include 
cap[ping] monitoring fees at $1 million over the first five years and no more 
than $250,000 in a single year of reform…The proposed amendments 
follow[ed] estimations made by [the Mayor] and other city officials that the 
DOJ’s request could potentially cost the city $10 million over the next three 
years…[and that] the proposed reform could financially break the city, 
which [had] a budget of about $14 million and [was] $2.8 million in debt. 
(Dukanovic, 2016, p. 935) 
 
268 See, Cleveland Police Monitor, Eighth Semi-annual report, July 2020, located at: 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5651f9b5e4b08f0af890bd13/t/5f0dc503ea043118c97d16e
5/1594737927356/FILE_9341.pdf. See also, Caniglia, J. (2020, July 13). Report blasts former 
Cleveland Public Safety Director [] for being lenient with problem police officers. Cleveland.com. 
Retrieved from https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2020/07/report-blasts-former-cleveland-
public-safety-director-michael-mcgrath-for-being-lenient-with-problem-police-officers.html.. 
269 Violent protests erupted the night of the shooting and continued for 11 days. A state of 
emergency was declared by the Missouri Governor on August 16, 2014 and an executive order 
calling in the National Guard was issued on August 18. The National Guard was not withdrawn 
from the city until August 21, 2014 (Devi & Fryer, 2020, p. 29). 
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The next day, the U.S. Attorney General announced the filing of a §14141 lawsuit 
against the city, saying that: “The City of Ferguson had a real opportunity here to step 
forward, and instead they’ve turned backwards…They’ve chosen to live in the past.” The 
City eventually accepted the DOJ’s proposed consent decree on March 15, 2016. 
(Dukanovic, 2016, p. 935, n. 144;270 Patel, 2016; Chanin, 2017a; Powell et al., 2017, p. 
576).271 
The court approved the Ferguson Consent Decree on April 19, 2016, after having 
received written submissions from community members.272 Many of the submissions  
argued that the community engagement provisions included within the 
Consent Decree failed to adequately incentivize officials and police officers 
to reach out to community…Commentators generally felt that citizen review 
boards would only have an enduring effect on the reform process if 
community oversight and engagement provisions were strengthened. 
(Patel, 2016, pp. 863-864) 
By 2017, reports indicated that although the Consent Decree required the 
creation of a Civilian Review Board to review allegations of police misconduct, the City 
missed a deadline for the Board to become operational and, as of April 2017, the board 
was still not able to accept complaints. The federal judge still found, however, that the 
city was “making meaningful progress” in the implementation of the decree (Police One, 
4/5/2017). Even so, by November, 2017, City leaders, who had reportedly paid more 
than $500,000 to its monitoring team over a one-year period, continued to question the 
value of the costs, being paid for by a city with a population of less than 20,000 (Jaio, 
2020, p. 5, citing Associated Press, 11/22/2017).273 
 
270 Citing, Wagner, L. (2016, March 15). Ferguson City Council Accepts Consent Decree Worked 
Out with Justice Department, NPR. Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/03/ 15/470598733/ferguson-city-council-accepts-deal-with-justice-department. 
271 The Ferguson Consent Decree was filed with the court on April 19, 2016 and can be found at 
https://perma.cc/AXP6-DMFG. 
272 The court approved the Consent Decree even though it acknowledged that many of the 
commentators believed it to be “biased in its approach” and recognizing that “some people have 
complained that they weren’t involved in the negotiation of the settlement agreement” (Patel, 
2016, p. 864-865, footnotes 467 and 468, quoting from Transcript of Excerpt of Ruling from 
Motion Hearing at 2, United States v. Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-00180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 
2016), ECF No. 43).  
273 Salter, J. (2017, November 22). Ferguson leaders wonder if monitor worth cost. Associated 
Press. Retrieved from https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2017-11-22/apnewsbreak-
ferguson-leaders-wonder-if-monitor-worth-cost. 
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By 2019, the court-appointed monitor was giving the city “mixed reviews.” 
Although,  
she lauded the city for implementing a police use-of-force policy and cited 
progress in use of body-worn and in-car cameras [and] gave generally high 
marks for municipal court reforms, …[she] cited ‘sluggish’ progress in 
community policing, officer training and data collection. (Associated Press, 
8/8/2019)274 
Maricopa County, Arizona (2015-Ongoing). 
The case of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, under the leadership of the 
infamous Sheriff Joe Arpaio, was the second of only three cases involving litigation 
between the DOJ and a local police agency.275 The case investigation was opened in 
March 2009 and following the refusal of the Sheriff’s Department to cooperate with the 
DOJ investigation, a law suit was filed by the DOJ in September 2010 seeking to compel 
the Sheriff’s Department to provide information to relevant to the DOJ investigation. The 
Sheriff eventually settled the first law suit in June 2011 by agreeing to cooperate. The 
DOJ investigation was finally completed in December 2011 wherein the DOJ “identified a 
pattern or practice of discriminatory policing against Latinos; unlawful stops and arrests; 
and unlawful retaliation against people who make complaints or criticize MCSO.” After 
unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate a settlement agreement (again, for the first time 
in the application of §14141), the DOJ filed a lawsuit in May 2012.276 A judicial decision, 
in the DOJ’s favor was granted in June 2015 and the parties entered into “a consent 
decree addressing issues concerning worksite raids, retaliation, and language access 
requirements.” The DOJ and the MCSO also entered into a memorandum of agreement 
 
274 It’s been 10 years since Ferguson: Are racial tensions even worse now? (2019, August 8). 
Associated Press. Retrieved from 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/08/08/ferguson-missouri-riots-5-years-since-
shooting-race-tensions-worse/1952853001/. 
275 The first Section 14141 litigation involved the City of Columbus, Ohio, which was sued by the 
DOJ in October 1999, wherein the city alleged that Section 14141 was unconstitutional (see, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=1034). That litigation was resolved in 2002, after the 
DOJ concluded that the Columbus Division of Police had “made significant changes to the 
policies and procedures that we sought to change through the pattern or practice lawsuit” (See, 
correspondence between City of Columbus and DOJ, found at: https://perma.cc/T38F-58BE). 
(See also, Ross & Parke, 2009, p. 204; Simmons, 2010, n. 116; Chanin, 2014, n. 2). The third 
case involved the Alamance County, North Carolina Sheriff’s Department, see infra. 
276 Negotiations reportedly “broke down when Sheriff Arpaio publicly refused a key point of the 
settlement proposed by the Department of Justice, a court-appointed monitor to ensure 
compliance with the agreement” (Harmon, 2012, p. 49). 
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regarding the operation of the local jails.277 In August, 2015, the DOJ intervened in a 
lawsuit filed by the ACLU regarding discriminatory policing (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 46). 
On May 13, 2016, Sheriff “Arpaio and his top deputies [were found] in contempt 
for violating court orders to stop racially profiling Latinos as part of unlawful enforcement 
operations targeting immigrants.” According to the presiding judge: 
 "the Defendants [] engaged in multiple acts of misconduct, dishonesty, and 
bad faith with respect to the Plaintiff class and the protection of its rights. 
They have demonstrated a persistent disregard for the orders of the Court, 
as well as an intention to violate and manipulate the laws and policies 
regulating their conduct…” (ACLU website, updated 9/13/2017)278  
Ultimately, the Sheriff was successful in his negotiations with the DOJ, as the 
final Settlement Agreement did not include the appointment of a court-appointed 
monitor, a key sticking point in the original negotiations. Sheriff Arpaio, however, lost his 
campaign for re-election in 2016. 
 On August 25, 2017, President Trump pardoned Arpaio, who was awaiting 
sentencing for the criminal contempt-of-court conviction.279 
 
Alamance County, North Carolina (2016- Ongoing). 
The DOJ’s investigation of the Alamance County, North Carolina, Sheriff’s Office 
was opened in June 2010 and concluded in September 2011 with a finding by the DOJ 
that the Sheriff had engaged in “a pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination against 
Latinos and unlawful stops and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment” (USDOJ, 
 
277 A Settlement Agreement between the DOJ and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department was 
filed with the court on July 17, 2015 and can be found at: https://perma.cc/6FEJ-HDVE. 
278 Retrieved from https://www.aclu.org/cases/ortega-melendres-et-al-v-arpaio-et-
al#:~:text=UPDATE%2FMay%2013%2C%202016%3A%20A%20federal%20court%20found%20
Arpaio,immigrants.%20The%20ruling%20stems%20from%20the%20ACLU%27s%20lawsuit. 
279 President Trump’s pardon stated that: “Throughout his time as sheriff, Arpaio continued his 
life’s work of protecting the public from the scourges of crime and illegal immigration, … Sheriff 
Joe Arpaio is now 85 years old, and after more than 50 years of admirable service to our nation, 
he is (a) worthy candidate for a Presidential pardon” (Riotta, C. (2020, August 8). Joe Arpai: 
Arizona Sheriff pardoned by Trump for criminal contempt fails to win back old job. The 
Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/joe-
arpaio-arizona-sheriff-election-trump-pardon-jerry-sheridan-a9661196.html. 
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2017b, p. 47). A complaint was filed by the DOJ in December 2012, after it was 
determined that the DOJ and the Sheriff would be unable to agree upon a settlement. 
After the first §14141-initiated trial, the DOJ’s complaint was dismissed by a federal 
District Court judge.280 The DOJ subsequently appealed the dismissal and, in August 
2016, while the appeal was pending the parties entered into a Memorandum of 
Agreement (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 47; Rushin, 2016; Chafin, 2017a, n. 3).281 
As with the Maricopa County Sheriff, no court-appointed monitor was required as 
part of the Alamance County MOA and, in fact, the history of the Alamance County case 
appears to have closely mirror the experiences of Maricopa County (Rushin 2016, pp. 
136-140). 
Miami, Florida (2016-Ongoing). 
The DOJ opened up an investigation into the Miami Police Department in May 
2002, but closed out the investigation without formal findings in May 2006.282 The DOJ 
re-opened the investigation in November 2011 and by July 2013, the DOJ identified 
systemic excessive use-of-force with respect to the discharge of firearms. The city and 
the DOJ entered into an MOA on March 10, 2016.283 
In the case of Miami, the MOA did include the appointment of a monitor. By 
2019, it was being reported that “some things have improved. Most important, Miami 
cops are indeed shooting fewer people than they were before the feds intervened” 
 
280 The court found that the DOJ failed to provide “evidence that any individual was 
unconstitutionally deprived of his or her rights,’’ and, instead, built its case on ‘‘vague, isolated 
statements’’ and statistical analysis that ‘‘failed to constitute reliable and persuasive proof of the 
claims under applicable legal standards’’ (Chanin 2017a, pp. 261-262, citing, United States v. 
Johnson (2015). United States District Court (Middle District of North Carolina). Retrieved from 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-NC-0002-0012.pdf, p. 251). 
281 The Memorandum of Agreement was signed on August 17, 2016 and can be found at: 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/886406/download. 
282 According to a 2015 report by the Marshall Project: “Justice officials have also found 
themselves back in Miami, where seven black men died in police shootings during an eight-month 
span ending in 2011. In 2006, the department had closed an earlier civil rights investigation of the 
Miami police after the force pledged to make a series of changes sought by Washington. 
‘Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems we believed were fixed have reoccurred, 
evidenced by a steady rise in officer-involved shootings,’ the then-head of the Civil Rights 
Division, Thomas Perez, wrote to Miami’s mayor and police chief in July 2013” (Marshall Project, 
4/23/2015). 
283 The Memorandum of Agreement between the DOJ and the City of Miami can be found at: 
https://perma.cc/R59Q-2YYX. 
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(Miami New Times, 9/6/2019).284 However, as of June 2019, the Community Advisory 
Board (set up as a result of the Settlement Agreement) and police-reform advocates in 
Miami were calling for the termination of the Monitor, a former Tampa Police Chief. 
Although the Monitoring position had been announced as a full-time job, the Monitor 
instead had decided to run for Mayor of Tampa, had reportedly missed deadlines for the 
submissions of reports and had been difficult to reach (Miami New Times, 9/6/19). 
Although the Monitoring reports stated that the internal affairs unit and body-worn 
camera policies were in compliance with the MOA, community members openly 
questioned those conclusions (Miami New Times, 9/6/2019). 
The Monitor was, in fact, elected Mayor of Tampa and took office on May 1, 
2019285 and was eventually replaced in September 2019 by a DOJ lawyer, rather than 
an independent monitor (Miami New Times, 9/6/2019). 
Baltimore, Maryland (2017 – Ongoing). 
The last Consent Decree reached by the federal government, immediately prior 
to the inauguration of Donald Trump, involved the City of Baltimore. The city’s then-
Mayor invited the DOJ to conduct an investigation into the Baltimore Police Department 
after the highly publicized in-custody death of Freddie Gary on April 19, 2015.286 By 
August 2016, the DOJ had 
identified a pattern or practice of unlawful stops, searches and arrests; 
discriminatory policing; excessive force, including use of force against 
people with disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; 
and violations of the First Amendment right to observe and record police 
activity. The Division also identified concerns with BPD’s handling of sexual 
assault investigations and transport practices. (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 48)287 
 
284 Iannelli, J (2019, September 6). Justice Department Appoints New Police-Misconduct Monitor 
to Oversee Miami PD. Miami New Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/miami-police-get-new-federal-misconduct-monitor-to-
replace-jane-castor-11259552. 
285 See, City of Tampa website, located at: https://www.tampagov.net/mayor. 
286 Broadwater, L. (2015, May 6). Baltimore mayor seeks federal investigation of police 
department, The Baltimore Sun. Retrieved from 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-ci-dojpartnership-20150506-
story.html. 
287 For a of the events leading up to the DOJ investigation and negotiation of the Baltimore 
Consent Decree, see Greenberger, 2016, pp. 201-203. 
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According to the DOJ, their Baltimore findings were informed by “well-
documented complaints from the Baltimore Fraternal Order of Police” and explanations 
from police union representatives “explaining the stress placed on officers by a staffing 
scheme that resulted in officers working double 10-hour shifts with only a few hours 
break between, and the impact of that stress on officers’ capacity to police 
constitutionally and effectively.” In addition, the DOJ reported that “meetings with 
individual officers helped [the DOJ] identify the ways in which lack of access to basic 
technology, such as in-car laptops and functioning computers at district headquarters, 
impaired their [work]” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 12).  
A Consent Decree was entered into by the Obama-DOJ and the City of Baltimore 
on January 12, 2017, eight days before the inauguration of the Trump Administration.288 
On February 15, 2017, the court scheduled a public hearing on the provisions of the 
Consent Decree to be held on April 6, 2017. On April 3, 2017, the Trump DOJ requested 
that the court postpone the public hearing, only to be quickly rebuffed by the court (U.S. 
v. Baltimore, Doc. 25, 4/5/2017).289 At the time, the Baltimore Mayor advised that the 
City would “strongly oppose any delay in moving forward” (New York Times, 
4/3/2017);290 the Baltimore police commissioner referred to the DOJ’s attempt to delay 
the implementation of the Consent Decree as “a punch in the gut” (New York Times, 
4/9/2017)291 and made public statements supporting implementation:  
“I want this consent decree,” the Baltimore police commissioner, Kevin 
Davis, said at a news conference. “We know we have to get better. We 
know that over many, many years, things have occurred here that prevent 
 
288 The Baltimore Consent Decree can be found at: https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-
document/file/925036/download. 
289 Court Order can be found at: https://htv-prod-media.s3.amazonaws.com/files/doj-motion-
denied-1491420970.pdf. 
290 Stolberg, C. & Lichtblau (2017, April 3). Sweeping Federal Review Could Affect Consent 
Decrees Nationwide. New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/us/justice-department-jeff-sessions-baltimore-
police.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer. 
291  Stolberg, S. (2017, April 9). ‘It Did Not Stick’: The First Federal Effort to Curb Police Abuse. 
New York Times. Retrieved from, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/us/first-consent-decree-
police-abuse-pittsburgh.html. 
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the Baltimore Police Department from being the best that it can be.” (New 
York Times, 11/21/2017)292 
In its first semi-annual report, released on July 18, 2018, the Monitoring Team 
questioned the capacity of the BPD to initiate sustainable reforms: 
…although BPD and City leadership are, to their credit, fully committed to 
reform, it is not yet apparent whether BPD has the capacity to implement 
the linchpin requirements of the Consent Decree. Will it be able to 
purchase, design and effectively utilize modern policing technology? Can 
it develop a robust system of supervision and officer accountability? Will it 
be able to hire and retain enough qualified patrol officers to fulfill the 
Consent Decree’s community-oriented policing goals and maintain the 
morale of a Patrol Division that is currently overworked and stretched thin? 
These are open questions right now and, with only several months of active 
monitoring completed, the Monitoring Team cannot say what the answers 
are likely to be. What the first several months of monitoring have revealed 
is that, despite BPD’s hard work, the challenges ahead are daunting. 
(Baltimore Monitoring Team 1st Semi-Annual report, pp. 6-7)293 
By 2020, it was being reported that the reform process in Baltimore had “moved 
slowly, in part because of turnover in the mayor’s and police commissioner’s offices” 
(Politico.com, 6/29/2020). By January 2020, the Monitor was reporting.that the BPD was  
in the “easy part” of the reform process —policy revision, training, self-
evaluation, planning [but that] BPD has yet to prove that it can do the “hard 
part.” [BPD] has not yet shown that it will be able to implement and properly 
utilize new technology, employ and properly deploy sufficient personnel, 
ensure effective supervision, hold officers accountable, perform rigorous 
self-evaluation and self-correction, and obtain officer and supervisor buy-
in so that constitutional, community-oriented policing becomes the 
Departmental norm. (Baltimore Monitoring Team, 4th semi-annual report, 
January 21, 2020, p. 28)294 
 
292 Eder, S., Protess, B. & Dewan, S. (2017, November 21). How Trump’s Hands-off Approach to 
Policing is Frustrating Some Chiefs. New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/us/trump-justice-department-police.html. 
293 Baltimore Monitoring Team, 1st semi-annual report (2018, July 18). Retrieved from 
https://www.bpdmonitor.com/resources-reports. 





Background Literature on Section 14141 
Enforcement 
Issues and concerns regarding policing, police accountability and police reform in 
the United States are not new. In fact, there is substantial academic and professional 
literature relating to the many aspects of police accountability and reform, to include 
topics ranging from the challenges associated with organizational and cultural change, to 
those associated with externally-driven reform through political pressure, judicial 
intervention, criminal prosecution, and civil litigation. In addition, there has been much 
discussion about the potential for internally driven reform through policy, training, data 
collection and evaluation, and police leadership. 
As noted by Armacost in her 2004 treatise entitled Organizational Culture and 
Police Misconduct Police Reform:  
Over the years, a number of prominent police departments have made 
efforts toward reform, often in response to the recommendations of 
independent commissions convened to investigate incidents of alleged 
wrongdoing by police. Still, misbehavior by law enforcement officers seems 
ubiquitous, and serious, lasting reform appears illusory. (p. 454)295  
Armacost (2004) ultimately suggested that lasting reform cannot take place unless police 
agencies are willing to address systemic issues relating to police culture, rather than 
individual instances of police misconduct (p. 455). 
The concept of looking at issues of ethics and integrity systemically and as 
organizational and cultural issues requiring comprehensive reform efforts is also not new 
or unique (see, for example, Hoffman, 1993; Livingston, 1999;296 Swope, 2001; Walker, 
 
295 Armacost (2004) quoted from a Los Angeles Times article which noted that: “Often, an 
investigation is undertaken, followed by recommendations for sweeping change, which are 
ignored or halfheartedly implemented. The cycle is so habitual that one steadfast aspect of each 
new report is a section wondering why the recommendations in past reports haven't been carried 
out” (pp. 454-455, quoting, McDermott, T. (2000, June 11). Behind the Bunker Mentality, Los 
Angeles Times). 
296 Livingston argued that “a conclusion drawn by many police scholars [is that] efforts at police 
reform will be most effective … when reform involves not simply adherence to rules in the face of 
punitive sanctions, but a change in the organizational values and systems to which both 
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2003; Armacost, 2004; Harmon, 2009; Walker & Macdonald, 2009, pp. 483-484; 
Simmons, 2010, pp. 381-382; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011, p.333, citing, Ivković, 2005, 2009; 
King 2009, [“[s]cholars have suggested that responsibility for officer misconduct 
ultimately resides at the organizational level”); Harmon, 2012, p. 35; and, Rushin, 2015, 
pp. 3 & 57). And, in fact, the recognition of this concept is an integral component of the 
basis for the use of the Section 14141 process which takes into account “patterns or 
practices” as opposed to individual officer conduct (Walker, 2017, p. 29 [stating that 
“[t]he DOJ [14141] program consolidated the view, already developing among police 
experts, that establishing professional and constitutional policing requires systemic 
organizational reform. Officer misconduct, in this view, is largely the result of poor 
management and a failure to establish the necessary accountability procedures”] (See 
also, Walker, 2018, p. 1819)). 
In addition to consideration of organizational and cultural imperatives in reforming 
a police agency, the issue of organizational justice and the extent to which 
“organizations perceived as unjust and unfair by their employees are more likely to 
experience employee deviance” also needs to be examined in order to better understand 
both the causes and potential solutions of any structural litigation reform experience 
(Wolfe and Piquero, 2011, p. 333, citing Greenberg, 1993). 
In this chapter, I identify the state of the literature with respect to theories relating 
to police reform; and specifically, with respect to externally-driven police reform efforts. 
The literature includes only a handful of substantive evaluation studies (to include PhD 
dissertations and research which collected original data)297 as well as additional efforts 
to collect data from multiple jurisdictions to compare the effects of DOJ investigations 
 
managers and line officers adhere” (Livingston, 1999, p. 850, citing Dixon, Law in Policing: Legal 
Regulation and Police Practices, p. 308 (1997); and, Jerome H. Skolnick & James J. Fyfe, Above 
the Law 211 (1993) p. 187 [“for reform to last, officers must come to adhere to different systems 
and values”]). 
297 See, Vera Institute of Justice Evaluation Studies of the Pittsburgh PA Consent Decree): Davis, 
et al, 2002; Davis, et al., 2005; RAND Corporation Evaluation Studies of Community-Police 
Relations and Traffic Stops over the course of the Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement: Riley, et 
al, 2005; Ridgeway, et al., 2006; Schell, et al., 2007; Ridgeway, et al., 2009; Ridgeway, 2009; 
Harvard Kennedy School evaluation of the Los Angeles Police Department: Stone, et al., 2009; 
and The Bromwich Group evaluation of Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Uses of 
Force 2008-2015: Bromwich, 2016. 
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and interventions. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the theory and data 
collected herein as it relates to prior research studies in this area. 
I used the literature identified below to helped inform the findings made herein 
and to provide context to determine to what extent the Seattle experience can be 
generalizable to other jurisdictional experiences. To the extent my findings are 
generalizable, they can be used to inform future DOJ practices in their attempts to 
ensure the long-term sustainability of police reform efforts. 
4.1. Police Reform Literature Status 
By 2010, the DOJ noted that “more than 80 articles about §14141 litigation have 
been published in legal and other academic journals,” however it was noted that only 
three evaluation studies (in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and Los Angeles) “provide[d] 
measurable examples of positive structural, organizational and community changes 
resulting from §14141 intervention in these jurisdictions.”298 The DOJ subsequently 
convened a “one-day roundtable [consisting of police chiefs and other law enforcement 
executives, attorneys, case monitors, advocates and other federal staff] to take stock of 
the last 15 years of §14141 litigation and to discuss ideas and suggestions for future 
directions” (Clark, 2010, p. 6). 
Since the time of the 2010 roundtable, additional studies have been conducted, 
using original data (usually in the form of stakeholder interviews, publicly available crime 
and population data, and court-appointed monitor and police department reports) to 
evaluate the quality and sustainability of §14141 imposed reform (Chanin, 2012; Rushin, 
2015, Chanin, 2015) and to look at more specific issues, such as impact on crime and 
police productivity (“depolicing”) (Rushin & Edwards, 2017; Chanin & Sheets, 2018; Devi 
& Fryer, 2020; Goh, 2020; Jaio, 2020), impact on civil suits against the police (Powell et 
 
298 I have not included the Cincinnati studies, conducted by the RAND Corporation as “an 
evaluation” study comparable to the Pittsburgh (Davis et al., 2002, 2005) and Los Angeles 
studies (Stone et. al, 2009). The Cincinnati studies were limited to the state of community-police 
relations in Cincinnati as the result of the implementation of the “Collaborative Agreement.” The 
Pittsburgh and Los Angeles studies, however, were much more comprehensive, including a wide 
variety of data over and above the impact of those consent decrees on community-police 
relations. 
145 
al., 2017), impact on police management practices (Morgan et al., 2017), and impact on 
police misconduct and policy (Chanin, 2016). 
There have been additional studies involving the collection of original data which 
have discussed issues of efficacy and sustainability on consent decrees as they related 
to multi-city comparisons, to include: Chanin, 2012 (Pittsburgh, Washington D.C., 
Cincinnati & Prince George’s County, MD.); Chanin, 2014 (Pittsburgh, Detroit, 
Washington D.C., Cincinnati, & Prince George’s County, MD); Chanin, 2015 (Pittsburgh, 
Washington D.C. & Cincinnati); Rushin, 2015 (Los Angeles and nationally);299 and 
Rushin, 2016 (Pittsburgh, Washington D.C., Cincinnati, Prince George’s County & Los 
Angeles). 
In 2012, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) conducted its own 
assessment of §14141 investigations and interventions by convening a group of more 
than 80 academics, police executives, monitors, and DOJ and federal representatives. 
As recognized in a 2017 report from the DOJ, the PERF report 
quoted many police chiefs who have been through the process of a DOJ 
investigation as saying “that the end result was a better police 
department—with improved policies on critical issues such as use of force, 
better training of officers, and more advanced information systems that help 
police executives to know what is going on in the department and manage 
their employees.” It further noted that, in many places, the reform 
agreement provided essential leverage to obtain the funding and political 
support necessary for reform. (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 38) 
USDOJ (2017b), looking at the implementation of §14141 since its 
implementation in 1994, painted a very positive picture of the results of the evaluations 
that had been conducted thus far: 
• The DOJ noted that the study conducted by the Harvard-Kennedy School of 
the Los Angeles Consent Decree concluded that public perceptions of the 
LAPD had improved, as well as police officer satisfaction. In addition, the DOJ 
quoted the Harvard-Kennedy report as noting that “oversight of the police 
department is stronger, and the quality as well as the quantity of enforcement 
activity are rising” (p. 38, citing Stone et al., 2009, p. 2); 
 
299 Rushin’s PhD dissertation included examples from a wide variety of cities with consent decree 
experiences with a separate chapter discussing the Los Angeles Experience (Chapter 5: “Los 
Angeles: How Does a Best Case Happen?”, pp. 125-170). 
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• The DOJ also commented on Chanin’s evaluation of the Philadelphia, Los 
Angeles and Cincinnati Consent Decrees when he concluded that “best 
evidence on the DOJ’s pattern or practice initiative suggests that after 
implementing mandated reforms, affected departments will likely possess a 
stronger, more capable accountability infrastructure, more robust training and 
a set of policies that reflect best practices” (p. 38, citing Chanin, 2015, p. 185); 
• Finally, the DOJ also noted positive findings made by the Vera Institute of 
Justice evaluations of the Philadelphia Police Department, which found that 
the Philadelphia reform effort was “a success story for local police 
management and for federal intervention” (p. 38, citing Davis et al., p. i). 
Since 1999, more than fifty academic and peer reviewed articles have discussed 
the applicability of §14141 to the effort to reform police agencies throughout the United 
States. A handful of academic scholars have, however, led the way, repeatedly adding 
data to the mix with respect to the ultimate question of whether the application of §14141 
by the USDOJ leads to sustainable and positive change in directly affected police 
agencies.  
The first academic articles theorized about the positive impact §14141 actions 
could have on policing, recognizing its emphasis on systemic reform (Livingston, 1999, 
p. 14 [“A consent decree's most obvious benefit is to focus the attention of the courts, 
local officials, and police on the systemic problems in a police department”]; Levenson, 
2001; Walker, 2003; Stuntz, 2006; Harmon, 2009). The first criminological research 
which discussed §14141 did so from a broad context of police reform in comparison to 
other tools previously used (Walker, 2005; Ross & Parke, 2009; Walker & Macdonald, 
2009).  
Even with the plethora of academic research and application of theory to §14141 
litigation, relevant academic articles have identified the need for additional and more up-
to-date research and evaluation in this area.  
Chanin (2015) recognized the need for “more consistent data” and a “more 
thorough, nuanced analysis” to include a broader “assessment of officer attitudes and 
organizational culture.” Chain also recommended additional research to determine to 
what extent police departments could “achieve and sustain desirable levels of key 
outcomes, … despite a culture that may not reflect core reform values” (p. 184). In 
particular, Chanin suggested that “future research should continue to monitor these and 
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other pattern or practice jurisdictions, paying particular attention to identifying those 
factors that distinguish reforms that endure from those that erode” (p. 185). 
It has been recognized that “except for the findings from a few narrow studies, 
we know little about how or how well the Section 14141 enforcement program works,” 
although “there is some evidence that suggests that Section 14141 litigation works to 
spur institutional change, at least temporarily … few scholars have tried to tackle Section 
14141 litigation with empirical rigor…” (Harmon, 2017, p. 618, citing Chanin, 2015; Davis 
et al., 2002; Stone et al., 2009). It has also been noted that “most of the existing 
research has been conducted in the theoretical realm, producing limited empirical 
evidence” (Powell et al., 2017, p. 581). As suggested by Chanin, “[d]espite its close 
connection to fundamental aspects of the American democratic process, the legitimacy 
and accountability of police bureaucracies, and to public safety, pattern or practice 
reform remains dramatically understudied” (Chanin, 2012, p. ii). 
Chanin also noted that while theoretical writing on the management of reform in 
the policing sector exists, it “tends to be fragmented and underdeveloped” (Chanin, 
2012, p. 203). Chanin further commented that as a consequence of the underdeveloped 
theoretical evaluation of police reform “two issues of particular relevance to the 
institutionalization of pattern or practice reform” are “underdeveloped … (1) Which 
factors most saliently affect the process of institutionalizing organizational reform in 
police bureaucracies; and (2) How does one evaluate the success of efforts to 
institutionalize change?” (Chanin, 2012, p. 205). Chanin made a particularly salient 
observation relating to the quick and generally overall support of “pattern or practice” 
reform by legal academics and police accountability experts: 
It is also unsurprising that legal academics and police accountability 
experts would champion a process predicated on the enforcement of 
constitutional rights and the rule of law. Pattern or practice reform 
represents the combined hopes of police reformers, civil rights activists, 
defense attorneys, and legal scholars: A credible, law--‐driven process that 
capitalizes on federal authority to identify and remedy unlawful police 
behavior prospectively, structuring comprehensive, agency--‐wide reform 
around a set of widely--‐accepted precepts. Yet much of this excitement 
has developed in the absence of empirical testing or considered theoretical 
examination. (Chanin, 2012, p. 329) 
In that vein, a number of academic lawyers have theoretically examined §14141, 
as a police accountability mechanism (Livingston, 1999; Stutz, 2006; Simmons, 2008; 
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Harmon, 2009) and by 2016, academics began to look at theories and practices of 
community engagement in Consent Decree processes over the court of the Obama 
administration (e.g., Patel, 2016). 
Even so, Walker (2012), like Chanin, was concerned about the lack of 
information available regarding the sustainability of reform efforts made by externally 
mandated DOJ-initiated reform: 
… reformers and police scholars alike have given little attention to the 
question of ensuring that achieved reforms endure and become a 
permanent part of an individual department or of policing in general. The 
police literature contains only a few references to the institutionalization or 
sustainability of reforms, and the discussions are typically very brief. Part 
of the problem, Stephen Mastrofski and James Willis importantly note, is 
that police scholars face enormous difficulties in tracking “changes in police 
organizations over long time periods.” Scholars are naturally averse to 
examining subjects that pose serious measurement problems. Lawrence 
Sherman cynically noted more than thirty years ago that in studying the 
persistence of anti-corruption reforms it is almost impossible to determine 
if “a department was truly reformed to begin with.” (pp. 57-58) 
Walker then went on to note the absence of any “systemic inquiry into the current 
state of police departments where consent decrees or MOAs have been terminated to 
determine whether the achieved reforms are still viable several years after the fact” (pp. 
64-65). 
And, more recently, in 2017, more than 20 years after the passage of §14141, 
Alpert et al. noted that  
[i]n the most recent CDs, outcome measures have been added, and 
enormous amounts of qualitative and quantitative data are collected to 
establish compliance with the CD. However, these data are rarely analyzed 
or made public beyond the required summary reporting by the Monitors. 
(Alpert et al., 2017) 
Walker (2018) was still expressing concern about the lack of empirical data 
relating to §14141 interventions, commenting that, 
several SLS settlements have been the subject of formal evaluations. 
Some evaluations confine themselves to a few issues, or even just one, 
while others assess a broader range of issues and use multiple methods 
to investigate them. There is, however, no evaluation that attempts a 
comprehensive assessment of all the reforms and goals of a single DOJ 
settlement. Because settlements involve a broad range of required reforms, 
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with multiple impacts, a comprehensive assessment would be an extremely 
daunting challenge in terms of work effort and cost. (p. 1802) 
Walker went on to conclude that given that “the goal of organizational 
transformation in policing has received little serious attention from police scholars … we 
have no real understanding of the conditions necessary for major reforms to be 
sustained over the long haul” (p. 1840). 
4.2. U.S. Commission Reports 
A traditional way for American municipalities to deal with police scandals was the 
creation of “blue ribbon” commissions to evaluate what went wrong and to make 
recommendations for improvement. As noted by Levenson (2001), however, “one way to 
track the history of police abuse in this country, as well as the failure of reforms, is to 
review the never-ending Commission reports documenting police misconduct” (pp. 10-
11).300 
In 1961, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights concluded “police brutality in the 
United States is a serious and continuing problem in many parts of the country” 
(Hoffman, 1993, n. 5, citing, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Justice 26 (1961)). In 1965, 
the McCone Commission Report on the Watts Riots “identified the role of police abuse in 
that explosion of despair” (Hoffman, 1993, n. 31, citing Governor’s Comm. On the L.A. 
Riots, Violence in the City – An End or a Beginning? Pp. 27-29 (1965); Levenson, 2001, 
p. 11). By 1968, “the [Kerner] Commission identified the problem of police abuse as a 
major cause of civil unrest in America’s urban communities and made recommendations 
for reform” (Hoffman, 1993, n. 27, citing Kerner Commission, 1968, p. 1; Levenson, 
2001, p. 11).301  
 
300 For an overview of police scandals in New York since 1894, See, Baer & Armao, The Mollen 
Commission Report: An Overview, 40 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 73, 73 (1995). In addition, numerous 
committees and commissions have reviewed and recorded police scandals prior to the 1960’s, to 
include “the Lexow Committee of 1894, the Curran Committee of 1913, the Seabury Committee 
of 1930, [and] the Harry Gross investigation of 1950…” (Levenson, 2001, n. 53). 
301 “Twenty-seven years later, the Tucker Commission, established by the California Assembly, 
found that the ‘causes of the 1992 unrest were the same as the causes of the unrest of the 
1960’s, aggravated by a highly visible increasing concentration of wealth at the top of the income 
scale and a decreasing federal and state commitment to urban programs serving those at the 
bottom of the income scale’” (Hoffman, 1993, n. 31, citing Assembly Special Comm. on the L.A. 
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In 1972, in New York City, “the Knapp Commission,” was created to investigate 
allegations of systemic corruption in that city’s police department, and made numerous 
recommendations for external and internal oversight to control police misconduct 
(Levenson, 2001, pp. 11-12). Similar allegations of systemic corruption were identified 
twenty-years later and addressed by the “Mollen Commission” (1994).302 
In 1991, the beating of Rodney King resulted in a public outcry about police use-
of-force. That outcry led to the creation of the well-known “Christopher Commission” 
which examined excessive force issues at the Los Angeles Police Department. In 
addition, the same outcry led the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to convene 
the lesser-known, “Kolts Commission,” whose recommendations led to the creation of 
the first municipally-created police monitor’s office in 1993 (Hoffman, 1993, pp. 1484-
1485, n. 127). Similarly, the Christopher Commission report identified systemic problems 
in training and policy that resulted in a pattern of excessive force on the part of LAPD 
officers (Christopher Commission, 1992, pp. xx & 154;303 Rushin 2015, pp. 29-31). Other 
commissions reported on police abuse in Chicago (Chicago Police Department’s Office 
of Professional Standards, 1990), New Orleans (Mayor’s Advisory Committee on Human 
Relations, Report on Police Use of Force, 1993), and Boston (St. Clair Commission, 
Report of the Boston Police Department Management Review Committee, 1992) 
(Levenson, 2001, n. 113). 
The shooting of Amadou Diallo (1994) and assault against Abner Louima (1997) 
by New York Police Department officers “sparked another round of commissions in New 
York City” (Levenson, 2001, p. 13). And the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles resulted in 
 
Crisis, To Rebuild is Not Enough: Final Report and Recommendations (1992) (“Tucker Report”), 
p.12). 
302 Mollen Commission (1994). Anatomy of Failure: A Path For Success, The City of New York 
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of 
the Police Department. Retrieved from 
https://archive.org/details/MollenCommissionNYPD/page/n229/mode/2up. “The Mollen 
Commission favored an independent panel to monitor the Internal Affairs Bureau of the New York 
police department. This recommendation also became a standard for future Commissions on 
police misconduct” (Levenson, 2001, p. 12). 




its own commission reports, to include an LAPD “Board of Inquiry,”304 an independent 
report commissioned by the police union,305 and follow up reports commissioned by the 
Police Commission.306 
Although some of the Commission reports did result in the creation of permanent 
oversight structures that have reportedly resulted in greater police accountability,307 
Levenson has argued that “Commissions and Reports have been used throughout the 
United States to investigate and address police corruption. If history repeats itself, 
however, these studies are more likely to serve as a historical chronicle of police abuse, 
rather than a cure” (Levenson, 2001, p. 13). 
4.3. Causes of Police Misconduct 
Many theories have been put forward suggesting the causes of systemic police 
misconduct go above and beyond the individual bad acts of “bad apples” within a police 
department.308 
• It has been argued that police-community relationships have been damaged 
by “a law enforcement mentality” that treats young people in visible minority 
communities “as enemies” and due to political actors “whose constituencies 
 
304 “Board of Inquiry into the Rampart Area Corruption Incident” (March 1, 2000). Retrieved from 
http://lapd-assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/boi_pub.pdf. 
305 Chemerinsky, E. (2001) An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department’s 
Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 34:545.  
306 Richard E. Drooyan, Report of the Rampart Independent Review Panel (2000). Retrieved from 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/faculty/facultyPubsPDF.php?facID=4878&pubID=16; 
Rampart Reconsidered: The Search for Real Reform Seven Years Later (2006). Retrieved from 
http://www.lapdonline.org/search_results/content_basic_view/32828. 
307 In particular, the Office of the Special Counsel to the Los Angeles County Board of 
Supervisors, which provided oversight in the form of semi-annual audit reports relating to the 
activities of the Los Angeles County Sheriff from 1993 through 2014 has been described as 
“arguably the most effective [civilian oversight of law enforcement program] in the country” 
(Walker, 2001; Walker & Archbold, 2014, p. 53). Even so, the program was disbanded by the Los 
Angeles County Board of Supervisors in favor of an Inspector General Program in 2014 after 
investigations identified a culture of abuse within the Los Angeles County jail system, overseen 
by the elected Sheriff (see, LA County OIG website, retrieved from https://oig.lacounty.gov/). 
308 “Policing scholars have increasingly recognized that ‘the roots of police misconduct rest within 
the organizational culture of policing’” (Rushin, 2005, p. 5, quoting Simmons, 2008, p. 505). 
“Misconduct becomes routine primarily through the development of an internal organizational 
culture that passively permits wrongdoing. This sort of culture often develops through a lack of 
oversight mechanisms and is reinforced through training, punishment, and rewards … 
Organizational research shows that socialization and on-the-job training can make rule violation 
routine” (Rushin, 2005, p. 29). 
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are on the other side of the ‘thin blue line’ that separates [the] white middle- 
and upper-class” [] from [] minority communities.” (Hoffman, 1993, p. 1469); 
Scott, 2000);309 
• The “militarization” of police forces has been blamed for creating police 
cultures that support excessive force against lower income communities on a 
systemic basis (Hoffman, 1993; Levenson, 2001, p. 44 [to include the 
“declaration of war” against drugs or gangs]; Walker 2003, p. 10 [and the 
“clash between crime control and due process perspectives on the criminal 
process”]; 310 Harmon, 2009); 
• Actual racial bias on the part of a cadre of officers has been identified as a 
potential factor in some cases of excessive force (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993; 
Hoffman, 1993, p. 1474); 
• Inadequate supervisory and management attention for line officers (Hoffman, 
1993, pp. 1474-1475; Scott, 2000; Harmon, 2012 [referring to police 
department “leadership and the local political process” as impacting 
“institutional police practices”]; Rushin 2014; 
• Lack of “effective internal discipline or external controls or accountability” 
(Hoffman, 1993, p. 1482; Walker, 2010; Rushin 2014, p. 3205);  
• Judges’ willingness to “automatically accept law enforcement’s version of its 
encounters with defendants;” (Levenson, 2001, pp. 41-42); 
• “Localization, discretion, and the lack of a national regulatory mechanism” 
described as “facilitat[ing] widespread wrongdoing in the early-to-mid twentieth 
century” (Rushin, 2015, p. 2; Walker, 2003); 
• A “warrior mentality that has dominated American policing for decades” 
(Walker, 2018, pp. 1796-1797; see also, Rahr & Rice, 2015; PERF, 2015); 
and, 
• The willingness of police departments to accept the consequences of police 
misconduct as “a cost of doing business” (Rushin, 2015, p. 3 [“Departments 
could choose not to adopt proactive reforms as long as they were prepared to 
pay the costs of such a breach. And historically, many departments have done 
just that”]. 
As noted by Chanin (2012),  
incidents involving police use of force reflect[] many of the most pressing 
and intractable social, economic, political, and civic problems in modern 
 
309 “[N]ew collaborations between police and community present significant challenges in a 
constitutional democracy. At times, the ‘majority rules’ philosophy of the community and the 
conservative traits of the police combine to support police practices that the courts find 
threatening to the constitutional order” (Scott, 2000, p. 201). 
310 Citing, Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 149 (1968). 
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America. The anatomy of a police shooting includes issues of race, class, 
power, and influence. It raises questions about the place of government in 
society, the proper relationship between citizen and state, and the role of 
pluralism and politics in our daily lives. (p. 2) 
Others have also noted that  
tension between police and the community, brought on by the reality and 
the perception of widespread police abuse and racism, has been one of the 
main causes, and usually the precipitating cause, of each of the serous civil 
disorders in this century… (Hoffman, 1993, p. 1515; see also, Greenberger, 
2016, p. 201; Patel, 2016, p. 857; Douglass, 2017) 
In addition, the DOJ in its more recent reform agreements identified “inadequacies in law 
enforcement agencies’ recruitment, hiring, and promotion systems [as] significant drivers 
of police misconduct” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 32). The DOJ also identified the impact of 
“fatigue and stress” on officer “health, judgment, and performance,” which “thereby 
increase the risk of police misconduct.” Failures to provide the “necessary equipment 
and technology to support constitutional policing” has also been identified as a factor in 
allowing misconduct to occur or continue on a systemic level. Finally, the DOJ identified 
“links between [police] misconduct and institutional failures outside of police 
departments, in areas such as social services, medical and mental health care, jails, and 
court systems” (USDOJ, 2017b, pp. 32-33). 
4.4. Consequences of Police Misconduct 
The academic literature is replete with cautions regarding the consequences of 
police misconduct. The Mollen Commission (1994), appointed to investigate allegations 
of corruption within the New York Police Department, made the following observation as 
it related to “drug-related corruption”: 
The seriousness of drug-related corruption must not be minimized. Many 
have mistakenly characterized today’s corruption as cops “merely” stealing 
from drug dealers – or, in other words, punishing those who deserve to be 
punished. This is wrong. Today’s narcotics corruption involves not only 
cops stealing from dealers, but cops using their authority to permit dealers 
and narcotics enterprises to operate freely and flourish on the streets of our 
City. Even worse: today’s corruption involves officers using their police 
powers to actively assist, facilitate and strengthen the drug trade. Thus, the 
victims of corruption are not the drug dealers on the streets of East New 
York. Indeed, they are often corruption’s beneficiaries. The victims of 
today’s corruption are the thousands of law-abiding individuals who live in 
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the high-crime, drug-ridden precincts of our City… [Drug-related corruption] 
breeds [a] sense of abandonment and hostility that poisons relations 
between the community and corrupt and honest cops alike. And corruption 
victimizes the millions of law-abiding residents of this City who depend 
upon the credibility and effectiveness of the police to fight the war against 
crime that threatens us all. (p. 15) 
Chemerinsky (2001) painted a similarly bleak picture of the consequences of the 
“noble cause” corruption that was uncovered as it related to the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s “Rampart Scandal,” when he referred to it as “the worst scandal in the 
history of Los Angeles,” arguing that “[n]othing is more inimical to the rule of law than 
police officers, sworn to uphold the law, flouting it and using their authority to convict 
innocent people” (p. 549). Chemerinsky was not alone in the recognition that officers 
manufacturing probable cause, using excessive force to enforce “street justice,” and 
lying in court “subverts the justice system by removing the opportunity for a fair trial and 
relying on proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a basis of guilt” (Merrington, Lauch, Bell 
& Keast, 2014, p. 20; Caless, 2008). 
At the same time, shortly after the “Rampart Scandal” became public knowledge, 
public confidence in the police was found to be impacted, leading to the potential for jury 
nullification, and “additional costs in retaining and recruiting officers” with police recruits 
not being interesting in joining “a besmirched department” (Levenson, 2001, p. 17; see 
also, Miller, 1998, p. 189 [“Designing institutional rules and procedures that deter and 
punish police misconduct, but allow police the necessary discretion to control crime 
effectively has proven an arduous task”]; Chanin, 2012, p. 228 [noting that “performance 
crises,” including individual instances of high profile police misconduct, can negatively 
affect “employee morale and organizational support for leadership”]; USDOJ, 2017b, p. 1 
[commenting that “when police departments engage in unconstitutional policing, their 
actions can severely undermine both community trust and public safety”]).  
In addition, the very concept of “community policing” is based on the premise that 
the police require community cooperation to achieve the goals of crime prevention and 
suppression – “[c]itizen cooperation, in turn, is diminished by patterns of abusive police 
conduct that undermines public trust” (Walker, 2009, p. 483). 
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4.5. Police Conduct Control Mechanisms 
Even prior to the passage of §14141, there were numerous tools available in 
police reform, both internal and external. Each of these tools, however, has been 
criticized as ineffective in its own way. 
4.5.1. External control mechanisms 
• Federal civil rights litigation pursuant to section 1983: It has been suggested that civil 
damage awards are “inherently unreliable as [a] primary federal tool against urban 
police abuse.” Multiple reasons have been provided for this conclusion to include, 1) 
the willingness of political operatives to consider civil liability as a cost of doing 
business, rather than a motivation to change police practices;311 2) the inherent 
difficulty in proving excessive force and unlawful arrest cases; and 3) the common 
practice of indemnifying involved officers for any damages that are granted (Franklin, 
1981, p. 194 [“Individual and class actions brought by victims [of] police misconduct 
have questionable remedial or deterrent efficacy”]; Hoffman, 1993, pp. 1509-1511; 
Miller, 1998; Gilles, 2000; Levenson, 2001; Kim, 2002; Walker, 2003, pp. 18-19; 
Silveira, 2004, pp. 603-604; Jeffries & Rutherglen, 2007, pp. 30-31 [“Damages 
actions are notoriously unsuccessful in vindicating police abuse. Except in a few 
high-profile cases, usually accompanied by video-tapes or other incontrovertible 
evidence of misconduct, those who seek damages for excessive force by law 
enforcement routinely fail”]; Harmon, 2009; Walker & Macdonald, 2009; Rushin, 
2014; Rushin, 2015). 
• Federal criminal exclusionary rules: The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
“police actions unrelated to evidence gathering … are impervious to the deterrent 
effect of the exclusionary rule.” Legal scholars have tended to agree: “Since the 
judge is not the policeman's superior there is nothing that prevents the latter from 
 
311 See, Hoffman, 1993 & Curriden, 1996, using the Los Angeles Police and Sheriff Departments 
as examples of police departments that ignored large litigation awards and “were content to pay 
millions of dollars in civil rights damage awards in the five-year period before the King beating 
without initiating any significant police reforms” (Hoffman, 1993, pp. 1509-1510). See also, 
Chanin, 2012, p. 9 [The “evidence suggests that many ‘police departments do not keep track of 
which officers were named [in civil lawsuits] what claims were alleged, what evidence was 
amassed, what resolution was reached, or what amount was paid,’” (citing, Schwartz, 2010, p. 
1023). 
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doing as he pleases while forwarding cases on a take it or leave it basis." 
(Livingston, 1999, p. 821; Levenson, 2001; Harmon, 2009; Walker & Macdonald, 
2009; Rushin, 2014;312 Rushin, 2015). 
• Federal and state criminal prosecutions: The high standard of proof required to 
convict an officer of a crime has always been recognized as a factor limiting this 
means of controlling officer behavior. In addition, “attacking local police departments 
[though the prosecution of their officers] is also politically perilous;” (Gilles, 2000, pp. 
1410-1411; see also, Levenson, 2001, pp. 21-23 [“criminal prosecutions of police 
officers by either federal or state authorities are still relatively rare and occur only in 
the most egregious cases”];313 Walker, 2003, pp. 19-20; Harmon, 2009; Walker & 
Macdonald, 2009; Rushin, 2014, p. 3204; Rushin, 2014, p. 3203 [“As the numbers 
demonstrate, the DOJ only had the resources to investigate a fraction of civil rights 
[criminal] claims []. Moreover, the DOJ only sought criminal charges in less than 1 
percent of the cases. Among those cases where the DOJ actually went to trial on § 
242 violations, acquittals were not uncommon”]). 
• Commission investigation and reports: Often noted as failing to achieve reform due 
to their ability to only make recommendations and the lack of any mechanism for 
follow-up to implementation of those recommendations (Levenson, 2001). As noted 
by Walker: “blue ribbon commissions have made important contributions to American 
policing … Commissions at both the national and local levels, however, suffer from 
one inherent weakness: they lack the capacity to implement their own 
recommendations … By their very nature, commissions are temporary bodies that 
disband once the final report is released” (Walker, 2003, p. 21; Walker & Macdonald, 
2009, p. 497-498). 
 
312 “Some studies show that judicial policymaking in the form of the exclusionary rule can instigate 
change in police departments. These studies find that police departments faced with the 
increased cost of evidentiary exclusion are sometimes more likely to punish officers engaged in 
wrongdoing, reward officers that obtain evidence legally, and choose not to promote officers that 
put cases in jeopardy by obtaining evidence illegally. But another strong current of research 
suggests that court efforts to alter police department behavior through the judicial decree have 
been of limited use” (Rushin, 2014, p. 3199). 
313 Levenson also noted that “the criminal prosecution of so-call rogue police officers may actually 
have a negative effect on deterring police misconduct. Because criminal prosecutions are 
relatively rare and occur only in the most egregious cases, it is easy for other officers [including 
command staff] in a police department to dismiss the charged officers as aberrations” (Levenson, 
2001, pp. 22-23).  
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• Civilian oversight of police: “There is mixed evidence about the effectiveness of 
citizen oversight of police” (Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 498-499). Challenges to 
local oversight organizations include political compromises in the creation of 
oversight programs, lack of resources, and police, political and union resistance to 
the needs of such agencies to independence and transparency (Zeidman, 2005; 
Rosenthal, 2018; see also, Rushin, 2017a, p. 6 [“It is often expensive and unpopular 
for local political leaders to invest in oversight designed to reduce police 
misconduct…In most police departments, correcting a pattern of police misconduct is 
not as simple as changing an internal policy. It requires oversight. It requires 
additional manpower. It requires technological tools. This leads to an uncomfortable 
realization. Fighting police misconduct is expensive”]). 
• Accreditation: An attempt by states to ensure officers are able to engage in policing 
activities only after receiving appropriate training and maintaining appropriate 
standards. (See, Rushin, 2014, p. 3204 [“Other mechanisms for spreading best 
practices in law enforcement, like accreditation, also deserve some recognition, 
although accreditation’s usefulness is limited by the fact that it is voluntary and 
intermittently used by local police agencies across the country”]. 
4.5.2. Internal control mechanisms 
• Internal supervision of officers: It has been “long lamented that the ‘low visibility’ of 
much police work is a factor that complicates – or even frustrates – the supervision 
of line officers” (Livingston, 1999, p. 820). In addition, it has been noted that there is 
little impetus for police departments “to be introspective and examine their conduct” 
in the absence of external intervention (Jerome, 2004, p. 6). 
• Administrative Discipline: The failures of police administrative discipline to effectively 
address police officer misconduct is replete in the literature. (See, for example, 
Simmons, 2010, p. 410 [“The characteristics defining police culture-such as the code 
of silence, violence, and lack of internal discipline-make it difficult for the public to 
trust police and may make the public skeptical of [internal] efforts to hold police 
accountable. By their inherent nature, the operations of police institutions and 
investigations of misconduct allegations are ‘shrouded in secrecy’ and shielded from 
the public.” 
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• Early Intervention Systems: Legal scholars have noted that the expensive nature of 
the data systems needed to implement a working early intervention system is often 
an impediment to the creation and sustainability of such a supervision tool. (See, 
Walker, 2018, p. 1840 [“early intervention systems … require continuous attention, 
and there may be a natural tendency for complex programs to slowly erode and lose 
their focus”]). 
4.5.3. General comments on police accountability mechanisms 
While the above-noted commentaries point out the limitations to traditional police 
reform strategies, each strategy has certainly made “some positive contribution within 
the limits of its purview” (Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 500).  
Epp argues that the combined effect of tort litigation and other reform 
efforts has been a broader culture of “legalized accountability,” a pervasive 
effort by the law enforcement profession to reduce liability risks through 
written rules and regulations. Walker, focusing on a broader range of 
reform strategies, labels the same development “the new world of police 
accountability.” (Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 500; Walker, 2005) 
Even so,  
experts have criticized [the] traditional approaches to police misconduct [as 
being] litigation-based and adjudicatory in nature … although the 
adjudicatory nature of these measures makes them well-suited to 
addressing individual incidents, they offer little hope in spurring systemic 
change because they fail to emphasize proactive problem-solving. 
(Simmons, 2010, p. 391) 
In addition, as commented on by Rushin (2014),  
[a]round the end of the twentieth century, a growing number of legal 
academics agreed that [] existing regulatory mechanisms were insufficient. 
These measures [could] not force local police departments to adopt 
reforms aimed at curbing misconduct. Instead, these traditional regulatory 
tools only incentivize reform by raising the cost of unconstitutional behavior. 
(p. 3191) 
And Levenson (2001), while commenting that “the traditional remedies for 
dealing with police misconduct … [have been] individually and collectively [] inadequate 
to deal with the true nature of police misconduct;” also argued that the remedies “should 
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not be abandoned. Rather, a closer examination of each remedy reveals why it must be 
complemented with new models of police reform” (p. 18). 
4.6. Depolicing 
A recent examination of eleven jurisdictions that were investigated by the 
Department of Justice sought to determine whether police officers reacted negatively to 
DOJ investigations and settlements by through the act of “depolicing” (Chanin & Sheats, 
2018).314 Although the research found “little or no quantitative evidence of depolicing in 
the context of pattern or practice reform” (Chanin & Sheats, 2018, p. 118),315 additional 
data were recognized as being necessary to determine whether “police officers under 
DOJ pattern or practice agreements are differentially compliant with rules, norms and 
community expectations, in their practices, regardless of what their arrest data show” 
(Chanin & Sheats, 2018, p. 121). 
Even so, evaluation studies in Pittsburgh (“the Vera Institute study”) and Los 
Angeles (“the Harvard-Kennedy School study”) both attempted to test the theory that 
police enforcement activities are reduced as the result of the implementation of consent 
decrees. Neither study found evidence of “depolicing” and the Los Angeles study 
suggested that, instead, the evidence supported a positive impact on both the quantity 
and quality of police activity (Davis et al., 2002, pp. 54-57; Stone et al., 2009, pp. i, 31-
32).316 In both cities, however, police officers insisted that officer productivity was 
 
314 For a definition of “depolicing,” see Cooper, F. R. (2002). Chanin & Sheats (2018) further 
describe the concept of “dissent shirking” as a concept underlying depolicing as “a common 
expression of protest over the production of disliked output” (citing Brehm & Gates, 1999, p. 30). 
“Economists and rational choice theorists have argued that such shirking is in fact an 
understandable response to policies that increase the cost of on-the-job error or abuse” (citing 
Prendergast, 2001). “Others have suggested that dissent shirking may not be the product of 
strategic thinking but instead an emotional response motivated by feelings of anger and 
alienation” (p. 107, citing “Ferguson effect,” 2014; and Sutton, 2015).  
315 Chanin & Sheats (2018) still found, however, that: “[d]espite qualitative support for depolicing 
under these conditions, this analysis shows no evidence that officers responded to external 
criticism and intensified oversight brought on by the pattern or practice reform process by policing 
less proactively” (p. 105). 
316 As recognized by Chanin & Sheats (2018), however: “Whatever the explanation, news reports 
from several cities, including Cincinnati (Howlett, 2001; Werthheimer & Adams, 2001), Seattle 
(Ho & Castro, 2002), Chicago, (Lyderson, 2008), and New York (Celona, Cohen, & Golding, 
2014), detail officers’ descriptions of depolicing. More systematic research has also uncovered 
claims of depolicing from officers targeted by heavy external criticism (Oliver, 2015; Wolfe & Nix, 
2016)” (p. 108). 
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negatively impacted by the implementation of the federal consent decrees (Davis et al., 
2005, pp. 16-27; Stone et al., 2009, pp. 19-21).317 In Seattle, the federal monitor also 
examined claims of depolicing, in the face of police officer claims that they were less 
willing to be proactive while under the constraints of the Consent Decree. The Monitor, 
however, found no long-term evidence of depolicing (Ninth Systemic Assessment, 2017, 
pp. 59-63).318 
The LAPD study noted one important factor that would explain how officer 
perceptions might differ from the reality of officer consent decree productivity. The study 
noted that even before the implementation of the Los Angeles consent decree, officers 
had strong distrust of the LAPD’s accountability systems – as such, it appeared that 
such distrust would have already had a long-term impact on officer productivity that was 
not necessarily related or impacted by the existence of the Consent Decree (Stone et al., 
2009, p. 20). That fact, in addition to the inherent conflict identified by policing scholars 
between police officers’ desire to enforce the law and limits put on officer actions by 
requirements of Constitutional policing may mean that officers’ complaints regarding 
their ability to be “pro-active” may simply be inherent in the profession of policing and not 
significantly impacted by consent decree implementation. 
Negative impacts on policing identified early-on in consent decree 
implementation appear to be mitigated over time as the reforms become more accepted 
by rank and file officers (see, for example, Stone et al., 2009, p. 30 [“Some depolicing 
may have occurred in the first two years of the Consent Decree, … but there is no sign 
 
317 As noted by Chanin (2012), “Depolicing is a common concern among police officials in 
jurisdictions facing DOJ intervention” (p. 184); for example, see also, claims of depolicing in 
Portland, Oregon (Bernstein, M. (2012, November 23). Portland police union leader says officers 
are reluctant to use force and are getting injured because of DOJ agreement. The Oregonian. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2012/11/portland_police_president_says.html; and, 
New Orleans (Frontline, 11/13/2015). 
However, Walker identified a more nefarious aspect of police claims of depolicing, calling them a 
“form of [] political blackmail employed by police unions to tell mayors and other officials that if 
you scrutinize us too closely, or limit our actions, crime will go up and the public will blame you. 
This has been called ‘playing the crime card’” (Walker, 2017, p. 13). 
318 Even so, a Seattle Police Department officer ended up being widely quoted when he 
described his concerns with police accountability at the SPD by telling a reporter that: “[p]arking 
under a shady tree to work on a crossword puzzle is a great alternative to being labeled a racist 
and being dragged through an inquest, a review board, an FBI and U.S. attorney investigation 
and a lawsuit” (Leo, J. (2001, July 30). Cincinnati cops out. U.S. News & World Report, 131, p. 
10, as cited in Chanin & Sheats, 2018, p. 106). 
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of depolicing since 2002…”].319 That finding appears to have been supported by a study 
which examined the impact of consent decree imposed reforms in thirty-one 
jurisdictions, and found “a statistically significant uptick in crime rates” immediately 
following the entry of consent decrees, followed by decreased crime rates over time 
(Rushin & Edwards, 2017, p. 730; see also Davis et al., 2002, making similar findings 
with respect to misdemeanor arrests by Pittsburgh Police officers).320 
And even though Chanin & Sheets reported that “the field of criminal justice has 
very little theoretical or empirical insight into the duration of depolicing,” they then went 
on to document reasons why such “dissent shirking” can be expected to be temporary: 
The emotional response explanation allows for the possibility that 
depolicing will subside even if oversight is unchanged. Underlying this view 
is the assumption that officers are willing and able to overcome the feelings 
of anger or frustration that motivate depolicing. The narrative surrounding 
police performance also tends to be fluid, as public criticism and calls for 
increased accountability are typically short-lived (Chermak, McGarrell, & 
Gruenewald, 2006; Weitzer, 2002). As the conversation changes, the 
thinking is that, so too will officers’ behavior, as public opinion of the police 
improves, incidence of depolicing will subside. Stone et al.’s (2009) study 
found that the low levels of depolicing that occurred in response to the 
LAPD CD ended after 2 years lending some empirical support to this 
position. (Chanin & Sheats, 2018, p. 110)321 
Regardless of the ultimate conclusions regarding the existence of depolicing in 
the long term, as the result of consent decree implementation, Douglass (2017) pointed 
 
319 In evaluating the results found in Los Angeles, Rushin (2016) was even more emphatic that, 
contrary to officer perceptions, depolicing did not occur in the long-term: “No matter how you 
break it down, LAPD officers appeared to be more aggressive after federal intervention than 
before. These statistics are even more impressive, considering the fact that LAPD officers likely 
had fewer opportunities to execute arrests at the end of federal intervention than at the start. This 
is because the total number of reported crimes in Los Angeles declined over this time period by 
43.8%. This makes the increase in total arrests and minor arrests even more impressive. If 
officers do feel more reluctant to engage in proactive street policing, the arrest and stop numbers 
show no evidence of such hesitation” (p. 133). 
320 “We found some evidence of a decline in clearance rates for misdemeanors coinciding with 
the signing of the decree. The percentage of Part II crimes cleared went from the low 50s in the 
three years prior to the decree to the low 40s for the three years following the decree. However, 
by 2000, the proportion of misdemeanors cleared had climbed back into the high 40s” (Davis, et 
al. 2002, p. 55). 
321 Additional factors as cited by Chanin & Sheats (2018), also support the “time-limited nature of 
depolicing:” 1) police leaders suggest that officers’ long-term motivation to keep their cities safe 
will eventually override “individualistic and subcultural concerns” associated with depolicing; and 
2) over time, officers hired over the course of consent decree implementation will consider it to be 
the status quo and be more willing to work within newly created policies and practices (p. 110). 
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out an ongoing challenge when it comes to police morale and opportunities for change 
as a result of externally mandated reform:  
Regardless of how warranted the investigation and justified the findings, 
the extended focus on the department’s failures undermines officer morale 
and fosters resentment, which increases resistance to reform. It may also 
reinforce the community’s perception that the police are resistant to reform 
and that the problems are intractable. (p. 332) 
4.7. Sustainability of Reform 
Issues relating to the sustainability of the Seattle Reform effort will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 8, infra. However, as noted by Chanin (2015), “Scholars know little 
about the bureaucratic response to reform and thus remain relatively ignorant about how 
and why innovations in policing continue to erode” (p. 164, citing Walker, 2012). And, in 
fact, even though the Vera Institute of Justice conducted a follow-up to its 2002 
evaluation of the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police (PBP) in 2005, and found that the PBP “did 
undergo major changes and, so far, the changes have remained in place,” (Davis et al., 
2005, p. 41), since that time, there have been repeated concerns that the PBP has, in 
fact, reverted back to poor policing practices (Walker & Macdonald, 2009; Chanin, 2012, 
pp. 32, 183 & 311; Walker, 2012, p. 64; Rushin, 2017a, pp. 241-242). 
When Chanin (2016) evaluated the sustainability of consent decree reforms in 
Pittsburgh, Washington D.C., Cincinnati, Prince George’s County and Los Angeles, he 
found that “the record of police department efforts to achieve and sustain organizational 
reform is at best mixed” (p. 71). A key issue that Chanin identified as in need of 
additional research was the question of whether “a department [can] achieve and sustain 
desirable levels of key outcomes … in spite of a culture that may not reflect reform 
values?” (p. 110). 
Interestingly enough, much of the literature speaks to the need for a regime 
change, in the form of a reform-minded Chief and command staff, in order to achieve 
consent decree compliance. In fact, much credit for what was perceived as a successful 
reform effort in Seattle was attributed to the hiring of a reform-minded Chief and the 
hiring of some command staff from outside of the Seattle Police Department (see 
Chapter 7, infra). However, the question of regime change after compliance raises its 
own issues. As recognized by Chanin (2012): 
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A … component of the organizational context thought to affect sustainability 
is the continuity of support for change among agency leaders and high-
level staff. Leadership turnover brings with it the possibility of a shift in 
department commitment to the settlement, and has the potential to move 
agency priorities away from accountability, in the process rendering long-
term sustainability less likely. (p. 301) 
And, in fact, that is exactly what was reported to have occurred in Pittsburgh, with the 
election of a police union-supported Mayor and his almost immediate termination of the 
Chief who saw the PBP through the Consent Decree (Rushin, 2017a, pp. 241-242). 
The DOJ has spoken of the importance of stakeholder engagement in the 
sustainability of the reform process:  
All stakeholders must feel invested in the remedies presented in the 
[DOJ’s] reform agreements. Communities must be invested for the long-
term sustainability of reforms. Individual officers who, day-to-day, will carry 
out the reforms must be invested for the long-term durability of reform. And 
police and local leadership must be invested to provide the leadership and 
support a long-term commitment reform requires. (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 18) 
Even if the DOJ were to be able to effectively engage all stakeholders in support 
of long-term sustainability of reform, the need to have outcome measures that can be 
used to evaluate reform sustainability in the long-term remains, “beginning with 
systematic metrics that establish broad, agency-wide performance” (Chanin, 2015, p. 
167).  As recommended by Chanin (2015): 
Mandating the dissemination of use of force statistics, officer disciplinary 
decisions, and civil litigation results would be a solid step toward facilitating 
evaluation of future settlement agreements. As would requiring 
independent monitors to set and report on outcome-related goals, rather 
than continuing to perform what amounts to an exclusively process-driven 
assessment. (p. 184)322 
 
322 Chanin (2015) was responding, in part, to issues and concerns relating to the viability of 
measuring the impact of Section 14141 litigation on police practices. As indicated by Walker & 
Macdonald (2009): “Measuring the impact of consent decrees and MOAs on routine policing 
poses a number of very difficult methodological problems. In theory, the research questions are 
fairly straightforward. Are there fewer incidents of use of excessive force following the reforms 
compared with beforehand? Are there fewer incidents of race discrimination in arrests and traffic 
stops (racial profiling)? Are there fewer citizen complaints? Do citizens have a more positive 
opinion of the police department? Are there any unintended adverse consequences arising from 
aspects of the Consent Decree or MOA? These might include lower police officer morale, less 
proactive police work ("de-policing"), and reduced crime-fighting effectiveness. It is also entirely 
possible that consent decrees and MOAs have no measurable impact on policing whatsoever.  
Investigating these questions, however, encounters a number of serious obstacles. The central 
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Some of the participants interviewed in the first Pittsburgh evaluation study 
expressed concern about whether the Police Bureau “would return to ‘business as usual’ 
with low accountability and frequent misconduct” and the Vera researches concluded 
with a message that “there is still work to be done and that the momentum created by 
the decree” needed to be sustained. In the words of one community leader: “It’s not just 
a matter of management, but a culture needs to change. Five years is barely enough to 
achieve change.” Another respondent was quoted as suggesting that sustainability 
required a ten-year probationary period “during which the Police Bureau would be 
required to submit written reports to the Department of Justice” (Davis et al., 2002, p. 
47). 
In a 2016 evaluation of “the durability” of the reform effort in Washington D.C., it 
was concluded that the Department and its use of force policies “‘continue[d] to be 
consistent with best practices in policing’ and with the provisions of the earlier MOA,” 
although the evaluation also noted that “the quality of use of force investigations has 
deteriorated over the past seven to eight years.” In addition, the evaluation concluded 
that “MPD’s record in successfully reducing its use of the most serious types of force, 
including firearms, even during periods of increased crime …speaks for itself,” and found 
“no evidence that the excessive use of force [had] reemerged as a problem.” The author, 
the former court-appointed monitor for the MPD, Michael Bromwich, suggested that the 
evaluation “clearly demonstrates that it is possible to enact and sustain reform when a 
commitment to such action is made at the highest leadership levels” and noted that: the 
“MPD is plainly a very different, and much better, law enforcement agency than it was 
when DOJ began its investigation in 1999” (Bromwich, 2016, pp. 25, 53-54 & 114-115). 
The Bromwich findings regarding the need for progressive and dedicated 
leadership to sustain change appears consistent with Chanin’s (2012) earlier findings 
that “maintaining leadership continuity is also considered a pivotal component of 
sustaining changes to agency policy, operations and culture” (citations omitted) and that 
 
problem, … is the absence of valid and reliable data for the time period before implementation of 
the Consent Decree and MOA reforms. On many of the important questions, there are no data 
whatsoever (e.g., public attitudes about the police). On others, the available data are not usable 
for purposes of research. Data on use of force incidents, for example, are often non-existent, 
incomplete, or erroneous” (pp. 530-531).  
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“the ability to maintain continuity of the support for reform … is central to an effort to 
institutionalize change” (citations omitted) (p. 215).323 
Chanin (2012) also suggested that the means by which reform is achieved will 
ultimately have a long-term impact on the sustainability of any changes. “A centralized, 
top-down approach… is more likely to produce short-run efficiencies. Such an approach 
may contribute to creating a hostile implementation process, however, and may result in 
less sustainable, long-term reform” (p. 180). And along with other commentators (see, 
for example, Gilles, 2000; Levenson, 2001; Simmons, 2008; Patel, 2016; Douglass, 
2017; Walker, 2017; & Walker, 2018), Chanin further suggested that “sustainable reform 
is more likely in those communities characterized by civil society organizations, 
members of the media, local academics, and others, who remain actively engaged with 
issues of police accountability in the years following implementation” (p. 314). Chanin 
further concluded that although “it is rather hard to define, and its effects – like many 
other aspects of a jurisdiction’s environmental context – are impossible to quantify, there 
appears to be a link between community involvement and the ability to sustain pattern or 
practice reform” (p. 320). In addition, Chanin and others also have suggested that 
including more stakeholders in Settlement Agreement negotiations “can increase the 
legitimacy of the settlement in the eyes of potential opponents and would be critics 
(citations omitted) … and give key stakeholders a sense of ownership over both the 
process and the content of the agreement” (p. 352; see also, Simmons, 2000; PERF, 
2013; Patel, 2016; & Walker 2016).324 
Chanin (2015) specifically examined the sustainability of §14141 initiated reforms 
and calling for “further scholarly inquiry” into the issue: 
The field would also benefit from future research that moves beyond the 
use of outcome data to evaluate sustainability, beginning with an 
assessment of officer attitudes and organizational culture more broadly. In 
addition to contributing to more thorough descriptive knowledge, examining 
the relationship between outcomes, officer behavior, and department 
 
323 Chanin (2012) went on to say that “[i]nstitutional change doesn’t appear possible over the long 
term in the absence of a credible leader who sees value in the settlement’s principles and actively 
works to ensure that they remain closely enforced and high on the department’s list of priorities” 
(p. 300). 
324 Quoting ACLU Cincinnati attorney Scott Greenwood: “There has to be very strong community 
buy-in in the process. Reforms cannot be sustainable without community involvement” (PERF, 
2013, p. 29). 
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culture would help to broaden understanding of those factors that explain 
institutionalization success and failure. To what extent do these elements 
show a consistent picture of agency efforts to pursue and institutionalize 
reform? Can a department achieve and sustain desirable levels of key 
outcomes, for example, despite a culture that may not reflect core reform 
values? … Finally, future research should continue to monitor these and 
other pattern or practice jurisdictions, paying particular attention to 
identifying those factors that distinguish reforms that endure from those that 
erode. (pp. 184-185) 
Finally, Chanin (2015) also recognized the need to confirm hypotheses made by 
other commentators to include to what extent support from middle management is 
critical to sustainability (citing, Ikerd, 2010), or to what extent “robust efforts to educate 
officers to the ‘nature, goals, and benefits’ of [] reforms would impact long-term 
sustainability” (citing, Walker, 2012, p. 91) (p. 185). Rushin joined Chanin in his 
conclusion that “more research [] is needed to understand the extent to which §14141 
reforms are sustained after federal intervention ends” (p. 120). 
Walker (2018) subsequently called for more research into the sustainability issue:  
More research, involving other departments experiencing major 
accountability-related reforms, is needed to determine whether the picture 
that emerges from these two evaluations [Pittsburgh & Los Angeles] is 
unique to the two departments involved or is representative of the general 
impact of court-mandated reforms on officer conduct. It is premature to 
conclude that the challenges to the police subculture prompted by the 
SLS’s [Special Litigation Section’s] efforts will be successful in the long run. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of a significant change to the traditional police 
officer subculture exists and that represents an important achievement of 
the SLS program. (p. 1837) 
4.7.1. Sustainability through municipal civilian oversight 
A number of commentators have suggested, and the DOJ appears to have 
recognized, the need for some form of external oversight continuity to exist upon the 
completion of a consent decree to ensure sustainability of reforms. Walker & Macdonald 
(2009), specifically noted how the role of the municipal police monitor model of 
accountability “closely parallels the strategy of organizational change embodied in 
Section 14141” (p. 499).325 Dukanovic (2016) also discussed the pros and cons of using 
 
325 Walker & Macdonald describe the “police auditor model of accountability” as involving “a 
police auditor [who] reviews the policies and practices of the departments for which it is 
responsible and makes recommendations for change … as a permanent agency, a police auditor 
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internal auditors or monitors to ensure reform sustainability; interestingly, even though 
Dukanovic noted the danger of an “internal” auditor or monitor suffering from “regulatory 
capture” over time, he failed to consider the use of a municipally appointed monitor, 
auditor or Inspector General to continue reform efforts (pp. 929-931). 
Walker (2012) argued that “assuming that accountability reforms are instituted, 
… the best way to ensure the continuity of those reforms [would be] the police auditor 
form of oversight” (p. 84). After describing those aspects of the police auditor and 
monitor programs that helped to ensure ongoing oversight over police reforms, Walker 
concluded by arguing that: “police auditors are not only a necessary instrument in terms 
of sustaining police reforms, but can be a major instrument in a new and broadly defined 
police reform effort generally” (pp. 89-90). 
The DOJ itself, noted the need for civilian oversight agencies to “provide another 
mechanism for community members to engage with police practices.” The DOJ pointed 
out that “many of [its] reform agreements [] create, expand, or reform independent 
civilian complaint review boards or other independent civilian review systems, such as 
an Inspector General” (USDOJ, 2017b, pp. 29, 32; see also, Chanin, 2016, p. 107 
[commenting on the “relatively strong external accountability mechanisms” created by 
the DOJ in Los Angeles]).326  
Even so, community advocates, have been critical of the DOJ’s efforts in this 
regard. For example, Politico.com reported that “Clevlanders complian that the new 
police commission and an older civilian police review board lack the power to compel 
reform or discipline officers.” Suggestions have been made that DOJ agreements 
“shouldn’t shy away from requiring restructuring of city government to increase 
 
office has the power to revisit an issue and determine whether previous recommendations have 
been implemented.” Walker and Macdonald also described the “police auditor” form of oversight 
as involving “permanent governmental agencies with responsibility for auditing or monitoring the 
activities of law enforcement agencies.” (pp. 499 & 515-516). See also, De Angeles, Rosenthal & 
Buchner, 2016, for a comprehensive description of civilian oversight of law enforcement agency 
schemas. 
326 The DOJ identified the following cities as examples where jurisdictions were required to 
“create a system of civilian or independent oversight:” Los Angeles (2001), Washington D.C. 
(2001), Cincinnati (2002), New Orleans (2013), Portland, OR (2014), Albuquerque (2015), 
Cleveland (2015), Ferguson (2016), Newark (2016) & Baltimore (2017) (USDOJ, 2017a, p. 63). 
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accountability” (Politico.com, 6/29/2020; see also, criticisms of Los Angeles 
accountability mechanisms as quoted by Chanin, 2016, pp. 107-108). 
Other commentators have suggested that the DOJ needs to initiate a “follow-up 
process” to check on the status of reform efforts after the dismissal of consent decree 
litigation (see, for example, Walker & Macdonald, 2009; Dukanovic, 2016). 
4.8. Costs 
One of the most controversial aspects of consent decree implementation involves 
the costs attributed to the implementation of reform, to include the administrative and 
personnel costs required for independent monitoring of the reform process (Jaio, 2020). 
The average annual costs of monitoring alone have been estimated to run anywhere 
from $880,000 (Seattle) to $2.2 million (Los Angeles) (Rushin, 2015, Fig. 4.1; see also 
Kupferberg, 2008, n. 168 [regarding monitoring costs for Los Angeles and New Jersey]; 
and, PERF, 2013, p. 34, [comparing the Monitoring costs paid by several jurisdictions]). 
According to findings made by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) (2013), 
after convening a summit on §14141 investigations,  
The costs of achieving compliance, and the legal costs paid to monitors, 
are sometimes contentious. Some police chiefs believe that consent 
decrees that continue for many years have been too costly, and that rules 
about achieving [] compliance [] are overly strict. On the other hand, several 
chiefs said that the costs, while high, are worth it, in terms of improving 
police departments as well as reducing lawsuits that can also be costly. (p. 
7) 327 
And the costs of monitoring are only a small portion of all of the costs potentially 
associated with consent decree compliance. Start-up costs for the Los Angeles consent 
 
327 According to an LAPD Commander, the Los Angeles Consent Decree “cost us a total of $15 
million for monitoring. It would have been only $11 million if we had finished in five years. But I 
think the money was well spent in terms of preventing future litigation and gaining credibility with 
the community. So yes, it was a lot of money, but I think we got our money’s worth” (PERF, 2013, 
p. 34). However, the costs of implementation were controversial and opposing positions have 
been expressed: “Towards the end of the Consent Decree monitoring, the then-President of the 
[Los Angeles] Police Protective League [] argued publicly that the [court appointed monitor] was 
‘wast[ing] taxpayer dollars [with] incessant, meaningless auditing that does nothing to enhance 
public safety or ‘reform’ the LAPD.’” In addition, “[p]olitical critics of the Consent Decree [] focused 
their attacks on the high cost of monitoring services. [A member of the City Council] publicly 
criticized the cost of things like airfare and food paid to monitors who needed to travel from out of 
state to perform their duties” (Rushin, 2015, p. 161). 
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decree were estimated at between $30 and $50 million annually328 (Levenson, 2001; 
Ross & Parke, 2009), and the Cincinnati consent decree estimated $13 million in start-
up costs and $20 million annually to ensure compliance (Walker, 2003).329 As noted by 
Ross & Parke (2009): “[s]tartup and maintenance costs linked with successful 
compliance of consent decrees are enormous” (p. 204). And more than one 
commentator has suggested that “without financial assistance from either the [state or] 
the federal government, some departments will be unable to institute the reforms that 
are necessary to prevent future abuse” (Levenson, 2001, p. 29; Ross & Parke, 2009, p. 
204; see also, Walker, 2003, pp. 49-50).330 
In addition, costs are associated with the completion of a formal DOJ 
investigation, both on the part of the DOJ itself331 and the City attempting to comply with 
DOJ information requests (Ross & Parke, 2009; see also, Harmon, 2009, p. 15, n. 7, & 
n. 82 [“A full investigation is intrusive and costly for a police department no matter how it 
is resolved”).332 And, as noted by more than one commentator, additional costs in the 
form of additional lawsuits once a pattern or practice of illegality has been found may 
also be in the mix for a police department:  
 
328 Rushin (2015) estimated the costs of implementing reforms in Los Angeles, at “around $80-90 
million. When factoring in the cost of hiring the external monitor in Los Angeles, which came in at 
around $2 million a year, the Los Angeles price tag likely surpassed $100 million” (p. 106). See 
also, Rushin, 2017a, pp. 209-211, for a description of costs associated with consent decree 
implementation in Los Angeles. 
329 In 2012, Carl Marquardt, Counsel for Seattle Mayor Michael McGinn commented that, “[i]n 
Seattle, we calculated an overall cost of $40 million dollars for implementation of DOJ’s original 
proposal, and estimated between $6 million and $7 million to comply with DOJ’s proposed 
sergeant-to officer ratio” (PERF, 2013, p. 34). 
330 Even Walker, a strong supporter of Section 14141 actions, also recognized the challenges 
associated with the costs associated with DOJ required reforms: “Given [] serious financial 
constraints affecting all state and local governments [], there is serious cause for concern about 
the ability of some cities to bear the costs of agreed upon police reforms” (Walker, 2003, p. 50). 
331 “In 2000, the DOJ requested $100 million in additional funding to expand the number of police 
department investigations under § 14141. This increase in funding was supposed to hire an 
additional sixteen new investigators each year—suggesting that investigations are a costly 
endeavor. The average investigation ‘can take years as investigators wade through piles of 
internal records and personnel files’” (Rushin, 2014, p. 3226, quoting, Stockwell, J. (2002, 
December 22). Rights Investigation of Police Continues, Washington Post). 
332 The authors offered the following observations and questions: “It is also costly for the DOJ to 
conduct investigations and several questions emerge: does it make sound public policy to spend 
millions in conducting these investigations, and is it good public policy for the DOJ attorneys to 
spend their time and budget conducting these investigations?” (Ross & Parke, 2009, p. 205). 
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[I]nvestigative procedures undertaken by the DOJ might have potentially 
negative consequences for the jurisdictions and agencies involved. 
Findings from investigation reports could lead to an increase in Section 
1983 lawsuits filed against the city and police department as a result of 
newly discovered evidence of organizational misbehavior. (Powell et al., 
2017, p. 582, citing Harmon, 2009; Silveira, 2004) 
Arguably, however, many of the costs associated with consent decree reforms 
are no more than the cost of a jurisdiction having failed to provide adequate funds to 
support their police department in the first place. In the case of Cleveland, for example, 
the DOJ investigation identified inadequate equipment and training that was the result of 
ongoing, long-term failures on the part of the City to effectively fund the Cleveland 
Division of Police.333 In Seattle, the lack of a working data platform to help supervisors 
identify problematic officer conduct was identified as a cause of the SPD’s failure to 
supervise and administratively adjudicate police misconduct.334 As such, the argument 
goes, if the City had appropriately invested in constitutional policing in the first place, the 
costs associated with consent decree compliance would never have been needed 
(Walker, 2017).335 
In addition, many commentators have argued that compliance with a consent 
decree and the resulting impact of an agency engaging in constitutional policing are 
likely to result in substantial cost savings for the jurisdiction. As recognized by Levenson, 
 
333 Investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police (2014, December 4). U.S. Department of 
Justice. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2014/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf. 
334 Investigation of the Seattle Police Department (2011, December 16). U.S. Department of 
Justice. Retrieved from 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/5436d96ee4b087e24b9d38
a1/1412880750546/spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf. 
335 As argued by Walker (2017), “[w]ith respect to the direct financial costs of consent decrees, 
discussions to date fail to take into account the fact that the reforms mandated by consent 
decrees (e.g., an EIS, computerized arrest and force reporting systems, etc.) are today 
recognized as essential ingredients of a professionally managed urban police department. The 
Cleveland police department, for example, lacked a modern computer infrastructure for officer 
reports. Officers lacked in-patrol car computers and were completing routine reports by hand on 
paper forms. In addition to being inefficient in terms of officer time, the lack of a computerized 
records system prevents a department from systematically analyzing patterns of officer conduct. 
Thus, a consent decree should not be blamed for cost of improvements that a department should 
have implemented long ago” (p. 24). Walker (2018) also persuasively argues that “Many of the 
cost estimates for pattern or practice settlements are [] inappropriately inflated. Many of the costs 
are for reforms (e.g., an early intervention system, or the cost of installing a computerized record-
keeping system) that were long overdue and would have been incurred had the departments in 
question been properly managed to begin with” (n. 210). 
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 [i]t takes a major police scandal for the public to notice the many different 
costs of police corruption, [which] may include [] potential civil verdicts 
against the city,336 the costs of lack of confidence in the police department, 
and the decline of support and confidence in the criminal justice system. 
(Levenson, 2001, p. 17; see also, Chanin, 2012, pp. 4-5) 
Other costs have also been associated with police misconduct. For example, the City of 
Cincinnati suffered approximately “$14 million in property damage, hospital bills, legal 
fees, and police overtime pay” in the wake of violence caused by a police shooting in 
2001 (Chanin, 2012, p. 4). Chanin (2012) also identified additional costs associated to 
decreases in business revenue due to a boycott organized by civil rights groups , and 
additional “intangible costs, including a loss of police legitimacy, an erosion to the rule of 
law, weakened police-community relations and the perpetuation of racial stereotypes 
and structural inequities…” (pp. 4-5).337 
Accordingly, during its 2012 summit, PERF heard from a number of police chiefs 
who were supportive of the results of their consent decrees, believing the benefits to be 
worth the costs: 
• “The process of having a consent decree can actually be a benefit to your 
department. You can leverage the Justice Department to get some things that you 
desperately need. When I was chief at the Metropolitan Police Department in 
Washington, we would not have been able to make the changes we made without 
the Consent Decree. We would have encountered pushback from the union, and we 
would not have obtained the funding needed to develop an early intervention system 
and underlying technology infrastructure to support it” (PERF, 2013, p. 34, quoting 
 
336 “Estimated in the Rampart Scandal [to be] between $125 million and $1 billion…” (Levenson, 
2001, p. 17). 
337 Walker (2017) also argued about additional “human and social costs of police misconduct. The 
human costs involve the pain and suffering of individuals who are unfairly stopped, frisked and 
searched by the police, and are physically brutalized by officers. There are the costs to people 
who are unfairly arrested and detained in jail because they are unable to raise bail. The costs of 
arrest and detention include an arrest record and possible loss of job or inability to take care of 
family responsibilities because of detention. To the extent that stops or arrests exert a labeling 
effect on people, those police actions are likely to cause individuals to undertake more serious 
delinquency or adult criminal activity, thereby imposing severe costs to themselves and society at 
large. Finally, human costs of unjustified fatal shootings by police are immeasurable, although in 
recent high profile cases the ‘going rate’ in court settlements [is estimated] to be between $4 and 
$6 million for unjustified fatal shootings” (p. 25). 
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Philadelphia Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey, former Chief of Police of 
Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police); 
• “When they announced their desire to enter into a consent decree, it seemed 
intimidating at first. But I could see that they opened a door for me that my labor 
union had closed. And the door they opened included funding and political support 
for all my initiatives for the department” (PERF, 2013, p. 35, quoting Bob McNeilly, 
former Chief of Pittsburgh Police Department); 
• “Prior to the Consent Decree in Cincinnati, we paid out $10 to $11 million to settle a 
number of lawsuits. But since the Consent Decree, the ACLU has not sued the 
Police Department. That is a tremendous savings” (PERF, 2013, p. 35, quoting 
retired Cincinnati Chief Thomas Streicher); 
• “Without the force of a court order behind us, I doubt we would have obtained the 
funding that we needed from the state, over a sustained period of time, to develop 
the systems that the New Jersey State Police put in place to ensure internal 
transparency” (PERF, 2013, p. 35, quoting John Farmer, Dean, Rutgers University). 
In response to concerns over costs, the USDOJ, in 2017, represented itself as 
attempting to reduce costs associated with monitoring on a holistic basis: 
The Division’s current generation of reform agreements generally provide 
that the independent monitor should stop reviewing the agency’s 
compliance with certain provisions of the agreement once the agency has 
fully implemented those provisions, allowing the scope of the agreement to 
be narrowed over time and for the Monitoring team to focus its efforts on 
areas where the agency is still struggling. In a number of instances where 
a law enforcement agency has accomplished significant, sustainable 
reform but discrete issues remain, the Division has terminated a court-
supervised consent decree prior to full compliance and entered into a 
separate transition agreement to address the remaining issues. Such 
transition agreements reduce the overall burden of compliance and 
acknowledge the progress the agency has made toward effective, 
constitutional policing. (USDOJ, 2017b, pp. 35-36) 
One of the most common refrains cited by a number of commentators, however, 
is the argument that, although expensive, §14141 litigation “may ultimately pay for itself 
through decreased litigation costs” (Rushin, 2015, p. 117; Walker, 2017, pp. 24-25; 
Powell, Meitl, & Worrell, 2017; Walker, 2018; Rushin, 2017a).338 Even so, Rushin 
 
338 Rushin (2015) used the LAPD experience as an example for this conclusion: “the LAPD spent 
around $17,477,740 to settle civil rights suits filed in 2001, and $13,187,100 to settle civil rights 
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commented that “the financial burden of structural reform litigation falls on local police 
agencies over a relatively short period of time” (Rushin, 2015; Rushin, 2017a). As such, 
municipalities, particularly those with poor property tax bases, could easily face short 
term budget deficits which would be difficult to overcome even if long-term savings could 
be anticipated (Rushin, 2015, pp. 109-110; 117-118). Rushin (2015) specifically used the 
examples of Camden, New Jersey (whose police department budget of $65 million in 
2011 compared poorly with its tax revenues of only $24 million for that same year) and 
New Orleans, which was forced to increase municipal taxes substantially when faced 
with the costs associated with its consent decree (Rushin, 2015, p. 118). 
The costs associated with externally mandated police reform also have the 
potential to put the police department at odds with city officials. As previously mentioned, 
police chiefs have recognized the ability to “force the reallocation of scarce resources … 
when local political actors are unwilling to make the necessary investments in police 
reform” (Rushin, 2015, pp. 109-110; PERF, 2013). Such a circumstance could ultimately 
take vital funds from other important city services, regardless of comparable needs. And, 
as argued by Rushin (2017), the “forced allocation of scarce municipal resources raises 
some serious concerns. Decentralization in American policing leads to wide resource 
disparities between municipalities. The result is that some jurisdictions lack the 
necessary resources to invest in policies and procedures to reduce misconduct” (p. 211). 
A 2019 Criminal and Justice Institute report, written with the intent to help 
jurisdictions avoid becoming the subject of a federal consent decree warned that 
consent decrees “require a substantial commitment of resources from the jurisdictions 
that are legally bound to comply” (CJI, 2019, p. 6). In essence, “federal intervention 
transforms heightened investment in the police department from a luxury to a legal 
necessity” (Rushin, 2017a, p. 211). The ultimate lesson to be learned, however, appears 
to be that “from a purely fiscal perspective, unlawful police behavior is expensive” 
(Rushin, 2017a, p. 217), as is the cost of police reform in support of constitutional 
 
suits in 2002. By 2008 and 2009, these numbers fell to $2,194,729 and $626,599. It is not difficult 
to imagine these types of yearly savings quickly adding up to pay for the high initial cost of 
structural police reform” (n. 179). See also, a quote from a Detroit official stating that “the amount 
of money that we have saved on lawsuits that we have endured for years, particularly for deaths 
in our holding cells, have paid for the cost of implementation of the monitoring 2 or 3 times” (n. 
24). 
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policing. In other words, the costs of policing have the potential to catch up with a 
municipality one way or the other. 
4.9. City & Police Leadership 
One of the most common conclusions amongst commentators and academics is 
the finding that the success of an externally mandated reform is largely dependent on 
the support of reform-minded police chiefs and municipal or county political leadership. 
In fact, there has been suggestion that without the support of these local leaders, it 
would be virtually impossible to achieve sustainable reform (Rushin, 2015, p. 170; 
Chanin, 2016; Rushin, 2017a; Scott, 2017; Jaio, 2020). 
In Pittsburgh, it was reported that “the initial shock and disbelief among city 
officials that followed the news of the federal investigation soon turned into dogged 
determination to take a negative and turn it into a positive” (Davis, et. al, 2002, p. 10). 
The researchers evaluating the implementation of the Pittsburgh decree concluded that 
the Chief played “the most important role” in the successful implementation of the 
Consent Decree (Davis et al., 2002, p. 12; see also, Walker & Macdonald, 2009, pp. 
527-528 [referring to a February 2005 “Conference on Pattern or Practice Litigation” in 
Washington D.C. wherein “there was a broad consensus of opinion … that the 
leadership of the then-police chief [of Pittsburgh] was the most important factor 
contributing to the success in Pittsburgh”]). Walker & Macdonald (2009) also noted “the 
critical importance of leadership” in consent decree implementation, using the 
experiences in New Jersey and Los Angeles as examples (p. 528). 339 See also, Chanin, 
2012, p. 103 [“In short, the presence of strong leadership that places a high priority on 
 
339 According to Walker & Macdonald (2009), conference participants noted that “[w]hen the New 
Jersey State Police neared the successful implementation of its consent decree in 2006, there 
was widespread agreement among leaders in the agency that it had dragged its feet for the first 
two years and that progress toward implementation only began with the arrival of a new 
superintendent. Some observers, meanwhile, argued that the LAPD began making significant 
progress toward implementation of the 2002 consent decree after the arrival of Chief William 
Bratton in 2002” (p. 528). 
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the policy implementation process is seen as being critical to overall success (citation 
omitted)”].340 
Chanin (2012), having evaluated consent decree implementation in four 
jurisdictions,341 found that “police leadership had a significant effect on the 
implementation of pattern or practice reform” and specifically identified evidence from 
Cincinnati that “emphasize[d] the potential value of not just supportive but capable, 
proactive political leadership” (pp. 189 & 182; see also, Stone et al., 2009 [regarding the 
impact of Chief Bratton on the LAPD reform effort]).342 
At the same time that Chanin was making his findings, Walker (2012) was 
similarly commenting on the importance of police leadership in achieving reform 
commenting that “the enforcement of department-generated policies depends entirely on 
the will of the police chief executive,” although Walker continued by identifying the 
challenges faced by even a reform-minded police chief: “In turn, the will of the police 
chief depends on the commitment of that person, his or her administrative skills, and the 
power of countervailing forces such as political influence, the police union, and the police 
officer subculture” (p. 67).343 
 
340 Chanin (2012) also noted the importance of “support from political principals,” as well as “the 
consistent provision of resources, [and] the support of executive branch leadership for pattern or 
practice reform [as being] particularly critical at the earliest stages of the process” (p. 181). 
341 Pittsburgh, Washington D.C., Cincinnati & Prince George’s County. 
342 Chanin (2012) used interviews with Professor Sam Walker and Merrick Bobb (described as “a 
lawyer and police accountability authority”) conducted in 2010 – about 2 ½ years before Bobb 
was appointed as the monitor for the Seattle Consent Decree, concluding that: “Implicit in [the] 
argument [that police leadership is essential to externally mandated reform] is the notion that 
patrol officers will embody the reform effort only when normative and cultural signals from the top 
of the organization stress the importance of compliance” (pp. 189-190). 
343 In support of this contention, see quotation from an LAPD Commander who served with the 
LAPD’s Civil Rights Integrity Division from 2000 to 2005: “We went through three mayors and 
three chiefs of police over the course of the decree. So it obviously transcended political 
administrations and the administrations of chiefs of police. I think it’s fair to say that there was a 
perception that Bernard Parks, who was Chief of Police when the Consent Decree was 
negotiated, was not completely behind it. And I think that played into the fact that Chief Parks’ 
tenure was not extended by the police commission. But Chief Parks did start to move on it and 
take some degree of ownership of it. Later, when Chief Bill Bratton took over in 2002, he had a 
much different leadership style. I think he clearly understood what had to be done; he provided a 
strong sense of leadership; and I think ultimately that was one of the main things that helped us 
move the Consent Decree along” (PERF, 2013, p. 30). 
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In a later work, using data from five jurisdictions,344 Chanin (2014) reasserted 
“leadership” as “a key factor in explaining the success of implementation efforts.” Chanin 
went into detail, identifying Cincinnati as “initially hostile to the reform effort,” D.C. 
leadership as “allow[ing] the process to fade from view” toward the end of Chief 
Ramsey’s tenure, and the “complexity of the reform effort” in Prince George’s County, as 
barriers to reform due to the level of involvement by the police leadership-of-the-day (p. 
45). Chanin then went on to describe the “most successful leaders” as having been 
“actively involved in the reform,” leading to successes in Pittsburgh, D.C. and Cincinnati 
(p. 50; see also, Dukanovic, 2016). 
Rushin (2015) added to the commentary, correlating the impact of changes in 
leadership in consent decree jurisdictions with the success of reform efforts. Rushin 
cited “the hiring of [] outside, reform minded police chief[s] who support[ed] the goals of 
the federal intervention,” and highlighted the hiring of Seattle’s Chief Kathleen O’Toole 
(who had previously been appointed as the Monitor for East Haven, Connecticut) as 
positively impacting reform efforts. Like other commentators, he also noted the impact of 
the hiring of Chief Bratton on the Los Angeles reform effort (pp. 110-111, 166-167; see 
also, Scott, 2017). Rushin also commented that his “[i]nterviewees emphasized that 
supportive leadership was necessary if a department was to change its organizational 
culture” (p. 123). Rushin also emphasized, however, that “leadership must be supportive 
not just in the police department, but also within the broader city government” (p. 167). 
Rushin went even further than other commentators, pointing out that “there is no 
evidence so far that the DOJ can use §14141 to overhaul a police department with 
intransigent leadership” and that “it seems that in each successful case of structural 
reform litigation in American police departments, supportive leadership has played a 
critical role in the measure’s success” (p. 167).345 Other commentators went on to agree 
with Rushin, including Scott (2017), who concluded that:  
there is not much evidence yet to suggest that federal pattern-and-practice 
lawsuits can correct what a reluctant or incapable chief cannot. Indeed, 
 
344 Now including Detroit, in addition to the jurisdictions used in his 2012 dissertation. 
345 Rushin (2016) compared the experience of the Los Angeles consent decree, which he referred 
to as a success, with DOJ attempts to reform the Alamance County Sheriff’s Department (North 
Carolina). The Alamance County Sheriff resisted the DOJ reform efforts, taking the DOJ to court 
to fight their allegation of unconstitutional policing. Rushin went on to argue that Alamance 
County experience was an example of the limitations of federal intervention via § 14141 in the 
face of a resistant police leader. 
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where these federal consent decrees seem to have been most successful 
in bring about lasting reform, the jurisdictions being sued have hired a 
competent reform-minded police chief who in turn has used the Consent 
Decree as leverage to expedite the reforms that he or she was predisposed 
to push. (p. 610, citing Davis et al., 2002 (regarding Pittsburgh) & Stone et 
al., 2009 (regarding Los Angeles)) 
By the time Rushin published his book on Federal Intervention in American 
Police Departments (2017), he was arguing that “there is little evidence … to suggest 
that the DOJ can use federal intervention to overhaul a police agency with defiant and 
stubborn leadership” (p. 166). Scott (2017), was likewise concluding that: “federal 
pattern-and-practice lawsuits can serve as useful leverage but not as a sufficient reform 
force in themselves” (pp. 610-611, citing Washington Post, 11/13/2015, and The 
Marshall Project, 4/23/2015). 
4.10. Community & Constituency Engagement 
In its most recent publications (all published prior to the tenure of the Trump 
administration), the DOJ Civil Rights Division emphasized its interest in engaging with 
the community over the course of consent decree investigations, settlement agreement 
negotiations and the implementation of reform.346 In its 2017 report describing its §14141 
work, the DOJ went into significant detail to explain how it engaged community prior to 
negotiating a Settlement Agreement: 
Before negotiations over a reform agreement begin in earnest, however, 
the Division seeks community input regarding remedies to the issues 
identified in the Findings Letter. The Division holds community meetings 
and draws on relationships built during the investigation stage to involve 
the community in building solutions. Often the Division will present specific 
briefings on its findings to community representatives and hold meetings 
focused on particular aspects of those findings designed to drill down on 
specific remedies. The Division always encourages community 
representatives to present specific proposals for reform, in writing or at a 
 
346 As commented on by Douglass (2017): “Over time, the [DOJ] came to recognize the value of 
broader community participation and the community’s role expanded beyond merely providing 
relevant evidence to participating in the process of shaping and monitoring the reforms. Currently, 
the DOJ ‘almost always conducts a series of community or town hall meetings in different 
locations designed to create a form for members of the community to speak to their experiences 
and insights. These face-to-face meetings also help build relationships between community 
members and the lawyers, investigators, and community outreach specialists conducting the 
investigation.’ This evolution reflected the recognition that community involvement and support for 
consent decrees is a crucial factor in whether they succeed.” (p. 328, quoting Simmons, 2008, p. 
519). 
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community meeting, and works to incorporate those proposals into its 
reform agreements. (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 17) 
The DOJ also commented that its “current generation of consent decrees require 
some form of community outreach and engagement, including mechanisms to 
institutionalize strong relationships between the law enforcement agency and the 
community it serves.” In addition, the DOJ emphasized its commitment to the 
establishment of “Community Committees or Councils,” community-based mediation 
programs, and data collection and transparency “to make data available to the public in 
a responsible and accessible format” (USDOJ, 2017b, pp. 29-30, 31; see also, DOJ 
2017a).347 
Starting with Seattle in 2012, the DOJ began ensuring the inclusion of some form 
of “community engagement” section in all settlement agreements with large urban police 
departments. These sections required the affected cities to create some form of 
structure to involve community in the Consent Decree reform process. (Patel, 2016, p. 
816). Even so, community advocates have expressed “a high level of frustration with the 
outsider role inherent with non-party status” (Patel, 2016, p. 817). In Seattle, fairly early 
in the process, the organization created to assist in the reform of the SPD, the 
Community Police Commission (CPC), attempted to intervene as a party;348 but that 
request was denied by the court.349 Even though the CPC was granted “amicus curie 
status” to file motions on topics of interest, CPC research participants, like community 
advocates in other cities as described by Patel (2013),350 expressed a strong sense of 
 
347 DOJ (2017a) provided “examples where the Civil Rights Division required law enforcement 
agencies to develop and maintain community connections and partnerships; and foster positive 
interactions between officers and community groups, youth groups, and individuals … These 
examples may include requirements for town hall meetings, small group dialogues, ongoing 
assessment and improvement plans for community engagement efforts; and appointment of 
community liaison officer(s)” (p.  69). 
348 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 90 (filed 10/24/2013). 
349 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 106 (filed 11/26/2013) 
350 Patel (2013) described community advocate frustrations in Puerto Rico (pp. 828-833 
[describing the ultimate refusal of the Puerto Rico Police Department to work with a group created 
to promote community participation in the Consent Decree reform process, the “Communitarian 
Work Group in Regards to the Police Reform,” over a dispute over maintaining “the confidentiality 
of information and draft proposals.”]; New Orleans (pp. 834-838  [describing unsuccessful 
community attempts to intervene in the Consent Decree litigation, a report from the “Community 
United for Change” organization finding “a definite disconnect [between] the people of New 
Orleans and the monitoring team, and concluding that “the New Orleans consent decree process, 
despite improvements in a number of other areas, has made little progress in the area of 
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frustration at being excluded from what they perceived to be important parts of the 
reform process. 
With respect to Seattle, Patel (2013) suggested that the Seattle consent decree 
“highlights several shortcomings and opportunities found in the community engagement 
process, such as contestation over the scope of community members’ involvement, both 
in terms of the type and form of input” (p. 818). The CPC, created by a Memorandum of 
Understanding entered into simultaneously with the Settlement Agreement, included 
police union members and specified specific policy areas for which the CPC was 
responsible: community engagement, accountability, investigatory stops and data 
collection, officer assistance and support, and transparency and public reporting.351 Even 
though Patel recognized “praise from scholars and positive reports regarding the Seattle 
CPC’s involvement in shaping the direction of the policies implemented as part of the 
Consent Decree reform process,” he also noted, “genuine concerns remain regarding 
the actual power granted communities to shape police policies” (p. 825). Finally, Patel 
made findings consistent with the interviews conducted in support of this research study:  
Today, members of the CPC question the DOJ's motives in creating the 
oversight body and worry their function is to rubber stamp the parties' 
reforms, rather than engage in community-driven decision making to effect 
a long-term shift in power between police and communities subject to police 
practices. (p. 824). 
 
community engagement. The rigorous intervention practice with this suit suggests discontent on 
the part of several community constituents and government agencies”]; Portland, OR (pp. 838-
847 [while highlighting an “historic” opportunity for community to participate in a two-day “fairness 
hearing” before the settlement agreement was approved by the court and the granting of 
“enhanced amici status” to a community group, ultimately noted that “by forcing the community to 
contest and organize simply to validate its role in the process, limited, community-based 
resources [were] taken away from innovative solution generation over substantive issues within 
the reform process”]; Cleveland (pp. 847-851 [describing community concerns with the 
Settlement Agreement-created Community Police Commission relating to its effectiveness and 
selection processes]; Albuquerque (pp. 851-856 [describing community criticism of settlement 
agreement created “Community Policing Councils,” and concluding that by failing to “prioritize[e] 
community voices, the Consent Decree’s remedies fail[ed] to capitalize on community knowledge 
and pose significant accountability problems from a democratic perspective”]; and Ferguson (pp. 
862-867 [noting community criticism of the settlement agreement created “Citizen Review Board,” 
intended “give disenfranchised residents a voice,” as the result of “broad language [used] for 
many of its requirements.”] 




As recognized by Patel, most of the literature relating to DOJ consent decree 
inclusion of community engagement provisions has been positive. Walker (2018) 
specifically noted that “the first generation of consent decrees [were] barebones 
documents, devoted entirely to the required reforms, with little discussion of the context 
of those reforms.” Walker then went on to credit the DOJ for its “second generation 
settlements” which “by contrast typically provide introductory narratives describing the 
social, political and historical context of the police department as a way of explaining the 
pattern of misconduct that has been found.” Walker believed that these changes were an  
effort to provide the public with a better understanding of police problems 
[and] reflects one of the most important developments in thinking about 
policing in America in recent years … the importance of public trust and 
confidence in local police agencies as a necessary predicate to enhancing 
legitimacy of and public cooperation with those agencies. (pp. 1808-1809). 
Walker (2017) also positively noted the DOJ’s recent inclusion of “formal 
procedures for giving community residents a direct voice both in the investigation stage 
of the DOJ’s pattern or practice program and in the implementation of a settlement,” 
specifically noting the Seattle, Portland and Cleveland agreements (p. 18; see also, 
Walker, 2018). Similar positive comments were made by Chanin (2017a) with respect to 
the Ferguson agreement which he described as being “oriented toward the community 
and includ[ing] several provisions designed ‘to promote and strengthen community 
partnerships and positive interactions between officers and Ferguson residents” (p. 267). 
The inclusion of community outreach provisions in the “second generation” of 
Settlement Agreements did not come from nowhere. There was initially substantial 
criticism of the decision by Congress not to allow private parties the opportunity to 
initiate actions for relief nor to intervene in DOJ actions (see, for example, Miller, 1998, 
pp. 173-178; Gilles, 2000, p. 1385-1386; Silveira, 2004; Harmon, 2009) and the lack of 
opportunity for community involvement to “influence the negotiation, design, or 
implementation of a Section 14141 consent decree” (Miller, 1998, p. 178; Gilles, 2000, 
pp. 1413-1414, 1425; Levenson, 2001, p. 30; Silveira, 2004; Simmons, 2008; 
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Kupferberg, 2008;352 Ross & Parke, 2009, p. 203; Simmons, 2010, p. 379; Chanin, 
2012;353 Walker, 2018354).  
In addition, the DOJ, after conducting a “roundtable” involving 100 law 
enforcement officials, researchers and consultants, acknowledged that “from the outset, 
there seemed to be consensus among participants that in addition to legal 
representatives, the [reform] process should involve police officials, subject-matter 
experts, labor unions and community representatives as well as other relevant parties” 
(DOJ, 2011, p. 4). Even so, there still appears to be disagreement between the DOJ and 
some commentators on whether third parties should be permitted to participate in 
settlement agreement negotiations, with the DOJ excluding third parties from being 
directly involved in settlement negotiations as a matter of practice and some 
commentators calling for direct community and police union involvement in those 
negotiations (see, for example, Chanin, 2017a, p. 265 [arguing that “while [community 
groups] may appreciate the opportunity to meet with and express their preferences to 
DOJ staff, proxy access cannot replace formal participation in the negotiation process”]). 
Multiple authors, however, have opined that “local support for reform among 
community leaders and individual citizens is critical to implementing and sustaining 
organizational change” (Chanin 2017b, p. 267, citing Chanin, 2015, Skogan, 2008 & 
Walker, 2012). And many commentators have cited the Cincinnati collaborative 
agreement as having been successful, in large part, due to its heavy reliance on 
 
352 Noting criticism of civil rights groups and community members who were never notified of a 
joint motion by the DOJ and the State of New Jersey to end consent decree oversight (p. 153). 
353 Chanin (2012) argued that “[s]imply the process of participating in negotiations can increase 
the legitimacy of the settlement in the eyes of potential opponents and would-be critics (Tyler 
2003; Tyler and De Cremer 2005). Participation can also give key stakeholders a sense of 
ownership over both the process and the content of the agreement.” With those thoughts in mind, 
Chanin recommended that “parties to the settlement process adopt a broad, grassroots effort to 
incorporate the views of the community. Whether through the use of focus groups, interviews, 
surveys, or other techniques, providing unorganized community members a chance to participate 
in the development of the settlement agreement - and thus ownership over the process and the 
content - has the potential to galvanize support for the reform effort and begin to develop the kind 
of broad commitment needed to sustain the initiative long after the DOJ and the monitor teams 
have left town” (p. 352). 
354 Walker (2018) referred to a 2009 unpublished report created by “an ad hoc meeting of police 
accountability experts,” that “discussed a variety of issues related to Section 14141 litigation” and 
recommended to the DOJ that it “should make the involvement of community groups in pattern or 
practice investigations, negotiations, and litigation standard operating procedure from the 
beginning of the process” (n. 221). 
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community involvement (Simmons, 2008; Chanin, 2012; PERF, 2013; Chanin, 2014; 
Rushin, 2015; Greenberger, 2016; Patel, 2016; Scott, 2017; Walker 2017). 
4.11. USDOJ Resourcing 
Many academics and commentators have discussed the problems associated 
with limited DOJ resources and the impact they have had on the ability of the USDOJ to 
fairly and objectively pursue problem departments throughout the U.S.  
Early DOJ messaging indicated an intent at first to only bring cases that were 
“sure, solid, cases that help establish good law,” with the recognition that the Civil Rights 
Division would need to “borrow resources from other divisions” in order to fully 
implement the law (Curriden, 1996 [quoting then then-Deputy Attorney General in 
charge of the Civil Rights Division]). In 1998, in an attempt to ensure its first two consent 
decrees had a wider impact on police departments nationally, the DOJ was giving advice 
to police departments seeking to avoid the attention of the DOJ’s Special Litigation 
Section by suggesting that they “would be well-advised to undertake changes in their 
operations consistent with the provisions of the [first two DOJ initiated consent decrees 
in] Pittsburgh and Steubenville” (Livingston, 1999, pp. 819-820).355 
By 2013, DOJ was once again providing advice on how to avoid a federal 
investigation and a consent decree, by advising departments to  
1) adopt[] strong policies on key issues such as use of force; (2) ensure[] 
that officers are trained and managed so the policies will be followed; and 
(3) develop[] strong management and supervision measures, … to help 
ensure that police managers are aware of and can quickly respond to 
problems as they develop. (PERF, 2013, pp. 7-8) 
And, while DOJ Settlement Agreements and MOU’s were described as “very useful tools 
for people in other jurisdictions to review, because everyone can see the kinds of 
practices and mechanisms for good police services that have been agreed between a 
jurisdiction and the Department of Justice,” agencies were warned that they could not be 
used as “a cookbook for what every department needs to do. There are unique 
 
355 Referencing, Cop Brutality (1998, March 15). Weekend All Things Considered, National Public 
Radio (featuring Steven Rosenbaum, Chief of Special Litigation, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of 
Justice). 
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circumstances facing each jurisdiction, and the delivery of police services is not the 
same everywhere” (PERF, 2013, p. 11 [quoting the then-Chief of the DOJ’s Special 
Litigation Section]). 
While many commentators complained about the lack of resources available to 
the DOJ to systematically attack unconstitutional police practices on a nation-wide scale 
(see, for example, Miller, 1998; Jerome, 2005; Jeffries & Rutherglen, 2007; Harmon, 
2009; Walker & Macdonald, 2009; Harmon, 2012; Chanin, 2012; Rushin 2015; Rushin, 
2017a), it was Rushin (2015) who identified these resource limitations in the most 
dramatic way, referring to the chances of being targeted by the DOJ as being akin to “a 
messy and imprecise … enforcement lottery” (pp. 64-65). With this description, Rushin 
highlighted the lack of procedural justice described by city officials all over the country 
(to include Seattle) when they professed shock and surprise that their city was targeted 
by the DOJ above all other poorly performing police agencies in the country. 
Rushin (2017) elaborated on this point when he identified the following problems 
with §14141 enforcement actions: first, the DOJ only responds to police misconduct “via 
piecemeal litigation after it successfully identifies a problem police department;” second, 
“between 1994 and 2013, the [DOJ] investigated only 0.017% of police departments 
annually … and, the [DOJ] intervened in only 0.006% of the police departments 
annually.” Rushin argued that “given these lottery-like odds, a rational police chief has 
little motivation to change his behavior because of the unlikely threat of federal 
intervention” (pp. 17-18). Ultimately, Rushin commented that the federal government 
lacks both the ability to systemically identify those departments engaging in systemic 
unconstitutional behavior and the necessary resources to target all of the departments it 
may identify. 
4.12. Consent Decree Success Stories 
“Efforts at police reform will be most effective when the police organization 
itself is involved in the process and, ultimately, when reform involves not 
simply adherence to rules in the face of punitive sanctions, but a change in 
the organizational values and systems to which both managers and line 
officers adhere”  
(Livingston, 1999, p. 850). 
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There have been a number of consent decree success stories, according to 
commentators and academics, all which seem to have involved one common factor: a 
police leadership committed to reform. The stories, coming out of Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, 
Los Angeles, Washington D.C. New Orleans and Seattle, all involved either new chiefs 
brought in to enact reforms (Los Angeles & Seattle) or reform-minded chiefs who either 
eventually embraced the reform effort (Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & New Orleans) or who 
invited the DOJ into the city in the first place (Washington D.C.). 
In describing the Los Angeles case as a success, Rushin (2015) built on findings 
made by Harvard researchers (Stone et al., 2009) and by Chanin (2012), finding that 
federal intervention “forced Los Angeles to make a concerted investment in police reform 
measures [which] … led to substantial improvements in how the LAPD internally audited 
and responded to officer behavior.” Rushin also noted that “the initiation of federal 
intervention also correlated with a change in leadership atop the LAPD [that] … 
contributed to the measure’s success in Los Angeles.” Finally, Rushin concluded that the 
according to the data he reviewed, the LAPD was able to reform “without significant 
overall cost … through reductions in civil liability for civil rights violations [and without] … 
any reductions in police efficiency or effectiveness.” However, Rushin, also concluded 
that §14141 litigation appears “most effective in agencies that are supportive of external 
intervention” (p. 170).  
In Washington D.C. a Republican Attorney General was quoted as saying: “these 
reforms have been implemented without impairing the ability of the police department to 
fight crime. In fact, last year we saw a decline in the number of murders and in the crime 
indexed in the District of Columbia.” And, officer involved shootings reportedly fell 78% 
from 1998 to 2000 with excessive force complaints falling 36% from 1999 to 2000 (Kim, 
2002, p. 777; 356  see also, Chanin, 2012).  
The court-appointed monitors were often effusive when completing their work, to 
include the D.C. monitor who reported in January 2008 that the MPD “has substantially 
 
356 Citing, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General News Conference with D.C. Mayor Anthony 
Williams and D.C. Police Chief Charles Ramsey (2001, June 13). Retrieved from 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/mpdpressconf.htm.  
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transformed itself for the better since the late 1990s” (D.C. Monitor Report, 2008, p. 4)357 
and the New Jersey monitor who concluded that “the agency appears to have become 
self-monitoring and self-correcting to a degree not often observed in American law 
enforcement” (New Jersey Monitoring Report, 2007, p. 4).358 Similarly, the Cincinnati 
Monitor’s final report referred to its reform process as “one of the most successful police 
reform efforts ever undertaken in this Country” (See Cincinnati Monitoring Report, 2008, 
pp. 55-56).359 And although the reforms in Cincinnati appear to have endured (Chanin, 
2015; 360 Simmons, 2010; Chanin 2016; Greenberger, 2016; Chanin, 2017a, p. 265 
[referring to Cincinnati as being “widely lauded as a model for effective, durable reform”]; 
Scott, 2017), even though the court-appointed monitor in D.C. was generally positive 
about the sustainment of reforms in Washington in 2016, Chanin reported “the picture in 
Washington DC [as being] difficult to interpret” (Chanin, 2015; 361 Bromwich, 2016). 
New Orleans, which started with conflicts between the City and the DOJ 
regarding the hiring of a monitor and the costs associated with the reform effort, has also 
been described as a success. The federal judge assigned to the decree, in an article 
written with NOPD staff, asserted that as a result of the Consent Decree, the “MOPD 
 
357 Michael Bromwich, Twenty-Third Quarterly Report of the Independent Monitor 4 (2008). 
Retrieved from http://www.policemonitor.org/080131report.pdf. 
358 Public Management Resources, Monitors' Sixteenth Report iv (2007), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/monitors-report-16.pdf. 
359 The report concluded that: “The Cincinnati Collaborative has been the most ambitious police 
reform effort ever attempted in this Country. The implementation of both a Department of Justice 
Memorandum of Agreement and a court ordered Collaborative Agreement increased the 
complexity of this endeavor. The Parties’ performances under the Agreements were initially 
halting and defensive. With time and the emergence of impressive leadership throughout the 
Cincinnati Community, significant compliance with the Agreements were achieved resulting in the 
Cincinnati Collaborative being one of the most successful police reform efforts ever undertaken in 
this Country.” 
Retrieved on 10/26/20 from: https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/linkservid/97D9709F-F1C1-
4A75-804C07D9873DC70F/showMeta/0/. 
360 With respect to Cincinnati, Chanin (2015) concluded that “[s]ix years removed from DOJ and 
monitor oversight, the Department has experienced little or no backsliding, a finding supported by 
consistent reductions in undesirable outcomes, including use of force incidence and allegations of 
abusive or unlawful behavior. In short, the reform effort in Cincinnati appears to have transformed 
the CPD” (pp. 179-180). 
361 Chanin (2015) noted that “[s]ignificant reductions in force-based civil litigation and related 
payouts since 2003 suggest that both the frequency and severity of MPD misconduct has 
declined. [However,] [a] spike in allegations of misconduct complicates the picture, as does the 
startling number of MPD officers that have faced criminal charges in the postreform years” (p. 
183). 
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has build the infrastructure to manage change effectively” and that “[n]ow, other police 
agencies are looking to the New Orleans Police Department for guidance on 
implementing reforms” (Morgan et al., 2017, 276, citing Crockett, 2017;362 NOPD, 
2017;363 PERF 2016;364 and Texas A&M University, 2016365). 
Even so, Chanin suggested that in some cases, such as Prince George’s 
County, meaningful reform “failed to take root” and that reform efforts in Pittsburgh 
“appear[ed] to have taken a significant step backwards in the years following the 
implementation of the Consent Decree” (Chanin, 2012, p. 323; Chanin, 2015). At the 
same time, Walker (2017) was arguing that while “true, there has been backsliding in 
some departments, but in no case has a DOJ settlement completely failed” (p. 29). 
In addition, Chanin (2012), made what appears to have been an astute 
observation of the circumstances under which some of the Consent Decrees in his study 
were terminated, pointing out that the termination of the decrees appeared to be “a fait 
accompli, an event pre-determined to occur at a mutually agreed-upon date, almost 
regardless of what the facts dictate” (pp. 336). Specifically, he noted that,  
Notwithstanding the delays and inefficiencies experienced while 
implementing key components of the settlement agreement, two of four 
agencies (Pittsburgh and Cincinnati) were released from DOJ oversight on 
time. Two other agencies (Washington D.C. and Prince George’s County 
were released after the settlement terms were extended by two years, 
though notable deficiencies remained in each department. (p. 336) 
And even though decrees in Los Angeles and Detroit have become almost 
legendary due to the length of time before their ultimate termination (twelve years and 
thirteen years respectively), and even though Chanin (2012) recognized “counter-
 
362 Crockett, J. (2017, January 16). NOPD police chief to meet with U.S. House Speaker. WDSU6 
News. Retrieved from http://www.wdsu.com/article/nopd-chief-to-meet-with-us-housespeaker-
monday/8601095. 
363 NOPD. (2016, August 23). NOPD hosting Baltimore Police Department leadership this week. 
Retrieved from http://www.nola.gov/nopd/press-releases/2016/20160823-nopdhosting-baltimore-
police-department/Office of the Consent Decree Monitor. 
364 Police Executive Research Forum. (2016, July–September). New Orleans Police Implement 
Peer Intervention Program, 30(2). Retrieved from 
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Subject_to_Debate/Debate2016/debate_2016_julsep.pdf. 
365 Implementation of police department consent decrees: Working together toward institutional 
change. (2016, November 3–5). Texas A &M University School of Law and Tarleton State 
University. 
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examples” in the experiences of the state of New Jersey (ten years) and the Pittsburgh 
Office of Municipal Investigation (nine years), his suggestion that “the DOJ prefers to 
limit the implementation process to a maximum of the original contract date plus two 
years” seems to ring true.366 In the Seattle example, although the City has recently 
entered year-eight of its consent decree process, the DOJ supported the initial finding of 
“full and effective compliance” after five and one-half years and opposed the Court’s 
finding that the SPD had fallen partially out-of-compliance in year-six.367 I would argue 
that the Seattle example appears to support Chanin’s overall conclusion that, for various 
reasons, to include “issues of politics,” “concerns over federalism,” “matters of 
symbolism,” and the law of “diminishing returns,” the DOJ has strong incentives to 
complete consent decrees “on time” or as shortly thereafter as possible, regardless of 
the actual impact of the reform effort. 
4.13. Future Research 
As previously described, even though §14141 has been in use for more than 
twenty years and has been used to create consent decrees and memorandums of 
agreement involving more than forty jurisdictions, academic research into the areas of 
effectiveness and sustainability remains elusive. Some of outstanding research 
questions include: 
• “What changes have [consent] decrees produced and what unintended 
consequences have they brought about?” (Livingston, 1999, p. 858). To include 
the need for further empirical evidence to support the framework developed by 
 
366 Chanin (2012) further theorized that “issues of politics and concerns over federalism seem to 
have as much, if not more influence over how and when affected departments will be released 
from DOJ oversight, than do matters of technical reform in police operations.” Chanin recognized 
“other plausible [theories] as well:” to include, that “matters of symbolism” are taken into account 
– where the importance of sending a message to the department and the public of the DOJ’s faith 
in the department are considered, as well as the recognition of the harms of long-term reform 
efforts that could undermine departmental and city leadership and community faith in local 
policing. Finally, Chanin noted that “the concept of diminishing returns” could be applied to the 
continuing use of DOJ resources on any one specific police department (pp. 336-338). 
367 See U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 3-1 (Settlement Agreement), filed July 27, 2012; Document 
No. 422 (DOJ Motion in Support of finding of Full and Effective Compliance), filed October 13, 
2017; Document No. 528 (DOJ Motion in Opposition to Finding of Non-Compliance), filed 
February 13, 2019. The DOJ also supported a finding of compliance on the part of the LAPD, 
which was subsequently ridiculed by the assigned federal judge who subsequently extended the 
consent decree by an additional three years (see Chapter 2.3, Section II.B., supra). 
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the DOJ to impose police reform through policies, training, supervision and 
discipline, and involving the following questions: 
• Does the Consent Decree process “accomplish what it is designed to do?” 
(Chanin, 2012, p. 356) 
• Is the DOJ framework “capable of controlling discretion and holding officers 
accountable?” (Chanin, 2012, p. 356) 
• Does the DOJ framework result “in limiting the use of excessive force?” 
(Chanin, 2012, p. 356) 
• “Are there interaction effects or unforeseen outcomes, either positive or 
negative?” (Chanin, 2012, p. 356) 
• “Is an agency-wide approach to managing misconduct truly more effective 
than individualized efforts that focus on deterrence through officer liability and 
administrative sanctions?” (Chanin, 2012, p. 356). 
• “The extent to which leadership in Section 14141 reform implementation conforms to 
a punctuated equilibrium pattern of change” (Chanin, 2012, p. 192); 
• The identification of “those factors shaping DOJ and monitor termination decisions” 
(Chanin, 2012, p. 337); 
• What are the differences between the use of consent decrees and memorandum of 
agreement and what are the strengths and weaknesses of each? (See, Chanin, 
2012, p. 366). 
• At what point can it be determined that a “critical mass” of officers have accepted 
mandated reforms? (Walker, 2012, n. 212); 
• The implication of the relationship between the various elements supporting a reform 
effort (to include available resources, police and political leadership, external 
monitoring and the presence of the DOJ) (Chanin, 2014, p. 50);  
• “Mov[ing] beyond the use of outcome data to evaluate sustainability, beginning with 
an assessment of officer attitudes and organizational culture more broadly.” To 
include determining whether “a department [can] achieve and sustain desirable 
levels of key outcomes [] despite a culture that may not reflect core reform values?” 
(Chanin, 2015, p. 184; see also, Rushin 2015, p. 124 [“Can the DOJ force reform on 
a municipality that adamantly opposes it?”]); 
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• The Monitoring of pattern or practice jurisdictions, “paying particular attention to 
identifying those factors that distinguish reforms that endure from those that erode” 
(Chanin, 2016, p. 110; see also, Rushin, 2015, p. 120, “[More research [] is needed 
to understand the extent to which §14141 reforms are sustained after federal 
intervention ends”]; 
• The need “to identify which types of regulations are most closely tied with depolicing” 
(Rushin & Edwards, 2017, p. 776; Chanin & Sheats 2018); 
• “Determin[ing] whether the picture that emerges from these two evaluations [the 
Pittsburgh and Los Angeles evaluations] is unique to the two departments involved 
or is representative of the general impact of court-mandated reforms on officer 
conduct” (Walker, 2018, p. 1837; see also, Rushin 2015, p. 170). 
• The development of “a model for comprehensive evaluations of the impact of 
systemic police reform efforts” (Walker, 2017, p. 23; see also, Alpert et al., 2017; 




Structural Reform Litigation & Police Reform Theory 
As a form of “structural reform litigation,” §14141 has been subject to general 
criticism due to its inherent conflict with the concept of local control of the police and its 
application has been evaluated using various forms of police reform theory. 
Unfortunately, academics and policing professionals have not applied police use-of-force 
theory to the application and implementation §14141 investigations and resultant 
settlement agreements and consent decrees. In fact, as discussed in this Chapter, police 
use-of-force theory is particularly appropo when it comes to evaluating the DOJ’s 
activities, even more so than generalized concepts of federalism. It also incorporates 
important concepts such as fairness, procedural justice, proportionality and 
reasonableness. 
5.1. Arguments for and Against Policing-Related Structural 
Reform Litigation 
Although the passage of §14141 occurred with relatively little fanfare as it was 
passed as part of the larger Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
(VCCLEA), its use has been controversial from the start and liberal versus conservative 
political philosophies have tended to either support or oppose the application of its 
authority by the USDOJ. 
Even those supporting its wide application have recognized the inherent 
limitations of §14141 when used solely as a tool of litigation. As recognized by Harmon,  
with existing resources, it is impossible to imagine that §14141 could be 
used to force change in more than a handful of departments each year. 
Even if the Special Litigation’s budget were doubled or tripled, the Section 
still could not be expected to examine more than a tiny fraction of large 
police departments. (Harmon, 2009, p. 21)368  
 
368 Even while recognizing its limitations, Harmon (2017) later argued in support of the application 
of Section 14141, concluding that: “[t]he Department of Justice’s use of Section 14141 might 
encourage policing reform in multiple ways. First, [] it could reduce constitutional violations by 
forcing reforms that decrease violations in departments with substantial patterns of them. Second, 
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(see also, Miller, 1998, p. 173 [arguing that the decision to authorize only the U.S. 
Attorney General to bring §14141 actions “will greatly reduce the frequency of such 
suits”]; see also, Harmon, 2012). And as recognized by many academics and 
commentators, the first line of defense for unconstitutional policing will always have to be 
the municipalities and the police departments themselves (Hoffman, 1993, p. 1514; 
Livingston, 1999, p. 822 [arguing that “[t]he decrees do not, and perhaps cannot, ensure 
the humanistic leadership within police departments that is vital to ongoing police reform. 
In some contexts, the entry of Section 14141 decrees may even undercut opportunities 
for such leadership to emerge”]; see also, McMickle, 2003; Jerome, 2004; Walker & 
Macdonald, 2009). 
In addition, the lack of a “political will to intervene” on the part of the DOJ and the 
lack of resources necessary “to fight pushback from reform-resisting police 
departments,” have a negative impact on the ability of §14141 to be used as a “long-
term enforcement” option against systemic civil rights violations (Dukanovic, 2016, p. 
912). 
5.1.1. Arguments for Policing-Related Structural Reform Litigation 
When §14141 was first passed, the “scholarly response … was strongly positive” 
(Harmon, 2009, p. 20, footnotes 69 & 70, quoting Stuntz (2006), p. 798 [referring to it as 
“the most important legal initiative of the past twenty years in the sphere of police 
regulation”]; also citing, Stuntz (2001),369 Armacost (2004), and Jeffries & Rutherglen 
(2007); see also, Simmons (2010)).370 
 
by suing some departments to enforce constitutional rights, it could induce other departments to 
adopt reforms to avoid the costs and intrusiveness of suffering Section 14141 enforcement. And 
third, by identifying institutional conditions that lead to constitutional violations and best practices 
to address them, it could reduce information costs for departments seeking to reduce misconduct 
for other reasons” (p. 623). 
369 “The best legal tool for regulation at the department level is neither the exclusionary rule nor 
damages - the two remedies whose merits are so extensively debated in the law reviews - but 
injunctions. That is why the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994) . . . may be more significant, in 
the long run, than Mapp v. Ohio, which mandated the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment” (Stuntz, 2001, n. 134). 
370 As noted by Chanin (2012), however, “[i]t is [] unsurprising that legal academics and police 
accountability experts would champion a process predicated on the enforcement of constitutional 
rights and the rule of law. Pattern or practice reform represents the combined hopes of police 
reformers, civil rights activists, defense attorneys, and legal scholars: A credible, law-driven 
process that capitalizes on federal authority to identify and remedy unlawful police behavior 
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In June 2020, as police related protests took place all over the country, Professor 
Christy Lopez, a former DOJ official who supervised §14141 investigations under the 
Obama administration was referenced in the New York Times as believing that “in many 
cases nothing short of a consent decree could overcome obstacles like entrenched 
racism and union opposition.” She believed that even though only “a tiny percentage of 
the nation’s 18,000 police departments” were the subject of federal consent decrees, 
“they set a tone, established best practices and put police leaders on notice that they, 
too, could come under scrutiny if they showed a ‘pattern or practice’ of civil rights 
violations” (New York Times, 6/13/2020). 
In support of the effectiveness of §14141, one academic noted that unlike civil 
actions pursuant to §1983, which permits victims of police abuse to sue for damages in 
federal court, §14141 “imposes direct political costs on local government agents” and 
cannot simply be seen as “a cost of doing business.” Harmon further suggested that a 
police chief facing the potential of “a federal takeover of his department” will have the 
incentive to make civil rights a department priority (Harmon, 2009, p. 47; see also, 
Levenson, 2001, p. 26, citing 1991 House Committee Report371). Other commentators 
recognized the deterrent value of §14141 actions as it relates to departments that will 
voluntarily undergo reforms in an attempt to avoid DOJ intervention (Harmon, 2012, p. 
36; Scott, 2017, pp. 611-612). 
From a systemic viewpoint,  
[t]he statute allows the DOJ to define the boundaries of legitimate policing 
by establishing best practices … Historically, there has never been any 
concerted federal effort to define these sorts of best practices. [The statute] 
represents the first real opportunity for the federal government to define the 
boundaries of legitimate behavior within the field of local law enforcement; 
(Rushin, 2015, p. 52) 
(see also, Livingston, 1999, p. 845; Jerome, 2004, p. 5; and, Walker, 2017, p. 8, [“[p]rior 
to the first DOJ consent decree, there was … no equivalent set of accountability-related 
best practices”]).  
 
prospectively, structuring comprehensive, agency-wide reform around a set of widely‐accepted 
precepts. Yet much of this excitement has developed in the absence of empirical testing or 
considered theoretical examination” (pp. 329-330). 
371 H.R. Rep. No. 102-242(I) (1991), available at 1991 WL 206794, at 138; see also, United 
States v. City of Columbus, 2000 WL 1133166, at 4 (S.D. Ohio 2000). 
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Along that same vein, commentators and evaluators have identified the potential 
for §14141 to be used to educate departments that have not yet been subjected to its 
provisions, and reduce the risk of police misconduct throughout the country (Miller, 1998, 
p. 191; Livingston, 1999, pp. 843-844; Jerome, 2004, p. 5; Harmon, 2009; see also, 
PERF, 2013, p. 9 [quoting Professor Sam Walker as saying that “[n]o police department 
should be in a position where it can be sued by the Justice Department, because the 
past cases make clear what is expected of them to achieve professional, bias-free and 
accountable policing”]).372 In addition, in 2019, the Crime and Justice Institute (CJI) 
reviewed twenty-one consent decrees settled between 1997 and 2017 in order to  
identif[y] the most common issues [and] summarize[] the mandated 
requirements for the purpose of easy consumption by law enforcement 
leaders [with] [t]he intent [to] provide any police executive or stakeholder 
the opportunity for easy self-assessment of the agency’s alignment with 
policies, trainings, and practices extracted from consent decrees. (CJI, 
2019, p. 8) 
Even though most agree that “the nature of consent decrees is coercive … [and] 
perhaps one of the most threatening vehicles for police reform,” it has also been 
recognized that there has been, historically, a “lack of alternatives [available] in making 
local policing more accountable” (Jaio, 2020, p. 9; see also, Hoffman, 1993, p. 1515, 
1526 [arguing that “[a]n active federal role is essential to a comprehensive system of 
police accountability” and is a necessary “weapon of last resort if local institutions are 
unable or unwilling to act in the face of widespread abuses”]; Levenson, 2001, p. 28; 
Kim, 2002, p. 769 [noting that “42 U.S.C. 14141 was intended to ‘close [the] gap in the 
law’ created by the modern equitable standing doctrine, which forecloses an individual 
 
372 However, at least one article has professed that “no evidence exists that agencies are 
impacted by the [consent decrees] of other departments” (Alpert, et al., 2017, p. 243), although 
the authors did acknowledge that the Baltimore Police Department used other Consent Decrees 
while it was negotiating its own consent decree with the DOJ. Contrary to the suggestions of 
Alpert, et al., while I was serving as the Independent Monitor for the City and County of Denver, I 
became aware that the Denver Police Department (DPD) did, in fact, conduct a review of all 
consent decrees in existence at that time in order to forestall what was considered an imminent 
DOJ investigation in 2004. The DPD subsequently made substantive changes in their use of force 
policies and no formal DOJ investigation was ever announced. See also, Jerome, 2005, p. 5 
[representing that “the existence of the Justice Department’s potential ‘hammer’ prompted many 
police departments to review their policies and procedures and implement additional systems for 
accountability, in order to avoid a Justice Department investigation. Agencies have also looked to 
the measures that were incorporated into the Justice Department agreements as progressive and 
necessary accountability practices”]. Jerome, however, did not identify any specific departments 
that conducted such policy reviews. 
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from obtaining injunctive relief against police misconduct absent a likelihood of future 
harm to that particular plaintiff”]; Walker, 2003; Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 480; 
Chanin, 2012 [arguing that “[u]ntil the passage of … Section 14141, there was no 
available means to regulate malfeasant police departments”];373 see also, Rushin 2015, 
p. 1, arguing that 
under the right circumstances, structural reform litigation is uniquely 
effective at combating misconduct in police departments. It forces local 
municipalities to prioritize investments into police misconduct regulations. 
It utilizes external monitoring to ensure that frontline officers substantively 
comply with top-down mandates. And it provides police executives with 
legal cover to implement wide-ranging reforms aimed at curbing 
misconduct. 
Even given the coercive nature of consent decrees, perceived positives for local 
police chiefs and local political operatives who are reform-minded have been identified. 
As suggested by the New York Times, “Chiefs may want consent decrees in order to 
insulate them from political and union opposition to change, as well as make it easier to 
demand money to pay for reforms” (New York Times, 1/14/2017;374 see also, Livingston, 
1999, n. 172; Davis et al. 2002, p. 12; PERF, 2013, p. 42, [noting that “a federal 
investigation can force otherwise reluctant local elected officials to provide funding that is 
needed to implement reforms [and assist in] overrul[ing] labor union opposition to certain 
changes in policies or practices”];375 Rushin, 2015, p. 114; Rushin, 2017a). As identified 
 
373 Chanin (2012) noted that proponents of Section 14141 have argued that “enforcing Section 
14141 is exactly the type of function the federal government is meant to perform. Local 
governments [] have no capacity to choose to violate constitutional law. Regardless of which 
crime control strategies a jurisdiction prefers or what percentage of the budget a city council allots 
to public safety, local police behavior must comport with the rights and liberties established under 
the constitution. Section 14141 grants to the federal DOJ authority to enforce those legal 
principles, and the performance of those duties is not only consistent with federalism principles, 
but represents a clear example of a divided government in action” (p. 375; Chanin 2017b, p. 267). 
Chanin also argued that given “that the rights of suspected criminals and police accountability are 
undervalued by the traditional political process, it would seem to lend credibility to the use of 
federal power to drive reform” (Chanin, 2017b, pp. 267-268). 
374 Dewan, S. & Oppel, R. (2017, January 14). Efforts to Curb Police Abuses Have Mixed 
Record, and Uncertain Future, New York Times. Retrieved 11/7/20 from, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/14/us/chicago-police-consent-
decree.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer. 
375 Walker commented on the significance of the content of the 2013 PERF report, which largely 
supported the prior work relating to Section 14141 enforcement: “The 2013 PERF report on the 
Justice Department’s pattern or practice program is notable for its lack of hostility to the program 
and the number of favorable statements about the program from chiefs or former chiefs or current 
commanders who experienced consent decrees. In past decades, one would have expected to 
hear a stream of criticisms of federal intervention and expensive court-enforced requirements. 
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by Chanin, these positive factors contributed to officials in Cincinnati, Baltimore, 
Cleveland and Albuquerque, “among others,” actually requesting §14141 investigations 
from the DOJ (Chanin, 2017a, p. 261). 
In addition, as explained by numerous commentators, the use of outside, 
independent monitors offer “a less distorted view of the progress of police reform” 
(Levenson, 2001, p. 28; for arguments in favor of the appointment of independent 
monitors, see, Chapter 3.2, infra, citing Davis et al., 2002; Davis et al., 2005; Walker & 
Macdonald, 2009; Clark, 2010; Chanin, 2012; PERF, 2013; Chanin, 2014; & USDOJ, 
2017b). Oftentimes, a positive report from a federal monitor may be more readily 
accepted by suspicious members of the public than any commentary that can be 
provided by a police chief on his or her own behalf (Chanin, 2017b).376 
The “second generation” of consent decree reforms (as identified by DOJ, 2017b; 
Walker, 2018 & Jaio, 2020) have arguable evolved from “bare-knuckled ‘command and 
control’ decrees to orders that emphasize data-collection, measurement, process and 
participation” (Jeffries & Rutherglen, 2007, p. 35). Jeffries & Rutherglen (2007) argued 
that “[i]f sensitively handled, such decrees can be ‘accountability reinforcing’” while also 
arguing that [there is every reason to believe and little reason to doubt that these 
decrees have been effective in raising the professionalism of delinquent departments, 
improving managerial knowledge and oversight, and thereby reducing the incidence of 
constitutional violations” (Jeffries & Rutherglen, 2007, p. 32, and n. 167, citing Davis et 
al. 2002; see also, Simmons, 2008, p. 497 [which argued that §14141 actions “offer[] the 
possibility for collaborative problem-solving among stakeholders to identify problems, 
implement institutional reforms, and monitor progress”]; and, Douglass 2017, p. 328 
[which argues that “[t]he evolution of the [DOJ’s] approach to pattern and practice cases 
 
Instead, … chiefs and former chiefs with consent decree experience from Cincinnati, Washington, 
D.C., and Los Angeles testified that, despite much pain at the outset, their departments were 
much improved as a result of the Consent Decrees” (Walker, 2018, p. 1798). 
376 In support of the position that “federal intervention has the ability to restore legitimacy to the 
affected department, which in many instances had lost the support and the confidence of the 
community,” Chanin (2017b) quoted a former federal monitor “at length:” ‘If you have an 
organization that has lost public trust and confidence … it’s going to view even your successes 
with suspicion and doubt. … And so now to have a court or monitor validate that you’ve been 
implementing best practices, that you’re in compliance, that your investigations are thorough. … I 
think this process restores legality and legitimacy’ (p. 268, quoting R. Davis, personal 
communication, 2009, December 18). 
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reveals a move away from the traditional adversarial, litigation model to a restorative 
justice model]”). 
Also, §14141 actions have been argued to promote transparency in policing, 
which also has the potential to increase public faith in the criminal justice system (See, 
Kupferberg, 2007, p. 161 [commenting that “data has been made available solely 
through consent decree provisions, and where consent decrees or other forms of outside 
monitoring do not exist, the public will often have no idea what individual officers or 
police departments are up to”]). 
Finally, even though consent decrees are expensive, evaluation studies have 
shown that those costs are often retrievable through reductions in civil liability and that 
consent decrees, contrary to expectations, do not result in long-term increases in crime 
or “depolicing” (See, Davis et al., 2002; Stone et al., 2009; Rushin, 2016; Rushin & 
Edwards, 2017; USDOJ, 2017b, p. 39; Rushin, 2017a; Jaio, 2020). 
5.1.2. Arguments against Policing Related Structural Reform 
Litigation 
On the other side of the equation, strongly held criticism of §14141 litigation has 
been made, to include by former Trump-appointed Attorney General Sessions and by 
the Trump DOJ. Although a memorandum issued by AG Sessions on November 7, 2018 
was reported as a death-knell for consent decrees under the Trump-DOJ (see, New 
York Times, 11/8/2018;377 Seattle Times, 11/10/2018),378 the verbiage used to evaluate 
whether or not the DOJ should consider pursuing a consent decree was not particularly 
ground breaking.379 
The memo declared that,  
[s]tate governments are sovereigns with special and protected roles under 
our constitutional order. Accordingly, the [DOJ] must ensure that its 
practices in such cases are in the interests of justice, transparent and 
 
377 Benner, K. (2018, November 8). Sessions, in Last-Minute Act, Sharply Limits Use of Consent 
Decrees to Curb Police Abuses, New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com. 
378 Horwitz, S. (2018, November 10, 2018). Sessions deals police reform a blow as he leaves 
AG’s office, Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
379 Memo retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1109681/download. 
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consistent with the impartial rule of law and fundamental principles, 
including federalism and democratic control and accountability. 
The memo purported to “provide[] guidance on the limited circumstances in which such a 
consent decree may be appropriate.” The memo cited federal law that identified consent 
decrees as “extraordinary remedies that ‘raise sensitive federalism concerns,’” and 
noted that such decrees  
can deprive the elected representatives of the people of the affected 
jurisdiction of control of their government, … have significant ramifications 
for state and local budget priorities … [and] … may “improperly deprive 
future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers” (citing, 
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004). 
As such, the memo concluded that the DOJ “should exercise special caution before 
entering into a consent decree with a state or local government authority.” 
In fact, nothing said in the memo, even an instruction that “approval of senior 
leadership” of the DOJ was required before entering into a consent decree should have 
been particularly controversial. Instead, it was how the language in the memo was 
interpreted by senior DOJ officials that put a stop to the use of consent decrees by the 
Trump DOJ. That conservative interpretation has resulted in no new consent decrees or 
MOA’s during the entirety of the 1997-2021 term of the Trump administration. 
Interestingly, there is no reason to believe that the memo actually needed to be 
amended by Biden administration officials in order to begin anew the use of §14141 
(now 12601) against police departments engaging in a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional policing.380 
Amongst the arguments made against pursuing §14141 actions include: 
 
380 Even so, as previously noted, the Biden administration did explicitly rescind the Trump era 
memorandum in an April 16, 2021 internal memorandum signed by newly appointed Attorney 
General Merrick Garland. The internal memorandum specifically noted that the Trump 
administration memo was inconsistent with prior DOJ practice of allowing career prosecutors to 
make consent decree related decisions. See, Internal DOJ Memorandum entitled: “Civil 
Settlement Agreements and Consent Decrees with State and Local Government Entities.” 
Retrieved from full.pdf (nyt.com). See also, Philo, K. (2021, April 16). Biden Policy Shift Kicks 




• “That the DOJ's enforcement of §14141 is overly political, with decisions on which 
jurisdictions to investigate made for partisan rather than policy reasons” (Ross & 
Parke, 2009; Chanin, 2016, p. 70; Rushin, 2016); 
• The choice of departments for a DOJ investigation is akin to “a messy and imprecise 
… enforcement lottery” (Rushin, 2015, pp. 64-65; Rushin, 2016; Rushin, 2017a, p. 
107; see also, Chanin, 2017a, pp. 261-263, acknowledging criticism of “the 
ambiguous legal and evidentiary standards underlying the DOJ’s investigation 
process”); 
• The inability of the DOJ to enforce §14141 “with sufficient frequency to change the 
calculus of reform for many police departments engaged in misconduct” (Levenson, 
2001, p. 28; Harmon, 2012, pp. 50-51, 53, [“while these remedies may be used to 
influence some additional departments to adopt promising remedial measures, they 
are unlikely to drive significant national reform”]; in addition, the cases are 
“expensive to investigate and difficult to prove;” Rushin, 2017a, p. 128 [recognizing 
the labor-intensiveness of §14141 investigations and the inability of the DOJ “to 
target every city apparently engaged in misconduct”]); 
• The “process is anti-democratic” (Chanin, 2016, pp. 70 & 376-380) and “[f]ederal 
intervention inherently begets issues of political legitimacy” (Livingston, 1999, p. 819; 
Simmons, 2010, p. 402; see also, Chanin, 2012, p. 18, citing Fiss, 1978,381 Fuller, 
1978,382 Horowitz 1977,383 and, Horowitz, 1983;384 Gilles, 2000, n. 34; Ross & Parke, 
2009); see also, statements of then-AG nominee Jeff Sessions (New York Times, 
1/14/2017)385 and an editorial statement from the Law Enforcement Alliance of 
America in response to possible federal intervention in Columbus, OH;386 similar 
 
381 Fiss, Owen M., The Civil Rights Injunction, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press (1978). 
382 Fuller, Lon L., “The Form and Limits of Adjudication,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 92 (1978). 
383 Horowitz, Donald L., The Courts and Social Policy, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution 
(1977). 
384 Horowitz, Donald L., “Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public 
Institutions,” Duke Law Journal, Vol. 32 (1983) pp. 1265‐1307. 
385 Referring to consent decrees as “dangerous” and “writing in 2008 that they ‘constitute an end 
run around the democratic process.”  
386 “A … battle is now being waged … pitting the legal weight and limitless financial resources of 
the U.S. Justice Department against [a municipal government’s] right to control its own police 
department. At stake is no less than the fate of local agencies everywhere to control their own 
destinies versus an emerging pattern by the … Justice Department aimed at federalizing 
municipal police departments …” (Chanin, 2017b, pp. 266-267, quoting, Richer, B. (2000, March 
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arguments suggest that the Consent Decree process is “antithetical to federalism” 
(Chanin, 2012, pp. 374-376; Duckanovic, 2016, p. 944-945; Chanin 2017b, pp. 266-
269);387 
• That the costs of the reform efforts are extraordinarily expensive without any 
assurance that they will bring “meaningful, durable organizational change” (Chanin, 
2016, p. 70; Ross & Parke, 2009, p. 205; see also, Levenson, 2001, p. 29). It is also 
noted that “there remain questions about the feasibility of this regulatory approach in 
poorer communities” (Rushin, 2015, p. 117; see also, Walker, 2003, p. 49; Powell, 
2017, citing, Chanin, 2014, and Davis, et al., 2002; Ross and Parke, 2009, pp. 204, 
208); 
• That the process is “too adversarial” (Dukanovic, 2016, pp. 929-930, [“The 
complaints center on claims that: lawyers are talking with other lawyers, the 
agreements are too complex and lengthy, negotiations are time-consuming, case 
monitors can be problematic, and police unions can serve to undermine agreed-upon 
changes”]; see also Clark, 2010, p. 3, [“some police officials reported that this 
litigation creates a negative stigma on a police department, which takes a long time 
to overcome in a community … Some also suggested that §14141 litigation is 
needlessly complex and takes too long to resolve”]; Jaio, 2020, p. 9 [noting the 
“coercive nature” of consent decrees and the initial negative reactions to the decrees 
from impacted police officers and departments]); 
• “The process is an ineffective means of balancing the defense of constitutional rights 
with other policy-related concerns” (Chanin, 2012, pp. 364-5, [“Ultimately, critics 
suggest that this exclusive focus on remedying constitutional violations too often 
ignores the complexity of the task, minimizing the importance of other important 
factors, including the jurisdiction’s limited resources, electoral preferences, and so 
 
18). Feds Threaten to Take Over Ohio Police Department, LEAA. Retrieved from 
https://www.mail-archive.com/ctrl@listserv.aol.com/msg38090.html. 
387 When faced with the prospect of federal intervention, Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan 
“argued that while reform was necessary, it should happen through the leadership of local officials 
– not through a full-scale federal takeover … Riordan argued, ‘[T]here’s no one better to make 
reforms than the Chief, the command staff, the Police Commission, the inspector general, the 
independent task force, the council and myself.’ He concluded that the current leadership in the 
City of Los Angeles ‘can solve [its] own problems.’” (Rushin, 2017a, p. 184). 
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on”]; see also, Chanin, 2017b, p. 265, citing Christensen & Wise, 2015,388 and 
Fletcher, 1982);389  
• “Various critics have claimed that federal intervention into the affairs of local police 
agencies decrease police efficiency, thereby increasing crime.” Additionally, “one of 
the most common arguments made … is that [Structural Reform Litigation] will 
decrease police aggressiveness” (Rushin, 2015, p. 120; 390 see also, Chanin, 2012, 
p. 184391 & Rushin & Edwards, 2017) and morale (Levenson, 2001, p. 28; Davis et 
al., 2005; Ross & Parke, 2009; Dukanovic, 2016, p. 941; Rushin & Edwards, 2017, 
pp. 199-202); 
• “There remain significant questions about whether [Structural Reform Litigation] can 
forcefully transform a police agency where local political leaders and police 
executives oppose the intervention” (Rushin, 2015, p. 117; see also, Chanin, 2012, 
p. 159; Rushin, 2017a; Scott, 2017, pp. 610-611, citing, Washington Post, 
11/13/2015 & Marshall Project, 4/23/2015; Rushin, 2017a;392 Jaio, 2020). 
5.2. Police Reform Theory 
In this section, I use police reform theory and police use-of-force theory to 
evaluate the Seattle reform effort and make recommendations for future reform efforts. 
In addition, I discuss how a review of the literature relating to police reform assists in 
 
388 Christensen, R. K., & Wise, C. R. (2015). Law and management: Comparatively assessing the 
reach of judicialization. In F. M. Van der Meer, J. RaadscheldersXXX & T. Toonen (Eds.), 
Comparative civil service systems in the 21st century (pp. 237–254). New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
389 Fletcher, W. A. (1982). The discretionary constitution: Institutional remedies and judicial 
legitimacy. Yale Law Journal, 91, 635–697. 
390 Rushin went on to comment, as have other commentators, on a lack of evidence to support 
the depolicing hypothesis (Walker & Macdonald, 2009, pp. 524-525; Rushin, 2015, pp. 120-122; 
Rushin & Edwards, 2017; Chanin & Sheats, 2018; see also, Stone, et. al, 2009 (Regarding Los 
Angeles Consent Decree) and the Seattle Police Monitor (Ninth Systemic Assessment, 2017, pp. 
59-63). 
391 Chanin (2012) also suggested that negative reactions by street-level officers to consent 
decree reforms “may subside over time (and many of those whose feelings do not change may 
leave the agency either through natural and forced turnover)” (p. 290). 
392 Pointing out that “[i]t can be particularly difficult to change the culture of a large, complex 
organization through forceful external mandates. To bring about sustainable change in a police 
department, you need both procedural changes enacted through external mandates and cultural 
change that results in organizational buy-in;” and arguing that “[f]ederal intervention is not a silver 
bullet. Real, long-lasting police reform requires local cooperation and dedication to succeed” 
(Rushin, 2017a, pp. 108, 166). 
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understanding the reaction of the Seattle Police Department to the external reforms 
demanded by the USDOJ. 
5.2.1.  Background Theory 
As indicated in the Chanin dissertation, “there is not an existing theoretical 
framework that lends itself seamlessly” to the application of structural reform litigation as 
it relates to policing (Chanin, 2012, p. 25). In fact, the prior evaluation studies (Davis, et 
al., 2002, 2005 and Stone, et al., 2009) were not “rooted in theory” and made “no 
attempt to couch their analyses in terms of broader administrative, organizational, or 
policy questions” (Chanin 2001, p. 20). As such, Chanin reported his need to rely on 
research conducted in multiple fields to include “organizational change, business, 
sociology, public management, educational reform, and policing scholarship” (Chanin 
2001, p. 203). Similarly, this dissertation also relies on diverse fields of study with 
respect to the analysis of available data relating to the Seattle consent decree process. 
First and foremost, it appears that theories of organizational culture and change 
need to be an important part of any analysis, to include the evaluation of various change 
management models as they relate to the structure and culture of the Seattle Police 
Department (Chanin, 2012; Rushin, 2015). In addition, it is necessary to examine 
literature and theory as it applies to sustaining organizational change in the public 
sector, particularly as it relates to policing (Armenakis, 1999; Armacost, 2004; 
Buchanan, et al., 2005; Davis, et al., 2005; Stone, et al., 2009; Ikerd & Walker, 2010; 
Walker, 2012; Chanin, 2015; Bromwich et al., 2016). 
Risk management theory also needs to be applied as a potential factor in 
decision-making by police and City administration, the Department of Justice and the 
Independent Monitor (Archbold, 1988). 
Rational choice theory also needs to be applied across the entirety of the 
Consent Decree process as a means to explain how and why cities (and, in particular, 
the City of Seattle) engaged in policing practices likely to give rise to a federal 
investigation and law suit and the decision-making process that took place during the 
negotiation and acceptance of consent decrees. For example, in Seattle, the cost of the 
federal investigation and ensuing law suit was significantly greater to the City then self-
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initiated reform would have been. So, why was a city, known for its progressive politics, 
unable to identify and address issues of police misconduct without federal intervention? 
Similar questions needed to be asked with respect to the Seattle Police union’s initial 
opposition to the Consent Decree process (Seattle Police Monitor, First semi-annual 
report, April 2013, pp. 2-3, 5)393 and the eventual perception of police rank and file 
support for the reforms enacted as a result of the Consent Decree (Seattle Police 
Monitor, Seventh semi-annual report, September 2016).394  
Deterrence theory needs to be used to similar effect to ask why the prospect of a 
federal investigation was not able to deter City or police officials from allowing the 
Department as a whole to engage in a pattern or practice of civil rights violations in the 
first place (Armacost, 2004, pp. 459, 464). 
Regulatory capture theory, although in existence for decades (Chanin, 2012, p. 
139, citing Bernstein, 1955; Kohlmeier, 1969), has only been rarely applied to police 
reform efforts (Prenzler, 2000; Chanin, 2012; Savage, 2013). Given the structure of most 
federal monitoring teams, including the Seattle team, to include former police executives 
and the very nature of the reform process as a process of collaboration and 
compromise, it was considered to be important to determine to what extent the 
Monitoring Team or the Department of Justice may have compromised or collaborated 
too much or may have otherwise minimized challenges associated with reforming the 
Seattle Police Department (Levenson, 2001, p. 30; Chanin 2011, p. 139-140).395 
 
393 Retrieved from 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/542c0a37e4b0801eab7129
4c/1412172343193/Seattle_First_Semiannual_Report_Final.pdf. 
394 In the final semi-annual report of the Independent Monitor, it was noted that “[i]t is becoming 
more and more evident that many officers have come to understand that the Consent Decree 
encapsulates best practice and contributes to their effectiveness and safety. It appears that the 
necessary cultural change has begun to at least some meaningful extent” (Compliance Status & 
Seventh semi-annual report, p. 2. Retrieved from 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/57ea7e30ff7c50214e95adc
e/1474985521872/Seventh+Semiannual+Report--FOR+FILING.pdf.) 
395 Chanin discussed the potential for application of the theory of regulatory capture to the Prince 
George’s County monitor’s “forgiving approach” to the implementation of the Department’s Early 
Warning System. He noted that “[t]he academic theory underlying this concept describes the fate 
of government regulators who come to identify with the industry they are charged with regulating 
(citation omitted). As a result of this convergence of world views, the regulator loses ‘requisite 
levels of impartiality and zealousness’ and is thus not capable of enforcing the law effectively 
(Prenzler 2000, 662). Regulatory capture is more likely to occur in cases of frequent personal 
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Literature and theory on the ultimate impact of court-imposed reforms was also 
examined (Chanin, 2012, p. 367, citing Cooper, 1988, pp. 88-89, citing Canon & 
Johnson; Chanin, 2014). 
5.2.2. Project Theory 
As data collection progressed, however, it became clear that a key challenge in 
the implementation of the Seattle Consent Decree related to issues of procedural justice. 
Seattle officials, police executives and rank and file officers were so offended by the roll-
out of the DOJ investigation and what they believed to be a lack of transparency and 
accountability of the DOJ’s investigation, that even though they recognized systemic 
problems within the Department, they were resistant to any externally mandated change 
until a change in Mayoral administration, and even then, throughout much of the 
implementation process.  
The first and most common assertion made by City and police officials was that a 
finding by the DOJ that 20% of the force evaluated was excessive was outrageous and 
unfounded and was the product of an investigation that was rushed and politically 
motivated. Even though the same participants commonly acknowledged entrenched 
problems and lack of accountability within the organization, the refusal of the DOJ 
litigators to share their methodology and data (unless and until formal discovery 
occurred during the course of litigation) made Seattle officials feel as though they had 
been “railroaded” and led to a lack of trust of the DOJ and, ultimately, the Monitoring 
Team. 
As such, a primary finding of this research concludes that police use-of-force, 
police accountability, and procedural justice theories should be applied to the DOJ vis-à-
vis their enforcement of police reform through the Consent Decree process. Just as 
police use-of-force theory explains that police officers should only use that level of force 
necessary to overcome resistance, this dissertation argues that the DOJ should act in a 
 
contact between regulator and regulated (Kohlmeier 1969). It seems logical to conclude that 
capture may be accelerated if regulators are former members of the regulated industry and thus 
may understand if not share those values driving the regulated industry.” Chanin (2012) quite 
correctly went on to note that “[t]he very nature of the pattern or practices monitor’s job presents 
the risk of capture. Monitor teams meet very regularly (bi‐monthly in some cases) with affected 
department leadership and spend several days at each site visit working through department files 
and observing day-to-day operations” (p. 139). 
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similar way in forcibly reforming a police department. Relatedly, the police use-of-force 
continuum used in most police training, should, in the future, be used by the DOJ in 
determining how to best use force in ensuring the reform of any particular police 
department, using externally driven reform tools. 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 1.2, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) has utilized a particularly useful use of force continuum in its training, that can 
be easily transformed into a use-of-force model that can, and should be used by the 
USDOJ. The RCMP model can be found, infra, in Figure 1.1; and the transformed use-
of-force continuum for the DOJ can be found, infra, in Figure 1.2. 
While City-based participants disagreed as to whether excessive force was 
actually used in requiring the use of a consent decree to reform the Seattle Police 
Department, there was a strong consensus amongst all City and police officials that the 
DOJ investigation lacked any transparency and accountability and, therefore, had no 
actual legitimacy in the reform effort. 
This above-noted visual (Figure 1.2) could be used by the USDOJ to evaluate 
their own “use of force” against a municipal police agency and contribute to a common 
vocabulary approach to future §12601 investigations and interventions. Like the use-of-
force training graphic upon which it is based (the “IMIM”), this graphic could be used by 
the upcoming Biden DOJ to “assess and manage risk through justifiable and reasonable 
intervention.” As with the IMIM, this graphic “is designed to reflect the rapidly evolving 
and dynamic nature” of DOJ interventions identifying intervention options to be used 
based on the totality of the circumstances. 
I argue that the use of this graphic, as a philosophy behind DOJ intervention, 
would be consistent with the DOJ’s language as articulated in several consent decrees 
that “[o]nly the force reasonably necessary under the totality of the circumstances shall 
be used to lawfully perform department duties and resolve confrontations effectively and 
safely” (see, CJI, 2019, p. 12). 
The DOJ is expected to take into account the entirety of the situation, to include 
“tactical” considerations, such as local politics, police leadership, the local police culture, 
the nature of local police controversies and misconduct, and budgetary considerations. 
The DOJ would also take into consideration the impact of merely announcing its 
205 
presence (through public monitoring) and interest in the challenges faced by the 
jurisdiction.396 Depending on the overall circumstances, DOJ communications would 
range from cooperative and collaborative to directive and could move from informal (via 
private and/or public meetings with city and/or police officials) to more formal offers of 
technical assistance or directions on how to avoid federal intervention. Technical 
assistance (to include targeted grants) and collaborative reform-based projects could be 
implemented if there is reason to believe they might be effective in ensuring 
constitutional policing practices; and litigation would only be considered or initiated 
where there is passive or active resistance to the DOJ’s efforts such that there is no 
reason to believe that reform can be achieved with lesser levels of intervention. 
Just as a police officer has the right to immediately jump to a higher level of force 
when faced with aggressive active resistance, the DOJ might need to start off with a 
formal investigation and insist on the use of a consent decree and the appointment of a 
monitor (similar to what occurred in Seattle), but only with substantial evidence to 
support that no lesser use of force would achieve similar results. Just like police officers, 
the DOJ would be expected to use time on its side, slowing down events as necessary 
and approaching their ultimate goal of police reform in a tactical way. And just as police 
officers are expected to use concepts of procedural justice to elicit cooperation from the 
public (see Walker, 2017, p. 19 [arguing that “legitimacy in policing … is arguably the 
most important rethinking of policing in some years”], the DOJ would need to minimize 
traditional litigation strategies, in favor of more transparent methods that would be more 
likely to obtain cooperation and collaboration from city officials (see, for example, Patel, 
2016, p. 802 [“[W]hen police processes are perceived as procedurally just, communities 
are more likely to cooperate with the police, and policing, in turn, is more effective”]; see 
also, Rushin & Edwards, 2017, p. 770, 773 [arguing that police morale is negatively 
affected when officers are not given the opportunity to have input into changes in 
policies and practices]).397 
 
396 Similar to how a police officer would take into account how his or her “mere presence” might 
impact the level of cooperation received in a potential use-of-force situation. 
397 Chanin (2017a) took specific note of the importance of procedural justice as it related to 
Section 14141 actions, in recognizing that “[w]hatever the actual merits of these critical views, the 
notion that pattern or practice investigations lack legitimacy serves to undermine the very 
procedural justice that is sought through the DOJ’s intervention and feeds a negative discourse 
that is counter to the evidence on positive dialog increasing legitimacy (Mazerolle, Bennett, Davis, 
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5.2.3. Theory Used to Evaluate Consent Decree Use & Implementation 
In 1999, after only two consent decrees had been entered, Livingston was 
theorizing about some of the challenges in the use of §14141 actions in controlling 
officer conduct. Livingston suggested that “[i]n the adversarial context of Section 14141 
litigation, [] line officers may already be resentful and defensive about the charges 
leveled at their departments” (Livingston, 1999, p. 851). Further, she noted that, 
[s]uch perceptions have their costs of officer morale and motivation. They 
may even frustrate the effort to minimize illegality: for if public employees 
perceive they are being treated as untrustworthy, they will act accordingly, 
and no amount of laws or controls will remedy the situation, they will make 
things worse. (p. 852) 
Chanin (2012) commented on the status of the theoretical framework as it related 
to then-existing research into federally initiated consent decrees. Specifically, Chanin 
noted that “there is not an existing theoretical framework that lends itself seamlessly to 
[evaluating the Consent Decree process].” As such, Chanin  
based [his] specific research design and analytical decision on existing 
theoretical literature … [which allowed him] to benefit from the rigor of 
earlier research on policy implementation and institutionalization while 
maintaining an analytical flexibility that may not be possible in other 
research build around well-established theoretical constructs. (p. 25)  
Chanin further noted that 
beyond the notion that policy implementation is a complex and inherently 
difficult task [citation omitted], there is no central theoretical principle, nor a 
prevailing organizational structure to these findings. Like many early 
efforts, these works are ad hoc, with narrow, often conflicting findings. (p. 
78) 
Even so, Chanin was able to use a framework developed in 1989 by Mazmanian and 
Sabatier,398 to evaluate consent decree implementation considering the following factors: 
 
Sargeant, & Manning, 2013; Tyler, 2006). An investigation seen as unsubstantiated, overly 
political or otherwise biased, may also further complicate a department’s effort to galvanize 
support for the reform process among the rank and file” (p. 263). In fact, Chanin might have well 
have been speaking specifically to what took place in Seattle where the initial reaction of the 
Chief and the Mayor was to conclude the DOJ investigation was politically motivated and based 
on a corrupt methodology (see, Chapter 7.2, infra).  
398 Mazmanian, Daniel A. and Paul A. Sabatier, eds., Implementation and Public Policy, Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America (1989). 
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1) “problem tractability,”399 2) “policy design factors,”400 3) “Contextual/Environmental 
Factors,”401 and 4) “Implementing Agency Factors.”402 Overall, Chanin noted the 
importance of “institutionalizing change” as a consensus within “a vast, diffuse, often 
conflicting and confusing” organizational change literature. Chanin also identified the 
difficulties in forcing change from outside an organization,403 the strong resistance often 
seen from police organizations to change,404 the importance of “continuous, 
uninterrupted leadership” and “the support for change among mid-level managers”405 as 
being a critical part of ensuring sustainable reform (Chanin, 2012, pp. 76, 79, 211 & 218; 
see also, Chanin 2014, p. 40, citing Fernandez & Rainey, 2006406 and Santos, 2013407 
[arguing that “[t]he presence of strong, supportive leadership that places a high priority 
 
399 Looking at “those elements related to the tractability of the public problem at issue. On the 
theory that some problems are simply easier to solve than others” (Chanin, 2012, p. 91). 
400 Relying on “[t]he second prong of the Mazmanian--‐Sabatier framework [which] is built around 
the argument that ‘policymakers can substantially affect the attainment of legal objectives by 
utilizing the levers at their disposal to coherently structure the implementation process” (Chanin, 
2012, p. 94, quoting, Mazmanian & Sabatier 1989, p. 25). 
401 Citing the impact of “socioeconomic conditions and technology, … the degree of public and 
media support for the policy initiative, … the attitudes and resources of constituency groups, … 
[and] the existence of support from political, legal, and financial sovereigns” (Chanin, 2012, pp. 
98-102). 
402 Evaluating “agency characteristics that may affect the implementation process,” to include “the 
disposition of street-level implementers, …the disposition of organizational leadership, … the 
existence of a well-devised and highly organized internal strategy for implementation, … [the] 
existence of incentives for promoting street‐level compliance, … [and] the availability of 
implementing agency labor, capital, and political resources” (Chanin, 2012, pp. 102-106). 
403 See also, Rushin: “It can be particularly difficult to change the culture of a large, complex 
organization through forceful external mandates. To bring about sustainable change in a police 
department, you need both procedural changes enacted through external mandates and cultural 
change that results in organizational buy-in” (Rushin, 2017a, p. 108). 
404 “American police departments have won a reputation for reticence, insularity, and an intense 
desire to manage the narrative on issues of concern (citation omitted). This impulse is 
pronounced in cases involving sensitive or controversial matters, of which officer misconduct and 
externally driven reform certainly qualify (citation omitted)” (Chanin, 2017b, p. 269). 
405 Chanin (2016) suggested that “[s]taff willingness to adopt new operational protocols is often 
couched in terms of organizational culture. Policing scholars have consistently found cultural 
change-measured in terms of individual officer preferences, norms, and values-predictive of 
institutionalized reform. The sustainability of pattern or practice reform is at least in part likely to 
be a function of the degree to which street and mid-level officers, as well as department 
leadership, have come to view both the letter and the spirit of the settlement as central to the 
department’s mission and reflective of the department's broader approach to policing” (p. 74). 
406 Fernandez, S., & Rainey, H. G. (2006). Managing successful organizational change in the 
public sector. Public Administration Review, 66(2), 168–176. 
407 Santos, R. B. (2013). Implementation of a police organizational model for crime reduction. 
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 36(2), 295–311. 
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on the implementation process has also been shown to be critical to overall success”] 
and, at p. 41 [discussing “the default cultural orientation of police departments” as 
tending to resist change from outside influences]). 
Walker identified the DOJ pattern or practice approach to police reform as 
“embrac[ing] the concept of ‘Accountability-Based Policing’ that relies primarily on 
internal police department procedures rather than juridically enforced standards of 
constitutional law as the principal tool for holding police officers accountable for their 
conduct” (Walker, 2018, n. 163, citing, Harris, 2009;408 Goldstein, 1997, pp. 157-186;409 
DOJ, 2017b, p. 30 [regarding “reform of written policies … [as] a central aspect of the 
Division’s reform agreements”]; and, Walker & Archbold, 2020 [pending publication]). 
However, as previously identified, there was a recognized need for the DOJ to address a 
department’s “organizational culture … when seeking to institutionalize police reform” 
(Ikerd & Walker, 2010, p. 15 [Recommendation No. 1]). Walker later identified 
“organizational transformation in policing [as involving] three distinct dimensions”: first, 
“rejection of the idea that police misconduct is caused by just a few bad officers,” 
second, rejecting “the piecemeal approach to police reform in which specific police 
actions – searches, interrogations, uses of force, and so on – are addressed separately”, 
and third “the recognition that much police misconduct is rooted in specific crime-fighting 
policies” (Walker, 2018, pp. 1819-1820). 
Recognizing these difficulties, the DOJ also noted that  
when the Division finds a pattern or practice of police misconduct, it usually 
finds that pattern or practice is the product of many decades of dysfunction 
that has become engrained in police culture. Reversing that process 
requires enormous effort and commitment. (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 36) 
Further research has also identified “police morale problems” as having the potential to 
interfere with reform efforts. “Proactive efforts to address morale problems would not 
only facilitate sustainable organizational change (Chanin, 2015), but may help to 
 
408 See, generally, David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—or 
Replace—the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, (2009) 7 Ohio State J. Crim. L., 149. 
409 Goldstein, H. (1977). Policing a Free Society, 157-86; NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL 
DISORDERS (drawing upon his various articles in the 1960s). 
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strengthen police–community relations” (Chanin-Sheats, 2018, p. 120, citing Greene, 
1989;410 Wolfe & Nix, 2016411). 
Most recently, it has been argued that resistance to consent decrees “can be 
traced to a strong police subculture, widespread misbehaviors, and local political 
traditions … The police subculture is difficult to change as loyalty to and solidarity with 
fellow officers are viewed paramount among police officers” (Jaio, 2020, p. 6). As such, 
Jaio argued that “[i]nstitutionalized policies and practices should be accompanied by a 
change in police culture to ensure individual and organizational accountability in the long 
run” (Jaio, 2020, citing Cleveland.com, 5/27/2015;412 Walker, 2005). 
As might have been expected, the experience in Seattle closely followed the 
predictions of the aforementioned theory. In fact, issues relating to police culture, morale 
and motivation was a constant refrain amongst research participants affiliated with the 
city, with concerns about line officers being resentful and defensive at the top of their list 
of concerns. “Problem tractability” was identified as a concern, once again, based on 
what was perceived to be the SPD’s culture of arrogance and the ascension of 
command staff who were unwilling to listen or learn. The DOJ approach of immediate 
implementation of change with respect to SPD use of force and other policy initiatives 
did appear to substantially affect the attainment of consent decree objectives through an 
aggressive implementation process. And the presence of public and media support for 
the policy initiatives did seem to eventually overcome internal SPD resistance. Further 
the ability of the city to eventually devote the resources necessary to the creation of a 
data platform was a key factor in implementation of consent decree required reforms as 
they related to supervision of front-line officers. Although most survey participants 
suggested that there was not, in fact, “a well devised and highly organized internal 
strategy for implementation,” the strong agency leadership that was eventually provided, 
 
410 Greene, J. R. (1989). Police officer job satisfaction and community perceptions: Implications 
for community oriented policing. Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 26, 168–183. 
411 Wolfe, S. E., & Nix, J. (2016). The alleged Ferguson effect and police willingness to engage in 
community partnership. Law and Human Behavior, 40, 1–10. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000164. 
412 Gomez, H. J. (2015, May 27). Cleveland consent decree provides blueprint for long-elusive 
police reforms: The big story. Cleveland.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/05/cleveland_consent_decree_provi.html. 
210 
along with the needed capital and political resources, led to a successful implementation 
effort overall.  
Although, as predicted by the literature, there was initially strong resistance to 
change in Seattle, there were points in which there appeared to be support for change 
among command staff and mid-level managers. And, ultimately, as suggested by Walker 
(2018), there was ultimately a rejection of the concept that the SPD’s problem was “just 
a few bad officers,” an acceptance of the need to address the multiple policies and 
practices which were disengaging the SPD from its community and a need to ensure 
SPD crime-fighting policies were consistent with constitutional policing.  
Even so, the Seattle experience was replete with examples of challenges to 




Challenges to Section 14141 Enforcement 
 “The implementation of pattern or practice settlement reform agreements is 
a complex and multi-faceted process … [involving a department’s] ability to 
implement ‘constituent’ pieces of a settlement agreement [and sustain that 
implementation effort] … [O]ne cannot overlook the difficulty inherent in 
bringing comprehensive, externally-driven, rights based reform to 
departments that have proved to be both dysfunctional and resistant to 
change … This dysfunction may be compounded by an insular, defensive 
organizational culture, … that is skeptical of outside experts”  
(Chanin, 2012, pp. 106, 159-160). 
 
§14141 actions fall victim to multiple challenges, to include resistance from police 
unions, an insular police culture resistant to change, local and federal politics, and a 
long-standing lack of DOJ resources. All these challenges combine to make police 
reform through an external means a challenging activity. Some of the more significant 
challenges to §14141 enforcement actions are discussed in this chapter. 
6.1. Police Unions 
Perhaps the most common challenge to police reform, as identified in the 
literature, is opposition from police unions. In fact, such opposition was considered so 
substantial that when an “implementation committee” was created in Pittsburgh, 
“participation of the union was considered too risky given that it expressed strong 
opposition to the decree” (Davis et al., 2002, p. 10).413 In addition, the union which 
reportedly, had “vehemently opposed” the decree, as a result, had a strained 
relationship with the Chief who was tasked with ensuring a successful implementation 
effort. Even so, and even though the union made continuing statements against the 
 
413 It has been suggested, however, that it was the decision to exclude the union from the process 
that “helped to engender a very contentious, almost hostile, implementation environment” 
(Chanin, 2012, p. 178). 
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decree, according to the court-appointed monitor, “it did nothing overt to derail the 
process” (Davis et al., 2002, p. 13). 
And interestingly, even though unions have actively opposed §14141 reform 
activities in many different cities (to include Seattle) (see, infra), it has been a general 
union opposition to changes in policies and practices that have contributed to requests 
for investigation by officials in many different cities (see, PERF, 2013, p. 42), to include 
Cincinnati, Baltimore, Cleveland, and others (Chanin, 2017a, p. 261, citing The Atlantic, 
5/28/2015,414 Washington Post, 5/6/2015,415 U.S. DOJ, 2014,416 and, Albuquerque 
Journal, 4/3/2014417).  And, in fact, §14141 enforcement actions have been recognized 
as a way to assist progressive police leaders in reforming their departments, while 
avoiding the “cumbersome collective bargaining process” (Rushin, 2017a, p. 186; see 
also, Rushin, 2015, p. 126 [using the Los Angeles consent decree as an example]). 
Given that “addressing systemic excessive force is one of the core functions of 
the [DOJ’s] pattern-or-practice cases” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 27), changes in use of force 
policies are a standard tool of DOJ settlement agreements. And as a result, there is a 
tendency of officers to complain that new use of force policies and robust investigations 
of officer uses of force put officers in danger as they become less likely to use force, 
even when necessary, out of fear of being investigated or punished for violating the new, 
more restrictive policies (see Davis et al., 2002, p. 51; Seattle Times, 5/29/2014;418 
 
414 Semuels, A. (2015, May 28). How to fix a broken police department. The Atlantic. Retrieved 
from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/cincinnatipolice-reform/393797/. 
415 Bui, L., & Hedgpeth, D. (2015, May 6). Baltimore mayor seeks Justice review for police dept.; 




416 U.S. DOJ. (2014). Justice Department and City of Cleveland agree to reform police after 
finding a pattern or practice of excessive force. United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights 
Division, Special Litigation Section. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndoh/pr/justice-
department-and-city-cleveland-agree-reform-divisionpolice-after-finding. 
417 McKay, D. (2014, April 3). Mayor calls for action on APD. Albuquerque Journal. Retrieved from 
https://www.abqjournal.com/378243/mayor-calls-for-action.html. 
418 Miletich, S., Sullivan, J. & Carter, M. (2014, May 29). Seattle cops sue over DOJ reforms, 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Cleveland.com, 5/28/2015;419 Hardaway, 2019, pp. 142-143 [describing the law suit filed 
by Seattle police officers against the DOJ and the court-appointed monitor]). 
As a result, police unions have commonly attempted to intervene in settlement 
negotiations, usually with the intent to attempt to block reforms which they perceive as 
unnecessarily burdensome on rank and file officers. In general, however, the DOJ has 
successfully opposed those attempts to intervene (Rushin, 2015, pp. 90, 94; Rushin, 
2017a, pp. 139-140).420 
It has also been recognized that active union opposition to §14141 actions “has 
the potential to manifest in ways that threaten the viability and legitimacy of reform-
based accountability systems” (Chanin, 2012, pp. 310). Given that possibility, Chanin 
argued in favor of including unions in settlement negotiations, commenting that:  
Inclusion [] precludes the kinds of direct challenges that [have] occur[ed] in 
Pittsburgh and Washington, D.C. Having participated in the negotiation, 
union leadership in Cincinnati [had] a much less legitimate case to make 
for criticizing the settlement in the press or actively working to dismantle 
the reform effort, either in court or through legislation. In effect, bringing the 
unions in [gave] the FOP ownership over both the content of the settlement 
and the process of reform, and has the potential to reduce the level of 
opposition from members of the rank and file. (Chanin, 2012, p. 313; see 
 
419 Macdonald, E. (2015, May 28). Cleveland Police Union Says Justice Department Reforms 
Would Endanger Police, Cleveland.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/05/union_head_says_aspects_of_cle.html. 
420 See, for example, Fuoco, M. (1997, March 5). Police Recoil: Union Chief Says No Extra Step if 
Court Approves City-Justice Pact. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette [noting Pittsburgh police union denied 
opportunity to intervene in its consent decree negotiations], cited by Levenson, 2001, p. 30; see, 
also United States v. City of Los Angeles, 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4., 2001) [order 
denying the Los Angeles Protective League’s motion to intervene], cited by Rushin, 2015, p. 94. 
However, the federal judge overseeing the Portland, Oregon consent decree, went against the 
prevailing judicial opinions by granting the Portland police union’s request to intervene as a party. 
“In so holding, the court reasoned that the PPA had a significant and protectable interest because 
the terms of the proposed settlement agreement conflicted with certain provisions of the labor 
agreement existing between the city and the PPA, because the disposition of the action could 
impair or impede the PPA's continuing ability to protect and enforce its contractual rights, and 
because the city could not adequately represent the PPA's interest since the city and the PPA 
were antagonists in the collective bargaining process” (Patel, 2016, n. 320). In addition, a request 
to intervene by the LAPD Police Protective League, which was dismissed by the assigned federal 
judge, was ultimately granted on appeal, when the appellate court found that the Police Protective 
League had a “protectable interest” in the Consent Decree litigation, U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, 
288 F. 3d 391 (2002); In a 2012 case involving the New Orleans police union’s motion to 
intervene, however, the court found that the Consent Decree “would not impair or impact the 
property interest of the officers (U.S. v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924, 2012 WL 12990388, at 
9  (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012). (see, Hardaway, 2019, pp. 184, 187). 
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also, Simpson, 2008, p. 495; Ikerd & Walker, 2010, pp. 18-19; Clark, 2010, 
pp. 4-5; Rushin & Edwards, 2017; Walker, 2017) 
However, Rushin & Edwards also identified good reasons for the DOJ to avoid 
the inclusion of unions in settlement negotiations. Specifically, where it believes police 
unions might attempt to use the process to undermine reform efforts rather than 
supporting an “appropriate balance of accountability measures to ensure constitutionally 
acceptable policing practices. This sort of cooperative rulemaking may also produce 
inferior reforms” (Rushin & Edwards, 2017, p. 775). In addition, as noted by Chanin,  
Making space for union representatives at the negotiating table, [] runs the 
risk of delaying the process considerably or derailing it altogether. Labor 
and management rarely see eye to eye, particularly on issues that involve 
the potential for increased officer discipline, the loss of autonomy and 
discretion, and the assignment of public blame for an ongoing pattern of 
police misconduct. (Chanin, 2017a, p. 264) 
Even so, there is an inherent danger in declining to include unions in the 
settlement agreements and/or as a sufficient part of the implementation process as it 
relates to the ultimate sustainability of consent-decree initiated reforms. “There is some 
evidence to suggest that pattern or practice jurisdictions are susceptible to backsliding 
after a settlement agreement has been terminated. Opposition to the reform effort from 
officer unions has played a part in this regression…” (Chanin, 2017b, p. 264, citing 
Chanin, 2012, Chanin, 2015, and, Washington Post, 11/13/2015).421 
Walker aptly described the current challenges faced in determining the extent to 
which unions should be included in §14141 actions, particularly in the negotiation of 
settlement agreements and as parties to the ultimate litigation: 
Since they emerged as a powerful factor in policing in the late 1960s, police 
unions have been a largely negative force with regard to police 
accountability. Unions have almost consistently opposed all measures 
designed to improve police-community relations, particularly the creation of 
citizen review boards. For this reason, David Sklansky points out that today 
many police scholars have “little affinity” for a vision of democratic 
governance of the police that includes “participation by, or deliberation 
 
421 For example, in an interview with Chanin on March 1, 2010, “the former head of the 
Washington D.C. officer’s union made clear that his organization remained intent on undoing the 
DOJ’s reforms: ‘And if you don’t respect ... the ability of the union to have input, whatever you do 
is going to be undone ... And eventually, even the good things that may have been done by [the 
reform] process could be undone because it wasn’t done the right way. And if you don’t respect 
the process from the beginning, you’re building a house of cards’” (Chanin, 2017a, p. 264). 
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among, police officers themselves” … The question remains, however, 
whether including representatives in similar community police commissions 
will also serve to advance accountability related reforms or produce only 
conflict and dysfunction. (Walker, 2018, p. 1817) 
Realistically, by all appearances, the answer of to what extent union participation 
in §14141 actions should be allowed appears to simply be: “it depends.” In some cases, 
union participation may assist with buy-in from rank-and-file officers resulting in 
sustainable change; in other cases, it may be that the union leadership is the very cause 
of the need for the §14141 action, and they may need to be excluded from the solution 
for any real progress to be made. One would hope, however, that if a police union were 
named as a party, the assigned federal judge would be able to control the union if it were 
to become obstreperous and refuse to become part of the solution, instead of the 
problem. 
And, even if the DOJ has opposed union intervention at the time of settlement 
negotiations, the DOJ has agreed in several decrees (to include Seattle and Cleveland) 
in union participation in the implementation process by giving union members 
representation on those cities’ “Community Police Commissions” (See, Patel, 2012; 
USDOJ, 2017b; Walker, 2017; Walker, 2018) and, in one of its more recent consent 
decrees, the DOJ required the court-appointed monitor to meet with representatives of 
the rank and file officers on an ongoing basis (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 23). In addition, the 
DOJ meets with union representatives, to the extent they will cooperate, during the 
course of its underlying §14141 investigation (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 10 [also describing 
specific feedback provided by officers in Baltimore (p. 12) and Cleveland (p. 17)]). 
 
A … battle is now being waged … pitting the legal weight and limitless 
financial resources of the U.S. Justice Department against [a municipal 
government’s] right to control its own police department. At stake is no less 
than the fate of local agencies everywhere to control their own destinies 
versus an emerging pattern by the … Justice Department aimed at 
federalizing municipal police departments …  
(Richer, B., Law Enforcement Alliance of America, n.d.)422 
 
 
422 Retrieved from [CTRL] Feds Threaten To Take Over Ohio Police Department: (mail-
archive.com). 
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6.2. Police Culture 
In the early 1990s, the Christopher Commission discussed a pattern of excessive 
force that, they believed, was based on an organizational culture of “hardnosed” 
aggressive policing that led to conflict between the LAPD and minority communities. “As 
the Christopher Commission was told by a high-ranking LAPD officer, excessive force 
was treated leniently because it did not violate the internal LAPD ‘moral code’ that 
permit[ed] ‘some thumping’ as a matter of course” (Hoffman, 1993, p. 1475, citing 
Christopher Commission Report, 1991, pp. 57-60, 97-100 & 151-178; see also Mollen 
Commission, 1994, p. 69 [concluding that in order to address corruption in the New York 
Police Department, “the department must transform [the] police culture”]; see also, DOJ 
Findings Letter, Albuquerque Police Department, 2014, p. 36 [finding that  “[t]he 
department’s lack of internal oversight has allowed a culture of aggression to 
develop”]).423  
Commentators familiar with the LAPD referred to “the LAPD mentality,” described 
as “a philosophy of aggressive policing that explain[ed] the [beating of Rodney King], 
and the failure of more than a dozen LAPD officers to intervene, as part of a subculture 
of policing [that] was not an isolated incident” (Hoffman, 1993, pp. 1481-1482). 
And, as noted by other commentators, the issue is not just about race, ethnicity 
or social background. “It is a stark reminder that the culture of a police department can 
leave an even greater impression on an officer than the culture in which he or she was 
raised” (Levenson, 2001, p. 14). Levenson went on to identify the following factors as 
“predictors of police misconduct” as they relate to the culture of any individual police 
department: 1) an “insulated police department … that excludes scrutiny by others;” 2) a 
department’s own particular “Code of Silence” – determined by what level of misconduct 
that is tolerated before it would be reported on by another officer; 3) the extent to which 
the department relies on “professional policing” versus “community policing;” 4) the 
extent to which the department’s discipline system is perceived as fair or unfair; and, 5) 
the adequacy of “screening, training, and supervision” (Levenson, 2001, pp. 14-16). 
Levenson concluded that  
 
423 Retrieved on from: 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/04/10/apd_findings_4-10-14.pdf. 
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ultimately, however, the determination that must be made is whether the 
officers in a department operate in a manner and with an attitude that 
condones or ignores police misconduct. It is this “culture” problem that must 
be addressed if meaningful reforms are going to result. (Levenson, 2001, 
p. 16) 
In evaluating the “LAPD Rampart Scandal” in 2000, Chemerinsky (2000) defined 
police culture as “the unwritten rules, mores, customs, codes, values, and outcomes - 
that creates the policing environment and style” (p. 559; see also, Walker, 2012, pp. 68-
69, citing Mollen Commission, 1994, p. 51, defining “the officer subculture [as] the set 
‘attitudes and values that shape officers’ behavior’”]). 
In 2003, the then-Monitor of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, who would 
later become the court-appointed monitor for the Seattle Police Department’s consent 
decree, commented that “many police reform advocates conclude the police 
organizations are hopelessly insular, endlessly self-referential, and mistrustful of 
outsiders” (Bobb, 2003, p. 158). At the same time, Walker (2003) was commenting on 
his “new paradigm of police accountability:” 
 … that was taking into account …that to be effective any reform must (a) 
reach deep into the police organization; (b) have some direct impact on the 
day-to-day behavior of police officers; and (c) ultimately change, or at least 
begin to change, the culture of police organizations. (p. 9; see also, 
Jerome, 2004, p. 3 [“Organizational and cultural change, especially in 
insular organizations such as police departments, takes time and it takes 
leadership”])424 
And even though many police leaders, when publicly addressing issues of 
misconduct that arise in the media, tend to talk in terms of “bad apples” as the 
perpetrators of misconduct (Swope, 2001; Rushin, 2015), Simmons described the 
consequences of accepting the “bad apple” theory of police misconduct: “efforts to 
address police misconduct, no matter how sincere, are doomed to fail if they consistently 
emphasize the behavior of individual officers rather than address the ‘distinctive and 
influential organizational culture’ of police institutions” (Simmons, 2008, p. 506; see also, 
Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p.  citing Armacost, 2004, p. 509 [as “argu[ing] that it is 
 
424 When discussing the literature relating to “police officer subculture,” Walker (2018) identified 
“[t]he pioneering work” in that area as having been written by Westley, W. (1970). Violence and 
the Police: A Sociological Study of Law, Custom, and Morality [emphasizing the norms of 
solidarity, hostility to the public, and secrecy]. He also cited, Herbert, S. (1998). Police Subculture 
Reconsidered, 36 Criminology 343 (n. 383). 
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necessary to change not just the formal procedures of a law enforcement organization 
but also the informal aspects of the organizational culture that play a powerful role in 
shaping officer conduct on the streets”]; see also, Ikerd & Walker, 2010, p. 15 [arguing 
that “a Department must address the organizational culture when seeking to 
institutionalize police reform [and] the management of a police department must make 
efforts to ‘win the hearts and minds of officers in the department’ to develop a culture 
that supports the proposed change”]). 
However, Walker (2012) pointed out the impact of demographic changes on 
policing culture:  
[t]he traditional concept of a homogenous subculture resistant to change 
appears no longer valid. The police officer work force is now far more 
diverse than in the past. Some elements of that work force are more 
receptive to change than others. Significant variations have been found 




Regardless, the DOJ has recognized the difficulties associated with reforming 
police culture as part of Section 14141 reform efforts:  
when the Division finds a pattern or practice of police misconduct, it usually 
finds that pattern or practice is the product of many decades of dysfunction 
that has become engrained in police culture. Reversing that process 
requires enormous effort and commitment. (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 36) 
And as recognized by Chanin (2014) in his evaluation of the implementation efforts in 
Philadelphia, Detroit, Washington D.C., Cincinnati and Prince George’s County, “culture 
is a significant determinant of an agency’s ability to implement policy reform” (Chanin, p. 
40, citing Halpern & Clapp, 2007,
426
 and Klein & Sorra, 1996
427
). Chanin went on to 
describe “the inhibiting effects of organization resistance to change” as having been 
“clearly documented by policing scholars. The default cultural orientation of police 
 
425 Even so, I can’t help but to be reminded of a comment made to me by a high-ranking Denver 
Police officer, while I was serving as the Independent Monitor for that Department, that with 
respect to police cadets – “they may come into the Academy White, Black, Brown or Red … but 
they all come out Blue.” 
426 Halperin, M., & Clapp, P. (2007). Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy (2nd ed.). 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
427 Klein, K. J., & Sorra, J. S. (1996). The challenge of innovation implementation. (Special topic 
forum on the management of innovation). Academy of Management Review, 21(4), 1055–1081. 
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departments tends to reflect an opposition to outside influence, skepticism of external 
accountability and a hesitancy to accept change” (pp. 40-41, citing Walker, 1997; 
Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; see also, Rushin, 2017a, p. 108 [commenting that “[i]t can be 
particularly difficult to change the culture of a large, complex organization through 
forceful external mandates. To bring about sustainable change in a police department, 
you need both procedural changes enacted through external mandates and cultural 
change that results in organizational buy-in”]). And as succinctly noted by one police 
chief in May, 2015 at a PERF symposium on use-of-force training: “culture will trump 
policy every time” (PERF, 2015, p.22). 
And perhaps most interestingly, the question of whether a consent decree has 
actually changed the culture of a police department for the better often appears to be an 
open question that can only be truly answered after a long-term evaluation of the impact 
of a consent decree. In the case of Seattle, for example, that question simply remains 
unanswered at this time. 
6.3. Politics 
Both local and federal politics have potential limiting effects on §14141 actions.  
As recognized by Walker (2017),  
[t]he DOJ experience with pattern and practice litigation over the past 
twenty years highlights the overriding importance of both national and local 
politics with respect to police reform … In the end, unpredictable changes 
in the political environment are overarching factor which have a major 
impact on police reform and are beyond the control of reformers 
themselves. (pp. 27, 28) 
Los Angeles has been used as a barometer of the impact of local politics on 
policing and on the federal response to calls for policing reform. In pre-consent decree 
Los Angeles, the LAPD was seen as having been “rewarded” for adopting “an 
aggressive style of policing,” which was supported by “the levers of political power in the 
city and county.” In addition, the standing of Los Angeles’ Chief of Police was strong with 
the Republican administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush (at least 
until the highly publicized beating of Rodney King), with the Chief having appeared on 
the campaign trail with then-candidate Bush (Hoffman, 1993, pp. 1486, 1470-1471 & n. 
62). 
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With respect to the impact of local politics on federal practices, as described by 
Gilles (2000),  
the Justice Department is often caught between the proverbial rock and 
hard place: If it determines not to bring a 14141 suit against a police 
department alleged to have engaged in unconstitutional patterns and 
practices, civil rights and community leaders may charge that the 
government is pandering to police unions; if it does choose to bring a 
"pattern or practice" suit, local elected officials may charge that the 
Department is engaged in partisan politics. (n. 112) 
As described in Chapter 3.1, Republican and Democratic presidential 
administrations have tended to wield §14141 in dramatically different ways, with the 
Clinton and Obama administrations administering the law in an aggressive fashion, the 
Bush administration adopting a “more conciliatory approach,” and the Trump 
administration abandoning the statute altogether in favor of efforts to appear supportive 
of local police departments (see, Silveira, 2004, p. 613; Rushin, 2015; Rushin, 2017a; 
Chanin, 2017b; Walker, 2018). 
The use of §14141 (now 34 USC 12601) was, at least temporarily, largely been 
brought to a halt by the Trump administration, which took office in January 2017.428 
 
428 See as examples, police reform efforts in Chicago and San Francisco: 
San Francisco: “In early 2018, [] the Attorney General of California agreed to serve as the Monitor 
of a settlement agreement involving the San Francisco Police Department. The settlement 
agreement was the result of a Justice Department Collaborative Reform investigation of the 
police department that could not be implemented when the Trump Administration cancelled the 
Collaborative Reform program. The San Francisco Police Department had previously been the 
subject of a highly critical Blue Ribbon Panel, organized by the San Francisco District Attorney. 
The Mayor of San Francisco and the Chief of Police were determined to pursue reform of the 
department and, consequently, requested that the State Attorney General serve as the Monitor of 
the implementation process” (Walker, 2018, p. 1789). 
Chicago: In December 2015, the Obama DOJ opened an investigation into the Chicago Police 
Department (DOJ, 2017b, p. 48). A report finding the CPD subject to the provisions of Section 
14141 was published on January 13, 2017 (Located at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download), one week before the inauguration of the 
Trump administration. In August 2017, the Attorney General of Illinois, recognizing that the Trump 
administration did not intend to pursue an action under Section 14141, sued the Chicago police 
department to obtain federal court jurisdiction over the reforms identified in the USDOJ 
investigation report (Smith, M. (2017, August 29). Illinois Attorney General Sues Chicago over 
Police Practices. New York Times). A consent decree was negotiated and eventually approved by 
a U.S. District Court Judge on January 31, 2019. Consent Decree located at 
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/cpb/supp_info/ConsentDecreeComplete.pdf. As 
noted by Walker (2018), “[i]n seeking its own consent decree with the Chicago Police 
Department, the Illinois Attorney General stepped into the void created by the termination of the 
pattern or practice program by the Trump Administration” (p. 1789). 
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Although implementation processes have continued under consent decrees and 
settlement agreements reached during the Obama Administration (and already under 
the jurisdiction of federal judges),429 the Trump DOJ initiated only one new investigation 
and reached two settlement agreements, without the appointment of any third-parties to 
monitor or audit compliance with those agreements (Washington Post, 5/14/2019). In 
fact, shortly after taking office, in a memo dated March 31, 2017, Trump’s first Attorney 
General, Jeff Sessions, ordered a review of the Consent Decree process, which 
ultimately resulted in a November 7, 2018 memo outlining “Principles and Procedures for 
Civil Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements” to ensure that police-related 
Consent Decrees were only to be used in “limited circumstances” and instructing federal 
prosecutors to “exercise special caution” before entering into such agreements  
(Sessions, 11/7/2018).430 
In 2019, the Trump administration took the extraordinary action of attempting to 
block a Consent Decree agreement between the City of Chicago and the Illinois Attorney 
General’s Office (Associated Press, 10/10/2018; New York Times, 6/13/2020), which 
was based on findings made by the Civil Rights Division against the Chicago Police 
Department upon completion of a §14141 investigation on January 13, 2017, one week 
before Trump took office.431 
 
429 Specifically, in Seattle (2012 Agreement), New Orleans (2013 Agreement), Puerto Rico (2013 
Agreement) [although Puerto Rico court-appointed monitor resigned in 2019 citing misspending 
and a failure on the part of either the Trump DOJ or the court to act, Washington Post, 5/14/2019 
[“Official Over Puerto Rico Police Reform Resigns in Protest”]], Portland, OR (2014 Agreement), 
LA County Sheriff (2015 Agreement), Albuquerque NM (2015 Agreement), Cleveland OH (2015 
Agreement), Miami (2016 Agreement [although the court-appointed monitor resigned in 2019 
after being elected as Mayor of Tampa, FL and was “replaced” by the Trump DOJ with a DOJ 
lawyer, Miami New Times, 9/6/2019], Ferguson MO (2016 Agreement),  Newark, NJ (2016 
Agreement), and Baltimore MD (2017 Agreement). 
430 Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-releases-memorandum-
litigation-guidelines-civil-consent-decrees-and. Walker (2018) correctly interpreted the ultimate 
result of the Attorney General’s review of DOJ consent decree enforcement activities when he 
observed that: “[v]irtually all observers understood the order to mean that the administration of 
President Donald J. Trump was terminating the Justice Department’s program of pattern or 
practice investigations of constitutional violations by local and state law enforcement agencies. 
The announcement was no surprise. During the 2016 presidential election campaign, and in the 
presidential transition period following Trump’s election in November 2016, both Trump and 
Sessions publicly expressed their opposition to Justice Department investigations of local and 
state police agencies, while also expressing strong support for the country’s police officers” (p. 
1779). 
431 See investigation report, at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download. 
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And, as previously discussed, local politics has, on numerous occasions, resulted 
in requests for DOJ intervention (for example Washington D.C., Cincinnati (see Chanin, 
2012), New Orleans and Cleveland),432 and, has at other times been brought to bear 
against the wishes of local politicians (for example, Pittsburgh, Seattle and Los Angeles), 
still resulting in the negotiation of settlement agreements, and occasionally, litigated by 
agencies refusing to accede to federal oversight (Maricopa County, AZ, and Alamance 
County, NC).433 And, as recognized by Chanin (2012), local politics involves the “inter-
workings” of the affected police departments as well: 
Relationships between police leadership and lower-level staff are 
inherently political. So too are organizational decisions regarding the 
allocation of personnel (e.g., whom to put in charge of the committee 
responsible for managing implementation or where to assign specific 
mission critical tasks) and resources, as well as the development of agency 
priorities. The politics between the police union and department 
management also have the ability to affect the implementation of pattern or 
practice reform. (p. 335)
434
 
Rushin (2014) further identified what he referred to as “political spillover” as it 
related to potential barriers in initiating §14141 actions against municipalities that were 
politically connected to either local United States Attorney’s Offices and whose 
resources might be needed with respect to local-federal law enforcement task forces. 
For example, interviews conducted by Rushin indicated that Special Litigation Section 
efforts to take action against the New York Police Department might have been affected 
by those types of political considerations (pp. 3235-3236). 
 
432 Also consider the following observations made by the Police Executive Research Forum as a 
result of a 2012 symposium on civil rights investigations of local police: “Some Chiefs say that a 
DOJ investigation can help overcome political opposition to reforms: Some police chiefs have 
welcomed or requested DOJ investigations, because a federal investigation can force otherwise 
reluctant local officials to provide funding that is needed to implement reforms. In addition, 
requirements of a court-approved consent decree can overrule labor union opposition to certain 
changes in policies or practices” (PERF, 2013, p. 7). 
433 See, Rushin, 2016, for a comparison between Section 14141 actions in Los Angeles and 
Alamance County; See, Harmon 2012, for a discussion of DOJ’s interactions with the Maricopa 
County Sheriff’s Office; see also, Walker, 2018, n. 156. 
434 See also, Walker (2012), noting that “the most obvious example of the negative impact of this 
political influence on police reform would be unions helping to elect mayors who are sympathetic 
to their perspective and who may appoint a police chief who is not committed to high standards of 
accountability” (p. 72). 
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Regardless of the actual circumstances, some jurisdictions believe or claim that 
DOJ’s enforcement of §14141 is purely political, “with decisions on which jurisdictions to 
investigate made for partisan rather than policy reasons” (Chanin, 2016, p. 70). Chanin 
(2017a) after recognized that  
[w]hatever the actual merits of these critical views, the notion that pattern 
or practice investigations lack legitimacy serves to undermine the very 
procedural justice that is sought through the DOJ’s intervention and feeds 
a negative discourse that is counter to the evidence on positive dialog 
increasing legitimacy … An investigation seen as unsubstantiated, overly 
political or otherwise biased, may also further complicate a department’s 
effort to galvanize support for the reform process among the rank and file. 
(p. 263, citing, Mazerolle et al, 2013, and Tyler, 2006) 
In reality, Harmon’s observation seems to be the one the rings most true: 
“Section 14141 enforcement is driven by a complicated mixture of politics, policy, and 
legal discretion run through the machinery of a large administrative agency” (Harmon, 
2017, p. 622). 
Finally, Chanin (2012), after evaluating four different jurisdictions where §14141 
actions had been terminated, noted his concern “that issues of politics and concerns 
over federalism seem to have as much, if not more influence over how and when 
affected departments were released from DOJ oversight.” Although he also suggested 
that “perhaps termination can be explained by the concept of diminishing returns” or 
could be based on a perceived need to avoid undermining the authority of department 
leadership and local political leaders (p. 337). Interestingly Chanin’s concerns in this 
regard have been shared by both federal judges overseeing §14141 litigations in Los 
Angeles and in Seattle after the DOJ recommended termination of consent decrees that 
were rejected by the assigned judges in both cases (see, Section 3.3.1 (Los Angeles), 
supra). 
6.4. DOJ Resources 
Regardless of arguments in favor of §14141 enforcement actions, the limitations 
of these actions to systemically reform American police departments must be 
recognized. Even absent the different levels of support for these actions by Republican 
versus Democratic presidential administrations, “resource limitations have extended 
from one presidential administration to the next.” In fact, it seems unlikely that the DOJ 
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will ever have the resources necessary “to fully and rigorously enforce Section 14141 
against all agencies that appear to be engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct.” 
The result is a “messy” process which “is also sometimes seemingly inconsistent and 
imprecise” (Rushin, 2017a, pp. 158-159). Given these circumstances, municipalities like 
Seattle will almost inevitably view the selection of their city for a federal lawsuit to be 
procedurally unjust. 
Of all the researchers, Rushin appears to have most thoroughly evaluated the 
selection criteria used by the DOJ in §14141 enforcement cases. Rushin (2014) 
ultimately “conclude[d] that the DOJ has historically underenforced §14141, due in part 
to resource limitations that prevent the agency from aggressively pursuing all reported 
cases of systemic misconduct.” Rushin also found that “the DOJ has unevenly enforced 
§14141 over time” and “has only initiated Section 14141 investigations against a fraction 
of problematic departments” (pp. 3189, 3193 & 3240). As an example of the problem, 
Rushin (2014) detailed that, 
If patterns or practices of misconduct exist in only one out of every 100 law 
enforcement departments, then the DOJ only has the resources to 
investigate less than 2 percent of these departments each year. It is fair to 
assume that, even during times when the DOJ has aggressively pursued 
pattern or practice claims, enforcement has still been less than optimal. (p. 
3230) 
Rushin went on to explain that “a single, complex Section 14141 case alone can nearly 
exhaust all the manpower and resources of the Special Litigation Section for an entire 
year” (Rushin, 2014, p. 3230; see also, Kim, 2002; Armacost, 2004; Harmon, 2009; 
Walker & Macdonald, 2009; Gilles, 2000; McMickle, 2003; Simmons, 2008, pp. 518-519; 
Harmon, 2012; Rushin 2015 & Rushin, 2017a). 
Due to its inherent resource limitations, the DOJ has always understood that its 
enforcement efforts would have to be limited. As such, the DOJ has approached the 
§14141 program with the expectation and intent that its limited actions could be used to 
influence the policing profession on a larger scale: according to one former DOJ litigator: 
§14141 actions “can be a beachhead for reform, moving the profession forward” 
(Jerome, 2004, p. 5). And, according to the then-Deputy Chief of the DOJ’s Special 
Litigation Section, 
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[i]n deciding where to spend our scarce resources, we take other things 
into consideration as well, such as whether the department seems to have 
a handle on the problem we are seeing: when a bad thing happens in the 
police department, how does the department respond to it? Do they 
respond immediately, or do they fail to do anything until the news media 
approaches them? In other words, we look to see if the department is able 
to handle problems that come up on its own. (PERF, 2013, p. 36) 
Walker summed up the DOJ position best, quoting a 2017 Civil Right Division 
report as noting that “the limited resources of the Special Litigation Section can be 
maximized by focusing on issues ‘common to many law enforcement agencies,’ along 






Seattle Consent Decree Implementation 
The implementation of the Consent Decree in Seattle has been a long and rocky 
road towards compliance. In this chapter, I discuss the history and context of police 
practices in Seattle, the USDOJ investigation and negotiation of the Consent Decree and 
the implementation of the agreement in general. I then discuss these experiences from 
the perspectives of various Seattle stakeholders. 
7.1. The History and Context of Police Practices in Seattle 
The decision to use a consent decree to reform the Seattle Police Department 
did not come from nowhere. In fact, the SPD had a long history of police brutality, racial 
discrimination and corruption before it was professionalized after criminal prosecutions 
of SPD command staff and officers in the 1970s. Subsequent to the professionalization 
of the department, the SPD showed an extraordinary resilience to change attempted 
from outside the department regardless of Mayoral administration. It was the 
Department’s ability to resist reform efforts and maintain the status quo that ultimately 
led the DOJ to conclude that only a consent decree and a court-appointed monitor would 
ultimately result in ensuring constitutional policing practices by the SPD. 
Table 7.1. History of Police Accountability in Seattle435 
Date/Year Police Accountability Occurrence Reference 
1955 Mayor Pomeroy formed the Advisory Committee on 
Police Practices (“the Leffler committee”) which 
identified potential problems with respect to 
brutality, racial discrimination, and corruption and 
then disbanded. 
Chair: Very Reverend John 
Leffler, dean of Saint Mark’s 
Episcopal Cathedral; Bayley, 
2015, pp. 35-36. 
 
435 For an even more extensive timeline relating to the history of police accountability in Seattle, 
see Appendix E, created and posted by the Seattle Municipal Arhives in March 2021, which is 
represented to be “a chronology of selected legislation and events regarding police accountability 
in Seattle through 2020.” Retrieved from Timeline 1955-2020 - CityArchives | seattle.gov. 
227 
Date/Year Police Accountability Occurrence Reference 
January 1967 Seattle Times runs seven articles over two weeks 
describing “a police payoff system” with respect to 
bars and taverns and a “parking ticket racket” where 
businesses paid police to ignore customers with 
parking violations. 
 
Mayor Braman appoints a citizen committee (“the 
Blue-Ribbon Committee”) to look into allegations 
raised by Seattle Times articles. 
Bayley, 2015, pp. 67-72; 
72.74. 
April 11, 1967 Report of the Blue-Ribbon Committee published. Bayley, 2015, pp. 73-74. 
October 6, 1969  “Palace Revolt” against Chief Frank Ramon led by 
his three Assistant Chiefs for covering up corruption, 
leading to his resignation. 
Bayley, 2015, pp. 96-98; 
Seattle Times, 7/29/1986.436 
July 1970 Acting Chief Charles Gain appoints SPD Task Force 
to investigate graft. 
Bayley, 2015, pp. 143-144. 
September 14, 
1970  
SPD Task Force issues public report. Bayley, 2015, pp. 143-144. 
July 27, 1971 Former SPD Chief Ramon, Assistant Police Chief & 
13 police officers and Sheriff’s Deputies (and others, 
including former District Attorney & longtime City 
Council member) indicted for payoff scheme 
involving illegal gambling. (Bayley, 2015, p. xv.) 
District Attorney Christopher 
Bayley 
August 7, 1971 SPD Chief Police Chief George Tielsch quoted in 
Seattle Times as saying that the country grand jury 
investigating allegations of a police bribery ring 
“functions ‘like a Spanish Inquisition— all they need 
is a rack and thumbscrews.’” 
New York Times, 8/7/1971.437 
July 10, 1992 ACLU Report: “Recommendations for Changes in 
Seattle Police Operations to Improve Accountability 
and the Complaint Review Process." 
ACLU of Washington.438 
October 1996 Veteran SPD Homicide Detective steals $10,000 
from home of deceased suspect who died in 
shootout with police. 
Citizens Review Panel Final 
Report, p. 2. 
March 1999 Homicide Detective Attempted Theft reported to 
County Prosecutor. 
Citizens Review Panel Final 
Report, p. 2. 
 
436 Christensen, A. (1986, July 29). Frank Ramon, Controversial Chief of Police of 1960’s, Dies. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
437 Turner, W. (1971, August 8). Police Bribe Ring Charges Studied by Jury in Seattle. New York 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1971/08/08/archives/police-bribe-ring-charges-
studied-by-jury-in-seattle-officials-and.html. 
438 Retrieved from Seattle Municipal Archives - CityArchives | seattle.gov. 
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Date/Year Police Accountability Occurrence Reference 
May 1999 Public reports that eight SPD officers (including an 
internal investigations Sergeant) failed to report 
allegations that a veteran Homicide Detective stole 
$10,000 from a crime scene 2 ½ years prior. 
ACLU of Washington, 
6/14/1999 Press Release.439 
May 7, 1999 Mayor Schell appoints Citizen Review Panel Citizens Review Panel Final 
Report, p. 2. 
August 19, 1999 Citizens Review Panel Final Report recommending 
creation of an Office of Public Accountability 
Johnson, C.; Durkan, J.; 




Mardi Gras Riots [resulting in one death and 70 
injuries - partly blamed on police commanders who 
had initially kept officers from intervening, fearing for 
their safety]. 
Seattle Times, 9/3/2011.441 
May 31, 2001 Shooting of Aaron Roberts [public controversy over 
shooting leads to claims of “de-policing”] 
Seattle Times, 6/26/2001, 
8/2/2001.442 
March 26, 2002 SPOG “vote of no confidence” in Chief Kerlikowske. 
Reportedly resulting from discipline imposed on an 
officer in a racial profiling case, command staff 
actions in Mardi Gras Riot and “tepid support” from 
Chief for officers involved in shootings. 
Seattlepi.com, 3/26/2002.443 
June 2007 Mayor Nickels appoints 11-member panel to 
“perform a thorough and comprehensive review of 
Seattle’s Police accountability system.” 
Police Accountability Review 
Panel Final Report, at i. 
January 29, 
2008 
Final Report of Police Accountability Review Panel Chair, Judge Terrence 
Carroll; Boruchowitz, B.; 
Durkan, J.; Gonzalez, M.L.; 
Jayapal, P.; Locke, G.; Krebs, 
J.; McKay, M.; Rice, N.; 
Shaw, J.444 
June 11, 2009 Beating of Daniel Macio Saunders. Referred to in Dec. 3, 2010 
ACLU letter to DOJ. 
October 31, 
2009 
Fatal Ambush Shooting of SPD Officer Timothy 
Brenton [resulting in “public sympathy” for the SPD]. 
Seattle Times, 9/3/2011. 
 
439 Retrieved from Seattle: ACLU-WA Calls for An Independent Office for Police Accountability | 
ACLU of Washington (aclu-wa.org). 
440 Retrieved from Seattle Municipal Archives - CityArchives | seattle.gov. 
441 Miletich, S. & Carter, M. (2011, September 3). Culture of Mistrust Behind SPD’s woes. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
442 Tizon, A. & Ith, I. (2001, August 2). Stats contradict ‘de-policing’ claims. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
443 Kamb, L. (2002, March 26). Seattle Officers Vote No Confidence in Chief, Seattlepi.com. 
Retrieved from Seattle officers vote no confidence in police chief (seattlepi.com). 
444 Retrieved from Seattle Municipal Archives - CityArchives | seattle.gov. 
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Date/Year Police Accountability Occurrence Reference 
April 17, 2010 Officer threatens to beat “the Mexican piss out of” 
Martin Monetti Jr. 
Seattle Times, 6/7/2012445 
Referred to in Dec. 3, 2010 
ACLU letter to DOJ. 
April 24, 2010 Incident involving alleged choking in the back of a 
police car with in-car video not working. 
Referred to in Dec. 3, 2010 
ACLU letter to DOJ. 
June 14, 2010 Video shows SPD officer punching teenage African 
American girl in the face during a jaywalking 
incident. 
Seattle Times, 12/10/2010446 
Referred to in Dec. 3, 2010 
ACLU letter to DOJ. 
August 30, 2010 Shooting of John T. Williams Referred to in Dec. 3, 2010 
ACLU letter to DOJ. 
October 18, 
2010 
Beating of unarmed cooperative African-American 
teenage in a convenience store, captured by 
surveillance video.  
Referred to in Dec. 3, 2010 
ACLU letter to DOJ. 
December 3, 
2010 
ACLU Letter to DOJ requesting §14141 
investigation. 
ACLU of Washington.447 
 
7.1.1. The Origins of Corruption in the Seattle Police Department 
 By the time of the initiation of the DOJ §14141 investigation in 2011, the Seattle 
Police Department had a reputation for being a relatively “clean” Police Department.448 
But that was not always the case and, in fact, the SPD’s origins involved a cycle of 
corrupt activities that lasted from the time of its creation in the 1880s for almost one 
hundred years. As described by a former King County District Attorney, who was 
credited with finally cleaning up the SPD in the early 1970s through a series of high-
profile prosecutions of public officials and police officers: 
 
445 Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (2012, June 7). City hits back at DOJ report - 'Reliability, 
trustworthiness' challenged Court filing comes amid talks on plan to fix SPD, Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
446 Miletich, S., (2010, December 10). SPD Officer Who Punched Teen in Jaywalking Incident 
Cleared of Using Excessive Force, Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
447 Retrieved from https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/re-request-investigate-pattern-or-practice-
misconduct-seattle-police-department. 
448 As represented by Sgt. Richard O’Neill, the then-President of the Seattle Police Officers’ Guild 
when the SPD came under scrutiny as a result of questionable uses of force in 2007 and 2008: 
“We have a squeaky-clean Police Department compared to other big cities” (Seattle Times, 
9/3/11). 
In 2015, former King County District Attorney Christopher Bayley (who served from 1971-1979), 
and was responsible for the 1971 indictments of public officials and police officers for graft wrote: 
“No one has accused Seattle’s current police force of personal corruption or graft. The federal 
and county criminal trials of 1970 to 1974 put a stake through the heart of that vampire…” 
(Bayley, 2015, p. 203-204). 
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At one point in the 1880s, 87 percent of the city’s general fund came from 
brothels, gambling and liquor…Occasional early condemnations by 
preachers and Seattle’s more moralistic founders had little initial impact. 
But by the 1880s and 1890s, the fight between vice and reform was a 
perennial election issue…But when reformers captured city hall, reform 
was partial and temporary. Usually it was not long before a different mayor 
appeared with a more open attitude or an external event [such as the 
Klondike Gold Rush in 1897] reversed any reform. (Bayley, 2015, p. 3). 
As reflected in Table No. 6.2, a history of Seattle police chiefs and their corrupt 
activities was chronicled by Bayley (2015) in his book Seattle Justice: The Rise and Fall 
of the Police Payoff System in Seattle. 
Table 7.2. History of Seattle Police Chiefs & SPD Corruption449 
Chief of Police Significant Events During Tenure 
1901 – Chief William Meredith Killed by a prominent theater operator after being accused of taking 
protection money and then harassing the theater operator. Meredith 
reportedly “hunted down” the theater operator, only to be killed in the 
ensuing fight (Bayley, 2015, pp. 6-7). 
1910 – Chief Charles 
Wappenstein 
Established open vice districts and extended them even further than 
discussed during the Mayoral election. Implicated in the protection 
racket allegations against Chief Meredith. Eventually convicted of 
bribery (Bayley, 2015, p. 7). 
1924 – Chief William Severyns Fired by the Acting Mayor after acknowledging there were at least 100 
corrupt officers in the SPD and refusing to fire them. Reinstated by 
elected Mayor shortly thereafter (Bayley, 2015, p. 8). 
July 1935 - Chief Walter B. 
Kirtley 
Professed shock by City Council allegations about illegal gambling 
operations and subsequently took no enforcement actions against 
them (Bayley, 2015, p. 10). 
1942 – Chief Herbert Kimsey Used guaranteed five-year term to ignore Mayor’s repeated requests 
to deal with complaints of criminal vice activities (Bayley, 2015, p. 12). 
1946 – Chief George Eastman Enacted “Tolerance policy” – vice laws to be “enforced as a 
reasonable man would want it enforced” (Bayley, 2015, pp 15-16). 
1952 - Chief H.J. Lawrence Described as “a man happy to tolerate a wide range of vice” (Bayley, 
2015, p. 18). 
1961-1969 - Chief Frank Ramon On October 6, 1969 Chief Ramon faced a “palace revolt” by his 
Assistant Chiefs for covering up corruption, leading to his resignation. 
Indicted in 1971 for corruption. (Bayley, 2015, pp. 96-98; Seattle 
Times, 7/29/1986; Seattle Times, 8/13/1989450). 
1971 – Chief George Tielsch Reported as “not tolerating graft of any sort” (Bayley, 2015, p. 139). 
 
449 For list of Seattle Police Chiefs since 1869, go to: 
https://blog.seattlepi.com/seattle911/2009/02/10/a-look-back-at-seattle-police-chiefs/. 
450 Duncan, D. (1989, August 13). Challenge and Change – Whistle Blows on a Tolerance Policy. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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7.1.2. Committees Appointed to Review Police Accountability Issues 
The advisory committee on police practices (1955). 
The first report of a Seattle committee to address issues of police accountability 
was the “Advisory Committee on Police Practices,” appointed in 1955 by then-Mayor 
Allan Pomeroy who served one term in office (1952-1956). Mayor Pomeroy appointed 
that committee based on allegations of SPD racism: 
The committee soon became intrigued by a report from the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics stating that narcotics were not a significant problem in Seattle 
except among blacks but that investigation of the problem was hampered 
because bars in the predominantly African American Central District paid 
off the police. [The] committee asked the police to come to meetings and 
answer questions. The police refused with the exception of a Captain Cook, 
who denied everything. The committee issued a report noting their 
frustration and suggesting the police might have problems in areas like 
brutality, racial discrimination, and corruption. It then disbanded (Bayley, 
2015, pp. 37-38). 
The blue-ribbon committee (1967). 
The next committee appointed to look into allegations of police corruption was 
created as the result of a series of articles run by the Seattle Times and was formed in 
January 1967. That committee, which had no ability to subpoena witnesses or put them 
under oath, reported back on April 11, 1967, based solely on voluntary testimony 
provided during confidential hearings. The committee concluded that: 
The information submitted to this committee falls short of establishing 
payoffs to police officers. While a number of statements by witnesses 
indicated the acceptance of payoffs by a few policemen in isolated cases, 
there was no substantiation or corroboration that would permit a finding by 
the committee as to the truth of the statements. Police officers appearing 
before the committee denied receiving any payoffs (Bayley, 2015, pp. 73-
74). 
The committee did, however, recommend that police no longer be permitted to 
“moonlight” at bars and that officers should be required to “rotate their beats no less than 
every two years” (Bayley, 2015, p. 74). 
232 
The SPD task force (1970). 
After the resignation of Chief Frank Ramon in October 1969, a new Acting Police 
Chief, on leave for one month from the Oakland Police Department (July – August 
1970), appointed Edward Toothman, a retired Oakland Police Chief to run an internal 
task force to investigate internal graft. The task force subsequently interviewed hundreds 
of police officers. In its public report, published on September 14, 1970, the task force 
minimized the extent and harm of the police corruption previously exposed by the 
Seattle Times: 
The question is asked, “How extensive was the involvement in terms of 
numbers of officers?” It has been stated earlier that only a few districts were 
involved. At a given period, there were about 35 to 40 men working in these 
districts. Of that number, not all were involved. There is only speculation as 
to how many there were. Of those who worked in the department during 
the last ten years, the Task Force identified about 70 to 80 as having been 
involved in payoffs. The majority of those persons had left the Police 
Department prior to the beginning of the investigation… 
It must be remembered, however, that there were many persons other than 
police officers that were involved in the payoff system. There were first, the 
Chiefs of Police who during their respective tenures failed to exercise 
adequate controls to prevent the criminal activities of the officers. Secondly, 
there were the gamblers and homosexuals who paid off the police to 
protect their own interests. Under the law, they are as guilty as the 
officers…Thirdly, the Mayors and Councilmen in the past who conceived 
and perpetuated what was known as the “tolerance policy” carried a major 
part of the responsibility for the shaping of the conditions that spawned 
crime and corruption in the Seattle Police Department… 
With the removal from the department of those officers known to have been 
involved, and the filing of criminal charges against several, the department 
through its own efforts has purged itself of most of the guilty officers. There 
are, of course, some officers who have not been exposed, so they will 
probably go unpunished, except by the knowledge of their guilt. Darkness, 
however, does not protect a man from his own conscience (Bayley, 2015, 
pp. 144-5). 
The citizens review panel (1999). 
The next committee to address issues and concerns regarding police 
accountability in Seattle, was not appointed until 1999, almost thirty years after the SPD 
task force report was published:  
The appointment of the panel followed the filing of first-degree theft charges 
against a police detective, accused of stealing $10,000 from the home of a 
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Seattle resident who died after engaging in a shootout with Seattle Police 
in October, 1996. The charges state that while the money was returned to 
the home and subsequently placed in evidence, the alleged theft – which 
was known to a number of Seattle police officers and was reported to a 
sergeant in the Department’s Internal Investigation’s Section – was not 
investigated by the Department until March, 1999, when a homicide 
detective informed a King County Deputy Prosecutor of the incident 
(Citizens Review Panel Report, 1999, at 2). 
The panel was given specific charges by then-Mayor Schell to: 
• Examine the barriers that give rise to the failure of employees to report 
misconduct, and propose steps to ensure compliance with reporting 
requirements.451 
• Evaluate the Department’s mechanisms to encourage and support citizens 
and employees who report or witness misconduct, and 
• Undertake a systemic review of Department policies, procedures and training 
programs – including Internal Investigations – that define employee 
responsibilities in disclosing and investigating allegations of misconduct 
(Citizens Review Panel Report, 1991, at 2). 
The panel was chaired by Charles V. Johnson, a retired Judge of the King 
County Superior Court and included three other members: a former U.S. Attorney for the 
Western District of Washington, a retired Special Agent in Charge of the Seattle FBI 
office and, perhaps most importantly, a lawyer and former Executive Counsel to the 
Governor who would later become the U.S. Attorney who led the Department of Justice’s 
reform effort in 2011, Jenny Durkan. Durkan would also make history as the first person 
to be a plaintiff in a federal pattern or practice lawsuit (as the local U.S. Attorney) and 
subsequently become a named defendant in the same lawsuit after having been elected 
Mayor of Seattle in 2017. 
The panel reported that while it “found that a number of factors can deter or 
encourage the reporting of misconduct, the single most important factor is whether 
people have confidence that complaints will be handled thoroughly, fairly and 
 
451 Interestingly, in its 2011 report announcing the conclusion of its pattern or practice 
investigation, the DOJ specifically noted concerns regarding then-existing barriers to internal 
reporting of misconduct: “during our investigation, we were told that referrals from supervisors 
about misconduct by their supervisees are admittedly “rare to non-existent” (DOJ Investigation 
Report, 2011, at 2). 
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expeditiously.” The panel then concluded that “the present system has not uniformly 
engendered such confidence” (Citizens Review Panel Report, 1999, at 4). The panel 
went on to recommend the creation of an “Office of Police Accountability” which would 
“subsume both the present duties of the Internal Investigations Section [IIS] and the IIS 
Auditor.” The OPA would be led by a civilian appointed by the Chief and confirmed by 
City Council and staffed by police officers. The panel recommended that the Chief would 
still, ultimately, be responsible for all disciplinary decisions, but noted that the OPA 
Director would “enforce the rights of officers and citizens with equal diligence.” The panel 
further recommended what they referred to as additional “substantive changes… in the 
areas of leadership; policies and procedures, and training” (Citizens Review Panel 
Report, 1999, at 5). 
Although the panel found “no widespread or systemic corruption,” it did find that 
“some employees [were] reluctant to report [] misconduct.” (Citizens Review Panel 
Report, 1999, at 6). And, although it did end up making a total of twenty-three 
recommendations for reform, the panel concluded by saying:  
If the panel were convinced, after four months of probing examination, that 
the Seattle Police Department was systemically flawed or poorly managed, 
it would not hesitate to say so. It is the conviction that an essentially good 
Department can be made better that has led to the panel's 
recommendations. (Citizens Review Panel Report, 1999, at 34) 
The panel was particularly concerned about how collective bargaining 
agreements between the City and the police guild were negatively impacting the integrity 
of police internal investigations. It was acknowledged that “[t]he current polic[ies] afford[] 
Seattle Police Department employees more rights and protections than those granted to 
citizens. In essence, current policy obliges the Department to conduct most 
investigations of misconduct by correspondence” (Citizen Review Panel Report, at 18). 
The panel found “this set of circumstances to be quite incompatible with the best 
traditions of police management and with procedures followed in most other police 
departments in the United States” (Citizen Review Panel Report, at 19).452 
 
452 This was the first report that appears to have identified the role of collective bargaining as an 
impediment to SPD accountability; a now reoccurring issue that ultimately resulted in the 
assigned federal judge, twenty years later, finding the city out of compliance with the Consent 
Decree (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 562, “Order Finding City of Seattle Partially Out of 
Compliance with the Consent Decree,” filed 5/21/2019). 
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Amongst the recommendations made by the panel included that:  
• “the Chief should issue a ‘bright line’ rule stating that lying, cheating, or stealing 
will not be tolerated by the Department and will result in termination” 
(Recommendation Two); 
• “the Chief have a more direct and authoritative role in the training and internal 
investigations process” (Recommendation Three);  
• an SPD ethics officer be appointed (Recommendation Four); “Sergeants be 
provided with additional managerial training regarding…their responsibility 
concerning complaints of misconduct” (Recommendation Five);453 
• the department determine whether budget cuts had reduced the ability of 
supervisors to perform their duties (Recommendation Six);  
• the Department “institute a more comprehensive ‘early warning system’” 
(Recommendation Seven);454  
• supervisors needed to “be held accountable for a pattern of misconduct 
allegations in their squads” (Recommendation No. 8);  
• officers “be transferred and supervisors rotated in their assignments with greater 
frequency” (Recommendation No. 9);  
• “all commanders, supervisors, and officers regularly [] be reminded of their duty 
to receive complaints from citizens whenever and wherever they are made” 
(Recommendation No. 10);  
• the department resume conducting performance evaluations (Recommendation 
No. 12); 
• the department increase and improve ethics training (Recommendations 13-16); 
and,  
• the department ensure appropriate training and resources for internal 
investigations investigators (Recommendations 17-18). 
 
453 The DOJ investigation report in 2011 would find that the finding of a pattern or practice of 
excessive force and issues related to biased policing was caused, in part, on lack of supervision 
on the part of SPD Sergeants and command staff (DOJ Investigation Report, 2011, pp. 4, 6, 8, 15 
& 17). 
454 The DOJ investigation report in 2011 would find that the SPD’s Early Intervention System was 
“broken.” (DOJ Investigation Report, 2011, p. 22). 
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The Seattle police accountability review panel (2009). 
Eight years after the Citizen Review Panel report of 1999 (on June 29, 2007), 
then-Mayor Nickels appointed an 11-person panel to review the police accountability 
system that was set up as a result of the 1999 Citizen Review Panel recommendations. 
The department had been under the leadership of Chief Gil Kerlikowske since 2000 and 
public allegations had been made that the Chief had improperly influenced an OPS 
investigation, was regularly undercutting disciplinary recommendations being made by 
the OPA Director and was taking “extraordinary measures to protect [his] officers” 
(Seattle Times, 6/19/2007).455 
As reported by the Seattle Times on June 20, 2007: 
A Seattle Times statistical review in 2005 found that since January 2002, 
[Chief] Kerlikowske had reversed 27 out of 100 findings by investigators of 
misconduct by officers. In some of those cases, officers accused of multiple 
violations were disciplined for at least one offense. But in others, no 
discipline was imposed… 
The reversals caught the attention of the citizen-review board — the panel 
that last week concluded in a report that Kerlikowske intervened in the 
internal investigation into the actions of a pair of officers involved in a 
controversial drug arrest in January.456 (Seattle Times, 6/20/2007)457 
Shortly after a series of articles appeared in local papers repeatedly commenting 
on the discipline issue,458 Mayor Nickels announced his plan to thoroughly review the 
 
455 Chan, S & Carter, M. (2007, June 19). Scathing report says chief interfered with cop probe - 
Civilian review board Kerlikowske calls findings "absolutely false.” Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
456 The citizen review report which criticized Chief Kerlikowske’s actions was written by the then-
Board President, attorney Pete Holmes, who would later be elected Seattle’s City Attorney in 
2009 and has served as the Seattle City Attorney through the entirety of the DOJ investigation 
and consent decree process. Holmes later supported a cooperative approach with the DOJ in the 
negotiation and implementation of the Seattle Consent Decree. 
457 Miletich, S. (2007, June 20). Once Tough on Cops Once tough on cops, is chief now too 
easy? - Kerlikowske has said no-confidence vote didn't alter his approach. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
458 Chan, S. & Carter, M. (2007, June 19). Scathing report says chief interfered with cop probe - 
Civilian review board Kerlikowske calls findings ‘absolutely false.’ Seattle Times; Miletich, S. 
(2007, June 20) Once tough on cops, is chief now too easy? Seattle Times [“Kerlikowske has 
said no-confidence vote didn't alter his approach”]; Sullivan, J. (2007, June 26). Rights group, 
union enter police chief fray. Seattle Times [“Two civil-rights groups have lined up on opposite 
sides of the controversy swirling around Seattle police Chief Gil Kerlikowske for intervening in the 
internal police investigation of two officers”]; Carter, M. & Clarridge, C. (2007, June 26). Police 
chief exonerated officers in violent arrest. Seattle Times [“Oversight leader had urged punishment 
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police accountability systems to ensure they were working effectively.459 Referred to as 
“a big-name panel,” the panel included a former Governor of Washington and a former 
Mayor.460 Once again, however, probably the most significant member of the panel was, 
in fact, attorney Jenny Durkan, who served on the 1999 Citizens Review Panel and 
would find herself appointed as the United States Attorney for the Western District of 
Washington in October, 2009.461    
In another prescient comment on the creation of the panel, the police guild 
president repeated a comment that was heard multiple times over the course of the 
implementation of the Consent Decree when he said: "I have no problem with a review 
of the accountability system… This panel has some distinguished professionals and they 
 
- Police official defends decision by Kerlikowske - A federal civil-rights lawsuit over the violent 
arrest of a young African-American man is drawing new attention to Seattle Police Chief Gil 
Kerlikowske and his record on police discipline”]; Clarridge, C. & Carter, M. (2007, June 27). 
Police chief: No regrets, but I'm open to change. Seattle Times [“Gil Kerlikowske says that while 
he stands by the controversial decisions he’s made on Seattle police discipline, he's not opposed 
to re-examining how the department polices itself”]; Young, B. & Chan, S., (2007, June 29). 
Stronger police oversight sought. Seattle Times [“Kerlikowske probe - Licata envisions group that 
would work with accountability experts - Seattle City Council President Nick Licata announced 
plans Thursday to convene an advisory group on how to strengthen citizen oversight of the police 
department”]. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
459 Sam Pailca, the first person to serve as an OPA Director, who had recently resigned to take a 
position at Microsoft Corp., commented on the creation of the panel: “The practice of civilian 
oversight has matured significantly even in the past few years, and Seattle can draw from that 
experience to make its system stronger, … But no structural changes will substitute for strong 
leadership and vocal and visible support from elected and appointed officials, … I hope this 
panel’s charge includes taking a hard look at the role of the administration that empaneled it” 
(Miletich, S. & Chan, S. (2007, June 30). Mayor forms big-name panel to scrutinize police 
oversight. Seattle Times). Pailca’s comments were consistent with police reform literature that 
emphasize the need of a committed police and city leadership to ensure accountability and 
sustainability of police reform efforts. 
460 Panel members included former Gov. Gary Locke; former Seattle Mayor Norm Rice, the first 
and only African-American Mayor of Seattle; attorneys Jenny Durkan and Mike McKay (both 
members of the 1999 blue-ribbon commission that recommended the creation of the OPA); Bob 
Boruchowitz, the former director of a King County public-defense agency; Hubert Locke, former 
dean of the public-affairs school at the University of Washington; Terrence Carroll, a former King 
County Superior Court judge and Seattle police auditor who also served on the 1999 commission; 
M. Lorena Gonzales, a civil rights attorney who would go on to be elected in 2005 as a member 
of Seattle’s City Council and its President in January 2020; Pramila Jayapal, the Director of an 
immigrant rights group who was later elected to the Washington Senate in 2015 and the U.S. 
House of Representatives in 2017; Judith Krebs, the General Council for a union representing 
health care workers; and Jennifer Shaw, a representative of the ACLU of Washington. (Seattle 
Times, 6/30, 2007; Police Accountability Review Panel Report, 2008, pp. 15-18; 
https://www.pramilaforcongress.com/home; http://www.seattle.gov/council/gonzalez/). 
461 See, http://www.jennydurkan.com/. 
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will know that any significant changes to the discipline system will have to be bargained 
with the union." (Seattle Times, 6/30/2007).462 
The Panel issued its report on January 29, 2008. The report presented “29 
specific recommendations for enhancing and strengthening the police accountability 
system in [] four areas”: Accountability & Public Confidence, Independence, Professional 
Conduct and Transparency. (Police Accountability Review Panel, 2008, at p. ii). Overall, 
the panel recommended that the City expand the role of the OPA auditor, increase the 
independence and the authority of the OPA Director, expand the OPA Review Board, 
require the disclosure of OPA records “to the maximum extent allowed by law,” adopt a 
policy of presumptive termination for sustained complaints involving dishonesty, and 
enhance the level of cooperation and coordination  between the three OPA mechanisms 
(OPA Director, OPA Auditor and OPA Review Board) (Police Accountability Review 
Panel, 2008, at p. ii-iii). 
The Panel report noted that, 
[o]ver the past several decades, the Seattle Police Department has 
improved its image and reputation in communities of color in our city. 
Periodic assessments of community attitudes toward the Department 
indicate this general development. At the same time, other indicators point 
to how much remains to be accomplished if a genuine climate of trust and 
cooperation is to exist between police officers and communities of color in 
Seattle. (Police Accountability Review Panel, 2008, at 3) 
Overall, the Panel found that: 1) the overall structure of the police accountability system 
did not need to be changed; 2) the intended working relationship between the OPA 
partner agencies needed to be better defined; 3) “the independent civilian review of the 
current system [needed to] be strengthened;” and, 4) all panel recommendations, not 
requiring collective bargaining, needed to be implemented “without delay.” (Police 
Accountability Review Panel, 2008, at 4).463 
The panel did not, however, recommend any restrictions on the police chief’s 
decision-making in disciplinary cases other than the implementation of a policy of 
 
462 Miletich, S. & Chan, S. (2007, June 30). Mayor forms big-name panel to scrutinize police 
oversight. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
463 Amongst its many recommendations, the Panel recommended the creation of an SPD ethics 
officer; a recommendation made previously by the 1999 panel, but never put in place. (Police 
Accountability Review Panel Report, Recommendation No. 21, at p. 11). 
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presumptive termination for false statements (Recommendation No. 20) and a 
requirement that if the Chief changed a finding of the OPA director, the Chief should be 
required to explain his/her decision in writing (Recommendation No. 25). 
Table 7.3. Seattle Police Chief Tenures and Respective Accountability-Related 
Incidents (since 1979) [Not including Interim Chiefs] 
Chief of Police (Term of 
Office) 
Events During Term of Office References 
Chief Frank Fitzsimons (1979-
1994) 
(former Assistant Chief, NYPD)
  
Longest serving Chief in Seattle 
history; initiated community policing; 
criticized by rank & file for some 
police officer terminations; criticized 
by City Council for “stonewalling 
calls for change” 
(Seattle Times, 7/16/1993)464 
Chief Norm Stamper (1994-
2000) 
(former San Diego Chief) 
Theft by homicide detective not 
reported and investigated. Citizens 
Review Panel appointed by Mayor 
Schell. Resigned after taking 
criticism for police response to WTO 
riots in 1999. 
June 14, 1999: ACLU calls for 
“the creation of an 
independent office for police 
accountability.” (ACLU press 
release, 6/14/1999). 
 
Citizens Review Panel 
(August 19, 1999). 
Chief Gil Kerlikowske (2000-
2009) 
(former Police Commissioner – 
Buffalo NY; former Chief of Fort 
Pierce PD (Fla.) and Port St. 
Lucie PD (Fla.) 
In June 2007, Mayor Greg Nickels 
appointed a citizen panel to perform 
a thorough and comprehensive 
review of Seattle’s police 
accountability system after the 
Chief was accused of taking 
extraordinary measures to protect 
officers. 
Police Accountability Review 
Panel (2008). 
Chief John Diaz (2009-2013) DOJ investigation initiated after 
August 2010 shooting of Native 
Woodcarver John T. Williams 
DOJ Investigation Report 
(2011) & Consent Decree 
(2012) 
Chief Kathleen O’Toole (2014-
2017) 
(Former Police Commissioner, 
Boston PD.) 
Implementation of Consent Decree 
& Initial Compliance 
Recommendations from court-
appointed Monitor; Passage of 
Police “Accountability Ordinance” 
on May 21, 2017. 
Court finding of Initial 
Compliance on January 10, 
2018.465 
 
464 Birkland, D. & Lilly, D. (1993, July 16). Police Chief says 15 years will be enough, Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
465 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 439. 
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Chief of Police (Term of 
Office) 
Events During Term of Office References 
Chief Carmen Best (2018-2020) Court “out of compliance” finding 
due to arbitrator ruling and police 
union contract inconsistent with 
“Accountability Ordinance.” 
Seattle Protest complaints  
Joint motion (DOJ & Seattle) 
to terminate Consent Decree 
(May 7, 2020);466 
City Motion to withdraw 
termination request (June 4, 
2020).467 
7.1.3. The SPD’s Road to Federal Intervention 
According to the Seattle Times at the time of the release of the DOJ’s 
Investigation Report into the Seattle Police Department,468  
The [DOJ] report echoed concerns that have been raised for years by 
Police Department auditors, a review board, blue-ribbon commissions and 
plaintiff's attorneys, among others, who have complained that officers 
escalate to the use of force too quickly, often relying on dangerous and 
damaging "impact weapons" such as batons and flashlights to subdue 
resistance. (Seattle Times, 12/16/11)469 
Earlier, on September 3, 2011, the Times provided their own explanation for how the 
SPD found itself in the sights of the DOJ. The Times suggested that the “root of the 
problem” could be traced back to the 1999 “crime scene” scandal involving a homicide 
detective who stole money for the home of a deceased suspect without appropriate 
intervention by other officers or internal affairs. It was reported that the scandal “sparked 
efforts to bolster how the Police Department polices itself – efforts that have advanced in 
fits and starts.” Chief Kerlikowske was seen to have “inherited the fallout from the 
scandal, forcing him to wrestle with disciplinary issues throughout his tenure.” It was 
reported that the Office of Professional Accountability (OPA) had just been created when 
Kerlikowske was hired as chief in 2000 and he ended up being faced with a police-
union-sponsored “no confidence” vote in 2002 after he publicly reprimanded an officer 
“for being rude to a group of young jaywalkers.” An anonymous former city official told 
 
466 U.S. v. Seattle, Document Nos. 612 & 615. 
467 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 621. 
468 Investigation of the Seattle Police Department (2011, December 16). U.S. Department of 
Justice. Retrieved from Investigation Documents (justice.gov).  
469 Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (December 16, 2011). Fed’s report slams police, Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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the Times that from that point on, Kerlikowske “got to the point where he would try and 
avoid conflict with the guild” and he reportedly “began reversing or softening the OPS’s 
disciplinary recommendations at a noticeable rate.” According to the Times, “for years, 
accusations of misconduct by Seattle police officers would be met with the same 
response, whether from then-Chief Gil Kerlikowske or the department’s union leaders: 
Other cities have it worse.” (Seattle Times, 9/3/2011). 
The Times opined that “in retrospect, it was the Police Department’s sense of 
self-satisfaction that blinded top commanders to festering issues.” After interviewing 
“past and present officers and department officials, along with community and 
government leaders, some speaking on condition of anonymity,” the Times presented 
what was referred to as “an inside view of how the failure of police officials to recognize 
problems effectively obscured breakdowns in training, supervision and community 
relations.” In addition, the Times quoted Settle City Councilmember Tim Burgess, the 
then-chair of the council’s public safety committee and a former SPD officer, as saying: 
“I think my general impression was that the department was resting on its laurels and 
had become disconnected, both from city elected leaders and … also from the 
community.” Burgess also noted that SPD officers and command staff tended to have an 
“insular attitude of, ‘We’re the experts and we know everything we need to know.’” 
According to the Times, overall, Burgess believed that these attitudes had “played out, 
… in the department’s lack of innovation and failure to keep up with crime-analysis 
technology, along with poor communication with the community and a ‘circle-the-wagons 
mentality.’” (Seattle Times, 9/3/2011). 
The Times also noted a recent opinion written by a Seattle federal judge who had 
“recently questioned the department’s willingness to examine its training.” U.S. District 
Judge Marsha Pechman wrote, after an off-duty officer was found by a jury to have 
violated the civil rights of the passenger of a vehicle that committed a traffic infraction, by 
holding him at gunpoint: “It is a sad day when the Seattle Police Department cannot stop 
to reflect upon the voices of citizen jurors who think that their conduct has overstepped 
the line, or contemplate a change when an officer’s judgment is found wanting” (Seattle 
Times, 9/3/2011). 
In addition, the Times reported on  
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a corrosive distrust [that had] developed between rank-and-file officers and 
the command staff, marked by crippling battles over officer discipline. The 
result has been the emergence of an increasingly powerful police union 
that has aggressively defended its members and attacked its critics. 
The result, according to an anonymous former department official was an “incredibility 
pervasive attitude of cynicism” throughout the SPD. It was noted that some officer had 
“rallied around two from their ranks charged with criminally assaulting citizens,” while 
other officers mocked what they perceived to be unfair impositions of discipline. (Seattle 
Times, 9/3/2011). 
Although it was reported that the police guild agreed to accept “virtually all” of the 
recommendations from the 2008 Police Accountability Review panel report in their 
upcoming 2008 contract with the City, it was only after the City offered “hefty pay raises.” 
Even so, according to the Times, “the union has continued to be a dissonant voice, even 
after Kerlikowski left and Diaz became chief.” Union President Rich O’Neill claimed that 
the DOJ complaint “grew out of complaints from a small number of groups. ‘But that’s 
the way it works, the squeaky wheel gets the grease.’” The union’s newspaper, The 
Guardian, had reportedly “become a soapbox for officers to lash out at police and city 
leaders.” And when articles published in the newsletter leaked out, the SPD as an 
organization tended to be perceived as a biased organization isolated from its own 
community.470  
Chief Diaz, in an interview with the Times, however, refused to say that the DOJ 
investigation was warranted and blamed it on isolated incidents that “went viral.” Still, he 
reported that significant changes were being made, to include, reverting to a previous 
system where officers would work on the same shifts as their Sergeants; “conducting 
neighborhood surveys, holding living-room conversations and using [the SPD] website to 
provide more information;” re-emphasizing the need for multiple officers to respond to 
urgent calls; continuing racial-sensitivity trainings; handing out “harsh discipline” and 
 
470 Madrid, C. (2011, April 6). You Pay this Sergeant’s Salary. The Stranger. [“The Guardian also 
regularly publishes inflammatory articles—joking about shooting African Americans and showing 
contempt for civilian oversight, for example—all written by Seattle officers … For example, last 
fall, Officer Steve Pomper wrote that city officials conducting racial and social justice training are 
‘the enemy’ and ‘the city is inflicting its socialist policies’ on officers”]. Retrieved from 
https://www.thestranger.com/seattle/you-pay-this-sergeants-salary/Content?oid=7560566. 
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ordering criminal probes of officers, to include the forced resignation of the officer who 
shot and killed Native Woodcarver John T. Williams (Seattle Times, 9/3/2011). 
The ACLU, however, in its call for a federal civil rights investigation of the SPD, 
laid out multiple cases of police abuse. Specifically, the ACLU noted the following 
incidents: 
• June 11, 2009: “Daniel Macio Saunders, an African-American man, was released 
from jail due to a bureaucratic mistake. Mr. Saunders did not know that he should 
not have been released, and went to the Seattle Police evidence unit to pick up 
his belongings. A police video shows Mr. Saunders opening the door to the 
evidence room lobby to admit three uniformed Seattle police officers. 
Immediately upon entry, the officers tackled Mr. Saunders, kicked his face and, 
for several minutes, administered blows to various parts of his body with their 
batons. News articles describing the incident state that the officers inflicted blows 
to Saunders’ body with their flashlights and fists and used a Taser in ‘touch 
mode’ several times on him…The Seattle Police Department’s internal 
investigation found the officers to be exonerated and ruled their conduct was 
lawful.” (ACLU Letter, 2010, at p. 1). 
• April 17, 2010: “Seattle police officers stopped a Latino man they believed might 
be a suspect in a robbery south of Lake Union. They ordered the man to lie face 
down on the ground while they continued their investigation. The man complied. 
Video shows that while the man was lying prone on the sidewalk, an officer 
kicked him in the face and threatened to beat the ‘Mexican piss’ out of him. 
Another officer stomped on his legs as still more officers looked on. Shortly 
thereafter he was released from the scene” (ACLU Letter, 2010, at p. 2). 
• April 24, 2010: “One of the same officers involved in the April 17, 2010 incident 
arrested a young man after a bar fight. The man was handcuffed and placed in 
the back of a patrol car where, he claims, the officer repeatedly choked him. 
Unfortunately, the in-car video that should have recorded the activity in the back 
of the car was not activated.” (ACLU Letter, 2010, at 2).  
• “June 14, 2010 and earlier jaywalking incidents. An SPD officer saw several 
young people jaywalking near Franklin High School. The officer confronted a 17-
year-old African-American girl. Video of the incident shows that after she put her 
hands on him, the officer punched the girl in the face. Another incident in 2009 
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also started with a jaywalking stop and ended up with a lawsuit for excessive 
force after the teenager who was confronted by police suffered a broken nose 
and concussion. The incident was also captured on video” (ACLU Letter, 2010, at 
2).471 
• August 30, 2010: “A Seattle police officer shot and killed John T. Williams, a man 
who belonged to a First Nations Tribe. Williams was well known in the community 
as a wood carver. The in-car video camera from the officer’s car shows Williams 
crossing the street in the crosswalk. He held a piece of wood and his 3-inch 
carving knife in his hand. The officer stopped his car, got out and yelled at 
Williams to drop the knife, but it is unclear if Williams heard the officer since he is 
partially deaf. So far, no evidence has come to light of any aggressive or 
threatening act by Williams toward the officer or anyone else, and there is 
physical evidence indicating Williams was not facing the officer when he was 
shot multiple times” (ACLU Letter, 2010, at 3). 
• October 18, 2010: “A convenience store’s surveillance camera shows an African-
American teenager entering the store, putting his hands up and waiting…A non-
uniformed Seattle police officer enters the store and kicks the youth hard in the 
groin area, causing him to fall to the ground. While the youth is on the ground, 
the plainclothes officer kicks him several more times more with blows apparently 
aimed at the youth’s head. A uniformed officer enters, pushes the kicking officer 
to the side, and immediately handcuffs the unresisting youth” (ACLU Letter, 
2010, at 3). 
My research interviews disclosed a wide variety of perceptions regarding SPD 
patterns of misconduct. On one side of the spectrum was the typical SPD response: “No 
smoking gun turned up as a result of the DOJ investigation…like any other large 
department, we have a small fraction of employees who engage in misconduct.”  
On the other side, however, some research participants perceived SPD problems 
as systemic: one City official described the history of the SPD as “a cycle of crisis, 
 
471 The ACLU also advised that “[f]our different police auditors for Seattle have noted that simple 
jaywalking stops too often result in physical confrontations between police and citizens, and they 
have called upon the SPD to take steps to reduce such incidents. Despite the auditor’s calls since 
2004 for improved training and supervision to de-escalate such situations, confrontations over 
jaywalking stops, particularly those involving persons of color, have not ceased” (ACLU Letter, 
2010, at 2). 
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reform and then backsliding.” According to one SPD command officer, the SPD’s 
problem was not really one of individual officer misconduct, but rather was one of “hubris 
and a fundamental misunderstanding of search and seizure law … SPD officers treated 
suspects as having the burden of proving there was no probable cause to search – it 
was a fundamental breakdown in an understanding the law.” Another high-ranking SPD 
officer argued that training issues were the crux of the problem and resulted in high 
profile mistakes, such as the shooting of John T. Williams.472 Another SPD participant 
believed that the DOJ investigation should not have been unexpected: “it was the result 
of a series of events … Chief Kerlikowski was constantly reducing discipline and got out 
of town in the nick of time, leaving poor John Diaz with all the problems.” 
Other City leaders blamed an arbitration process which routinely overturned 
disciplinary decisions made by the Police Chief who was subsequently unable to impose 
serious discipline, to include termination, of an officer sustained for misconduct. And still 
others blamed SPD supervisors for failing to hold their officers to account.473 All in all, 
however, the vast majority of participants, even if they disagreed with the DOJ’s 
conclusion that 20% of all SPD uses-of-force involved Constitutional violations, did agree 
that problems in training, discipline and supervision were responsible for ongoing 
problems in how the SPD carried out its duties. 
7.2. The DOJ Investigation & Negotiation of the Seattle 
Consent Decree 
It took slightly less than nine months for the DOJ to first announce and complete 
a “full-scale” civil rights investigation of the Seattle Police Department. It subsequently 
took another eight months for the City and the DOJ to negotiate a satisfactory 
agreement. The investigation report’s findings, and the DOJ’s refusal to share its 
methodology, resulted in an emotional and negative response from the SPD and the 
 
472 There is continuing controversy within the SPD about the shooting of John T. Williams. Some 
SPD officers believe that the involved officer acted according to his training and that the shooting 
was “awful but lawful;” while others argued that the shooter should not only have been fired, but 
also criminally prosecuted. 
473 The issue of SPD appointing “Acting Sergeants” which was identified as problematic by the 
court-appointed Monitor in his first semi-annual report (at p. 16) was also an issue of concern 
identified by research participants: “Today the officer is a supervisor, tomorrow he or she is on the 
street, there was no incentive to hold their people accountable.” 
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Mayor’s Office and a rocky start to the implementation process overall. According to 
survey participants, it took a full two years before the implementation process could be 
called, in any way, successful. 
7.2.1. The DOJ Investigation & Its Announcement 
December 3, 2010 ACLU Letter requesting federal 
investigation474 
Taylor, K. & 35 other signatories. 
March 31, 2011 DOJ Announcement of “full-scale” civil-
rights investigation of the SPD.475 
USDOJ Civil Rights Division, 
USAO, Western District of 
Washington 
November 23, 2011 DOJ Technical Assistance Letter regarding 
officer “Garrity” Protections476 
J. Smith, Chief, Special Litigation 
Section DOJ, J. Durkan, U.S. 
Attorney, Western District WA 
December 16, 2011 DOJ Report: “Investigation of the Seattle 
Police Department”477 
USDOJ Civil Rights Division; 
USAO, Western District of 
Washington 
 
On December 3, 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Washington, 
taking note of a progressive Democratic administration in Washington D.C., together 
with 34 other Seattle community organizations, made a formal request for the DOJ to 
conduct a “pattern or practice” investigation into the Seattle Police Department.478 The 
 
474 Retrieved from https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/re-request-investigate-pattern-or-practice-
misconduct-seattle-police-department. 
475 Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-opens-investigation-seattle-
police-department. 
476 Retrieved from 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/seattlepd_TA_11-23-11.pdf. 
477 Retrieved from 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf. 
478 The signatories represented the following Seattle-based civil rights organizations: ACLU of 
Washington, Asian Bar Association of Washington, A. Philip Randolf Institute, Central Area 
Motivation Program, Asian Counseling and Referral Service, Council on American-Islamic 
Relations of Washington State, Chinese Information and Service Center, El Centro de la Raza, 
Community Christian Leaders Association, Seattle Immigrant and Refugee Advisory Board, El 
Comité Pro Reforma Migratoria y Justia Social, King County Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 
International District Housing Alliance, “A Legacy of Leadership, Equality, and Organizing,” 
Center for Law and Equality, Loren Miller Bar Association, Latina/o Bar Association of 
Washington, Middle Eastern Legal Association of Washington, Lutheran Public Policy Office, 
Mother’s for Police Accountability, Minority Executive Directors Coalition, Pacific-American 
Women’s Association - Seattle,  NAACP of Seattle King County, Northwest Indian Bar 
Association, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, “People advocating Involvement in  
Democracy,” OneAmerica, Qne Law, Puget Sound Sage, Seattle Human Services Coalition, 
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letter complained about “a series of incidents involving Seattle police officers inflicting 
[unnecessary and excessive] physical violence on city residents,” and provided specific 
details relating to six separate SPD use-of-force incidents “of concern” that took place 
between June 2009 and June 2010. In particular, however, the August 2010 shooting of 
Native woodcarver John T. Williams has been identified as having “galvanized the 
community request for [a DOJ investigation]” (Seattle Times, 6/30/2020).479 
As of the time of the ACLU letter, Seattle civil rights organizations had reason to 
believe that the Special Litigation Section of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights 
Division was back in the business of pursuing police reform through the use of §14141. 
Prior to the election of President Barack Obama (who took office in January 2009), the 
last settlement agreement that had been reached pursuant to §14141 was a February 
2004 Memorandum of Agreement with the City of Cleveland, which was terminated by 
the Bush administration by March 2005 (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 45). 
However, as a result of the change in Presidential administrations and the 
appointment of Attorney General Eric Holder (sworn in on February 3, 2009),480 the Civil 
Rights Division (CRD) received renewed attention with AG Holder referring to the CRD 
as “the crown jewel of the Justice Department,” and announcing that the CRD was “on 
its way to regaining it’s luster.”481   
By the time of that announcement, the Special Litigation Section (SLS), in charge 
of managing law enforcement “pattern or practice” litigation, was already engaging in 
activities unlike what had been seen in the prior Presidential administration. In March 
2009, shortly after the swearing in of AG Holder, the Department of Justice had already 
entered into a consent decree with the Virgin Islands Police Department and announced 
an investigation into the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (Arizona). In September 2009, 
the DOJ announced investigations into the East Haven Police Department (Connecticut) 
 
“Real Change,” South Asian Bar Association of Washington, Seattle/King County Coalition on 
Homelessness, United Indians of All Tribes, and Trusted Advocates Association. 
479 Diaz, M. (June 30, 2020). Op. Ed., Seattle police have made gains in recent years, but work 






and the Suffolk County Police Department (New York). In May 2010, the DOJ 
announced an investigation into the New Orleans Police Department and in June 2010, 
the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office (North Carolina). By August 2010, the USDOJ had 
entered into a formal Memorandum of Agreement resulting from a §14141 pattern or 
practice investigation relating to the Eaton Police Department (Pennsylvania), followed 
shortly thereafter by another Memorandum of Agreement with the Orange County 
Sheriff’s Department (Florida) in September 2010 (DOJ, 2017b). 
On March 31, 2011, the USDOJ, apparently acting on the ACLU letter, 
announced it would be conducting a formal investigation of the Seattle Police 
Department (SPD), “pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.”482 Upon announcing the DOJ investigation, then-U.S. Attorney 
Jenny Durkan was quoted as saying:  
Without trust, police officers can't do their jobs, … Officers rely on citizens 
to give them good information, to let them patrol their streets, … Trust goes 
to the heart of safety. They have to trust that they're welcome—that they 
can get out of their cars and be safe. It's the linchpin to good policing. (The 
Stranger, 4/6/2011)483 
Assistant Attorney General Tom Perez identified the purpose behind the investigation: 
“Our goal with this investigation ... is simple: to ensure that the community has an 
effective, accountable police department that controls crimes, ensures respect for the 
Constitution and earns the trust of the public it is charged with protecting” (Seattle 
Times, 4/1/2011).484 
According to research participants, the DOJ’s announcement of a full 
investigation shocked Seattle City officials and the SPD command staff. Although the 
then-Chief of Police, John Diaz publicly stated that the SPD was expecting a DOJ 
investigation, and was widely quoted as welcoming the DOJ investigation as “a free 
 
482 https://www.justice.gov/crt/investigation-documents. 
483 Madrid, C. (2011, April 6). Rich O'Neill Never Works a Policing Shift but Gets $109,703 a Year 
in Taxpayer Money to Run the Citizen-Antagonizing Police Union. The Stranger. Retrieved from 
https://www.thestranger.com/seattle/you-pay-this-sergeants-salary/Content?oid=7560566. 
484 Carter, M. (2011, April 1). Diaz: ‘We have nothing to hide’ Justice Dept. to probe use of force, 
look for police bias. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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audit” (Seattle Times, 9/3/2011),485 privately, city officials were shocked and baffled by 
the DOJ’s decision to target the City of Seattle. After all, it was widely believed within the 
Seattle city structure that with all of its faults, the SPD was basically a corruption free 
and progressive department.486 In policing circles, the SPD was reportedly jokingly 
referred to as a “wimpy” organization, in large part due to its apparent commitment to 
community policing and its visible activist community who were believed to keep the 
police largely in check. In particular, Seattle was certainly not like New Orleans which 
was perceived to be ripe with corruption and with instances of police officers actually 
murdering civilians. Nor was Seattle anything like the Maricopa County Sheriff’s 
Department which was widely revilled as racist. As such, the question was repeatedly 
raised: why wasn’t the DOJ looking at the New York or Chicago Police Departments, 
both large controversial agencies with long histories of corruption and brutality, and 
instead setting their sights on a progressive and otherwise benign SPD?487 
 
485 As reported by the Seattle Times: “Mayor Mike McGinn and Police Chief John Diaz welcomed 
the probe, but Diaz at first seemed not to grasp its significance: The day it was announced, he 
likened it to a ‘free audit’ — a comparison met with stony silence by the U.S. attorney in Seattle, 
Jenny Durkan” (9/3/2011). 
486 As indicated by SPD Sgt. Richard O’Neill, the then-President of the Seattle Police Officers’ 
Guild when the SPD came under scrutiny as a result of questionable uses of force in 2007 and 
2008: “We have a squeaky-clean Police Department compared to other big cities” (Seattle Times, 
9/3/2011). At the time the DOJ investigation was announced, Sgt. O’Neill made a prediction he 
would later come to regret. According to the Seattle Times: “Sgt. Rich O'Neill, president of the 
Seattle Police Officers' Guild, said he’s confident the investigation will not turn up any systemic 
problems with force or biased policing in the SPD. ‘In a way, I'm looking forward to this,’ O'Neill 
said. ‘There's no doubt in my mind they will not uncover any systemic problems. They may come 
up with suggestions in ways we could do better in both areas. Great.’” (Seattle Times, 4/1/2011). 
But then consider the statements of Seattle Councilmember Tim Burgess, a former SPD officer 
and the then-chair of the Council’s Public Safety Commission to the Seattle Times: “I think my 
general impression was that the department was resting on its laurels and had become 
disconnected, both from city elected leaders and … also from the community.” Burgess also 
comment about an “…insular [SPD] attitude of, ‘We’re the experts and we know everything we 
need to know’ which has culminated in a ‘circle-the-wagons mentality.’” These statements need to 
be compared to the statements of SPD Command staff: “[Chief John] Diaz and [SPD Deputy 
Chief] Kimerer, … disputed any notion that the department has been too complacent. “I can’t 
remember a period of resting on laurels,” Kimerer said. “It’s [the SPD, has] been a very, very 
dynamic place” (Seattle Times, 9/3/2011). 
487 Similar questions were asked when the DOJ first began choosing departments for Section 
14141 intervention. “As Gary Dufour, former City Manager of Steubenville, bluntly asked a 
reporter after the DOJ targeted his city with pattern or practice litigation, ‘We’re an awfully small 
community. You see all these problems that have come up at the police departments in Los 
Angeles and New York and New Orleans, and you’ve got to wonder, why us?’” (Rushin, 2015, p. 
70). In Seattle, a member the McGinn administration had his/her own views on the question of 
“why Seattle?”: “I believe Seattle was chosen by the DOJ due to political opportunism. The DOJ 
was looking for work; there were a few high-profile incidents that got the ball rolling and 
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Community organizations clearly disagreed with this perspective. They perceived 
the SPD as an organization impermeable to change with a continuing history of 
unnecessary force and tendencies towards racism. The shooting of John T. Williams 
galvanized the opinion that SPD officers were too quick to shoot and the “Mexican piss” 
comment made by an SPD officer, which other officers later defended in depositions as 
being an appropriate control technique,488 further solidified community concerns 
regarding the Department. It was further noted that the SPD command staff was insular 
and although always claiming to be willing to talk, was fully entrenched in the status quo. 
This, even with a robust civilian oversight structure that had been created in order to 
satisfy prior concerns but which seemed to have no actual impact on the actions of 
street officers.489 
 
community advocates who knew what they were doing. You add onto that, a local U.S. Attorney 
who had her own political agenda, and you end up with a pretty good (if not perfect) storm. It 
didn’t start with a dispassionate review of our uses of force to determine we had an outlier 
department – it just started with a viral video that fueled a narrative that the SPD was a bad police 
department.” 
In his dissertation evaluating the DOJ’s use of Section 14141 over the years, Rushin reached the 
following conclusion: “For a police department to become subject to SRL under § 14141, 
numerous variables must opportunely align. The DOJ must have leadership that is supportive of 
federal intervention into local police departments, like that of the Clinton or Obama 
Administration. The misconduct of the targeted police department must stand out to the DOJ, 
above and beyond the nation’s other 18,000 police departments. And the DOJ must have enough 
available resources to investigate the department” (Rushin, 2015, pp. 64-65). In the case of 
Seattle, the Obama administration was in office, a highly organized civil rights community got the 
attention of a local U.S. Attorney who had previously engaged in two formal attempts to reform 
the SPD and, according to study participants, the DOJ was looking to expand their use of Section 
14141 into the Pacific Northwest. These factors, along with the DOJ’s expectation that Seattle 
would be a “quick win,” made the SPD a logical choice for intervention, even if that fact was not 
then-recognized by Seattle city or police officials. The decision to force a formal Consent Decree 
with a court-appointed monitor appears to have been driven by the local U.S. Attorney who had 
clearly been frustrated by the lack of perceived success in reforming the SPD based on two prior 
commission investigations. 
Rushin has identified that process by which police departments are selected for 14141 
intervention as a “sloppy and imprecise” “enforcement lottery” (Rushin, 2015, p. 64). As he 
previously and aptly noted, “From the perspective of local municipalities, getting selected for 
structural police reform today is akin to winning a terrible lottery” (Rushin, 2014, p. 3194; Rushin, 
2017a). 
488 In April 2010, while conducting a robbery investigation, an SPD detective ordered a Hispanic 
detainee to remain still or he would “beat the (expletive) Mexican piss” out of him. The incident 
would ultimately result in a 30-day suspension issued against the officer and a promise from 
Chief Diaz that future violations of that sort would be cause for termination of employment 
(Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (2012, June 7), City hits back at DOJ report. Seattle Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.seattletimes.com). 
489 As stated by one community organizer: “We were not surprised DOJ took on Seattle. Because 
the U.S. Attorney, Jenny Durkan was on two blue ribbon panels and was a defense attorney 
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On the USDOJ side, the choice of Seattle made perfect sense. Part of the DOJ’s 
tactics included trying to use their limited resources to influence police departments 
nationwide to change. And, in fact, the DOJ had never purported to enforce §14141 
provisions against only the “worst departments;” even if that may have been perception 
that existed within the police community. With respect to the decision to investigate 
Seattle, the DOJ had not yet investigated a Pacific Northwest police department and 
Seattle was perceived to likely be a “quick win” and a City that “could do better.”490 With 
a progressive city government that was expected to cooperate with police reform efforts 
(even if they were externally mandated), an informed and active community and a 
relatively strong tax base, the DOJ fully expected they could successfully reform Seattle 
quickly and efficiently and even make the Seattle experience a crown jewel of the 
pattern or practice litigation model. 
Prior to the completion of its investigation, on November 23, 2011, the DOJ 
issued a “technical assistance” letter after finding that the SPD was inappropriately 
applying the limited use immunity provisions of the seminal 1967 United States Supreme 
Court case, Garrity v. New Jersey, to all use of force and police shooting incidents.491 
The DOJ specifically found that  
SPD's inappropriate blanket invocation of Garrity may result in the 
exclusion of important evidence from an investigation. Moreover, SPD's 
failure to shield criminal investigators from Garrity materials could taint and 
render unusable other critical evidence. These practices compromise both 
SPD's ability to supervise officers' use of force, and its ability to fully and 
efficiently conduct criminal and administrative investigations. Put simply: 
This practice makes it too difficult to quickly exonerate officers who have 
followed policy and to properly discipline officers who have not. Further, 
these practices compromise the ability of prosecutors or other outside 
 
before, she felt personally offended that after all the work of the blue-ribbon panels stuff was still 
falling apart. She saw an opportunity to use her position to say: ‘Come on in and we’ll show you 
how this can be done.’ She was tied into the legal and political community. She not only brought 
in DOJ but also knew how to work with community and the police.” 
Still, other community organizers were surprised when the DOJ investigation was announced: “In 
2010, we did not know what to expect. We were concerned that other cities had more police 
killings; we were concerned they might not come up with supportive findings because our level of 
shootings did not come up to level of other cities.” 
490 Seattle was also a good first target when compared to cities with entrenched issues of 
corruption (such as New York City and Chicago) or cities that had weak tax bases that might not 
be able to support expensive reform efforts (such as Cleveland and Baltimore). 
491 Retrieved from 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/seattlepd_TA_11-23-11.pdf 
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agencies to adequately assess incidents and to hold officers accountable 
for their actions. The net effect of these consequences is diminished public 
trust in SPD. (DOJ Technical Assistance Letter, 11/23/2011) 
On December 6, 2011, in response to the technical assistance letter, SPD Chief 
John Diaz announced  
a “complete revamp” of how the Police Department develop[ed] its 
‘professional standards and expectations’ for officers: and announced the 
creation of a Force Investigation Team and a Force Review Board to 
supplement the work of a previously established Firearms Review Board. 
(Seattle Times, 12/7/2011)492 
Shortly thereafter, on December 16, 2011, the Seattle Times reported on an 
upcoming announcement from the United States Department of Justice as to its findings 
after completing its investigation of the SPD. The page-one headline read: “Fed’s report 
slams police – ‘Astoundingly critical’ of routine use of force, sources say.” The sub-
headline to the story read:  
A federal civil-rights investigation into the Seattle Police Department has 
found routine and widespread use of excessive force by officers, and city 
and police officials were told at a stormy Thursday night meeting that they 
must fix the problems or face a federal lawsuit, according to two sources. 
(Seattle Times, 12/16/2011)493 
The Seattle Times article described a meeting, attended by Mayor Mike McGinn, 
Police Chief John Diaz and members of the SPD command staff as ending “in raised 
voices and bitter accusations by city and police officials, upset at the Justice 
Department’s findings.”494 It was further reported that Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas 
Perez, “who heads the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, flew to Seattle from 
Phoenix on Thursday and will address a 9:30 a.m., Friday news conference alongside 
U.S Attorney Jenny Durkan.”  
 
492 Miletich, S. (2011, December 7). Chief orders sweeping changes – Amid federal probe, Mayor 
details overhaul of police policies, procedures. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
493 Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (2011, December 16). Feds’ report slams police – ‘Astoundingly 
critical’ of routine use of force, sources say. Seattle Times. 
494 Participant interviews confirmed this description of the meeting between the DOJ and the City. 
In addition, participants described a follow-up meeting between U.S. Attorney Durkan and Mayor 
McGinn wherein Durkan reportedly threatened that any lack of cooperation on the part of the City 
would result in ongoing and embarrassing disclosures by the DOJ. 
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Subsequent to the above-mentioned meeting, the Department of Justice did, in 
fact, hold a press conference with extensive statements provided by Durkan and 
Perez.495 When announcing the conclusion of the Seattle investigation, U.S. Attorney 
Durkan released the following statement: 
Today marks a critical milestone in our community and for the Seattle 
Police Department. Understanding how we got here is obviously very 
important, but how we move forward is even more important. The coming 
months could very well determine what the next generation of policing will 
look like in this city. We are at a rare juncture where the City can purposely 
determine the culture of the Seattle Police Department and its relationship 
with the community it serves. While there are some difficult and systemic 
issues to resolve, we are very optimistic for the future of SPD.  
Our optimism is based on three important factors.  
First, while our investigation has found serious constitutional deficiencies, 
… our investigation also confirmed that the great majority of SPD officers 
are honorable law enforcement professionals who risk their physical safety 
and well-being for the public good Day in and day out, the men and women 
of the Seattle Police Department put on the blue uniform and sacrifice 
much, to serve all of us. We understand that the dangers are real. Our 
region suffered through the horrible murders of five local police officers -- 
including the murder of an SPD officer -- and the attempted murder of his 
partner. Police must have the tools needed to protect the public and 
themselves. We are optimistic for the future of SPD because of the solid 
foundation its dedicated, honorable officers provide.  
Second, we also are optimistic because of the way the City and the 
Department have conducted themselves throughout this investigation. We 
were given access to every document and person requested, often on an 
expedited basis. We had frank and candid conversations throughout the 
investigation, and the Department at the highest levels showed a strong 
desire to address the deficiencies we uncovered. Indeed, as noted in our 
letter, the City has already taken steps to begin addressing some of the 
issues we have brought to their attention. We met with the Mayor, Chief 
Diaz and Department officials yesterday and today to brief them on our 
findings. They expressed their commitment to remedy the problems. We 
have every reason to believe we will move forward in a way that honors 
 
495 It should be noted that the announcement of results of the Seattle investigation were made 
only after the DOJ announced findings of pattern or practice violations by the New Orleans Police 
Department (March 17, 2011), the Puerto Rico Police Department (September 8, 2011) and only 
a day after findings were announced with respect to the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department 
(December 15, 2011). See, https://www.justice.gov/crt/special-litigation-section-case-
summaries/download#nopd-summ. Study participants associated with Seattle City government 
and the SPD claimed shock that the SPD, which had been lauded nationally as a progressive 
police department, was being grouped together with police departments which had reputations for 
brutality, corruption and racist policing practices.  
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both to the men and women working in the Department and the residents 
of this great City they serve.  
Finally, we are optimistic because it is clear that the people of Seattle want 
and will demand the highest standards for their police force. They also want 
safe neighborhoods, and want their police to succeed. I believe they will 
support the changes needed to fix the problems present in the Department. 
Through the course of our investigation we have heard from many people, 
coming from all walks of life in our city. They came forward because they 
care about this City, and because they care about the police department 
that serves them.  
Before we launched our investigation at the end of March, we met with the 
Mayor and City leaders; Chief Diaz, command staff and SPD personnel; 
and dozens of community stakeholders. Despite the diversity of opinions 
we solicited, we heard broad agreement that SPD’s success depends on 
providing officers strong and consistent leadership along the chain of 
command, effective training and policies, and vigilant oversight. Those 
early insights were borne out by our investigation.  
For the past eight months, our attorneys, investigators and experts have 
conducted extensive interviews with command staff and rank-and-file 
officers. We have reviewed thousands of pages of documents – including 
written policies and procedures, training materials, internal reports, and 
investigative files – and analyzed hundreds of hours of video footage. We 
also met with and interviewed hundreds of community members and 
advocates.  
We have concluded the following. We found reasonable cause to believe 
that SPD engages in a pattern or practice of using unnecessary or 
excessive force, in violation of the United States Constitution and federal 
laws. This finding includes violations committed by officers through their 
actions while policing and failures by supervisors responsible for reviewing 
their actions. There are significant deficiencies in oversight, policies and 
training with regard to when and how to (1) use force, (2) report uses of 
force, and (3) use many impact weapons. Based on a randomized, 
stratified, and statistically valid sample of SPD’s use of force reports: 
• We found that when officers used force, it was done in an unconstitutional 
manner nearly 20% of the time.   
•We found that officers too quickly resort to impact weapons such as their 
batons and flashlights. When SPD officers use batons, 57% of the time it 
is either unnecessary or excessive.  
• We also found that SPD officers often use unnecessary or excessive force 
when they apply force in tandem against a single person.  
• We found that SPD officers often escalate minor situations and resort to 
using unnecessary or excessive force when making arrests for minor 
offense. This was particularly troubling in SPD’s encounters with individuals 
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with mental illness or those under the influence of alcohol or drugs, which 
is a population, according to SPD’s own estimates, that account for 70% of 
their use of force encounters.  
When we looked at the critical issue of oversight, we found that supervisors 
regularly fail to hold officers accountable for excessive force. Equally 
troubling is that there is virtually no review of supervisory findings up the 
chain of command. Of the approximately 1,230 use of force reports we 
reviewed, only five were referred for “further review” at any level within 
SPD, and we did not find a single case in which a first-line supervisor was 
held accountable for the inadequate investigation or review of a use of force 
incident.  
We also found that the system designed to respond to civilian complaints 
against SPD officers – the Office of Professional Accountability – is in need 
of repair, and the internal system designed to detect officer performance 
issues – the Early Intervention System – is broken. These systems fail to 
provide adequate oversight to prevent a pattern or practice of excessive 
force. To its credit, SPD has been open to our ongoing discussions about 
these topics and is in the process of revamping its review of officer uses of 
force and OPA’s classification and findings systems.  
In addition to these formal findings, our investigation uncovered other 
deficiencies of serious concern. In particular, our investigation revealed that 
some SPD policies and practices, particularly those related to pedestrian 
encounters, could result in unlawful discriminatory policing against racial 
and ethnic minorities. There is little doubt that some community members 
believe that SPD engages in discriminatory policing. And this perception is 
rooted in a number of factors, including negative street encounters, well-
publicized videos of force being used against people of color, incidents of 
overt discrimination, and concerns that the pattern of excessive force 
disproportionately affects minorities. 
We are particularly concerned that SPD officers lack a fundamental 
understanding of the differences between casual, social contact with 
members of the community and investigative detentions, known as “Terry” 
stops. SPD does not have sufficient policies in place that address 
pedestrian stops or possible bias policing. For example, there are no 
policies in place that track incidents in which young people of color are 
randomly stopped on the street and made to justify their presence in a 
given neighborhood. Nor are there any methods of tracking and disciplining 
officers who engage in discriminatory policing. These practices undermine 
SPD’s ability to build trust in our community. The City and SPD need to 
thoroughly examine the issues raised, address the policies, procedures, 
and training that contribute to the problem, and conduct more sustained 
and effective community engagement.  
…, let me close by saying that our investigation was not prompted by any 
one particular incident. It was not an attempt to focus on or resolved the 
facts of any high-profile event. Rather, our charge was to examine the 
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structural and systemic deficiencies that have can result in widespread 
problems relating to uses of force and discriminatory policing.  
Throughout this investigation we have been mindful of the realities police 
officers face and the admirable service the great majority of them provide. 
We are very cognizant that it is tough job, and we are fortunate that we 
have so many officers who are doing it well. It is wrong to allow their work 
to be undermined. We owe it to both the community and the police that we 
make sure the deficiencies are corrected.  
We are also aware of – and sensitive to – the very real and raw feelings 
some residents of Seattle, particularly members of our diverse 
communities, have towards the Seattle Police Department. Whether these 
feelings are the result of are incidents that make the news or encounters 
that are part of your daily reality, we know that there is work to be done. I 
am hopeful this too can change.  
We appreciate the courage of those in our community who came forward 
to contribute to this investigation and the commitment we have received 
from our city’s leadership and the SPD to create real and lasting change.496 
The statement made by U.S. Attorney Durkan was particularly significant given 
her involvement in prior efforts to reform the accountability mechanisms in the SPD as a 
member of the two separate task forces which previously made recommendations for 
reform in 1999 and 2008. 
U.S. Attorney Durkan’s statement was followed by a statement made by Tom 
Perez, the Assistant Attorney General responsible for the Civil Rights Division of the US 
Department of Justice in Washington D.C. The USDOJ released the following statement 
from AAG Perez: 
When we began our investigation of the Seattle Police Department, we had 
a simple mission – to ensure that Seattle has a police force that reduces 
crime, respects the Constitution, and earns the confidence of the public it 
is charged with protecting. These three goals are the guidepost for all of 
our police reform efforts.  
As U.S. Attorney Durkan has noted, our investigation has been 
independent, exhaustive, and inclusive. Our attorneys, investigators and 
experts conducted extensive interviews with command staff and rank-and-
file officers; participated in ride-alongs with officers; and reviewed 
 




thousands of pages of documents. We also met with and interviewed 
hundreds of community members and attended local advocacy meetings.  
Today, we met with Mayor McGinn and Chief Diaz to brief them on the 
findings of our investigation. We had a very constructive and candid 
dialogue. From the beginning of our investigation, we have been grateful 
to have their full cooperation and support. Throughout the investigative 
process, we provided real time feedback to SPD. For instance, on 
November 23, we outlined our concerns regarding SPD’s application of the 
Garrity rule and how it should be applied in a way that protects officers 
against self-incrimination while allowing full investigations of misconduct.  
Reform takes time. It is not only about a change in policy, but a change in 
culture. New procedures must be put in place and sustained until they 
become part of the DNA of the department. Building community trust is a 
long term and ongoing process. It will require transparency and 
engagement in order to create a blueprint for sustainable reform.  
As with all investigations conducted by the Civil Rights Division we not only 
determined wrongdoing, but diagnosed why. We looked for root causes of 
the violations of the constitution and federal law. We did this to fully 
understand where the solution lies because our goal is to fix the problem, 
not to affix the blame. 
We peeled the onion to its core, and in doing so, we found concerns with 
policy, training, supervision, accountability and record keeping that 
contributed to our finding of a pattern or practice of excessive force and our 
areas of serious concern regarding biased policing.  
In this investigation, two issues particularly jumped out at us:  
First, we found that the systems of accountability are broken. Accountability 
is at the heart of constitutional policing. Systems of supervision and early 
problem identification permit the timely discovery of deficiencies in conduct, 
training, or policy. These systems allow a well-functioning department to 
continually learn, correct and improve. They can identify potential problems 
and fix them.  
Those systems are broken in Seattle and need to be repaired. Front line 
supervisors need more hands-on contact with line offices - a problem we 
are grateful that the department is addressing. I often say that Sergeants 
are the most important people in a department after the chief. 
However, there needs to be more data collected, issues with incomplete 
and deficient report writing need to be fixed and the time line for the OPA 
investigative process shortened. The complaint investigation process itself 
needs to be streamlined and simplified to provide more transparency to the 
public.  
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We need to construct systems that will identify early the officers who need 
correction, assistance or training. It will also provide SPD management 
necessary tools to identify and fix broken policy or training.  
Second, the trust between the Seattle police department and the people of 
Seattle is broken and must be repaired. Public safety depends on the 
confidence of the people in the police department. Without this trust public 
safety is compromised. Constitutional and biased-free policing is a 
necessary part of any effort to restore that critical trust. Effective policing 
and constitutional policing go hand in hand.  
Now let me discuss where we go from here. We will take these findings, 
and we will continue our active engagement with Mayor McGinn, Chief Diaz 
and key stakeholders in the community, the police department, and others 
throughout Seattle in order to transform our findings into a comprehensive 
blueprint for sustainable reform. The reform must be part of a court order 
and must include the assistance of an independent monitor, and we will 
work with SPD to create these reforms. In the weeks ahead, we will 
continue to conduct extensive public outreach. We want to hear from the 
people of Seattle, answer questions, and get your recommendations and 
input on the path forward. 
The SPD has shown a deep commitment to the reform process. We will 
continue to give feedback to the department in real time. 
I would like to address two key sets of stakeholders who play a critical role 
in reforming this police department. To the men and women of SPD, we 
honor the difficult work that you do day in and day out and believe that 
addressing the core systemic problems of SPD will, in the end, make your 
job easier, safer, and more rewarding. To the people of Seattle, our goal is 
to help restore the Department into an organization in which the public has 
confidence and trusts. This is only possible with your continued 
engagement, and we look forward to continuing to hear your input. We 
remain optimistic about the changes that are to come. Failure is not an 
option, but sustainable reform is only possible with your continued 
engagement. Thank you and I look forward to working with the city of 
Seattle and the Police Department on making the necessary reforms in 
order to make the SPD a world class police department.497 
Assistant Attorney General Perez made it clear in his statement that the only 
option for resolving the DOJ investigation that would be acceptable to the DOJ would be 
through the imposition of a consent decree and the appointment of an independent 
monitor and that other options were non-negotiable. This position was of continuing 
 




concern to SPD command and city officials, however, as they could not understand why 
a less intrusive manner of reform would not be considered by the DOJ.498 
7.2.2. The DOJ Investigation Report’s findings 
In its 41-page report, the DOJ made two specific findings: 
First, the DOJ found that:  
SPD engages in a pattern or practice of using unnecessary or excessive 
force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Section 14141. Deficiencies in SPD’s training, policies, 
and oversight with regard to the use of force contribute to the constitutional 
violations. Officers lack adequate training or policies on when and how to 
report force and when and how to use many impact weapons (such as 
batons and flashlights). We also find that, starting from the top, SPD 
supervisors often fail to meet their responsibility to provide oversight of the 
use of force by individual officers. Command staff does not always provide 
supervisors with clear direction or expectations of how to supervise the use 
of force. (DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, p. 3) 
Second, the DOJ concluded that, even though they “[did] not make a finding that 
the SPD had engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory policing, [] our 
investigation raises serious concerns on this issue…” The DOJ found that: 
Some SPD policies and practices, particularly those related to pedestrian 
encounters, could result in unlawful policing. Moreover, many community 
members believe that SPD engages in discriminatory policing. This 
perception is rooted in a number of factors, including negative street 
encounters, recent well-publicized videos of force being used against 
people of color, incidents of overt discrimination, and concerns that the 
pattern of excessive force disproportionately affects minorities. This 
perception can significantly undermine the trust necessary for SPD to 
conduct effective policing in minority communities. The City and SPD need 
to thoroughly examine the issues raised, address the policies, procedures, 
and training that contribute to the problem, and conduct more sustained 
 
498 Seattle officials did appear to misperceive how they were being treated, when compared to 
other cities, however, As noted by one study participant who was familiar with the history of DOJ 
pattern or practice litigation: “People think of consent decrees as a single unit, that’s the hammer, 
but if you look at consent decrees, they are vastly different from one another – lumping them 
together is a non-nuanced way of looking at them.  Seattle’s Settlement Agreement is significantly 
narrower than other cities– [the DOJ] did not go whole hog on Seattle; New Orleans and Seattle 
were not alike and the Baltimore Consent Decree is 3 to 4 time longer and covers many different 
areas.” 
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and effective community engagement. (DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, p. 
3) 
Perhaps most significantly, the DOJ report concluded that fully one of every five 
instances of force by Seattle officers violated the Constitution's protections against illegal 
search and seizure (DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, pp. 4, 8). As previously noted, this 
20% figure was highlighted over and over again by study participants associated with the 
City and SPD as an outrageous finding, unsupported by any accurate data and as being 
a significant impediment to the implementation of the Consent Decree at its initial 
stages. 
In addition, as reported by the Seattle Times,  
the [DOJ] report echoed concerns that have been raised for years by Police 
Department auditors, a review board, blue-ribbon commissions and 
plaintiff's attorneys, among others, who have complained that officers 
escalate to the use of force too quickly, often relying on dangerous and 
damaging ‘impact weapons’ such as batons and flashlights to subdue 
resistance. The Justice Department report noted that many victims of these 
encounters are people with mental illness or under the influence of drugs 
and alcohol. (Seattle Times, 12/17/2011)499 
The DOJ investigation report, described an extensive effort to collect data 
relating to its inquiry. Specifically, the report stated that DOJ investigators  
… requested, received, and reviewed from the City and SPD hundreds of 
thousands of pages of documents, including SPD’s written policies and 
procedures; its training materials; its internal use of force reports; SPD and 
OPA’s public reports; OPA’s complaints and investigative files; and data 
generated from SPD and OPA databases. The data included several 
hundred hours of video footage and raw computerized data, both of which 
we were permitted to select and retrieve. We additionally obtained 
thousands of pages of documents from the public record and the 
community. We also conducted hundreds of interviews and meetings with 
SPD officers, supervisors, and command staff, as well as Seattle City 
officials, local community advocates and attorneys, and members of the 
Seattle community at large. Additionally, in May and September 2011, we 
and our police practices experts conducted two on-site tours of SPD, 
meeting with SPD command staff and a range of personnel over several 
days. We also conducted six full days of interviews with community 
 
499 Carter, M., Sullivan, J. & Miletich, S. (2011, December 17). Feds vs. SPD - City faces 
possibility of court intervention DOJ finds ‘systemic use of force’ by Seattle police Chief Diaz 
defiant: Show us the evidence. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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members, and attended separate community meetings with local 
advocates and community members. (DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, p. 8) 
Additional and specific findings by the DOJ relating to excessive force included 
that SPD officers were “using excessive force in response to minor offenses” (DOJ 
Investigation Report, 2011, p. 9), SPD officers were using excessive force “when they 
apply force in tandem against a single individual” (DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, p. 12), 
SPD officers were “too quickly and unreasonably resorting to the use of impact 
weapons,”  (DOJ Investigation Letter, p. 13), SPD officers were using “excessive force 
against individuals who [were] already under physical control,” (DOJ Investigation Letter, 
2011, at 13), and SPD officers used excessive force “against individuals who ‘talk back,’” 
(DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, p. 14). 
The DOJ found the following “deficiencies that contributed to the pattern or 
practice of excessive force:” officers systemically failing to report force when used; the 
Department’s “failure to develop adequate policies and training” relating to less-lethal 
weapons such as OC spray, batons and Electronic Control Weapons; and, inadequate 
supervision of uses of force. (DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, pp. 15-17). 
Inadequate supervision of use of force included an “inadequate first-line 
supervisory review of use of force incidents,” “insufficient on-scene supervisory 
investigation[s],” the “insufficient analysis of use of force incidents,” “inadequate training 
on how to investigate” uses of force, and “inadequate oversight and review of police 
uses of force” (DOJ investigation, 2011, pp. 17-19). In addition to the shortcomings in 
training relating to use of force weapons, use of force reporting, and sergeant training, 
the DOJ also found “deficiencies in training relating to verbal de-escalation techniques” 
(DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, p. 23). 
In addition, the DOJ found that the SPD’s “Early Intervention System 
[EIS]…designed to identify employees who may be experiencing ‘symptoms of job 
stress, training deficiencies and/or personal problems that may affect job performance’ 
[was] broken.” (DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, p. 22) The DOJ elaborated on what was 
wrong with the EIS, suggesting that EIS thresholds were “far too high,” and 
“interventions on officers’ behaviour [were] far too late,” and supervisor EIS reviews were 
“superficial at best.” In addition, SPD was found to have failed to track officers over time 
to determine the success or failure of EIS interventions, officer participation in the EIS 
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process was not mandatory, and SPD performance evaluations consistently failed to 
reference EIS interventions (DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, pp. 22-23). 
The DOJ also concluded that the Department’s Office of Professional 
Accountability was “not providing the necessary accountability.” The DOJ specifically 
found that the “OPA [was] not provid[ing] the intended backstop for the failures of the 
direct supervisory review process.” The DOJ expressed “concern” relating to the quality 
of precinct level investigations and the OPA’s classification and findings systems (DOJ 
Investigation Letter, 2011, p. 24). 
In addition, the DOJ investigation identified “serious concerns” about SPD 
practices vis-à-vis pedestrian stops:  
SPD’s policy and practices blur the line between a social contact or casual 
encounter, and a temporary investigatory detention pursuant to Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Consequently, officers lack adequate 
guidance as to when someone must heed an “order” to stop or stay. (DOJ 
Investigation Letter, 2011, p. 26) 
With respect to allegations of discriminatory policing, the DOJ noted numerous 
“reported incidents in which racial epithets were used or minorities were singled out for 
harsh treatment.” The DOJ highlighted that in one high-profile incident, the actions of the 
SPD detective who threatened to “best the Mexican piss” out of a Hispanic detainee was 
not called out or reported by any of the other SPD officers who were present, including 
supervisors. The DOJ concluded that the SPD culture appeared to be tolerant of “this 
kind of abuse” (DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, p. 27). The DOJ found that inadequate 
biased policing and pedestrian stop policies, inadequate data collection and inadequate 
supervision were all potentially contributing factors in the creation and continuation of a 
culture that tolerated unconstitutional policing practices (DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, 
pp. 29-31). The DOJ also specifically identified that the SPD provided “insufficient 
training” with respect to unbiased policing, social contacts, Terry stops and 
communication skills. (DOJ Investigation Letter, 2011, p. 35). 
Although not extensively reported in the media, the DOJ did acknowledge 
progress made by the SPD, purportedly as the result of technical assistance provided by 
the DOJ over the course of the investigation: 
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The report acknowledged the following progress having been made. These 
actions by SPD included: 
• SPD had “recently created a Force Review Committee to give the commander 
greater assistance in reviewing use of force reports, and identifying 
problematic use of force patterns and training deficiencies;” 
• SPD had “recently developed a Professional Standards section, which will be 
responsible for conducting research on standards and best practices, internal 
audits and inspections, and managing strategic initiatives;” 
• SPD had “directed additional resources to” Crisis Intervention Training; 
• SPD had “recently implemented a 48-hour training on the use of force, and 
SPD policy and expectations;” 
• SPD had “begun to clarify expectations and improve training for sergeants, 
including rolling out a new sergeant’s training that all SPD sergeants and the 
top 20 officers on the Sergeants Promotion list will attend in 2011;” 
• SPD had “committed to develop the LEED (Listen and Explain with Equity and 
Dignity) training, which will focus on respect, listening skills, and the use of 
verbal tactics as an alternative to the use of force;” 
• SPD had “instituted a zero-tolerance policy for racially inflammatory 
language;” 
• “A Working Group comprised of the OPA Director, OPA Auditor, and 
representatives of the OPA-[Review Board] has convened to simplify the 
classification and findings systems, to provide a clearer delineation of the new 
classification and findings categories, and to improve turnaround time to its 
target time of 120 days;” 
• “OPA recently [had] suspended referring complaints for investigation to the 
chain of command until sergeants receive additional training on how to 
conduct such investigations;” and, 
• SPD had “made renewed efforts in community outreach” (DOJ Investigation 
Letter, 2011, pp. 35-36). 
“Additional remedies” that were needed were also identified, to include twelve 
recommendations made relating to the DOJ’s finding of excessive force,500 eleven 
 
500 The following recommendations were made relating to the finding of excessive force:  
SPD should revise its Use of Force policy to clarify that officers must report any use of force 
above un-resisted handcuffing, including the active pointing of firearms. Even in cases of un-




SPD should develop and implement a use of force policy that includes a specific force policy for 
each and every weapon available to SPD officers, including the following: OC spray, flashlights, 
ECW, batons, and the active pointing of a firearm. These policies should clearly define and 
describe when, how, and how much force is appropriate, and when such force will be considered 
deadly force. SPD should also consider providing intermediate weapons to more of its officers, 
but only following the development of policies and training.  
SPD should develop and implement protocols with the CIT unit on how to handle interactions with 
individuals with mental health issues and individuals who appear to be under the influence of 
drugs and or alcohol. The protocols should include when CIT should be consulted, and how 
situations involving impaired subjects should be addressed when CIT cannot respond.  
SPD should ensure that supervisors perform the following actions in response to any use of force 
incident: (a) ensure that a medical unit report to the scene of every use of force resulting in injury, 
actual or complained; (b) conduct a thorough analysis of the incident based on all obtainable 
physical evidence, adequately descriptive use of force reports, witness statements, and 
independent investigation; (c) resolve any discrepancies in use of force reports or witness 
accounts and explain and document all injuries; and (d) complete a summary analysis regarding 
the reasonableness, proportionality, and legality of the force used. If the supervisor cannot 
resolve any factual discrepancies, determine the source of any injury, or determine the lawfulness 
of a use of force, the supervisor should refer the matter immediately and directly to his/her 
supervisor and to OPA. Every level of supervision thereafter should be held accountable for the 
quality of the first-line supervisor’s force investigation.  
SPD should use multidisciplinary roll-out teams, including OPA, the Training Unit, and a 
prosecutor to investigate incidents involving serious uses of force. Serious uses of force can be 
defined either by the injury sustained by a subject, or as any use of deadly force or unjustified 
force, regardless of the severity of the injury. Trained investigators should roll-out to officer 
involved shootings and other serious incidents to make the determination about whether to 
consult a prosecutor.  
Following SPD Use of Force Policy 6.240.XII.A.7, SPD should require officers to submit use of 
force statements before they go off-duty, including following officer-involved shootings. 
Exceptions may be made if an officer is physically or mentally incapacitated.  
Supervisors should review and take appropriate disciplinary or non-disciplinary corrective action, 
when warranted, in situations in which he or she becomes aware of potential misconduct or 
criminal behavior by an officer.  
Supervisors should conduct focused reviews of any officers involved in a disproportionately high 
number of use of force incidents for any training or discipline issues. When the supervisor 
becomes aware of potential misconduct or criminal behavior by an officer, the supervisor should 
take appropriate disciplinary or non-disciplinary corrective action  
SPD should track the prosecutorial disposition of all arrests as one tool to identify possible trends 
in abuse of law enforcement discretion.  
EIS reviews should be conducted by a higher-level supervisor, such as a captain. The supervisor 
should conduct a timely EIS review that identifies patterns in officer behavior and specific training 
deficiencies. Officers in the EIS program should have a monitoring supervisor designated to 
ensure that all training and other Department-initiated remedial steps are taken and documented, 
and that the officer’s performance is closely monitored and evaluated. At the end of the 
monitoring period, the precinct captain should either certify that the officer has successfully 
completed the EIS program or initiate another plan for improvement.  
EIS should be expanded to track supervisor and precinct activity. Participation in EIS must be 
mandatory.  
The following changes to EIS thresholds should be made: (a) adjust EIS thresholds to identify at 
least 3-5% of the line officer population; (b) revise the aggregate indicator to include uses of force 
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(DP&P 3.070.II.I); (c) create single-event thresholds for events so critical that they require 
immediate department intervention; (d) implement rolling thresholds, such that after an officer 
who has received an intervention for use of force should not, for example, be permitted to engage 
in seven additional uses of force before again triggering EIS; and (e) include a threshold 
specifically related to biased policing complaints. 
(DOJ Investigation Report, 2011, pp. 37-38). 
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recommendations made relating to the Office of Professional Accountability,501 and eight 
recommendations relating to discriminatory policing.502 
 
501 The following recommendations were made relating to the Office of Professional 
Accountability: 
An independent expert should conduct a bi-yearly randomized, stratified audit of OPA intake.  
Intake sergeants and lieutenants should receive formal orientation, training, and written protocols 
that conform to best national practices regarding (a) intake, (b) complaint classifications, (c) when 
an investigation is necessary, and (d) how to avoid conflicts of interest in investigations.  
OPA should develop protocols with its officers, precincts, and any other outside agency that 
receive complaints, so that all police misconduct complaints are timely received by OPA for its 
review and investigation. 
OPA or the City should conduct anonymous Integrity Checks. That is, OPA (or third-party auditor) 
should retain a qualified individual to file dummy complaints with OPA (and with the precinct or 
City) and report on how the complaint is directed and handled.  
OPA should provide final approval of any action or inaction taken in Preliminary Investigative 
Review and Supervisory Referral matters, and the outcome should be reported back to the 
precinct.  
SPD should expand upon existing investigation techniques and continue to train all of its 
investigators on: what factors to consider when evaluating complainant and witness credibility; 
examination and interrogation of accused officers and other witnesses; identifying misconduct, 
even if it is not specifically named in the complaint; and using the preponderance of the evidence 
standard as the appropriate burden of proof. An SPD officer’s statement should not be given any 
preference over a civilian’s statement, nor should SPD completely disregard a witness’s 
statement merely because the witness has some connection to the complainant. OPA 
investigators should make efforts to resolve material inconsistencies between witness 
statements.  
Supervisory Interventions should only be allowed once SPD has issued a definitive and true 
finding. 
OPA should simplify its classifications, and have two findings, for purposes of reporting to the 
complainant (“Sustained” or “Not Sustained”), for each allegation against each officer. OPA may 
explain to the Complainant, named officer, and public what remedial steps will be taken in 
Sustained complaints (i.e., “Formal Discipline” or “Training”) or why a complaint was Not 
Sustained, whether because the conduct was “Exonerated/Lawful,” “Unfounded/Officer Not 
Involved,” “Inconclusive,” or “Administrative/Procedural” reasons.  
SPD, in consultation with OPA and appropriate experts, should consider issuing a discipline 
matrix that guides the Director and the COP when making disciplinary decisions.  
Each precinct should have an Integrity Control Officer (“ICO”). The ICO, who would report directly 
to the OPA Director, would review the quality of Line Investigation investigations and the 
disposition of PIRs and SRs (or its equivalents). The ICO would also review the completeness of 
use of force files.  
SPD and OPA should ensure that all in car video recordings are made available to supervisors for 
review. (DOJ Investigation Report, 2011, pp. 38-39). 
502 The following recommendations were made relating to allegations of discriminatory policing: 
Each precinct should regularly collect the demographic data for their area, including districts.  
The Training Unit and Special Operations Bureau should update SPD databases and training 
materials to ensure that all officers report pedestrian stop-related activity to the proper database.  
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7.2.3. Seattle Research Participant Reactions to the DOJ’s findings 
Research participants affiliated with the City and the SPD complained of the DOJ 
investigation as “a political process.” Most aggrieving, however, was the finding, as 
announced by U.S. Attorney Durkan, that 20% of the SPD’s uses-of-force were 
unconstitutional in their application. As commented on by one city official: the 20% 
finding “was completely spurious and without evidence to support it – it was the 
conclusion of a retired, small city police chief – it was outrageous.”503 Another research 
participant, with extensive knowledge of the facts underlying the DOJ investigation, 
suggested that “the DOJ pulled their findings out of their ass.”504 
Even participants who were not affiliated with the City and who otherwise 
supported the DOJ investigation and the need for a consent decree believed the 20% 
finding to be “an exaggeration.” As explained by one well-placed research participant: 
 
SPD should conduct regular audits of SPD databases, including the CAD and Street Check 
Databases, to ensure compliance with the reporting requirements of each database.  
SPD command staff, precinct commanders, and supervisors should conduct regular analysis of 
officer activity data produced by the Street Check and CAD databases.  
SPD should revise the Social Contact, Terry Stop, & Arrest Policy to ensure that definitions of 
social contacts and Terry stops are in accordance with individuals’ constitutional rights.  
SPD should revise the Unbiased Policing Policy to outline what behavior(s) are impermissible and 
to identify supervisory responsibility in investigations of biased policing incidents. 
SPD should increase training and understanding regarding (a) investigatory encounters and 
temporary investigatory detentions pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), (b) pretextual 
encounters, (c) discriminatory policing investigations, and (d) communication skills and cultural 
competency. 
Supervisors should, in conjunction with the SPD Training Unit and OPA, develop a roll call 
training curriculum that reviews issues related to discriminatory policing, including activity 
identified within the Department. 
(DOJ Investigation Report, 2011, p. 40). 
503 Even so, as was common in this research study, there were dissenting opinions – even within 
the SPD. One SPD participant recalled that an internal SPD review did, in fact, find that 20% of 
the use of force cases that were reviewed “were fundamentally problematic.” 
504 Numerous research participants referred to a confidential memorandum that had been 
prepared by one city lawyer (that I was unable to obtain), that specifically evaluated each case 
referenced in the DOJ investigation. The memo concluded that, in virtually every case, facts were 
either misstated or taken out of context and factors that explained or mitigated officer conduct 
were simply ignored. The memo was, apparently, widely distributed throughout the City and later 
provided to the DOJ, and was consistent with findings later reported by a Seattle University 
Professor (Hickman, M. & Atherley, L. (Dec. 2012). Police Use of Force in Seattle, January 2009 
– March 2011. On file with author. 
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I don’t know how the DOJ got that number or how much analysis was 
given – I suspect it was taken at face value – throwing that number at 
the SPD without proving it really set them off – it set Seattle on edge 
and made them think they were getting a bum deal and that the fix was 
in… 
Within the SPD, and even in the face of supportive and positive comments made 
by the DOJ and the U.S. Attorney, officers perceived the Seattle consent decree as 
“unnecessary” and “a slam on themselves and fellow officers.” They believed the DOJ 
action to be the result of a weak police chief and a politically weak Mayor. SPD officers 
seemed particularly miffed at what they perceived to be “underhanded” DOJ litigation 
tactics in refusing to disclose their methodology and the bases for their conclusions 
outside of the published report, which SPD officers believed raised more questions than 
it answered.505 
“I had an overwhelming feeling that life as we knew it had changed.”  
An SPD officer’s emotional response while watching the DOJ 
press conference announcing the results of its pattern or practice 
investigation of the SPD. 
 
From the DOJ perspective, the investigation was “extraordinarily efficient, with a 
quick turnaround period and an increased level of transparency by making an early 
announcement of the findings of the investigation.” Further, although the 20% reference 
was “heavily debated” amongst and between the DOJ team, in the end, they expressed 
confidence that the number could be defended and believed that there was a simple 
misunderstanding on the part of the City as to how the use of force numbers were 
 
505 Seattle’s complaints over what was perceived as a lack of “procedural due process” from the 
DOJ were not new. In the early days of the implementation of Section 14141 the DOJ had an 
“early reputation for heavy-handedness and an unnecessarily adversarial approach to the 
investigation process.” (Chanin, 2017a, p. 260, quoting former SPL Chief Shanetta Cutlar (2008), 
as acknowledging “We had an approach where we basically came to your department with, you 
know, the biggest truck we could find, asked for all of your documents, rolled away, went back to 
Washington, and came back maybe two or three years later with an agreement and said, ‘Sign 
here, or we will sue you.’” Interestingly, Seattle’s initial reaction to the DOJ findings was similar to 
that expressed by Pittsburgh officials when they were singled out for the first Section 14141 
enforcement action in 1997: ““PBP officials, angry over being singled out as the first subject of 
Section 14141 enforcement and skeptical of the DOJ’s ability to demonstrate a pattern or practice 
of PBP misconduct, initially considered fighting the allegations. After some reflection, however, 
the city decided against litigation and agreed to settlement terms ([Former Pittsburgh Police 
Chief] Robert McNeilly, Remarks given at the 2008 PERF Annual Meeting, Miami, FL, 2008)” 
(Chanin, 2012, p. 40). 
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stratified. In addition, the Seattle investigation and consent decree was one of the first to 
have the involved a local U.S. Attorney’s Office. There was a strong belief amongst 
some participants that local U.S. Attorney involvement was extremely effective at 
informing the DOJ team not only about community issues and concerns, but also in 
preparing them for the opportunities and challenges ahead.  
Perhaps the most challenging aspect to the response to the DOJ investigation 
was the “schism” that developed between the Mayor’s Office and the SPD command 
staff on one side, and the City Attorney and the City Council on the other side. Seattle 
was, by all appearances, a “house divided.” This schism was both a boom and a bust for 
the DOJ. On the one hand, the DOJ had insiders in the City who were willing to 
advocate in support of its position to create a wide ranging and comprehensive consent 
decree; on the other hand, the DOJ was faced with a City leadership that was 
dysfunctional and viturally impossible to manage. 
The first indication of the true magnitude of the schism was in the City’s initial 
response to the DOJ investigation. There was a cadre with SPD and the City Attorney’s 
Office who were eager to make the DOJ prove their case with the expectation that the 
City could win in court. There were others within the City Attorney’s Office, however, 
who, even though they did not have faith in the DOJ’s methodology, believed that the 
SPD was in a weak position to defend itself, particularly given the SPD’s ongoing lack of 
documentation and analysis of its officers’ uses of force. Those City staffers believed 
that the resources that would be required to fight the DOJ (whose “brand” was positively 
recognized throughout the Seattle community) would be better spent on improving the 
deficiencies that everyone agreed existed within the SPD. Within the City leadership and 
SPD, there were “true believers” who considered the SPD to be one of the foremost 
police organizations in the country and who felt the DOJ investigation was nothing more 
than a political tool being used by the Obama Department of Justice and a politically 
motivated local U.S. Attorney to make themselves look good. This cadre believed that all 
that was needed was technical assistance and an opportunity to improve. And then there 
were the opposing agendas, common in Seattle, amongst and between Seattle 
politicians actually (or being perceived to be) jockeying for power and those having 
opposing or different political ideologies and personal experiences. 
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Mayor McGinn, having begun his term of Mayor January 1, 2010, was walking a 
political tight-rope. He had been elected, not based on any alliances with the traditional 
democratic party operatives, but instead as more of a community-based grass roots 
campaign effort. His campaign was directed towards transit issues, not policing, only to 
be (at least from his administration’s perspective), thrust into an ongoing scandal about 
policing. He had decided to keep Chief Diaz (who was originally appointed as interim 
Chief by McGinn’s predecessor) as Chief as he believed Diaz would work to 
incrementally reform the department from within. Only months before the ACLU letter (in 
August 2010) he had appointed Chief Diaz as the permanent Chief; so, by the time the 
DOJ investigation was completed, he trusted and felt a certain degree of loyalty to Diaz 
and wanted him to succeed. When faced by a Chief and an SPD command staff who 
chaffed at the DOJ’s findings, McGinn was in the unenviable position of having to try to 
walk a fine line between the strongly held beliefs of 1) the community who elected him, 
2) the Chief who he selected, 3) a command staff and police rank and file who could 
cause him immeasurable grief if he failed to defend them, and 4) a new City Attorney 
who was aligned with a majority of the City Council who were supportive of the DOJ. His 
primary strategy appeared to be to try to protect the Department and the City from being 
“steamrolled” by what he perceived to be an overly aggressive DOJ while, at the same 
time trying to avoid being perceived as an opponent of police reform. 
Mayor McGinn ended up choosing to aggressively negotiate a settlement 
agreement with the DOJ on behalf of the City, only to be painted, in the end, as being 
generally opposed to the reform effort. This, in turn, resulted in his projecting a position 
which ultimately provoked resistance to the reform effort from many SPD command staff 
and rank and file officers. 
Amongst the City Council, although there was substantial debate and 
discussion in private, when it came down to actual voting, “no one 
wanted to be seen as not recognizing there was a problem.”  
Seattle City Official 
 
Interviews with then-City officials and SPD command staff, made it clear that they 
were surprised by the position of the DOJ that a consent decree would be required; in 
fact, they had expected that, in a worst-case scenario, they would only be required to 
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made changes as per one or more technical assistance letters.506 When they were only 
given one evening’s notice before the public was advised of the DOJ’s findings and 
demands, they felt “steamrolled” by the DOJ and were completely unprepared to accept 
the DOJ’s position as reasonable or appropriate. This element of surprise and the DOJ’s 
reported refusal to share their data or methodology with the City absent formal litigation, 
initiated a poor start to the reform process that many members of the City were unable to 
get over for years to come.507 
As such, even though many of the words uttered by U.S. Attorney Durkan and 
Assistant AG Perez praised SPD initiatives and invited collaboration between the DOJ 
and the SPD, those words fell on deaf ears when conjoined with the non-negotiable 
demand for a formal consent decree and an independent monitor – which the City 
rightfully anticipated would cost millions of dollars in monitoring fees over the course of 
consent decree implementation.508 
7.2.4. The City’s Public Reaction to the DOJ Investigation 
A front-page story in the Seattle Times on December 17, 2011 highlighted the 
conflicts between the DOJ and the SPD at the time of the release of the DOJ report, with 
the latter part of the headline reading: “Seattle Police Chief defiant: Show us the 
 
506 As noted by one SPD participant: “The DOJ investigation results were surprising - we were a 
progressive agency with training that was recognized nationwide. SPD was one of the first with a 
Domestic Violence unit; we had community advisory councils with LGBT, Asian and Pacific 
islanders – anything a police department was supposed to be doing, we were doing it with 
respect to maintaining relationships with diverse communities. SPD had a series of progressive 
chiefs: Stamper and Kerlikowske were both progressive. Kerlikowske was the head of the Major 
City Chiefs and worked closely with the USDOJ Community Oriented Policing Office – he was 
really well connected and progressive and held people accountable. In fact, SPD could be 
positively compared to the King County Sheriff – when DOJ investigators came out, they named 
several incidents that were in fact King County uses of force – but they had been reported as 
Seattle uses of force.” 
507 Even at the time of the interviews conducted as part of this research (in the first Quarter of 
2020), emotions still ran high amongst City and police participants. 
508 A survey of 13 police departments involved in consent decrees identified costs expected to 
surpass $600 million. According to LAPD budget records, the Consent Decree there “cost about 
$115 million in spending,” although the City’s Chief Legislative Analyst estimated actual costs at 
$300 million. “In many cases, the salaries and expenses of the federal monitors and their staffs, 
who fly in and out of the cities, are among the largest costs… In Puerto Rico, for example, its 
2013 reform agreement costs about $1.5 million annually to monitor…Implementing the changes 
that the Justice Department wants is expected to take 10 years and cost $200 million” (Frontline, 
11/13/2015). 
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evidence” (Seattle Times, 12/16/2011). According to the Times article: Diaz was quoted 
“hours after the findings were unveiled” as saying: “’I want to make this clear. The 
department is not broken.” This was said in the face of Assistant Attorney General 
Perez’ position that the department’s practices to assure accountability and public trust 
were, in fact, “broken” and that the only way to ensure systemic change was through a 
consent decree and the appointment of an outside, independent monitor. In addition, 
Diaz sent an email to officers just before the report was made public wherein, he told his 
officers: “[w]e have many reasons to question the validity and soundness of the DOJ’s 
conclusions. At this time, the city’s simple request is to examine the data, methods and 
analyses used in support of these allegations and to reach these conclusions” (Seattle 
Times, 12/17/2011). 
Mayor McGinn was quoted as saying that the DOJ investigation report raised 
“serious allegations,” but according to the Times “stopped short of embracing its 
conclusions or Perez’s solutions, but [] promised that the city would continue to 
cooperate with the Justice Department in coming months” (Seattle Times, 12/16/2011). 
Showing political conflicts to come, Seattle City Councilmember Tim Burgess, the 
chairman of the Council’s Public Safety and Education Committee,509 released a 
statement more supportive of the DOJ findings and critical of the SPD; he noted that the 
DOJ findings,  
confirm what many, including myself, have believed for some time — our 
Police Department can do better…Chief Diaz, the police command staff, 
every officer and civilian employee of the Seattle Police Department and 
the elected leaders of our city should embrace this informed, constructive 
criticism and work quickly to implement fundamental and sustainable 
reforms… Rebuilding the public's trust and confidence in the Police 
Department is an essential and urgent obligation. (Seattle Times, 
12/17/2011) 
The Seattle Police Officer’s Guild (SPOG), the union representing SPD officers 
and Sergeants, joined Chief Diaz in challenging the DOJ’s findings in a statement 
released by its then-President, Richard O’Neill:  
 
509 Councilmember Burgess would eventually serve as interim Mayor after the untimely 
resignation of Mayor Ed Murray in September 2017 (Jaywork, C. (2017, September 19). Tim 
Burgess Appointed 55th Mayor of Seattle. Seattle Weekly. Retrieved from Tim Burgess 
Appointed 55th Mayor of Seattle | Seattle Weekly). 
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It is my hope that the DOJ will be as cooperative as we have been and 
allow the police department to examine and study the data that helped 
them come to their conclusions. Officers are often put in very difficult and 
dangerous situations and all they want are clear and specific ground rules 
to guide them when making use of force decisions… (Seattle Times, 
12/17/2011) 
Noting that officers were then working without a contract, the O’Neill was further quoted 
(making a prescient statement): “if the city intends to adopt any changes that affect the 
working conditions of the officers, then we look forward to discussing those at the 
bargaining table.”510 
Although participant interviews showed that members of the community were 
dismayed by the DOJ’s failure to find that the SPD had engaged in a pattern or practice 
of biased-policing (in addition to the finding of a pattern or practice of excessive force), 
they did not publicly express those concerns at the time of the release of the DOJ report. 
Instead, as expressed by the executive director of El Centro de la Raza, Estela Ortega, 
the findings were a  
victory for all the people who have been victimized and violated over the 
years. They have been vindicated… This is what people have been saying 
all along, that police use excessive force, especially against people of 




510 In fact, 5 ½ years later, the City would be found “partially out-of-compliance” with the Consent 
Decree, largely as a result of a newly negotiated contract with the police union that failed to fully 
implement a Police Accountability Ordinance passed by the City Council on May 22, 2017 (See 
U.S. v. Seattle, Docket 562, pp. 5-6). 
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7.2.5. The Negotiation of the Settlement Agreement & the 
Memorandum of Understanding 
July 27, 2012 Settlement Agreement & Memorandum of 
Understanding between City of Seattle and 
USDOJ511 
Signed by Thomas Perez, 
Assistant AG, Civil Rights 
Division; Jenny Durkan, US 
Attorney, Western District of 
Washington; Mayor Michael 
McGinn & City Attorney Peter 
Holmes 
 
The Settlement Agreement, commonly referred to in Seattle as “the Consent 
Decree” was not signed until more than seven months after the DOJ investigation was 
publicly released. The Settlement Agreement and an accompanying “Memorandum of 
Understanding” (MOU) was the subject of intense and arduous negotiations between the 
DOJ and the City which required the hiring of a professional mediator after the two sides 
reached impasses in several areas.512  
At first, as reported in the Seattle Times on December 22, 2011 (only six days 
after the release of the DOJ investigation report), it appeared that City leadership would 
be on board with the DOJ’s demands, although Mayor McGinn continued to question 
what actual reform would look like. In an interview with the Seattle Times, Mayor McGinn 
was quoted as saying:  
 
511 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 3-1, filed July 27, 2012 (Settlement Agreement); Memorandum 
of Understanding retrieved from Microsoft Word - FINAL MOU - 7 27 12.doc (seattle.gov). 
512 City affiliated study participants often commented on the dangers and pitfalls inherent in 
negotiating with the DOJ; particularly noting the political dangers of appearing to be “against” 
police reform or police accountability in a city with an electorate as liberal as Seattle. In addition, 
the elected Seattle City Attorney was very publicly supportive of the DOJ position, thereby 
providing the DOJ with additional political cover in taking an aggressive position on the need for 
and content of the Consent Decree.  
In addition, as noted by Miller, shortly after the first use of Section 14141 against the Pittsburgh 
and Steubenville Police Departments, “[i]n pursuing a strategy of negotiating consent decrees, 
the Department of Justice operates from a position of strength. No municipality could relish the 
prospect of a § 14141 trial. The publicity surrounding a trial pitting the municipality against the 
federal government over incidents of police misconduct would be enormous and largely injurious. 
The monetary costs of litigating a protracted § 14141 trial would be exorbitant. A judgment that 
the municipality violated § 14141 would not only subject the local police department to a structural 
injunction designed by a federal judge, but also could provide existing police misconduct suits 
with additional evidence and spark new individuals to sue for damages. As a result, municipalities 
will likely respond favorably to Justice Department overtures regarding the possibilities of 
settlement” (Miller, 1998, p. 187). 
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We're committed to making reforms here, but we need to work through with 
DOJ (Department of Justice) about what those reforms look like…There’s 
not a recommendation that we say, ‘we can't do that,’ or ‘you're wrong 
there.’ There are some we've done already; there’s some we started; and 
there are some we’re working toward. (Seattle Times, 12/22/2011)513 
Mayor McGinn’s support for the reform effort was reportedly in response to a 
letter from the ACLU “and 34 community groups, many representing minorities” which 
had pressed on him “to embrace the Justice Department’s findings and include members 
of the community in working toward solutions” (Seattle Times, 12/22/2011). In a 
response letter to the ACLU, Mayor McGinn wrote: “We have heard from the public and 
now the federal government that more must be done…We agree. Let us be very clear: 
we are committed to reform” (Seattle Times, 12/22/2011). Although the Mayor still 
professed to want to see the methodology used by the DOJ to reach its conclusions, he 
said that the City was going to focus, instead, on the actual reforms needed to achieve 
an objective of “a highly professional police force that treats everyone with dignity and 
respect” (Seattle Times, 12/22/2011).  
Community pressure on Mayor McGinn, who was reportedly elected “with 
minority group support,” was intense. Community leaders expressed that they were 
“deeply troubled” by the Mayor and Chief’s initial defensive reactions to the DOJ report. 
As expressed by the executive director of “OneAmerica:” “This is not the time for 
deliberative thinking. It's time for a clear statement that he [the Mayor] wants the force to 
be the best it can be to serve and protect the community” (Seattle Times, 12/22/2011). 
By February 3, 2012, the DOJ’s work in coming up with a first draft of a consent 
decree was reported as having included consultations with the Mayor, the City Attorney, 
City Council members and “dozens of citizens groups and community members…with 
an eye toward completing interviews and most information-gathering by the middle of 
February.” Some members of community groups were already complaining about being 
left out of the negotiation process and expressed concerns that they were being “rushed 
 
513 Miletich, S., Martin, J. & Thompson, L. (2011, December 22). Mayor tells police chief: Do what 
the feds say. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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by the process.” It was, however, still anticipated that a first draft of the settlement 
agreement would be completed by the end of February (Seattle Times, 2/3/2012).514 
By the end of March, it was reported that a collaborative attempt to address the 
Consent Decree, between the Mayor, the City Council and the City Attorney had 
“unraveled.” By this point, the Seattle Times was reporting that although Mayor McGinn 
supported police reform efforts, he and the SPD did not believe that court oversight was 
necessarily required to achieve those goals. That position, reportedly, set the Mayor and 
the police apart from the City Attorney and members of City Council, who were strongly 
and publicly advocating for collaboration and cooperation with the DOJ (Seattle Times, 
3/29/2012).515 According to research participant statements, within the Mayor’s Office 
and the SPD, there was strong suspicion about the motives of those public officials 
advocating cooperation with the DOJ; they believed the publicly stated positions were 
politically motivated and had the potential of usurping local control of the police in a 
manner that was contrary to public policy, safety and the city’s precarious financial 
status. 
Within one day of members of the President of the City Council sending Mayor 
McGinn a letter expressing concern about the Mayor’s apparent unwillingness to 
collaborate with City Council members on how to best work with the DOJ to achieve 
reform, Mayor McGinn announced what he referred to as the “20-20 plan” for police 
reform. The plan proposed a 20-step, 20-month plan that was described in the Seattle 
Times as “a sweeping package of 20 initiatives, aimed at addressing issues from officer 
hiring to training to biased policing, which they promised to implement over the next 20 
months” (Seattle Times, 3/30/2012).516 Although the Mayor was quoted as saying that 
the plan went “far beyond a response” to the DOJ investigation, the proposal eventually 
became lost amongst the Consent Decree negotiations and study participants noted, 
was never implemented. Instead, the 20-20 plan was perceived as a last-ditch attempt to 
convince the DOJ to scale back its plan for externally forced reform through a Consent 
 
514 Carter, M. (2012, February 3). Consent order for police reforms being rushed, groups 
complain. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
515 Carter, M. (2012, March 29). Seattle panel to fix police sharply split, sources say. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
516 Carter, M. (2012, March 30). Plan for a better police force, City’s response to Feds’ stinging 
report. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Decree and a court-appointed Monitor. In fact, shortly after the 20-20 plan was 
announced and it was discussed with the DOJ, U.S. Attorney Durkan continued to make 
it clear that court ordered reform was non-negotiable (Seattle Times, 3/31/2012).517 
On March 30, 2012, the DOJ provided the City with a confidential draft of a 
proposed consent decree. By May 10, 2012, however, the City and the DOJ had still not 
agreed on a final version and the DOJ had reportedly threatened to file a lawsuit in early 
June if an agreement was not reached. Even though almost five months had passed 
since the announcement of the DOJ’s investigative findings, Mayor McGinn was still 
unwilling to signal to the public whether he would accept a court-appointed monitor, 
telling the Seattle Times “he would have to consider the ‘effectiveness’ of proposed 
changes, the cost to the city at a time of other pressing needs and the ‘capacity’ of the 
Police Department to absorb the changes while dealing with crime problems.” Mayor 
McGinn also advised that some aspects of the reforms would have to be negotiated with 
the police unions (Seattle Times, 5/10/2012). 
On May 16, 2012, an SPD internal response to the DOJ’s proposed Consent 
Decree was reported as “deriding” the DOJ proposal as “unrealistic:”  
Plainly stated, the overwhelming majority of programs proposed by DOJ 
cannot be implemented in less than one to three years, if at all…These 
timelines can only be described as impossible and prompt serious 
questions about the analytical thoroughness and organizational experience 
of those who proposed them. (Seattle Times, 5/16/2012)518 
Also, on May 16, 2012, the city wrote a response to the DOJ as part of the 
ongoing negotiations, disagreeing with the DOJ’s excessive-force finding and asserting 
that “[t]he fact that DOJ has limited its analysis to a small subset of cases where force 
was used should prompt caution in drawing broad conclusions from the evidence.” The 
City further argued that there was no evidence that the alleged instances of excessive 
force were “rooted in any municipal policy” or reflected a “deliberate indifference” to 
 
517 Carter, M. (2012, March 31). Feds stick to hard line on SPD - They say court must oversee 
any plan to address police bias, use of force. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
518 Seattle Times staff (2012, May 16). Justice Dept. police plan derided as unrealistic. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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citizen rights (Seattle Times, 6/26/2012b).519 Even so, the City represented that it was 
willing to enter into an agreement to avoid the costs and delay of protracted litigation and 
to ensure the SPD was operating at a high level. As per reports from the Seattle Times, 
the City’s “31-page plan offered more modest changes than those proposed by the 
Justice Department, focusing on policies and procedures relating to use of force but 
conspicuously omitting measures to deal with biased policing…” In a separate cover 
letter, and hinting a spit on the City’s side of the negotiations, the City Attorney, Pete 
Holmes indicated that “the City is not limiting its reforms to the elements of this 
counterproposal. The City will continue to explore and implement measures to ensure 
effective and constitutional policing” (Seattle Times (7/8/2012).520 
The head of the Special Litigation Section of the DOJ responded that same day 
suggesting that there was “a very dramatic gap” between the parties. The DOJ 
expressed particular surprise that the City did not include in its proposal “any measures 
to respond to the issues of discriminatory policing, community engagement, or the City’s 
accountability system.” It was also noted that the city had made “this process 
unnecessarily contentious and personal,” and was, thereby, increasing the risk of 
“unnecessary litigation” (Seattle Times, 7/8/2012). 
On May 18, 2012, the City reportedly filed a motion opposing the introduction of 
the DOJ report in the high-profile civil case involving the “Mexican-piss” comment by an 
SPD detective.521 In that filing, the City argued that the DOJ report was not reliable or 
trustworthy and was based on a “subjective review solely of use-of-force reports…” The 
City argued that the report failed to include “sample sizes” or “margins of error” and 
further noted that the DOJ had refused to provide underlying data or its analysis for 
review and that the City would be able to show “significant quantitative and 
methodological errors in the report even without the underlying data.” While the filing 
was an attempt by the City to merely stop a civil plaintiff from using the DOJ 
investigation report against them, its content clearly highlighted the animosity against the 
 
519 Miletich, S. (2012, June 26). Records show deep split over SPD fixes. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
520 Miletich, S. (2012, July 8). McGinn's legal adviser shows blunt voice in talks with DOJ - Letter 
reveals significant role Attorneys for mayor, city, must perform delicate balancing act. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
521 The plaintiff was the Latino suspect in the robbery investigation where an SPD officer 
threatened to “beat the (expletive) Mexican piss” out of him (Seattle Times, 6/7/2012). 
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DOJ report that continued to permeate through the City and the SPD and was consistent 
with the perceptions of this study’s research participants who were affiliated with the City 
and the SPD.  
On May 20, 2012, a Seattle University Professor wrote an op-ed piece which 
previewed his analysis of SPD uses of force used by the DOJ to make their findings. He 
found that the DOJ’s analysis was faulty and urged the City to “move ahead” with its 20-
20 plan and “brush aside” the DOJ’s threat of a lawsuit. In his opening paragraph he 
questioned:  
How can a city negotiate with opponents whose modus operandi consists 
of making dramatic allegations in the public arena, refusing to explain how 
they arrived at their conclusions, and then threatening to sue if the city fails 
to immediately roll over on its back and accept a consent decree and court-
appointed monitor? (Crosscut.com, 5/20/2012)522 
As a result of his review, Professor Hickman concluded that the DOJ had “deliberately 
chosen extreme cases and selectively summarized these cases in the least favorable 
light possible, omitting many details that may lead a reasonable person to a different 
conclusion.” He further criticized the DOJ report for reflecting an “alternative reality” 
wherein it represented the SPD as a brutal department that often engaged in excessive 
force when, in fact, in “the vast majority of cases, [SPD officers] use the minimal amount 
of force necessary to control the suspect while preserving their own safety and that of 
the public” (Crosscut.com, 5/20/2012). 
In a May 23, 2012, letter to the Seattle City Attorney, the Chief Attorney of the 
Special Litigation Section in Washington “accused the city of going ‘backwards’ on its 
agreement to accept a consent decree and a monitor,” instead proposing that all issues 
identified in the DOJ investigation be covered in a more informal “memorandum of 
understanding” that would not include the appointment of an independent monitor. The 
 
522 Hickman, M. (2012, May 20). City of Seattle should brush aside fed’s police lawsuit threat. 
Crosscut.com. Retrieved from https://crosscut.com/2012/05/city-seattle-police-justice-lawsuit-
force. Hickman’s findings were also referred to by Chanin (2012): “Mathew Hickman, an 
academic and former statistician in the DOJ’s COPS office, examined the raw data compiled 
during the DOJ’s investigation of allegations that the Seattle Police Department had engaged in a 
pattern or practice of excessive force. In concluding that the DOJ’s case was based on skewed 
data and bad science, Hickman (2012, para. 2) uncovered what he termed ‘factual errors as well 
as errors of omission, gross misrepresentations, apparent statistical errors, and other substantive 
flaws’” (Chanin, 2017a, p. 262). 
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May 23 letter also suggested that the City needed to stop engaging in “piece meal 
bargaining” and instead work to “accomplish essential reforms” in “a comprehensive” 
manner (Seattle Times, 6/26/2012b). 
By May 25, 2012, it was reported that the head of the Special Litigation Section 
of the DOJ in Washington had sent two “scathing” letters to the Seattle City Attorney 
(one on May 16 and the second on May 23),523 accusing the City of providing an 
inadequate response to the DOJ’s proposed consent decree and criticizing the City for 
leaking a draft consent decree which contained proposed changes sought by the DOJ. 
The second letter was quoted as instructing the City that they needed to “get serious” 
about the negotiation process. 
In a May 31 letter to the DOJ, Mayor McGinn’s legal counsel asserted that the 
City was, in fact, “open to discussing different forms of agreement, including a court-
enforceable reform plan for use of force provisions and a memorandum of agreement for 
other provisions.” As such, the City was proposing a consent decree for the excessive 
force finding, but a “memorandum of understanding” for the biased policing and 
community engagement recommendations. At the same time, the Mayor’s legal counsel 
argued that the DOJ’s proposed consent decree included “measures that appear 
impractical, ineffective and unaffordable…” (Seattle Times, 6/26/2012b) and criticized 
the DOJ for a reform proposal that addressed “many areas that were not subject to any 
rigorous analysis or findings” and included measures that were “cost-prohibitive, 
operationally impossible, untested, inconsistent with best practices, and harmful to police 
responsiveness and effectiveness.” He further criticized DOJ lawyers for dismissing the 
city’s budget concerns and for not making it clear why the city’s 20-20 plan was not 
“measurable and enforceable.” Ultimately, however, he also suggested mediation as an 
option to resolve the ongoing differences between the parties (Seattle Times, 7/8/2012). 
Interestingly, while the City was on a strong legal footing for insisting that the 
Consent Decree not include provisions regarding biased policing practices for which 
there was no pattern or practice finding, that position proved to be politically risky for the 
 
523 In a July 8, 2012 article discussing the roles of the City Attorney versus the Mayor’s legal 
counsel, the Seattle Times disclosed the dates of the two letters (Seattle Times, 7/8/2012). 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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McGinn administration in the face of strongly and widely held concerns in the Seattle 
community about biased policing practices.524 
By June 12, 2012, the negotiation progress had broken down to the point that 
Mayor McGinn reportedly went to Washington D.C. to make his case against the 
Obama-led DOJ taking what was perceived as an aggressive approach against a 
progressive, democratic mayoral administration.525 As reported by the Seattle Times:  
McGinn's meeting comes amid delicate talks between the city and Justice 
Department, which grew increasingly tense when Jonathan Smith, chief of 
the Special Litigation Section of the Justice Department's Civil Rights 
Division, wrote two sternly worded letters to the city in May questioning the 
city's willingness to negotiate in good faith. (Seattle Times, 6/22/2012)526 
As of June 22, 2012, the Seattle Times was reporting that community groups 
were “denounce[ing] the pace of negotiations” and “demand[ing] a place at the 
negotiation table.” Specifically, the “Minority Executive Directors Coalition” and its “Multi-
Racial Task Force on Police Accountability” advised the Mayor that it would not support 
any effort by the SPD to implement its 20-20 plan until there was “some mechanism to 
enforce changes, preferably a court-enforceable consent decree.” On that same date, 
Mayor McGinn announced that the City and the DOJ had agreed to hire a mediator to 
attempt to resolve their differences (Seattle Times, 6/22/2012).527 
Even as Mayor McGinn was, according to study participants, personally 
engaging in the mediation effort between the City and the DOJ (negotiations which were 
actually kept confidential in a city which “leaked information like a sieve”) a very public 
confrontation between Mayor McGinn and City Attorney Holmes broke out when a 
“confidential” 6-page letter from the City Attorney to the Mayor was leaked to the media. 
 
524 In fact, a 2013 public survey found that 53% of Seattleites believed that the SPD engaged in 
racial profiling “very or somewhat often” (See, 3rd Systemic Report, 2016, at Appendix C, p. 6). 
525 The date of the meeting between Assistant Attorney General Perez and Mayor McGinn was 
disclosed in an article subsequently published by the Seattle Times, 7/8/2012. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com.  
526 Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (2012, June 22). Police talks go to mediation. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
527 According to one study participant with inside knowledge of the negotiations, one of the 
reasons for the agreement to mediate was that the City was being pressured to release 
information through Washington State “open records” requests; however, once the parties 
entered into mediation, state law supported protecting the confidentiality of the negotiation 
discussions. 
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Described in the media as “sharply worded,” the letter warned that the Mayor’s 
negotiating strategy was putting the city on the verge of a civil rights law suit that could 
have resulted in “dire consequences” (Seattle Times, 7/17/2012). 
In the letter, Holmes asserted that “[a] troubling victim narrative has emerged at 
SPD, in which DOJ is cast as a 'bully' seeking to impose a 'shadow chief' at an 
unverified, speculative cost.” Holmes was critical of what he believed to be attempts to 
rebut the DOJ using “a narrow legal theory,” missing opportunities to shape an 
agreement, and the rejection of two proposed monitors to oversee court-ordered reform. 
He criticized the Department’s 20-20 reform plan saying the plan “lack[ed] both 
substance and accountability.” Holmes noted that if the mediation effort were not 
successful, the city would “face costly, burdensome, and risky litigation with the federal 
government.” Holmes suggested that members of City Council should rejoin the city’s 
efforts to reach an agreement – according to sources not identified by the Seattle Times, 
it was McGinn’s earlier refusal to comply with that request that led Holmes to decide to 
write the letter. Holmes further advised McGinn that the city had an “unprecedented 
opportunity” to work collaboratively with the DOJ to reform the SPD, “greatly benefiting 
the City for generations to come…But the clock is running out on this reform 
opportunity.” Holmes urged that the City make the selection of a monitor a top priority 
and that any rejection of a proposed Monitor528 was “premature and a mistake.” He also 
commented on the withdrawal of another Monitor candidate, which he believed was the 
result of the City’s strategy of delay. Finally, Holmes opined that litigation would be 
“costly in dollars, morale, public safety and public relations.” Holmes also suggested that 
the City needed to include “measures designed to curb discriminatory policing and 
improve SPD’s accountability mechanism…in the Monitored consent decree.” Holmes 
pushed the Mayor to act as "Commander in Chief," adding, "Civilian control of SPD is 
the Seattle way. And times like these require strong leadership and control of SPD” 
(Seattle Times, 7/17/2012). 
The letter was an example of the continuing political strife that existed within the 
City over the period of the negotiations and the challenges faced by a city with an 
 
528 And, in fact, the Monitor was ultimately chosen by City Council over Mayor McGinn’s objection 
(see, Chapter 2.2, Section III, infra). 
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elected City Attorney who saw his role as being more than just a mouthpiece for the 
Mayor’s office. 
By July 27, 2012, the DOJ and the City finally reached an agreement that they 
agreed would include both a Consent Decree and a Memorandum of Understanding. 
The damage had already been done, however. As a result of the fractions between the 
Mayor and the Police Department on one side and the City Council and the City Attorney 
on the other, many in SPD felt bulldozed by the DOJ and sandbagged by the City 
Council and the City Attorney. Mayor McGinn was irreparably harmed politically; 
although he received a certain amount of credit within the SPD for his initial response, 
he was widely criticized for giving into the DOJ at the end; and although he was credited 
by the community for advocating on behalf of the creation of a “Community Police 
Commission” and appointing powerful advocates to that body, he was widely perceived 
by voters as having been anti-reform when his administration stood up to the DOJ and 
refused to simply cooperate with their initial demands. Mayor McGinn was elected as an 
outsider, without support from the Democratic establishment in Seattle on a transit 
platform – in the end, however, the policing issues dominated his administration and he 
was ultimately defeated in November 2013 by a candidate who professed a position of 
collaboration and cooperation with the DOJ (Seattle Times, 10/13/2013).529 
7.2.6. The Content of the Consent Decree and the Memorandum of 
Understanding 
As described above, the Seattle consent decree ended up being the product of 
intense and aggressive negotiations between the DOJ and the City. According to city 
participants, it was only after Mayor McGinn went to Washington D.C., in an attempt to 
gain leverage over the DOJ’s negotiating position, that the DOJ appeared willing to give 
enough ground for a mediator to be used to negotiate the final agreements.530 
A unique result of these marathon negotiations was the creation of two separate 
documents: the “Settlement Agreement,” often referred to as “the Consent Decree” 
 
529 Seattle Times Editorial Board (2013, October 13). Ed Murray for Seattle Mayor. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
530 More than one survey participant decried the final product, believing it to be significantly 
watered down from the first version suggested by the DOJ. 
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which fell within the direct jurisdiction of a court-appointed monitor and a “Memorandum 
of Understanding” which fell outside the four corners of the court and monitor 
enforceable consent decree.531 Interestingly, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
ended up creating one of the most visible, sometimes distracting, sometimes 
controversial and often-times effective community panels ever created as a result of a 
DOJ intervention: the Seattle Community Police Commission (CPC).532 The MOU 
specifically noted the following areas for CPC review: 1) Community Engagement,533 2) 
Accountability,534 3) Investigatory Stops and Data Collection,535 4) Officer Assistance and 
 
531 The difference between a “Settlement Agreement” or a “Consent Decree” and a “Memorandum 
of Understanding” was described by in DOJ (2017b), a publication describing the DOJ’s work 
Section 14141 activities from 1994 through 2017: “Where the Division has found evidence of a 
pattern or practice of police misconduct, resolution generally will take the form of an order 
enforced by a federal court. These orders are usually called “consent decrees,” reflecting that the 
terms of the order were negotiated and agreed to by the United States and the law enforcement 
agency that was investigated…The Division may, in relatively rare cases, resolve a pattern-or-
practice finding by a “memorandum of agreement” enforceable in federal court as a contract 
between the United States and the local jurisdiction, rather than as a consent decree actively 
overseen by a federal court. Such an outcome generally only occurs when the issues to be 
addressed are relatively narrow and there is significant evidence that the jurisdiction has the 
capacity to accomplish and sustain reform in a timely manner without ongoing court oversight. 
The Division has also on occasion entered into memoranda of agreement on specific issues 
when its findings do not rise to the level of a pattern or practice in violation of federal law, but 
there are problems that the federal government and local jurisdiction can work together to 
resolve” (pp. 20-21). 
532 Initially a creature of the MOU, the CPC eventually pursued the passage of an “Accountability 
Ordinance” (AO) which both expanded its membership and made it a permanent entity. In 
addition, the CPC attempted to join the litigation between the United States DOJ and the City of 
Seattle as a party. Although that attempt was ultimately rejected by the assigned Judge, the CPC 
was granted “amicus status,” which allowed the panel to make formal arguments relating to 
issues of concern and which, more than once, appeared to either sway the Judge or support the 
Judge’s ultimate conclusions (see, U.S. v. Seattle, Document #106, filed 11/26/2013).  
533 The CPC was expected to “engage in an assessment of the Department’s community 
activities,” and issue one or more reports regarding strategies for the SPD to employ “to increase 
community engagement and community confidence in SPD” (MOU, 2017, para. 12-14). 
534 The CPC was assigned to review Seattle’s oversight structure and make recommendations 
(MOU, 2017, para. 15), assess ways to improve timeliness in the handling of complaints and 
investigations (MOU, 2017, para. 16), assist in the development of public outreach regarding 
complaint handling (MOU, 2017, para. 17), and advise the SPD on metrics to use to measure 
community satisfaction with the Office of Professional Accountability (MOU, 2017, para. 18).   
535 The CPC was required to give recommendations to the SPD on necessary changes to policy 
and training with respect to SPD data collection (MOU, 2017, para. 19). 
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Support,536 and 5) Transparency and Public Reporting.537 In addition, the MOU called for 
the formalization and expansion of a “Crisis Intervention Committee” (CIC).538  
Ultimately, the MOU was enforceable against the City by the DOJ if the DOJ 
were to conclude that the City had failed to comply with any provision of the MOU. 
However, the DOJ agreed “to consult with the City before commencing enforcement 
proceedings, and to provide opportunity to cure consistent with the informal dispute 
resolution procedure[s]…” (MOU, 2017, para 27).539 
The “Settlement Agreement,” however, was enforceable as a court order and 
was binding on the City. (U.S. v. Seattle, Document 3-1, paras. 219, 223, 225). Within 
the Settlement Agreement, the DOJ and the City made commitments in six specific 
 
536 The CPC was expected to work with the SPD on the development of officer mentoring 
programs (MOU, 2017, para 20). 
537 The CPC was expected to consider SPD “policies and practices regarding disclosure of 
documents, videos, and other materials (MOU, 2017, para. 21).  
538 The CIC was expected to include representation from “SPD command leadership, SPD’s 
Training and current CI Team units…the civilian leadership of the City government; Public Health-
Seattle & King County; King County’s Sheriff’s Office; King County Prosecutor’s Office; City of 
Seattle Municipal Court; the City Attorney’s Office; Washington State Department of Social and 
Health Services’ Division of Behavioral Health and Recovery; the Washington affiliate of the 
National Alliance on Mental Illness; the Downtown Emergency Services Center; professionals 
from the emergency health care receiving facilities; the King County Jail; and mental health and 
homeless services professionals and advocates or others” (MOU, 2017, para. 23). The CIC was 
intended to “serve as a problem-solving forum for interagency issues and may review any 
relevant data that may be collected by each agency (MOU, 2017, para 24). 
539 The significance of the creation of the CPC is hard to overstate. As discussed by Walker: “It is 
important to note that the requirement that the City of Seattle create a Community Police 
Commission was a bold and unprecedented effort on the part of the Justice Department with 
respect to restructuring the governance of local police departments. The President’s Task Force 
on 21st Century Policing made several recommendations regarding citizen input into police 
policymaking but none went so far as to involve a formal restructuring of police governance. In 
the first generation of [settlement agreements], community groups had been largely excluded 
from the reform implementation process. Some experts argued that this exclusion undermined 
the legitimacy of settlements among a crucial local constituency” (Walker, 2018, p. 1814). 
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areas 1) use-of-force,540 2) Crisis Intervention,541 3) Stops and Detentions,542 4) Bias-free 
policing,543 5) Supervision,544 and 6) the Office of Professional Accountability.545 In 
addition, the Settlement Agreement included provisions relating to the appointment of a 
“jointly selected” “Monitor.” 
Importantly, the Settlement Agreement defined what it would take for the City to 
satisfy its requirements. Paragraph 184 defined “full and effective compliance” as 
existing where: 
the City and SPD have: (a) incorporated the requirement into policy; (b) 
trained all relevant personnel as necessary to fulfill their responsibilities 
pursuant to the requirement; and (c) ensured that the requirement is being 
carried out in practice. … Noncompliance with mere technicalities, or 
temporary or isolated failure to comply during a period of otherwise 
sustained compliance, will not constitute failure to maintain full and 
effective compliance. At the same time, temporary compliance during a 
period of otherwise sustained noncompliance will not constitute full and 
effective compliance. 
7.2.7. The Negotiation Process Described 
The negotiation process certainly took its toll with varying concerns expressed by 
research participants. One participant noted that: 
The negotiations over the Consent Decree were intense. The initial draft 
was far better than the one they ended up with. The DOJ did itself a disfavor 
by overstating their case at the onset and overstepping their bounds. It 
 
540 Including Use of Force Principles, Weapon Specific Policies (Firearms, Conductive Energy 
Devices (CED’s), Oleoresin Capsicum Spray (“OC Spray”) and Impact Weapons), Use of Force 
Reporting and Investigations, and Use of Force Training (Settlement Agreement, Section A (1-4)). 
541 Including Crisis Intervention Training for officers and dispatchers (Settlement Agreement, 
2017, at paras. 130-135), tracking of officer interactions with persons in crisis (Settlement 
Agreement, 2018, at para. 136) and review and analysis of data collected (Settlement 
Agreement, para. 137). 
542 Relating to policies, training and supervision of SPD officers (Settlement Agreement, paras. 
138-144). 
543 Relating to policies, training and supervision of SPD officers (Settlement Agreement, paras. 
145-152). 
544 Relating to supervision generally and improvements to the SPD’s Early Intervention System 
(EIS) (Settlement Agreement, paras. 153-163). 
545 Relating to revising SPD policies on internal reporting of misconduct, prohibiting relation 
against “any person who reports misconduct,” updating a policy manual to “formalize OPA’s 
procedures, best practices, and training requirements,” and the creation of “OPA Liaison Officers” 
at each SPD precinct (Settlement Agreement, paras. 165-168). 
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would have been better to convince the city that they needed to do the 
reforms; the original decree that was proposed was far better than the 
Consent Decree the DOJ wound up with. If the DOJ had been more 
transparent and reasonable, they could have brought city along.546 
From the City perspective, participants noted that Mayor McGinn had taken the 
position that given that the DOJ had only made findings on excessive force, the 
negotiated agreement should have only applied to issues relating to force.547 The DOJ, 
however, took the position that a broad agreement was necessary that would include not 
just issues of excessive force, but also biased policing and community-based policing. 
According to one City participant: 
We were pushing back on [the idea of a broad agreement] … the white hat 
of DOJ claimed that was there was a crisis of confidence and we needed 
to restore confidence in the SPD … it seemed disingenuous given that they 
told public that use-of-force was wildly out of control but did not make any 
findings on biased policing….and [yet] they wanted to include it in the 
decree. 
Another participant advised that the Mayor’s Office and the DOJ simply did not 
understand how the DOJ could insist that issues relating to bias should be included in a 
Settlement Agreement in the absence of a finding of a pattern or practice of biased 
policing. It was noted that the City’s first counter-offer, which did not include any 
provisions relating to bias was leaked and that Mayor McGinn’s constituencies were 
“appalled” that he was fighting the DOJ on bias. Interestingly, while the Mayor and SPD 
 
546 Interestingly, see Rushin’s discussion of the legitimacy of negotiations as they related to the 
creation of city-specific consent decrees through compromise: “Ultimately though, correcting 
unconstitutional practices through compromise seems counterintuitive. Why, after all, should 
there be any negotiating about the correction of unconstitutional practices? The answer is at the 
heart of the complex [structural reform litigation] process. There is no perfect formula that a police 
department can implement to prevent unconstitutional misconduct amongst its ranks. Instead, 
there are best practices that leading experts in the field believe encourage lawful behavior. The 
negotiation process, thus, invites compromise between the targeted police agency and the DOJ—
with the DOJ demanding extensive, costly reforms and the police agency attempting to limit the 
scope of the federal oversight” (Rushin, 2015, p. 93). 
Further, see Hardaway who argues that individualized reform serves the best interest of each 
individual community: “There appears to be an effort on the part of the government to tailor each 
agreement to the needs of the locality in question. This narrowly-tailored approach presumably 
serves to meet the needs of each individual jurisdiction while ensuring that an overly centralized 
myopic approach to policing is not forced on cities with unique community and policing needs” 
(Hardaway, 2019, p. 165). 
547 See, Seattle Times headline on page A-1: “City's reply to DOJ omits issue of bias in policing - 
Response concentrates on excessive force. Some community groups upset; others back 
strategy” (Miletich, S. & Carter, M., (2012, May 18). Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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were critical of the DOJ’s litigation strategy of refusing to share discovery in the absence 
of actual litigation, they themselves chose a litigation strategy of trying to avoid including 
biased policing in the Settlement Agreement, even though it was acknowledged that 
“bias was the underlying problem and likely what caused issues of excessive force.” 
Another City participant noted that the DOJ was initially pushing for an early 
appointment of a Monitor. The Mayor’s Office, however, wanted to avoid a Monitor who 
would be akin to “a shadow [police] chief.” Specifically, there was a strong desire to have 
“the proposals for reform to be generated within the City.” “We didn’t want the Monitor 
writing SPD policy; we needed police and community buy-in for this to work across the 
Board.” 
Overall, City negotiators complained that they were “struggling to find a voice” in 
the negotiation process and were worried about a lack of procedural justice given the 
DOJ’s refusal to share any of the data underlying their use-of-force findings. 
The question as to who first proffered the idea of a Community Police 
Commission is an area of some debate. Participants who worked with Mayor McGinn’s 
administration insisted that the CPC was an idea conceptualized by the city and acceded 
to by the DOJ. In fact, during his re-election campaign, Mayor McGinn was quoted as 
having said that he had to “fight” for the creation of the CPC over the course of the City’s 
negotiations with the DOJ. The DOJ took the unusual course of contradicting that claim 
in a letter signed by U.S. Attorney Durkan and Civil Rights Division Chief Smith, directed 
to the CPC and dated October 21, 2013. That letter represented that “an oversight board 
was a concept the DOJ actively supported…” The letter further stated that “the City’s 
initial response to the DOJ in May 2012 ‘was so limited in scope it nearly derailed the 
settlement process and prolonged negotiation.’” The letter concluded that while “City 
leaders should properly be credited with their role in crafting the final provision and 
supporting [the] work [of the CPC, … the DOJ never resisted or delayed an agreement 
because it contemplated community involvement” (Seattle Times, 10/23/2012). 
Ultimately, the City and the DOJ entered into day-long confidential negotiation 
sessions that allowed them to reach a collaborative decision; even if some of the 
signatories may have felt pressured to accept some DOJ provisions based on politics 
and the power and influence of the DOJ brand. The very first step would be the selection 
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of the Monitor and the creation of a Monitoring plan. Only then would the City and the 
DOJ be able to embark on their journey of externally mandated reform. 
7.3. The Implementation of Reform in Seattle 
“If you ask ‘do consent decrees work?’ – What’s the lens? What are 
your metrics? What’s your frame of reference? From whose 
perspective? This explains why there is such a divergent set of views 
on success or failure of consent decrees: no one is wrong; they are 
just walking in different shoes.”  
Community Member Research Participant 
 
As will be addressed later in detail, the implementation of reform is Seattle was 
not a seamless effort. There were many “bumps in the road” from the time that the 
Settlement Agreement was filed on July 27, 2012548 to the finding of “initial compliance” 
made by Judge Robart on January 10, 2018,549 and finally, to the order finding the city 
partially out-of-compliance on May 21, 2019.550 (See Appendix F for “Seattle Police 
Reform Timeline).” This section will first discuss academic articles as they relate to the 
Seattle implementation efforts and then provide a chronological history of the 
implementation efforts, as summarized by the reports filed by Seattle’s court-appointed 
monitor. 
7.3.1. Comparing the Academic Literature to Seattle Consent Decree 
Implementation Experiences 
The academic literature on consent decrees has discussed issues regarding 
implementation, in a general context, and has covered, to a limited degree, some of the 
specific challenges identified by this research with respect to implementation efforts in 
Seattle.  
 
548 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 3-1, filed July 27, 2012. 
549 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No 439, filed January 10, 2018. 
550 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 562, filed May 21, 2019. 
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The Independent Monitor was appointed on October 30, 2012551 and submitted 
his first-year monitoring plan on March 5, 2013.552 As recommended by Walker & 
Macdonald: 
A [] factor related to successful implementation [] involves the existence of 
a meaningful implementation plan. Consent decrees and MOAs all involve 
a large number of significant reforms that must be implemented 
simultaneously, many of which are major challenges in and of themselves. 
Police experts are generally agreed that implementing any single major 
reform poses a significant management challenge. This has proven to be 
the case with EIS, use of force policies, and corruption control programs. 
(Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 528) 
As also noted by Walker (2012), any effort to institutionalize police accountability reforms 
in a sustainable way requires “far more than simply adding discrete elements to the 
management of a police department (e.g. the use of force policy).” Indeed, the 
development of “state-of-the-art” policies requires the development of “a systemic policy 
development process within a department,” “effective training of officers in a department 
where in-service training has been haphazard, inadequate or even possibly non-existent, 
and meaningful supervision of officers.” (p. 75). And, in fact, that was exactly what 
Seattle needed in order to implement the reforms necessary to achieve compliance with 
its Settlement Agreement. 
In one area identified as problematic by Walker, Seattle struggled. Walker (2012) 
specifically observed that “[i]n the various Justice Department consent decrees and 
MOAs, there is no evidence that departments were required to undertake, or undertook 
on their own initiative, department-wide training about the nature and goals of the 
required reforms” (p. 81). And, in fact, many research participants identified an overall 
failure to adequately engage SPD rank & file officers as a weakness in the Seattle 
implementation effort.  
Even so, according to the academic literature, and as anticipated by the DOJ at 
the outset, Seattle had all the important components to be a success story, particularly 
once there was the change of leadership within the Chief’s Office. Chanin (2014) 
suggested that  
 
551 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 35, filed October 30, 2012. 
552 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 59, filed March 5, 2013. 
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results further indicate that implementation is the product of the interaction 
of several theoretically interesting variables, including strong police 
leadership, external oversight, adequate resources and support for the 
process among a jurisdiction’s community members, civil society groups, 
and political leaders. (p. 38) 
And, in fact, with the introduction of an outside Chief, Kathleen O’Toole, Seattle 
appeared to have support in each of these areas, to include a robust civilian oversight 
system, a strong property tax base and a coordinated and sophisticated civil rights 
community who requested DOJ intervention in the first place. 
Where Seattle appeared to have gone wrong, at least initially, was with respect 
to public statements made by Department command staff resistant to the Consent 
Decree which subsequently filtered down to SPD’s mid-level supervisors. As also 
mentioned by Chanin (2012),  
[w]hile strategic focus is set in the chief’s office, evidence suggests that 
day-to-day implementation is in many ways a function of an agencies mid-
level supervisors … those managers act[] as a conduit between agency 
leadership and patrol officers and, as such, occupy[] a key position of 
accountability within [the] organization. (p. 46)  
And, according to SPD research participants, mid-level supervisors struggled mightily 
with the mixed messaging coming from city and SPD leadership, at least until the time 
that Chief Diaz stepped down from his position and was replaced by a Chief more open 
to the external reform process. 
As identified later in this Chapter, the SPD reform process was described by SPD 
and City participants as being particularly “traumatic.” And the implementation efforts in 
Seattle appear to have been described by Chuck Wexler (the Executive Director of the 
Police Executive Research Forum, based in Washington D.C) to a tee: 
Some police departments under consent decrees go through a progression 
something like the stages of grief. The first stage is, in some departments, 
you just get resistance: People can say they won’t do this, … In the second 
stage, you get acceptance, but now the hard work begins. In the third stage, 
you start to get momentum … It’s probably like root canal surgery, … While 
you’re undergoing it, it’s not so great. But when it’s done, you’re happy you 
had it done. (Politico.com, 6/29/2020) 
And, in fact, in the first stage of Seattle’s implementation of the Consent Decree, it was 
widely agreed that there was resistance. With the appointment of Chief O’Toole, there 
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was acceptance and then there was momentum, at least until issues relating to police 
accountability measures, not included in the Settlement Agreement, appeared to derail 
the City’s progress towards compliance.553 
In a 2013 evaluation of civil rights investigations of local police, based in large 
part on a symposium of “leaders in policing,” the Seattle experience was extensively 
discussed and experiences with the Consent Decree process were shared by Carl 
Marquart, then-Council to Mayor McGinn. Marquart was quoted in the report discussing 
challenges faced in negotiating the Settlement Agreement as it related to setting the 
ratio of officers to supervisors, crisis intervention response, DOJ aggressiveness in 
negotiations and the ultimate cost of consent decree implementation: 
• Setting the Number of Officers Per Supervisor Can Be a Difficult Issue. 
“Frontline supervision was certainly an issue we recognized and accepted. 
Our current ratio is about eight officers to one supervisor, and it varies across 
different functions. The Department of Justice wanted a six-to-one ratio within 
one year, but that was simply not achievable under our existing service rules. 
It’s also not desirable, because in order to increase our number of supervisors 
that much and so quickly, we would have to lower our promotional standards” 
(PERF, 2013, p. 19); 
• There Are Alternative Strategies for Responding to Mental Health Crises. 
“Seattle Police Chief John Diaz has made Crisis Intervention training a high 
priority. Our goal is to give all of our front-line officers 40 hours of CI training, 
so that every responding officer has the tools to deal with crisis situations. 
DOJ advocated moving to the Memphis Model, in which crisis intervention 
teams are deployed to a CI event and there are specialists within the 
department who have that function. We went back and forth as to whether that 
was really a better model, and ended up with an agreement to continue to look 
at that and other ways of providing these services” (PERF, 2013, p. 26); 
• Negotiations Should Be More Collaborative. “I think it was important to be able 
to negotiate certain issues, such as staffing ratios and training related to 
encounters with the mentally ill. When DOJ comes and announces that a 
police department has a problem, it can create a very difficult environment in 
which to negotiate, because the involvement of DOJ and the investigation 
itself creates a great deal of political and media pressure. In Seattle, DOJ’s 
initial approach to negotiations was very inflexible; it was difficult to get them 
to acknowledge our local concerns about costs, potential impacts on police 
responsiveness, and the need for community input. While we eventually 
reached a workable resolution, the process could be much more collaborative 
in jurisdictions where there is no internal resistance to adopting best practices” 
(PERF, 2013, p. 28); 
 
553 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 562, filed May 21, 2019. 
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• Seattle Consent Decree Could Cost $40 Million. “In Seattle, we calculated an 
overall cost of $40 million dollars for implementation of DOJ’s original 
proposal, and estimated between $6 million and $7 million to comply with 
DOJ’s proposed sergeant-to officer ratio” (PERF, 2013, p. 34). 
7.3.2. Seattle Consent Decree Implementation 
August 30, 2012 Court Order Provisionally Approving 
Consent Decree554 
Judge James Robart 
September 21, 2012 Stipulation and Joint Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law555 
Judge James Robart 
October 30, 2012 Independent Monitor appointed by the 
Court556 
Monitor: Merrick Bobb, Police 
Assessment Resource Center 
December 2012 Analysis of DOJ investigation: “Police Use 
of Force in Seattle, January 2009-March 
2011” 
Professor Matthew Hickman 
(Seattle University) & Loren 
Atherley (Northwest Justice 
Solutions) 
2013   
March 5, 2013 Monitoring Plan for the First Year557 Seattle Monitoring Team 
 
Research participant comments on initial challenges in the implementation 
of the Consent Decree. 
Observers outside of the Mayor’s Office and the SPD placed the blame for initial 
consent decree implementation delays at the feet of Mayor McGinn, who it was claimed, 
refused to collaborate with the DOJ and the new Monitor which subsequently required 
the DOJ and the Monitor to take a more aggressive approach at the beginning of the 
implementation process. 
In retrospect, probably one of the most problematic aspects that negatively 
impacted early efforts at implementation was the very public debate over the choice of 
the court-appointed Monitor. After his appointment was forced on the Mayor and the 
SPD by the City Attorney and the City Council, the Monitor had to try to overcome 
suspicion from SPD and the Mayor’s Office and faced active and public resistance from 
 
554 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 8, filed August 30, 2012. 
555 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 14, filed September 21, 2012. 
556 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 35, filed October 30, 2012. 
557 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 59, filed March 5, 2013. 
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Chief Diaz about the content of his monitoring plan (Seattle Times, 3/9/2013).558 By but 
by February 2013, the Monitor was reportedly pushing back after being accused by the 
City of improper billings in support of his decision to lease an apartment for members of 
the Monitoring team, instead of paying ongoing hotel expenses (MyNorthwet.com, 
2/21/2013). 
An additional challenge faced by the DOJ, acting as an “outsider” attempting to 
force change, was Seattle personalities and Seattle politics. Participants described a 
veritable “snake pit” when trying to navigate amongst and between the various 
personalities and agendas in the City.  Although, on its face, one would think that in a 
City where the Mayor and all but one City Council member were Democrats (with the 
sole additional Councilmember identifying as a Socialist),559 police reform would be an 
issue upon which all could agree. In fact, however, nothing could have been farther from 
the case. The Mayor and the City Attorney publicly sparred about each other’s roles in 
the reform process – to the point that on March 7, 2013, the Seattle Times in an 
unsigned op-ed article noted that the two had “sunk into a needless feud at the very 
moment they should be focused on police reform” (Seattle Times, 3/7/2013a).560 
The Monitor’s reports. 
April 8, 2013 Jim Pugel named as Interim Chief of 
SPD.561 
Appointed by Mayor Mike 
McGinn 
April 26, 2013 First semi-annual report562 Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Between April 2013 and September 2016, Merrick Bobb, the court-appointed 
monitor for the Seattle Consent Decree, filed a total of seven semi-annual reports which 
provided substantive information on the progress of consent decree implementation over 
the course of the first four years. In addition, between September 2015 and June 2017, 
 
558 Miletich, S. (2013, March 9). McGinn back pedals, accepts Monitor’s police-reform plan. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
559 See, https://ballotpedia.org/Municipal_elections_in_Seattle,_Washington_(2017) [Democratic 
dominance over city council]. 
560 Seattle Times (2013, March 7). McGinn-Holmes Spat hurts police-reform effort. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
561 Green, S. (2013, April 11). The man who will soon lead SPD. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
562 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 71, filed April 26, 2013. 
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the Monitoring Team also filed ten “Systemic Assessment” reports to evaluate to what 
extent SPD policies and processes were in compliance with specific requirements of the 
Consent Decree. In February 2019, the Monitoring Team filed its final public report 
entitled: “Sustainment Plan Update Report.” A review of these reports provides an 
excellent history of the progress of implementation from the Monitor’s point-of-view: 
First semi-annual report. 
In the Seattle monitor’s first semi-annual report, filed with the Court on April 26, 
2013, the Monitor appeared to attempt to portray an even-handed approach by 
“commending” the SPD for the “considerable progress” that had been made, and 
positively commenting on “good relationships” that had been established with all of the 
City and police stakeholders (1st semi-annual report, 2013, p. 1). The Monitor reported, 
however, “that SPD record keeping, data storage, and data retrieval are in need of 
profound overhaul and rethinking,” and commented that the police unions “thus far have 
failed to play a constructive role in word and deed” and invited the unions to join in the 
reform effort. The Monitor noted the “ultimate goal” of Consent Decree implementation: 
top to bottom reform of the Seattle Police Department into an organization 
that effectively fights crime and enforces the laws by listening to and 
working in constant consultation with Seattle’s diverse communities; 
actively and persistently dealing with the risk of unconstitutional conduct by 
sworn personnel, including excessive use of force and discriminatory 
policing; and demonstrating at all times its abhorrence of excessive force 
and race-based policing and its unwillingness to tolerate those who engage 
in it. (1st semi-annual report, p. 5) 
The report specifically identified the challenges then faced, noting that the SPD “still 
does not speak with one voice. In-fighting up and down the command staff level has 
been a concern. The SPD does not appear settled on a unified vision of what it is to 
become.” In addition, the Monitor noted that “[a] part of the SPD, mostly but not 
exclusively within the union- organized ranks, remains ‘dug in’ and continues to resist 
the force and implications of the Settlement Agreement.” The Monitor suggested that 
“part of the cause of this resistance” could be attributed to a failure to adequately explain 
the Consent Decree to command and rank and file officers (1st semi-annual report, p. 5). 
In support of this conclusion, the Monitor observed that: “[s]tories and myths have been 
fed to rank-and-file officers without their having received counterbalancing messages 
from the command staff to understand reform as being in the long-term best interests of 
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all officers and the Department.” As such, the Monitor made it clear that he expected 
SPD command staff to send a clear message to officers “that the Settlement Agreement 
is here to stay and is not going to be fed to the shredder” (1st semi-annual report, p. 6). 
While the report noted that the SPD was making good efforts to better monitor 
officer use-of-force, including the formation of a Use of Force Review Board, it was 
observed that in the first quarter of 2013, although the Board reviewed and evaluated 78 
individual uses of force, “not a single instance” was found to be in violation of SPD use-
of-force policy. The report also included specific criticism of the SPD’s “Firearms Review 
Board,” opining that “[t]hey fail to reach the higher standards of the Use of Force Review 
Board,” and recognizing “some activity that, at minimum, raises the potential or 
appearance of skewing testimony by those seeking to protect an officer” (1st semi-annual 
report, p. 11).  
In response to the report, then-U.S. Attorney Jenny Durkan told the Seattle 
Times that the Monitor’s report was “a ‘frank assessment’ of progress — and the lack of 
progress — to date.” She further stated that “[w]e are at a new juncture — where all 
eyes and efforts must be on the road ahead, … Getting reform right, in a way that 
increases public safety and public confidence, has to be a priority for everyone in the 
department” (Seattle Times, 4/27/2013).563 
August 20, 2013 CPC Letter requesting extension of time 
for Monitor to approve SPD use-of-force 
policy.564 
Betsy Graef, Acting Director 
November 26, 2013 Court denies CPC motion to intervene – 
CPC granted amicus curiae status565 
Judge James Robart 
December 13, 2013 Second semi-annual report566 Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Second semi-annual report. 
The Monitor’s second semi-annual report, filed with the Court on December 13, 
2013, was preceded by a draft report, dated November 15, 2013, which was described 
by the Seattle Times as “a blistering report card.” The draft report cited “resistance in the 
 
563 Carter, M. (2013, April 27). First SPD Report: Progress, ‘dug in’ hostility. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
564 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 82, filed August 20, 2013. 
565 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 106, filed November 26, 2013. 
566 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 114, filed December 13, 2013. 
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top ranks of the department, error-ridden data collections and failures to ‘fully and fairly’ 
analyze shootings by officers” (Seattle Times, 11/16/2013). The Times later reported that 
two Assistant Chiefs were demoted in the wake of the receipt of the draft report (Seattle 
Times, 11/26/2013 & 11/28/2013).567 
Although the final second semi-annual report praised the then-Interim Chief, Jim 
Pugel, for pushing reforms forward and commended the department’s Use of Force 
Review Board for better preparation and more participation by assistant chiefs, the 
report highlighted the Monitor’s “significant disappointment and frustration across several 
areas.” The Monitor identified “intransigence and an aversion to innovation in some 
quarters,” criticized the SPD’s Information Technology (“IT”) leadership for giving 
“incorrect or incomplete information to the Monitor and the Monitoring Team” and 
commented on its inability “to tackle the management of projects of import or complexity 
relating to use of force and other areas encompassed by the Settlement Agreement” (2nd 
semi-annual report, p. 1). The report further stated that “[t]he data produced by the IT 
Department has been error-ridden and inadequate” and that the SPD did not 
have the data required to implement the Consent Decree, to manage the 
risk of unconstitutional conduct, to respond to the Monitoring Team’s 
requests for data in order to measure progress, to enable the Court to 
assess the speed and good faith of implementation, or to respond to routine 
inquiries by City Council for data needed for legislative purposes. (Second 
semi-annual report, p. 1) 
Further, the Monitor mentioned that “[t]he failure of the SPD to fully and fairly 
analyze officer-involved shootings is equally disappointing” (2nd semi-annual report, p. 
1). In addition, the Monitor reported on rumors of de-policing in the downtown core that 
he described as “troubling” and noted that the Monitoring team had observed an 
 
567 Miletich, S. (2013, November 26). SPD shake-up: Assistant Chief takes demotion after report. 
Seattle Times; Miletich, S. & Sullivan, J. (2013, November 28). New SPD jolt hits another. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. It should be noted that other cities also 
experienced resistance at the beginning of the implementation process. For example, in Los 
Angeles, in that City’s 3rd monitoring report, the monitor reported that “the LAPD is non-compliant 
with a number of provisions of the Consent Decree. Of equal or greater seriousness is the 
presence of a vocal minority inside the LAPD that continue to fight to preserve the insular culture 
that led to the adoption of the Decree” (Kupferberg, 2008, p. 148). “In Cincinnati, the police 
department actively resisted cooperating with the monitoring team, and the district court in that 
case found it in ‘material breach’ of the MOA, which it then converted into an Order of the Court. 
The conflicts were eventually resolved, implementation proceeded, and federal oversight finally 
terminated in December 2008 (Walker & Macdonald, 2009, pp. 512-513). 
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“unacceptable” number of use-of-force cases where recording equipment malfunctioned 
or officers failed to properly activate recording equipment (2nd semi-annual report, p. 26). 
As reported by the Seattle Times, however, the Monitor “leveled his harshest 
criticism at the department’s Firearms Review Board (FRB),” which was reported to have 
moved to keep the Monitor “at bay” and had barred the director of the Office of 
Professional Accountability, which investigates allegations of officer misconduct, from its 
proceedings: “The FRB procedures ‘do not guarantee anything close to a thorough, fair 
and impartial investigation,’ the draft report says. ‘Instead, they continue to permit the 
possibility of collusive, biased, or inaccurate testimony’” (Seattle Times, 11/16/2013; 2nd 
semi-annual Report, pp. 31-32). 
Although the Monitor found that “SPD’s resistance to the settlement agreement 
has started to diminish,” he reported that it “is not abating with adequate speed” (2nd 
semi-annual report, pp. 2, 5). The Monitor observed that a year had passed since his 
appointment (and nearly 18 months had passed since the Settlement Agreement had 
been signed). As such, he concluded that it was “unfortunate that there is still resistance 
to the notion that police officers and their supervisors must be accountable for misuse of 
force and discrimination and must challenge themselves to embrace new approaches” 
(2nd semi-annual report, pp. 5-6). 
December 17, 2013 Court approves SPD Use of Force 
policies568 
Judge James Robart 
January 1, 2014 Term of Mayor Ed Murray begins569  
January 8, 2014 Harry Bailey appointed as Interim Chief570  
January 17, 2014 Court approves SPD policies on “Terry 
Stops” and Bias Free Policing571 
Judge James Robart 
February 10, 2014 Court approves SPD Crisis Intervention 
Policy572 
Judge James Robart 
March 24, 2014 Court approves Second Year Monitoring 
Plan573 
Seattle Police Monitor; Judge 
James Robart 
 
568 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 115, filed December 17, 2013. 
569 http://www.seattle.gov/cityarchives/seattle-facts/city-officials/mayors. 
570 Miletich, S. (2014, January 8) Mayor shakes up police brass. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
571 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 118, filed January 17, 2014. 
572 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 121, filed February 10, 2014. 
573 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 129, filed March 24, 2014. 
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May 28, 2014 Filing of Civil Rights Complaint by 126 
Seattle Police Officers regarding proposed 
Seattle PD UOF policy (Seattle Times, 
5/28/2014)574 
126 Seattle Police Officers – Pro 
Se 
June 10, 2014 Court approves Crisis Intervention 
Training;575 & Instructional System Design 
Model for Use of Force Training576 
Judge James Robart 
June 13, 2014 Court approves Force Investigation Team 
Training Curriculum,577   
Judge James Robart 
June 16, 2014 Third semi-annual report578 Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Third semi-annual report. 
The Monitor’s third semi-annual report, was filed with the Court on June 16, 
2014. This report noted that the SPD had “made significant strides” in adopting policies 
relating to use-of-force, biased policing, stop and frisk policies and contacts with people 
in mental health crisis. However, the Monitor reported that putting those policies into 
practice would require “a broader acceptance of change throughout the department,” 
more Sergeants on the streets and a new computer system to fully track the progress of 
reforms (Seattle Times, 6/17/2014, summarizing 3rd semi-annual report).579 
As an indication of continued resistance to reform, the Monitor cited a recent 
federal lawsuit, filed by more than 100 officers, detectives and sergeants, only 19 days 
before the filing of the Monitor’s report, seeking to block the new use-of-force policies 
(3rd semi-annual report, at n. 1) and commented that “[m]uch work remains to ensure 
that the objectives and goals of the Consent Decree have been understood and 
internalized by all officers — whether command staff or rank and file” (3rd semi-annual 
report, p. 4). 
The Monitor suggested that the election of a new Mayor, who took office in 
January, 2014, would assist in achieving compliance, noting that Mayor Ed Murray “has 
 
574 Miletich, S., Sullivan, Carter, M. (2014, May 28). Seattle Cops Sue over DOJ reforms. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
575 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 152, filed June 10, 2014 
576 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 153, filed June 10, 2014. 
577 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 151, filed June 13, 2014. 
578 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 154, filed June 16 2014. 
579 Miletich, S. (2014, June 17). Monitor on SPD: progress, dissent. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
300 
taken on hard issues… [and] has maintained a sustained and thoughtful involvement 
with Consent Decree issues” (3rd semi-annual report, p. 2). The Monitor stated that 
“[p]erhaps the most hopeful turn of events in the last six months has been the active 
involvement of the Mayor’s Office in its oversight of the SPD;” the Monitor further 
commented that “the Mayor appears to recognize that the SPD needs a deep and 
thorough cultural change to earn the respect, trust and cooperation of all of Seattle’s 
diverse communities…” (3rd semi-annual report, p. 2).  
The report was released one week before the confirmation of a known reform-
minded Chief, Kathleen O’Toole, who had previously worked as the first female 
Commissioner for the Boston Police Department, the first Chief Inspector of the Gardia 
Síochána Inspectorate (which provided oversight for the Irish national police service) 
and the court-appointed monitor for the East Haven Police Department (Connecticut). 
The report singled out the SPD’s Use of Force Review Board as a “central driver 
of the Department’s critical self-analysis.” The Monitor observed that, for the first time, 
the Board had found certain uses of force out-of-policy and made referrals to the Office 
of Professional Accountability (3rd semi-annual report, p. 3). The Monitor also positively 
reported that the SPD had developed a mentoring program for officers as part of an 
early intervention program and had embraced new approaches for designing and 
conducting training programs to address use of force. It was also acknowledged that 
trainers were currently developing promising programs on bias-free policing and routine 
stops and detentions. The Monitor also praised the department’s new Force 
Investigative Team (FIT) and positively commented on the SPD’s decision to merge the 
responsibilities of the Firearms Review Board (which had been previously the subject of 
significant criticism) into the Use of Force Review Board. Finally, the report praised the 
department for its work in developing a Crisis Intervention program (3rd semi-annual 
report, pp. 14-15 (Crisis Intervention), 18-26 (Training), 55-57 (Firearms Review Board), 
57-60 (Force Investigation Team), and 76-89 (Mentoring Program)). 
The report was not completely positive, however; the Monitor observed that SPD 
data systems remained weak; in fact, the report negatively compared the department’s 
use of analytic data to the Oakland Athletics baseball team’s use of data as documented 
in the book and movie “Moneyball,” concluded that the “SPD is a long way from playing 
Moneyball…Compared to many other law-enforcement agencies, SPD is flying blind” (3rd 
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semi-annual report, pp.  35-37). Although the Monitor was critical of “bungled efforts” to 
produce a stopgap computer program and “foot-dragging” on developing a new business 
intelligence system, the Monitor reported that he was encouraged at the prospect that 
the mayor’s office, the new police chief and experts within and outside the department 
would fix the problem (Seattle Times, 6/17/2014). 
Further, the Monitor reported that the Monitoring team and parties “have not yet 
been able to agree to a satisfactory plan for ensuring that SPD deploys an adequate 
number of sergeants to effectuate law enforcement objectives and the objectives of the 
Consent Decree” (3rd semi-annual report, p. 5). 
As it related to accountability, the Monitor was critical of the disciplinary process 
which he referred to as a “byzantine and arcane.” process that allowed Interim Police 
Chief Harry Bailey to reverse misconduct findings against several officers who had 
appealed their cases (3rd semi-annual report, pp. 6, 71). The report was specifically 
critical of the authority given to the police chief to ignore disciplinary recommendations: 
“If all of the investigation and analysis conducted by the OPA can be negated with the 
stroke of the Chief’s pen, and without regard to the opinion of the OPA, the fairness, 
thoroughness, and rigor of investigations below are rendered meaningless” (3rd semi-
annual report, p. 73). 
Finally, although the Monitor was critical of the disciplinary process, he did note 
substantive improvements in the complaint investigation program: the Office of Police 
Accountability (OPA): “Whereas OPA was considered by some for the last few years to 
be a cat’s paw of SPD executives, this perception has seemed to change markedly 
under the leadership of OPA’s current Director” (3rd semi-annual report, p. 72). 
June 23, 2014 Kathleen O’Toole confirmed as Chief of 
Police580 
Appointed by Mayor Ed Murray 
July 10, 2014 Court approves Office of Professional 
Accountability Internal Operations & 
Training Manual,581  
OPA; Judge James Robart 
 
580 Miletich, S. (2014, June 24). O’Toole, confirmed as police chief, promises a force ‘second to 
none.’ Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
581 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 161, filed July 10, 2014. 
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August 14, 2014 Court approves Use-of-Force Training 
Curriculum582 
Judge James Robart 
September 22, 2014 Court approves Instructional System 
Design Model for Search & Seizure and 
Bias-Free policing training;583 Court 
approves Advanced Crisis Intervention 
Training Curriculum & Strategy.584  
Judge James Robart 
December 15, 2014 Fourth semi-annual report585 Seattle Police Monitor 
  
Fourth semi-annual report. 
The Monitor’s fourth semi-annual report, was filed with the Court on December 
15, 2014. That report provided the first truly optimistic assessment of the department’s 
achievements since the reporting period began (Seattle Times, 12/16/2014).586 The 
report painted a picture of a department heading towards compliance, even though the 
Monitor reported that he could not “make any promises or representations about how 
long it will take to reach full and effective compliance”: 
What the Monitor can say, … is that, thanks to the current leadership, SPD 
is making sustained positive, progress … If it continues on the path that it 
is now, the Monitor can say — for the first time — that SPD is likely to get 
the job done. (4th semi-annual report, p. 12) 
The report still identified continued challenges that laid ahead, to include “the need to 
widen the scope of reform throughout the department and hold officers accountable for 
failures to de-escalate confrontations” (Seattle Times, 12/16/2014). However, the 
Monitor reported that the SPD was “approaching mid-passage in its voyage to fully and 
effectively comply with many provisions of the Consent Decree” (4th semi-annual report, 
p. 1). 
The report specifically acknowledged the leadership of Chief O’Toole, Mayor 
Murray, Seattle City Attorney Pete Holmes and the Community Police Commission as 
“sharing the accolades for the solid progress made to date.” (Fourth semi-annual report, 
p. 1).  In particular, however, the Monitor singled out Chief O’Toole for repeated praise, 
 
582 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 168, filed August 14, 2014. 
583 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 179, filed September 22, 2014. 
584 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 180, filed September 22, 2014. 
585 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 187, filed September 22, 2014. 
586 Miletich, S. (2014, December 16). Federal monitor seeing SPD progress. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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reporting that she had made compliance with the Consent Decree her “highest priority” 
and promoted some of the department’s “best and brightest” who “are fully in support of 
the Consent Decree and understand the necessity of reform” (4th semi-annual report, pp. 
1-2, 5, 62, 65-67, 81, 86).  The Monitor took specific note that Chief O’Toole personally 
appeared in federal court, (“which her two immediate predecessors had pointedly not 
done”) and offered her personal assurance that “under her direction, things would move 
quickly toward compliance” (4th semi-annual report, p. 4). 
The Monitor further reported that “training on new policies dealing with use of 
force, bias-free policing, stops and crisis intervention had been carried out at a 
remarkable pace” Seattle Times, 12/16/2014, citing 4th semi-annual report). The report 
observed that  
[w]hatever the issues might have been in the past with the quality of SPD 
training and the resources devoted to it, the Education and Training Section 
under its new leadership — which has only been on the job for eight months 
— has become one of the Department’s most promising drivers of systemic 
change. (4th semi-annual report, pp. 2-3) 
In a written statement responding to the report, Mayor Murray was quoted as 
saying the report “reflects the significant progress that the Seattle Police Department has 
made in the last year toward reform and compliance… We are making good headway 
and I am committed to keeping police reform moving forward” (Seattle Times, 
12/16/2014). 
Despite the progress reported, including the acceleration of the SPD’s timeline to 
develop a business-intelligence system (a project that had “been previously hampered 
by delay, drawing a rebuke from [Judge] Robart”), the report was quoted as identifying 
substantive challenges ahead, to include: 
• Delays in completing some use-of-force investigations; 
• Failures to spread the good work of SPD’s use-of-force review board 
throughout the department; 
• Lapses by the review board in not holding officers accountable for 
unreasonable failures to de-escalate confrontations, a key element of the 
reform plan; 
• Demonstrating that officers are being held accountable for failing to activate 
their in-car video systems; 
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• Developing better self-analysis procedures to manage the risk of 
unconstitutional policing; 
• Fully implementing an early-intervention system to identify potential problem 
officers and employ non-disciplinary measures; 
• Providing enough sergeants to carry out crucial, front-line supervision; 
• Closing the “significant distance” in re-establishing trust with the community; 
• Weaving a new culture of accountability into the fabric of the organization that 
will remain intact no matter who is chief (Seattle Times, 12/16/2014). 
Depolicing Issue. 
The fourth semi-annual report referred to “recent media reports” that suggested 
there was “a purported lack of proactivity and reactivity among the SPD precincts” (4th 
semi-annual report, p. 4). In his second semi-annual report, the Monitor had reported 
becoming “aware of some contentions by SPD officers that force [was] being 
underutilized at the risk of officer safety, because of the Settlement Agreement and DOJ” 
and a motivation on the part of SPD officers to “de-police” (2nd semi-annual report, p. 
24). The Monitor went on to address the de-policing issue in his ninth systemic 
assessment, relating to SPD use-of-force, released in April 2017. 
February 10, 2015 Court approves SPD 2015 Training 
Program587 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
March 19, 2015 Court approves Third Year Monitoring 
Plan588 
Seattle Police Monitor; Judge 
James Robart 
April 15, 2015 Court approves SPD 2015 Tactical De-
escalation & Individual Firearms 
Training589 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
May 11, 2015 Court approves SPD revised Early 
Intervention System Policy590 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
June 15, 2015 Fifth semi-annual report591 Seattle Police Monitor 
 
 
587 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 192, filed February 10, 2015. 
588 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 196, filed March 19, 2015. 
589 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 199, filed April 15, 2015. 
590 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 203, filed May 11, 2015. 
591 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 212, filed June 15, 2015. 
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Fifth semi-annual report. 
The Monitor’s fifth semi-annual report, was filed with the Court on June 15, 2015. 
Media coverage of the report, highlighted the Monitor’s strongly held belief that “the time 
for permanent use of on-officer cameras by all SPD officers is now” and his conclusion 
that such camera systems were “a key tool for ‘accountability and transparency.’” 
(Seattle Times, 6/16/2015;592 5th semi-annual report, p. 21). The Seattle Times reported 
that the Monitor’s report came “at a time that the department confirms that it plans to 
shift from a small pilot program to departmentwide use of the cameras by some 640 
patrol officers” (Seattle Times, 6/16/2015).593 
The Monitor continued his positive reporting of the progress made by the SPD by 
“commending” Chief O’Toole, her command staff and the DOJ “for their ‘unflagging 
commitment to police reform” (Seattle Times, 6/16/2015; 5th semi-annual report, p. 10).  
The Monitor did report that “significant work…remains,” highlighting the need to 
improve the investigation and review of police uses of force; however, it also praised the 
Department’s efforts to track contacts with people in “behavioral crisis” and collaborative 
efforts on the part of the SPD to revise use-of-force policy to de-escalate confrontations 
and ensure the proportional and reasonable uses of force. New training efforts were also 
identified, along with a comment that SPD training practices were now “attracting 
national attention” (Seattle Times, 6/16/2015; 5th semi-annual report, pp. 2, 15).  
The Monitor also opined that based on initiatives taken by the SPD during the 
reporting period, the Monitoring team saw “encouraging signs that the Department was 
… not attempting to address unconstitutional policing issues by unacceptably reducing 
policing.” The Monitoring team “likewise found it encouraging that crime was reportedly 
down across the city by 12% over the first part of 2015” (5th semi-annual report, p. 5). 
 
592 Miletich, S. (2015, June 16). SPD Monitor: Time ‘is now’ for on-officer body cameras. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
593 It was not until July 17, 2017 that the Mayor signed an executive order that instructed the SPD 
to follow a specific timeline for the deployment of Body Worn Cameras to SPD officers: cameras 
were ordered to be deployed to: West Precinct bike patrol officers by July 22; West Precinct 
officers by September 30; and then on a monthly basis out to each SPD precinct. Retrieved from 
EO-2017-03-body-worn-cameras.pdf (seattle.gov). 
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However, the report also contained critical comments regarding the work of the 
department’s Force Investigation Team (FIT), identifying a practice of asking 
“inappropriately leading and suggestive questions” (5th semi-annual report, p. 22), a 
developing backlog of cases being considered by the SPD’s Force Review Board (FRB) 
(5th semi-annual report, p.27), and challenges faced by the FRB which was showing a 
tendency to engage in “convoluted interpretations of policy, extended philosophical 
conversations about the importance and meaning of concepts like ‘intent’ and the 
meaning of ‘may,’ or unrealistic and implausible interpretations of facts” (5th semi-annual 
report, p. 25). The report also criticized the “ungainly, 14-month process” to reform the 
Department’s Early Intervention System (EIS) (5th semi-annual report, p. 8). 
In a response to the report, Mayor Ed Murray stated “I think the collaborative 
process is paying off” (Seattle Times, 6/16/2015). 
June 4, 2015 Court approves revised Crisis Intervention 
Policy594 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
June 11, 2015 Court approves revised Bias-Free policing 
policy & Voluntary Contacts Terry Stops 
and Detention policy595 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
July 27, 2015 Court Order approving updated SPD Use-
of-Force policies596 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
August 27, 2015 Scheduled Date for SPD to establish “Full 
& Effective Compliance” 
Per SPD Monitor Timeline (as of 
11/30/2012)597 
 
Between the time of the fifth and sixth semi-annual reports, the Monitoring Team 
completed its first two “Systemic Assessments,” relating to the SPD’s Force Investigation 
and Reporting practices and the practices of its new Force Review Board: 
September 24, 2015 First Systemic Assessment: Force 
Investigation & Reporting598 
Seattle Police Monitor 
 
 
594 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 210, filed June 4, 2015. 
595 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 211, filed June 11, 2015. 
596 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 225, filed July 27, 2015. 
597 Per Seattle City Attorney memo, dated December 18, 2012. On file with author. 
598 U.S v. Seattle, Document No. 231, filed September 24, 2015. 
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First systemic assessment: force investigation & reporting. 
The Monitor’s first systemic analysis, relating to “Force Investigation & Reporting” 
was filed with the court on September 24, 2015. The ultimate finding was that, 
in a short amount of time – just six months from the Court-approved, force-
related policies taking effect on January 1, 2014 – rank and file officers 
have responded to clear rules of the road for systematically documenting 
force whenever it is used, sergeants have responded to the scene in way 
that permits a thorough investigation, and FIT investigations are 
consistently excellent. (1st Systemic Assessment, p. 1) 
 As such, the Monitor found that “the reporting of and response to force is in 
initial compliance with paragraphs 100, 101, 102, and 103 of the Consent Decree.”599 
The Monitor also concluded that “the quality and integrity of FIT investigations are 
consistent with the requirements of paragraphs 112, 113, 114, 117, and 118 of the 
 
599 Paragraphs 100 to 103 of the Settlement Agreement read as follows: 
Para. 100. “Officers will document a Type I use of force in a searchable and retrievable format 
that contains the following information: 1) an account of the officer’s actions in using force; 2) the 
suspect’s actions that led to the application of force; 3) the identity of the officer who used force; 
4) the names of other officers or identified witnesses present; and 5) the name of the supervisor 
screening the incident. The officer’s immediate supervisor will review the documentation as soon 
as practicable and direct the officer to supply more information, if needed.” 
Para. 101. “A Type I use of force report must be provided orally and screened in person by a 
supervisor, unless impractical under the circumstances, prior to the subject being booked, 
released, or the contact concluded. If the subject is free to leave, the detention will not be 
extended to facilitate the screening process; however, the subject may choose to remain at the 
scene to speak with a supervisor. If there is any uncertainty or concern about the reason or 
nature of the force used, or the existence of any injury, the supervisor will immediately roll out to 
the scene, unless impractical in the circumstances.” 
Para. 102. “The supervisor will determine if the use of force is appropriately classified as a Type I 
incident. If the supervisor is unable to make that determination, the supervisor will consult with 
FIT or his/her direct supervisor to assist in the determination. The supervisor will also evaluate 
the incident for any other concerns (tactical, threat assessment, etc.). The supervisor will address 
any concerns with the officer involved. If it appears that misconduct may have been involved in 
the use of force, the supervisor will ensure that OPA is contacted and consult the FIT team 
regarding reclassification of the incident as Type II or III.” 
Para 103. “For Type II and Type III uses of force, all involved officers will complete an officer 
statement using descriptive language. The statement will include: 1) the reason for the initial 
police presence; 2) a detailed description of the incident circumstances, including the words, 
actions, and/or threat posed by the suspect warranting the need for force; 3) a detailed 
description of the force used by the officer giving the statement; 4) a detailed description of the 
force used by other officers if clearly observed; 5) a detailed description of any apparent injury to 
the suspect, any complaint of injury, or the lack of injury, including information regarding any 
medical aid or medical evaluation provided” (Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Seattle, Document 3-
1, filed July 27, 2012). 
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Consent Decree600 and demonstrate initial compliance with those provisions.” Although 
the Monitor found that “Sergeant investigations of Type II force601 are not yet where they 
 
600 Paragraphs 112-114, 117 & 118 of the Settlement Agreement read as follows: 
Para. 112. “FIT will conduct investigations of (1) all Type III uses of force except for firearms 
discharges (which will continue to be investigated by the Homicide Unit and reviewed by the 
FRB); (2) any use of force that result in broken bones, loss of consciousness, or an admission to 
the hospital for treatment; the application of a neck hold (LVNR or Lateral Vascular Neck 
Restraint); hard strike to the head or neck with an impact weapon (flashlight,,baton, or other 
object); (3) uses of force that potentially involve criminal conduct or misconduct on the part of the 
officer; and (4) uses of force referred to FIT by any SPD supervisor (and approved by the FIT 
commander), the Chief, his/her designee, or OPA. Response by FIT to a scene does not assume 
a criminal or administrative violation has occurred.” 
Para. 113. “Type III uses of force will be investigated and documented by FIT, with assistance 
from the on-scene sergeant. The FIT response will be tailored to the circumstances but will 
normally include one to three FIT detectives, the FIT sergeant, a Homicide Unit command level 
officer, and a Training Section representative. The Training representative will not have 
investigative roles at the scene of a use of force, but will attempt to identify any policy or training 
issues. At least one member of FIT or a homicide supervisor will be available at all times to 
evaluate potential referrals from SPD supervisors.” 
Para. 114. “If a FIT investigation, at any point, reveals officer misconduct, a FIT supervisor will 
contact OPA.” 
Para. 117. “The supervisor will have the following responsibilities in responding to a Type III use 
of force: 
a) A sworn supervisor will respond to the scene, and will ensure that appropriate medical aid is 
summoned for any injured party, either subject or officer. If the subject is transported to a 
hospital, the supervisor will arrange for a hospital guard for the subject, if appropriate. 
b) The supervisor will obtain sufficient basic information to determine whether a FIT response is 
appropriate and contact the FIT sergeant to screen a response. 
c) Whenever there is an indication of possible criminal conduct involving an officer, the officer will 
not be compelled to provide a statement. 
d) The supervisor will ensure the scene is contained and will turn the scene over to the arriving 
FIT personnel. The scene will be left intact and will be processed by FIT personnel. 
e) The supervisor will make reasonable attempts to locate civilian witnesses to the event, and 
identify and request that the witnesses standby for the FIT personnel’s arrival.” 
Para 118. “FIT will have the following responsibilities in responding to a Type III use of force: 
a) FIT personnel will take control of the use of force investigation upon their arrival. 
b) Where possible, FIT detectives will ensure that all interviews with civilian witnesses are 
recorded. 
c) FIT personnel will arrange for a canvass for any privately-owned video that may have captured 
the contact, and attempt to obtain copies voluntarily. If the owner refuses, they will document the 
location and/or owner of the video. If no privately-owned video is discovered, they will document 
that none was found. 
d) The FIT supervisor will arrange for photographing and processing of the scene. 
e) FIT detectives will respond to the subject’s location, and request a medical release if relevant, 




f) The FIT supervisor or commander will respond to the FIT office and arrange for ICV downloads 
as well as witness statements from all witness officers prior to the end of their shift(s) unless 
impracticable. 
g) When available, the FIT detectives will conduct in-person interviews of the involved officers. 
h) The FIT supervisor or commander will arrange for the involved officers to submit a use of force 
written statement as soon as practicable. 
i) The FIT sergeant or commander will be responsible for ensuring notification of a FIT 
investigated use of force, which will be forwarded to the involved officer’s chain of command up to 
the Chief, as well as the Investigation Bureau Commander, no later than 12 hours after learning 
of the use of force, unless impractical. This notification will contain basic information about the 
incident. 
j) Within 30 days or as soon as possible thereafter, the FIT commander will present the 
completed investigation to the commander of the Investigation Bureau for review as to 
completeness of investigation. This review will normally be completed within three business days. 
The investigation will then be forwarded to the involved officer’s chain of command. After this 
review has been completed, the FIT commander will be responsible for presenting the 
investigation to the Use of Force Committee (UFC). Consistent with current officer-involved 
shooting protocols, any presentations to the command staff will also be the responsibility of the 
FIT commander. 
k) If at any time during the investigation, information is obtained that suggests either criminal 
liability on the part of any officer, or misconduct (as defined previously) on the part of any officer, 
the FIT commander will be responsible for notifying the command staff, and taking one of the two 
following actions: 
(1) Criminal Liability – If at any time information is obtained that suggests that an officer may have 
committed a crime during the use of force incident, the investigation will immediately be referred 
to the OPA. If OPA agrees that a criminal investigation is appropriate, they will refer the 
investigation back to the Homicide Unit commander or another investigative body per current 
practice, for assignment to an uninvolved Homicide sergeant for bifurcated criminal and 
administrative investigations using a “Clean Team” and “Exposed Team” approach. All 
information gathered during the administrative investigation to date will be screened through a 
Case Master, who will ensure no information that would compromise the criminal investigation is 
passed on to the Homicide sergeant doing the criminal case. Additionally, any compelled 
interview of the subject officer(s) will be delayed until the end of the investigation. A 
representative of the King County Prosecutor’s Office or the City Attorney’s Office will be 
consulted when necessary during the course of the criminal investigation. While the 
administrative investigation will continue, the criminal investigation will have priority over 
witnesses and evidence. 
(2) Misconduct (as defined in Section II) – If at any time information is obtained that an officer 
may have committed misconduct during the use of force incident, the OPA Director will be 
advised and the misconduct investigation referred to their office. The assigned FIT investigator 
will continue to complete the use of force investigation.” 
601 Paragraph 65 of the Settlement Agreement defined a Type II use of force as: “a use of force 
which causes an injury, could reasonably be expected to cause an injury, or results in a complaint 
of an injury, but does not rise to the level of a Type III use of force. Examples of this type of force 
include: a “hard” strike, take-down, or kick; CED deployment of any type against a subject; use of 
an impact weapon (including batons and flashlights) to strike a subject; deployment of canine that 
results in an injury or complaint of injury; deployment of Oleoresin Capsicum Spray (OC Spray) at 
a subject; and placing a subject in a full restraint position” (Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Seattle, 
Document 3-1, filed July 27, 2012). 
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need to be,” noting that only 45% of use of force investigative files included all material 
evidence, and “Lieutenants and Captains are likewise not yet identifying and addressing 
deficiencies in sergeant investigations of Type II force,” the Monitor found that “SPD’s 
review of Type 1 force602 [was] in initial compliance with paragraph 102 of the Consent 
Decree.”603 The Monitor concluded that: “Still, much work remains. With respect to this 
assessment, the quality and integrity of Type II force investigations must improve 
substantially” (First Systemic Assessment, at Executive Summary, pp. 1-4). 
The day after the filing of the first systemic assessment, the U.S. Attorney 
General, Lorette Lynch visited Seattle as part of a six-city tour to promote Community 
Oriented Policing. Attorney General Lynch addressed a forum at the Northwest African 
American Museum and was quoted in the Seattle Times as saying: 
From Ferguson to Baltimore and from Cleveland to New York City, we have 
witnessed the pain and the unrest that can ensue when trust between law-
enforcement officers and the communities they serve is damaged, broken, 
or lost…In many cases, these tensions have their roots in a long and 
difficult history of inequality, oppression and violence, and they speak to 
issues that have tested our country’s unity since its inception…They will 
not be overcome with easy solutions or simple strategies. ... But as 
Seattle’s recent experience can attest, real progress is possible. (Seattle 
Times, 9/25/2015)604 
Further, the Seattle Times reported that  
 
602 Paragraph 64 of the Settlement Agreement defined a “Type I” use of force as: “the use of low-
level physical force that is greater than De Minimis Force, is not reasonably expected to cause 
injury and does not result in an actual injury or complaint of an injury, but causes transient pain 
and/or disorientation during its application as a means of gaining compliance. Examples of this 
type of force include disorientation techniques (e.g., open or empty hand strike), weaponless pain 
compliance techniques while using sufficient force to cause pain (e.g., wrist lock), and ‘soft’ take-
downs (e.g., controlled placement of a subject, including on the ground or floor) not included in a 
Type II use of force. Pointing a firearm at a person is reportable as a Type I use of force” 
(Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Seattle, Document 3-1, filed July 27, 2012). 
603 Paragraph 102 of the Settlement Agreement reads as follows: “The supervisor will determine if 
the use of force is appropriately classified as a Type I incident. If the supervisor is unable to make 
that determination, the supervisor will consult with FIT or his/her direct supervisor to assist in the 
determination. The supervisor will also evaluate the incident for any other concerns (tactical, 
threat assessment, etc.). The supervisor will address any concerns with the officer involved. If it 
appears that misconduct may have been involved in the use of force, the supervisor will ensure 
that OPA is contacted and consult the FIT team regarding reclassification of the incident as Type 
II or III” (Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Seattle, Document 3-1, filed July 27, 2012). 
604 Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (2015, September 25). U.S. AG lauds police-reform steps. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Lynch was joined by Mayor Ed Murray and Police Chief Kathleen O’Toole. 
Lynch said Seattle is at the forefront of police reform and is becoming a 
model for law-enforcement agencies around the country in light of deadly 
police encounters in Ferguson, Mo., and Baltimore, Md. (Seattle Times, 
9/25/2015) 
October 1, 2015 Court approves Updates to Third Year 
Monitoring Plan605 
Seattle Police Monitor; Judge 
James Robart 
November 24, 2015 Second Systemic Assessment: Force 
Review Board606 
Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Second systemic assessment: force review board. 
The Monitor’s second systemic analysis, relating to the SPD’s “Force Review 
Board” was filed with the court on November 24, 2015. The ultimate finding was that the 
FRB’s performance was “in initial compliance with paragraphs 119 to 125 of the Consent 
Decree.”607 Specifically, the Monitor found that the 
 
605 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 236, filed October 1, 2015. 
606 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 247, filed November 24, 2015. 
607 Paragraphs 119 to 125 of the Settlement Agreement read as follows:  
Para 119. “SPD has established a use of force committee. For purposes of this Agreement, this 
committee is referred to as the Use of Force Committee (“UFC”). SPD may rename the 
committee. This committee will conduct timely, comprehensive, and reliable reviews of all Type II 
and Type III uses of force.” 
Para. 120. “Committee Membership: The UFC will consist of: an Assistant Chief or his designee 
(who will chair the Committee); supervisors from the Training Section; one representative from 
each involved precinct, selected by each precinct captain; and a representative from the PSS. 
The Chair may include any subject matter experts the Chair feels would be helpful in reviewing 
particular incidents.” 
Para. 121. Training: “Each member will receive a minimum of eight hours of training on an annual 
basis, including legal updates regarding use of force and curriculum utilized by the Training 
Section regarding use of force.” 
Para. 122. “The UFC may consult with other advisors as necessary.” 
Para 123. Review: “The UFC will review each use of force packet to determine whether the 
findings from the chain of command regarding whether the force used is consistent with law and 
policy and supported by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the investigation is thorough 
and complete, and whether there are tactical, equipment, or policy considerations that need to be 
addressed.” 
Para. 124. Review of FIT Investigations: “The review of FIT investigations is the same as for Type 
II investigations, except the FIT investigation review will be chaired by a Deputy Chief. The 
Monitor and SPD will explore ways to include others in the review of FIT investigations, including 
civilian observers. Consistent with current practice and the provisions above, the UFC will 
document its findings and recommendations for FIT investigations. Unless an extension is 
granted by the Chair, the review should be conducted within seven days of the FIT presentation 
to the UFC.” 
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SPD’s FRB [is] functioning well and, in a great majority of instances, as the 
Department’s hub of internal accountability, analysis, and continual 
improvement with respect to force. The Board appears to be 
understanding, and embracing, its role as the key forum for “internal 
innovation and critical analysis” of force. It is regularly exploring important 
issues that go well beyond whether an involved officer’s use of force was 
consistent or inconsistent with SPD policy and instead consider “what [the] 
force incidents can teach the Department and its officers about training, 
tactics, procedure, and policy.” (2nd Systemic Assessment, at 1) 
December 15, 2015 Sixth semi-annual report608 Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Sixth semi-annual report. 
The Monitor’s sixth semi-annual report, was filed with the Court on December 15, 
2015. The Monitor reported that “[o]ver the last six months, the SPD has moved forward 
and continues to be on track.” The Monitor gave a preview of the results of SPD 
Community Confidence surveys, which he reported “showed improvement[s]’ in positive 
attitudes towards the SPD.” The Monitor also reported that the SPD was “moving 
forward with implementation of body-worn cameras in conjunction with the Mayor’s 
Office” (6th semi-annual report, p. 7).   
The Monitor also observed that “[a]s of June 19, 2015, a dramatically-overhauled 
early intervention system has been up and running across SPD,” although it was too 
early to determine how the system was functioning. The report positively commented on 
the SPD’s ongoing progress on a data analytic platform and noted the court’s approval 
of “surgical revisions” to core policies involving use-of-force, bias-free policing, crisis 
intervention and early intervention (6th semi-annual report, p. 10). 
Finally, the Monitor commented positively on the status of officer training 
programs:  
 
Para. 125. Corrective Action: “The UFC will not make recommendations concerning discipline; 
however, the Chair of the UFC is obligated to ensure a referral to OPA is made if potential 
misconduct is discovered in the review process. Should policy, equipment, or training deficiencies 
be noted in the review process, the UFC Chair will ensure that they are brought to the attention of 
the relevant commanding officer for appropriate action. The Bureau Commander of the officer 
involved with the use of force will have the final responsibility regarding retraining or 
recommending discipline to the Chief” (Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Seattle, Document 3-1, 
filed July 27, 2012). 
608 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 251, filed December 15, 2015. 
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SPD officers and command staff continue to receive significant training on 
topics and issues related to the Consent Decree. This second year of 
training is a significant part and evidence of SPD’s commitment to the 
reform process. It is a testament to the City as a whole that it is willing to 
expend the hours and cost to ensure that SPD officers are among the best-
trained in the nation. (Sixth semi-annual report, at 11) 
Between the time of the sixth and seventh (and final) semi-annual reports, the 
Monitoring Team completed another three “Systemic Assessments,” relating to the 
SPD’s Office of Professional Accountability, the results of Community Confidence 
Surveys, and the SPD’s Crisis Intervention program: 
January 20, 2016 Court Order Seeking Input into proposed 
revisions to OPS Policy Manual609 
Judge James Robart 
January 27, 2016 Third Systemic Assessment: Community 
Confidence610 
Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Third systemic assessment: community confidence. 
The Monitor’s third systemic analysis, relating to the results of City Community 
Confidence surveys was filed with the court on January 27, 2016. 
As reported by the Seattle Times: “Led by Police Chief Kathleen O’Toole, the 
Seattle Police Department has woven community-oriented policing into its daily 
interactions and boosted public confidence in the department, the federal monitor 
overseeing court-ordered reforms concludes in a new report” (Seattle Times, 
1/28/2016).611 The Monitor specifically noted that,  
[r]ather than believing that isolated initiatives or scattered community 
meetings are sufficient engagement with the community, the Chief is 
driving – in words and action – the SPD to conduct policing in dynamic 
partnership with the community in all of its forms. These efforts are 
deservedly receiving national attention and praise. (3rd Systemic 
Assessment, p. 2) 
The Monitor still found, however, that “the SPD has work to do to learn how to listen to 
and engage isolated communities – and to demonstrate that the input of those 
 
609 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 258, filed January 20, 2016. 
610 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 263, filed January 27, 2016. 
611 Miletich, S. (2016, January 28). Federal monitor finds gain in community confidence in SPD. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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communities is understood and incorporated into policing reforms” (3rd Systemic 
Assessment, p. 34). 
The Monitor specifically reported on the findings from recent interviews 
conducted by the Monitoring Team with community members and police personnel over 
a period of several months in 2015. In addition, a baseline community survey was 
conducted by a Monitor-hired research firm (ALZ Research) in 2013, with a follow-up 
survey having been conducted in 2015 (Third Systemic Assessment, Appendix A 
[Methodological Framework & Approach for Qualitative Assessment of Public 
Confidence], pp. 36-55). 612 
The community survey’s key findings were explained by ALZ research in a 
report, dated September 10, 2015, which was appended to the Third Systemic 
Assessment as Appendix “C.” The research firm reported that “the Seattle Police 
Department’s overall ratings improved, with disapproval of the department down 
sharply.” These findings were considered significant particularly in light of the fact that 
approval ratings for the Washington State Patrol, the Seattle Fire Department and 
Seattle Schools had not changed significantly: “it is [therefore] likely that this change is 
about SPD more than a general positivity towards local and state institutions.” 
Even so, the survey report noted that: “Latinos’ and African Americans’ 
experiences still back up the public’s perception that SPD treats them worse than 
others.”  According to the report, even though: 
African Americans’ and Latinos’ experiences have gotten better in the last 
two years, [] they are still not the same as whites or Asian Americans. They 
are more likely than whites to disapprove of how police treat them, they are 
more likely than whites to say police used force in an interaction, and they 
are less likely than whites to say police engaged in a wide range of positive 
behaviors such as treated them respectfully and listened to them. And they 
are more likely than whites to report being stopped in the first place by SPD. 
Most Seattleites also think that SPD treats Latinos and African Americans 
worse than others in the city (ALZ Executive Summary, p. 2). 
 
612 As indicated in the Executive Summary to the survey report: “This research was 
commissioned by the federal monitoring team to assess community perceptions of the Seattle 
police, gauge the prevalence of community interactions with the police, and understand the 
nature of those interactions. This is the second survey of its kind commissioned by the monitoring 
team, and it follows a similar survey conducted in August 2013 that asked many of the same 
questions to a similar audience” (Executive Summary, p. 1). 
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Specifically, the report indicated that since 2013, amongst Latinos, approval of 
the SPD had improved from 54% to 65% and disapproval had decreased from 39% to 
23%. With respect to LGBT Seattleites, approval of the SPD had improved from 55% to 
72% and disapproval had decreased from 44% to 27%; amongst Asian Americans, 
approval of the SPD had improved from 27% to 70% and disapproval had decreased 
from 27% to 17%. With respect to Whites, approval of the SPD had increased from 60% 
to 66% and disapproval had decreased from 35% to 25%. The most notable group that 
had not “warmed” towards SPD, however, were African Americans where the statistics 
remained virtually unchanged with 48-49% approving of the SPD and 40-42% 
disapproving (ALZ Executive Summary, p. 3). 
The Monitoring Team also reported having conducted interviews with community 
members and police personnel over a period of several months: while it was 
acknowledged that community comments were mixed, officers reportedly believed that 
relations with the community were “generally and increasingly solid and positive,” even 
though officers “readily admit[ted] that the department still has much work to do to 
realize the full potential of its community policing strategies and programs” (3rd Systemic 
Assessment, pp. 3-4).  
Among the “isolated communities” and community activists interviewed by the 
Monitoring Team, the Monitor reported that people complained that little had changed 
and “that SPD, like police across the country, continue a history of violence, disrespect 
and apathy against individuals in some communities.” Still, the Monitor reported that, 
“SPD is, to at least some extent, defying national trends through their own, affirmative 
efforts toward reestablishing a closer, collaborative relationship with the community 
going forward” (3rd Systemic Assessment, pp. 4, 18). 
The Monitor further reported that the SPD’s investment in Community Oriented 
Policing had potentially resulted in an increase in solved homicides. The Monitor 
reported that the homicide clearance rate had increased from 35% in 2012 (when the 
Consent Decree was entered) to 57% in 2013 and 68% in 2014. Although the Monitor 
acknowledged that homicide clearance rates were not “a perfect measure,” he argued 
that greater public trust in the police could be expected to result in more cooperation 
from the public and increased clearance rates (3rd Systemic Assessment, pp. 16-17). 
The Monitor concluded his report with the following substantive remarks: 
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The SPD has engaged in significant efforts to put itself on a solid path 
toward building stronger relationships with the Seattle community. In 
particular, the Chief’s emphasis on the issue, the re-structuring of policing 
efforts through the micro-community policing plans, the agency’s training 
strategies, and the overall willingness to engage in and embrace the reform 
effort with the community are clear signs that the SPD understands where 
it needs to go and is willing to undertake the difficult changes associated 
with this. (3rd Systemic Assessment, p. 35) 
As with his other reports, however, the Monitor went on to ask for more, reporting 
that the SPD still had “a great deal of work to do to fully institutionalize community-
oriented policing strategies into all aspects and corners of the organization” (3rd Systemic 
Assessment, p. 35). Interestingly, it was this habit, of first praising the SPD, and then 
identifying additional work that needed to be done that raised the ire, over the long term, 
of many of the SPD and city-affiliated research participants who concluded that no 
matter what the SPD did, it would never be good enough for the Monitor. 
January 22, 2016 Fourth Systemic Assessment: Office of 
Professional Accountability (OPA)613 
Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Fourth systemic assessment: office of professional accountability. 
The Monitor’s fourth systemic assessment, relating to the City’s “Office of 
Professional Accountability” (OPA) was filed with the court on January 22, 2016. 
The OPA, in existence since 1999, serves as the City agency responsible for 
receiving and investigating both internal and community complaints against the police. 
The Department of Justice’s 2011 investigation found that “the structure of OPA [was] 
sound” and that OPA investigations were “well-organized, well-documented, and 
thoughtful.” However, the investigation also found that “OPA fail[ed] to provide adequate 
oversight to prevent a pattern or practice of excessive force… [and did] not provide the 
intended backstop for the failures of the direct supervisory review process” (DOJ 
Investigation Report, 2011, p. 5).  
Consequently, the Consent Decree contains provisions to encourage SPD 
to ‘ensure that all complaints regarding officer conduct are fully and fairly 
dealt with; that all investigative findings are supported by the evidence and 
documented in writing; and that officers and complainants receive a 
 
613 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 294, filed January 22, 2016. 
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thorough, fair, and expeditious resolution of complaints. (4th Systemic 
Assessment, p. 15) 
The Monitor’s assessment of the OPA was limited in scope. The assessment 
was focused on evaluating OPA’s intake of complaints and the conduct of its 
investigations but did not evaluate many of the organization’s other responsibilities. The 
Monitor remarked that, unlike the other assessments being conducted,  
the purpose of this assessment is not to assess compliance with specific 
requirements under the Consent Decree, nor to declare that the SPD is in 
initial or full and effective compliance with the Decree. The purpose of this 
assessment, rather, is to provide the Parties, the Court and the Monitoring 
Team itself vital information to complete two important tasks: (a) to revise 
the OPA Manual with evidence-based data, informed by real-world 
experience, actual SPD trends, and objective facts observed across cases 
by neutral reviewers, not hypotheticals or unsubstantiated claims; and (b) 
to advise the Court, armed with such data, about how to “create a better 
framework of independent review of the various policies, organizations and 
systems that will monitor the performance of the Seattle Police 
Department.614 (Fourth Systemic Assessment, p. 2) 
The consent decree specifically sought to ensure OPA’s compliance through two 
specific requirements: 1) the SPD was required to revise policies regarding employee 
reporting of misconduct and protection against retaliation and 2) the OPA was required 
to complete a manual which would “formalize OPA’s procedures, best practices, and 
training requirements.”615 The Monitor reported that the required policies and an updated 
OPA Manual had been approved by the court in July 2014 and that policy and manual 
revisions had been recently submitted to the court on January 14, 2016 (4th Systemic 
Assessment, p. 2). 
Overall, the Monitor found that “the design of SPD’s complaint investigation 
process [to be] exceptionally strong and very well structured.” Still, the Monitor found 
that “although the quality of the great majority of OPA investigations are generally 
satisfactory or better,” the OPA needed to make certain “targeted changes to its 
operations, … before it can be considered in practice, and not merely existing on paper, 
 
614 A minute order was filed by the Court on August 26, 2015, ordering the parties to file “an 
approach for SPD accountability and review systems [to be used] … to create a better framework 
for independent review of the various policies, organizations and systems that will monitor the 
performance of the Seattle Police Department.” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 228, filed August 
26, 2015).  
615 See, Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 3-1, at paras 165-167. 
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as the ‘backstop’ to the failures of any other part of the accountability system” (4th 
Systemic Assessment, pp. 3-4). The Monitor identified issues and concerns regarding 1) 
“the quality and consistency of interviews,” 2) “the timeliness of the interviews;” and 3) 
the quality of “investigations that raise[d] potential criminal or terminable offenses (such 
as false statements)” (4th Systemic Assessment, p. 4).   
The Monitor recommended a more robust use of civilian investigators, which he 
believed would potentially mitigate any deference or perception of deference to SPD 
witnesses and skepticism toward civilian witnesses. It was noted that the OPA Director 
made this same point in an October 16, 2015 memorandum to the court regarding SPD 
Accountability Systems when he observed that “the current situation of an all-
commissioned intake and investigation staff is a serious challenge to OPA’s actual and 
perceived independence”616 (4th Systemic Assessment, p. 4). The Monitor also identified 
concerns relating to the timeliness of OPA investigations after having identified that “in a 
full one-fourth of OPA cases, the unit did not meet the well-known, 180-day deadline,” 
under which any untimely findings could not be used to impose discipline on an SPD 
officer. Finally, the Monitoring Team reported that where OPA investigations involved or 
raised potential allegations of criminal conduct against SPD staff, OPA tended to 
“address[] less than it could and should have on issues that came to light during the 
context of the criminal investigation” (4th Systemic Assessment, pp. 4-5). 
The Monitor also suggested that the City consider changes to its accountability 
structure to mitigate the negative impacts of the “cabined nature of OPA’s charge,” which 
did not allow the organization to “readily address…more systemic problems of police 
culture and procedure” (4th Systemic Assessment, p. 7).   
Perhaps most significantly, the report noted that about 39% of OPA complaints 
were initiated from within the SPD, which was “a remarkable number given that, during 
DOJ’s 2011 investigation, internal complaints were ‘rare to non-existent’” (4th Systemic 
Assessment, at 21).617 
 
616 See U.S. v. Seattle, Docket. No. 238 (Memo of OPA Director Pierce Murphy), at p. 6. 
617 Although one member of the SPD’s command staff advised me that the number of internal 
complaints had actually gone “out of control” and that officers were unnecessarily making internal 
complaints out of the fear that they themselves would get into trouble if they did not. 
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February 16, 2016 Fifth Systemic Assessment: Crisis 
Intervention 618 
Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Fifth systemic assessment: crisis intervention. 
The Monitor’s fifth systemic assessment, relating to the SPD’s “Crisis 
Intervention Program,” was filed with the Court on February 16, 2016. 
The assessment reported that the SPD had taken “major steps” in reducing 
police uses of force against persons suffering from mental crisis and reached “initial 
compliance” in that area of the Consent Decree.619 As reported by the Seattle Times:  
 
618 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 269, filed February 16, 2016. 
619 Section III. B. (paragraphs 130-137) of the Settlement Agreement contained provisions relating 
to SPD use of force against persons in crisis: 
B. CRISIS INTERVENTION 
Para. 130. “SPD will continue its work in providing training in verbal tactics with the goal of 
reducing the use of force against individuals in behavioral or mental health crisis, or who are 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and to direct or refer such individuals to the appropriate 
services where possible. SPD has currently provided Crisis Intervention training to approximately 
365 officers. SPD will continue to provide Crisis Intervention training as needed to ensure that CI 
trained officers are available on all shifts to respond to incidents or calls involving individuals 
known or suspected to have a mental illness, substance abuse, or a behavioral crisis (‘individuals 
in crisis’).” 
Para. 131. “SPD will maintain its program of dispatching CI trained officers to incidents or calls 
involving individuals in crisis.” 
Para. 132. “CI trained officers will take the lead, when appropriate, in interacting with individuals 
in crisis. If a supervisor has assumed responsibility for the scene, the supervisor will seek the 
input of CI trained officers on strategies for resolving the crisis event where it is reasonable and 
practical to do so.” 
Para. 133. “To be considered ‘CI trained,’ SPD officers will be required to undergo a 40-hour 
initial comprehensive CI training, and eight hours of in-service CI training annually thereafter. 
SPD’s CI training will continue to address field evaluation, suicide intervention, community mental 
health resources, crisis de-escalation, and scenario exercises. The training may include on-site 
visitation to mental health facilities and interaction with individuals with a mental illness. 
Additionally, the CI training will provide clear guidance as to when an officer may detain an 
individual solely because of his/her crisis. SPD will consult with the Crisis Intervention Committee 
(“CIC”) regarding changes to the curriculum going forward.” 
Para. 134. “SPD officers who do not receive the comprehensive CI training will receive basic 
training on crisis intervention. This training should include a subset of the topics and training 
methods included in the CI training, and will also explain the circumstances in which a CI trained 
officer should be dispatched or consulted, and how situations involving impaired subjects should 
be addressed when a CI trained officer cannot respond. SPD will consult with the CIC regarding 
the curriculum and appropriate number of hours for this training.” 
Para. 135. “SPD, in conjunction with the CIC, will evaluate its current training for dispatchers on 
identifying calls for service that involve individuals in crisis. SPD will ensure that all dispatchers 
are appropriately trained to identify calls for service involving individuals in crisis and dispatch CI 
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[t]he SPD’s treatment of the mentally ill or chemically impaired was a 
significant finding of the DOJ’s 2011 investigation into the use of excessive 
force by officers. The investigation found police routinely used 
unconstitutional levels of force in making arrests, often against people who 
were mentally ill or intoxicated. (Seattle Times, 2/17/2016)620 
According to the Monitor’s report, the SPD provided basic training to every officer 
on the department and advanced training to “some 550” officers. “CIT” trained officers 
were reportedly being dispatched to virtually every call involving people in crisis and 
“there has been a real, tangible, and objective change in the way Seattle police are 
interacting, compassionately and with an eye toward treatment, with those in crisis” (5th 
Systemic Assessment, pp. 14, 22; Seattle Times, 2/17/2016). Further, the Seattle Times 
reported the SPD to be “the first major policy agency in the country to gather detailed 
 
trained officers to the crisis event. SPD will consult with the CIC regarding the curriculum and 
appropriate number of hours for this training.” 
Para. 136. “SPD will continue and expand its tracking of information regarding SPD’s interactions 
with individuals in crisis and provide this data to SPD’s current CI Team. SPD will consult with the 
CIC to determine what interactions result in data collection, and the types of information to be 
collected based on the level of interaction. Subject to the CIC’s review and recommendations, 
and applicable law, SPD should gather and track the following data: 
a) date, time, and location of the incident; 
b) subject’s name, age, gender, and address; 
c) whether the subject was armed, and the type of weapon; 
d) whether the subject is a U.S. military veteran; 
e) complainant's name and address; 
f) name and badge number of officer on the scene; 
g) whether a supervisor responded to the scene; 
h) techniques or equipment used; 
i) any injuries to officers, subject, or others; 
j) disposition, and; 
k) brief narrative of the event (if not included in any other document).” 
Para. 137. “SPD will review the outcome data generated through the process described above, 
and may use the data for developing case studies for roll call and CI training, recognizing and 
highlighting successful individual officer performance, developing new response strategies for 
repeat calls for service, identifying training needs for the annual in-service CI training, making CI 
training curriculum changes, or identifying systemic issues that impede SPD’s ability to provide an 
appropriate response to a behavioral crisis event” (Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Seattle, 
Document No. 3-1, filed 7/27/2012). 
620 Carter, M. (2016, February 17). ‘Real, tangible’ change in SPD’s crisis response. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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data on responses to calls requiring crisis intervention and whether force was used” 
(Seattle Times, 2/17/2016). 
According to the data available to the SPD, officers had resorted to force in just 
2% of the calls involving persons in crisis from June to August, 2015 with the department 
“on track for around 10,000 crisis contacts per year” (5th Systemic Assessment, pp. 5, 
11). The Monitor further noted that, in those cases where force was used, 84% of the 
time, the lowest-level of reportable force was used with the next level of force (Level II) 
being used in the remainder of incidents. Level III uses of force (involving uses of 
serious or deadly force) were not reported in any of the crisis calls (5th Systemic 
Assessment, p. 11).  
These numbers suggest that the SPD is using significant and appropriate 
restraint in difficult situations, making decisions that preserve safety and 
reduce use of force. This is a significant finding, indicative of the culture 
shift that has taken place – and supportive of initial compliance. (5th 
Systemic Assessment, p. 12) 
The Monitor summarized his findings as follows: 
1) The SPD is dispatching their now large and trained cadre of CI-Certified 
officers to crisis events in the great majority of instances. 
2) Initial data indicates that officers use force against individuals in crisis 
less than two percent of the time and, when they do use force, 80 percent 
of the time they use the lowest level of force (and not once used the highest 
level of force), even in high-risk situations. 
3) Over the past two years, all officers have received some level of crisis 
intervention training, which has been approved by the Department of 
Justice, the Monitor, and the Federal Court. 
4) A sufficient number of officers appear to be stationed throughout the 
City, and on all watches, to provide coverage for crisis incidents. 
5) SPD has institutionalized attention to crisis intervention work by 
establishing and funding the CIT Program, implementing training and data 
collection processes, and continuing to take the lead in maintaining the 
CIC. 
6) SPD is making strong efforts to guide people in crisis into the social 
service system, as opposed to arresting and jailing them (5th Systemic 
Assessment, pp. 1-2). 
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February 25, 2016 Court Order approving Plan for 
Assessment of SPD Accountability 
Processes621 
Judge James Robart 
March 16, 2016 Order approving Revisions to OPS Manual 
“With One Exception”622 
Judge James Robart 
June 6, 2016 Minute Order Scheduling Status 
Conference Re: SPD Accountability 
Systems Review623 
Judge James Robart 
July 14, 2016 Court Order approving Fourth Year 
Monitoring Plan624 
Seattle Police Monitor; Judge 
James Robart 
August 9, 2016 Court Order Authorizing City to Draft 
Legislation concerning SPD’s 
Accountability Systems625 
Judge James Robart 
September 26, 2016 Compliance Status & Seventh semi-annual 
report626 
Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Compliance status & seventh (& last) semi-annual report. 
The Monitor’s seventh and last semi-annual report, was filed with the court on 
September 26, 2016. In that report, the Monitor reported that the SPD had “made 
‘significant progress’ over the past year in complying with many aspects of a consent 
decree to address excessive force and biased policing” (Seattle Times, 9/28/2016).627 
For the first time, the Monitor identified a possible time frame for the City to reach full 
compliance; suggesting that it could occur “in as little as a year from now” (Fall 2017).628 
According to the Monitor, “[i]t has been a prodigious effort to come this far, and the 
distance traveled now exceeds the distance that remains” (7th semi-annual report, p. 2).  
The Monitor credited Mayor Murray, with providing the leadership necessary to 
achieve the necessary reforms: “Mayor Ed Murray promised nearly three years ago that 
reform of the SPD was the top priority of his first term. He has been good to his word 
and significant credit is due to [him].” He also credited Chief O’Toole for “her sharp focus 
 
621 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 275, filed February 25, 2016. 
622 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 278, filed March 16, 2016. 
623 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 293, filed June 16, 2016. 
624 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 298, filed July 14, 2016. 
625 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 305, filed August 9, 2016. 
626 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 317, filed September 26, 2016. 
627 Miletich, S. (2016, September 28). Seattle police win praise. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
628 The court actually made its first finding of “initial compliance” on January 10, 2018. 
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on compliance with the Consent Decree” and for “building necessary bridges, and 
collaborating both internally and with the key stakeholders outside the SPD” (7th semi-
annual report, p. 2). 
The Monitor’s report also suggested that the SPD culture appeared to have 
changed since the Settlement Agreement had been reached; although he noted that it 
would take time to ensure that the culture change had been “‘baked in’ to the fabric of 
the Department.” The Monitor also lauded the department’s rank-and-file “who have had 
to learn and implement new policies, receive and internalize extensive new training, 
work under more sustained supervision, document and report more about their daily 
performance, and respond constructively to greater accountability” (7th semi-annual 
report, pp. 2,3). 
The Monitor highlighted that officers were now appearing to exercise restraint in 
using force against people in crisis. He also noted a reduction in the use of moderate to 
high levels of use of force, suggesting that this “may signal that officers, on the whole, 
are de-escalating more incidents and reserving force for only those instances where it is 
necessary, proportional and reasonable” under the circumstances (7th semi-annual 
report, pp. 2-3). 
However, as reported by the Seattle Times, the seventh semi-annual report did 
not discuss pending issues of accountability. In fact, earlier that Summer, the 
membership of the Seattle Police Officers’ Guild (SPOG) had “overwhelmingly rejected” 
a contract offer from the City that included reforms relating to police accountability and 
discipline. During a court hearing on August 15, 2016, after the union rejected the 
contract in late July, the assigned federal Judge stated: “the court and the citizens of 
Seattle will not be held hostage for increased payments and benefits...” (Seattle Times, 
7/21/2016, 8/16/2016, 9/28/2016).629 In fact, it turned out to be issues of accountability 
that would ultimately derail the compliance schedule for the Consent Decree, resulting in 
a finding by the court, on May 21, 2019, that the City had fallen “partially” out of 
compliance with the Consent Decree as it related to its police accountability regime.630 
 
629 Miletich, S. (2016, July 21). Seattle police union soundly rejects contract. Seattle Times; 
Miletich, S. (2016, August 15). In tongue lashing, judge won’t let guild hold police reform 
‘hostage.’ Seattle Times; Seattle Times, 9/28/2016. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
630 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 562, filed May 21, 2019. 
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The Monitor’s last five systemic assessments, relating to Supervision (December 
31, 2016), Type II Force Investigation & Reviews (a Reassessment) (January 27, 2017), 
the Early Intervention System (EIS) (March 23, 2017), Use of Force (April 16, 2017) and 
Stops, Search & Seizure (June 18 ,2017) were all filed between December 31, 2016 and 
June 18, 2017. 
October 20, 2016 Unfair Labor Practice Complaint filed by 
Seattle Police Management Association 
(SPMA) alleging Police Accountability 
reforms in violation of contract631 
Seattle Police Management 
Association (SPMA) 
December 13, 2016 Court order approving SPD Force 
Investigation Unit Procedural Manual632 
SPD FIT; Judge James Robart 
December 31, 2016 Sixth Systemic Assessment: 
Supervision633 
Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Sixth systemic assessment: crisis intervention. 
The Monitor’s sixth systemic assessment, relating to the SPD Supervision, was 
filed with the Court on December 13, 2016. 
The Monitor noted that the Consent Decree contained four provisions 
(paragraphs) relating to supervision, “requiring SPD to deploy a sufficient number of 
well-trained sergeants who can provide the supervision, guidance, and oversight 
necessary to provide real-time accountability to line-officers.”634 
 
631 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 347, filed December 30, 2016, p. 2. 
632 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 341, filed December 23, 2016. 
633 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 351, filed December 31, 2016. 
634 Para. 153. “The City will provide and SPD will deploy an adequate number of qualified 
field/first-line supervisors (typically sergeants) to assure that the provisions of this Agreement are 
implemented. SPD will employ sufficient first-line supervisors to assure that first-line supervisors 
are able to: 1) respond to the scene of uses of force as required by this Agreement; 2) investigate 
each use of force (except those investigated by FIT) in the manner required by this Agreement; 3) 
ensure documentation of uses of force as required by this Agreement; and 4) provide supervision 
and direction as needed to officers employing force.” 
Para. 154. “As a general rule, all operational field officers (including patrol officers) should be 
assigned to a single, consistent, clearly identified first-line supervisor. First-line supervisors 
should normally be assigned to work the same days and hours as the officers they are assigned 
to supervise.” 
Para. 155. “Sergeant training is central to effective first-line supervision. The City and SPD will 
ensure that personnel assigned to a planned assignment of acting sergeant for longer than 60 
days will be provided adequate training to fulfill the supervisor obligations under this Agreement, 
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The 2011 DOJ investigation specifically found that the pattern of excessive force 
attributable to the SPD was, in part, the product of inadequate supervision. Specifically, 
the DOJ found that “SPD has tacitly allowed a pattern or practice of excessive use of 
force by failing to provide adequate supervision of force.” The DOJ continued that:  
[t]he failure to supervise patrol officers’ use of force has occurred at every 
level, from the first-line supervisor’s (typically a sergeant) investigation and 
review, to the chain of command’s secondary review of that investigation, 
to the final review by command staff. (DOJ Investigation, 2011, pp. 4, 17) 
As part of the supervision failures, the DOJ identified a systemic failure to adequately 
train sergeants. In addition, the DOJ found that “SPD fails to provide adequate 
supervision to assess biased policing concerns by (1) failing to conduct data analysis 
regarding its officers’ activity and (2) failing to conduct thorough investigations of biased 
policing allegations” (DOJ Investigation, 2011, pp. 19, 31). 
As reported by the Monitor, 
the Consent Decree focuses on four main topics concerning supervision. 
The first is the adequacy of supervision by the chain of command. The 
second concerns “unity of command,” or ensuring that SPD personnel are 
“assigned to a single, consistent, clearly identified first-line supervisor.” The 
third relates to sergeant training, ensuring that any personnel assigned as 
a long-term “acting sergeant” receives specific training within sixty days of 
their appointment on the responsibilities and requirements of such a 
supervisor position. Finally, it must be clear that SPD “deploy[s] an 
adequate number of qualified . . . supervisors to assure that the provisions” 
of the Consent Decree are implemented. (6th Systemic Assessment, p. 1) 
The Monitor found the SPD in initial compliance with the supervision 
requirements of the Consent Decree “subject to two important considerations.” First, the 
Monitor commented that he had “previously found deficiencies in supervisory review of 
Type II force cases based on a 2014 sample.” As such, a follow-up assessment was 
required to determine if the “quality and rigor of Type II investigations and reviews by 
supervisors” had improved over the prior two years. Second, an upcoming assessment 
of Investigative stops and bias-free policing would “explore whether supervisors are 
 
either prior to serving as acting sergeant, or as soon as practicable (and in no event longer than 
90 days from the beginning of the planned assignment).” 
Para. 156. “Precinct commanders and watch lieutenants will continue to closely and effectively 
supervise the first-line supervisors and officers under their command, particularly whether 
commanders and supervisors identify and effectively respond to uses of force” (Settlement 
Agreement, U.S. v. Seattle, Document 3-1, filed 7/27/2017). 
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sufficiently reviewing documentation for such stops – as such, the outcome of those 
assessments would also have an impact on the Department’s overall compliance with 
the supervision requirements of the Consent Decree” (6th Systemic Assessment, p. 2). 
January 3, 2017 Court approves 2017 SPD Training 
Plan.635 
Judge James Robart 
January 4, 2017 Status Conference Re: SPMA Unfair Labor 
Practice Complaint.636 
City of Seattle 
January 6, 2017 Court Order Regarding Accountability 
Legislation.637 
Judge James Robart 
January 27 2017 Seventh Systemic Assessment: Type II 
Force Investigation & Review Re-
Assessment638 
Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Seventh systemic assessment: type II force investigation & reviews (re-
assessment). 
The Monitor’s seventh systemic Assessment, relating to Type II Force 
Investigation and Review, was filed with the Court on January 27, 2017. 
The Seventh Systemic Assessment was intended as a follow-up report to the 
First Systemic Assessment, which, although it found the SPD in initial compliance with a 
number of the provisions regarding force investigation and review, identified a need for 
additional progress relating to intermediate-level, Type II force investigations. 
The report made a general observation regarding consent decree progress up to 
the time of the publication of the assessment: 
SPD continues making progress toward compliance with many important 
provisions of the Consent Decree. It has taken great effort to come this far 
– sometimes with one step back for two steps forward. The Monitoring 
Team acknowledges and commends those who have been resolutely 
keeping their eyes on the goals of effectuating constitutional policing, 
ensuring officer and public safety, building better community relationships, 
encouraging greater clarity and transparency from the SPD, and seeking 
meaningful and depoliticized input by persons from the communities and 
groups most aggrieved by past incidents of unconstitutional police 
practices. (7th Systemic Assessment, p. 1) 
 
635 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 353, filed January 3, 2016. 
636 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 347, filed December 30, 2016. 
637 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 357, filed January 6, 2016. 
638 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 360, filed January 27, 2017. 
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The report also acknowledged that “despite 92 percent of the Seattle population 
wanting to see body cameras used by SPD officers, only a very small number of officers 
currently use the camera in what is either the third or fourth ‘pilot’ of the technology.”639 
The Monitor acknowledged the local challenges that resulted in implementation delays, 
but strongly encouraged movement in this area, which he had previously referred to as 
essential to accountability involving police uses-of-force: 
Seattle has long, and in many ways justifiably, prided itself on consultation 
and civic engagement and debate until a consensus seems to be reached. 
In theory, this way of making policy has the virtue of being highly 
democratic and inclusive because it gives equal force to all constituents. In 
practice, however, these virtues can become distorted when the process is 
geared not toward implementing the overwhelming policy preferences of 
the majority in a manner that preserve and defend the rights of all but 
toward thwarting meaningful consideration of a workable policy 
whatsoever. (7th Systemic Assessment, p. 4) 
The Monitor commented that a change in police union leadership had brought 
about the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the City and 
the police unions. As noted by the Monitor, “[t]he new union leadership suggested that if 
there were more money for the rank-and-file, they might take a more flexible bargaining 
position. The Court has made clear that constitutional reforms would not be held hostage 
to monetary demands” (7th Systemic Assessment, p. 4). The Monitor further commented 
on the fact that the union representing police Lieutenants and Captains “took a different 
tack” by filing an unfair labor practice claim “that threatens to tie up the reform process in 
endless negotiations and proceedings ricocheting between the state labor board and the 
federal court” (7th Systemic Assessment, pp. 4-5). 
The Monitor concluded on a negative note:  
The Monitoring Team suggested almost a year ago that the SPD could 
reach full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree in late summer 
or early fall 2017. At a status conference in early January 2017, the Court 
estimated that it might be 2018 or beyond before that point is reached – in 
no small part due to a lack of definitive action in the areas briefly described 
here. Indeed, describing the progress on issues related to body cameras, 
union agreements, and the prospective system of “accountability” in Seattle 
as glacial gives glaciers a bad name. (7th Systemic Assessment, p. 5) 
 
639 As noted above, it was not until July 17, 2017, that Mayor Murray issued an executive order 
intended to overcome union resistance to the implementation of a body worn camera program. 
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With respect to the specific assessment of use of force investigations, the 
Monitor evaluated all Type II use of force investigations that took place in the first quarter 
of 2016. The Monitor reported that there had been “a noticeable improvement” in line 
supervisors’ investigations of Type II uses of force and in force investigation reports. The 
Monitor also positively noted that the Force Review Board and the Force Review Unit 
“continue to do a commendable job of identifying policy issues and inconsistencies, as 
well as issues with the actual force and tactics, that were not caught earlier in the 
process” (7th Systemic Assessment, p. 6). Even though the Monitor expressed concerns 
as to whether the SPD had established a “solid record of uniform and consistent 
compliance,” he identified proactive steps as having been taken by the SPD to use 
“Administrative Lieutenants” to ensure high quality reviews and investigations and, thus, 
found the SPD to be in “initial compliance” with paragraphs 103-111 of the Consent 
Decree.640 
 
640 Paragraphs 103-111 of the Consent Decree read as follows: 
Para. 103. “For Type II and Type III uses of force, all involved officers will complete an officer 
statement using descriptive language. The statement will include: 1) the reason for the initial 
police presence; 2) a detailed description of the incident circumstances, including the words, 
actions, and/or threat posed by the suspect warranting the need for force; 3) a detailed 
description of the force used by the officer giving the statement; 4) a detailed description of the 
force used by other officers if clearly observed; 5) a detailed description of any apparent injury to 
the suspect, any complaint of injury, or the lack of injury, including information regarding any 
medical aid or medical evaluation provided.” 
Para. 104. “Upon notification of a Type II use of force, a supervisor will respond to the scene and 
thoroughly investigate all Type II events unless officer or public safety will be compromised as a 
result. No supervisor who participated in, or ordered the force, will conduct or be involved in 
conducting the investigation of the incident. In thoroughly investigating all Type II events, the 
investigating supervisor at a use of force incident will: 
a) Respond to the scene, examine the subject of the force for injury, interview the subject for 
complaints of injury, and where necessary, summon medical aid via SPD Communications. 
b) If the subject does not require medical attention, and probable cause exists for his/her arrest, 
the supervisor may arrange for transport to a police holding facility or directly to jail. 
c) The supervisor will obtain sufficient basic information to determine if a FIT response is 
required. Whether required or not, a supervisor retains the discretion to refer any use of force to 
FIT for FIT’s determination of whether to take investigatory responsibility over the matter. 
d) Whenever there is an indication of possible criminal conduct by an officer, the officer will not be 
compelled to provide a statement. 
e) If a FIT response is not appropriate, the supervisor will conduct the investigation, as an 
impartial fact-finder and will not be responsible for determining the ultimate disposition of the 
incident. The supervisor will: 
(1) Identify and secure evidence to enable the supervisor to describe in detail the use of force and 
the facts and circumstances surrounding it. 
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(2) Ensure collection of evidence sufficient to establish material facts related to the use of force, 
where reasonably available, including physical evidence, audio and video recordings, 
photographs, and other documentation of injuries or the absence of injuries. 
(3) Make reasonable attempts to locate relevant civilian witnesses including the subject and third 
parties, and arrange for witnesses to be interviewed. Supervisors should use interview techniques 
taught in use of force investigation courses, including avoiding leading questions. 
(4) Where practicable and warranted in the circumstances, ensure that all interviews with civilian 
witnesses are recorded. Interviews of the subject, or the subject’s refusal to be interviewed, will 
be audio or ICV recorded, if possible. 
(5) As with civilian witnesses, conduct separate interviews of officers involved in a use of force 
incident, unless unreasonable under the circumstances. 
(6) Require each officer at the scene to complete either a witness statement (if they did not use 
Type II use of force) or a Use of Force Statement (if they did use Type II use of force). Each 
officer will describe what he/she did and saw as comprehensively and descriptively as possible 
and in the context of the use of force by other officers, identifying all other officers involved in the 
incident when possible. The supervisor will assure such statements comply with SPD guidelines. 
(7) Review any ICV or holding cell video related to the incident, and red flag for retention ICV that 
documents contact with the subject. 
(8) Canvass the area for privately-owned video that may have captured the contact, and attempt 
to obtain copies voluntarily. If owner refuses, document the location and/or owner of the video. If 
no privately-owned video is discovered, document that none was found. 
(9) Photograph the location where the incident occurred, to determine damage, and ensure that 
relevant evidence is collected. Photograph any officer injuries or areas of complained injury, and 
any damaged government or private property. 
(10) Respond to the subject’s location, and photograph the subject for identification purposes, 
and any visible injuries or places where the subject complains of injury. 
(11) Consider all relevant evidence, including circumstantial, direct, and physical evidence and 
make credibility determinations and resolve material inconsistencies in statements, if feasible. 
When possible, assess the subject’s injuries and determine whether the subject’s injuries are 
consistent with the force reported used by the officer(s). 
(12) When a supervisor concludes that there may have been misconduct, the supervisor will 
consult with an on-duty commander of the permanent rank of lieutenant or above and ensure that 
OPA is notified.” 
Para. 105. “An email or other form of notification of a reportable use of force will be forwarded to 
the supervisor’s commanding officer by the end of the shift during which the force occurred. The 
notification will contain basic information concerning the incident.” 
Para. 106. “Each supervisor will complete and document a use of force supervisory investigation 
using a Supervisor’s Force Investigation Report (a revised form 1.40b) within 72 hours of learning 
of the use of force, unless an extension is approved by the supervisor’s commanding officer. The 
Supervisor’s Report will include the following: 
a) The supervisor’s narrative description of the incident. A supervisor’s narrative will summarize 
the force used by the officers and the subject, injuries sustained by the subject and the officer, 
and will describe the sequence of events. Additionally, it will document the supervisor’s actions in 
reviewing or screening the incident. The summary should provide a commander reviewing the 
supervisor’s summary a complete understanding of the incident from beginning to end, including, 
crucially, when each officer used force, why the force was necessary at each point in time, and 
how each injury, if any, occurred. 
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February 7, 2017 Court order approving SPD Crowd 
Management Policy641 
Judge James Robart 
March 23, 2017 Eighth Systemic Assessment: Early 
Intervention System (EIS)642 
Seattle Police Monitor 
 
b) The report will be accompanied by the use of force packet which contains documentation of all 
evidence that was gathered, including physical evidence; photographs; and names, phone 
numbers, addresses, and summaries of statements by all civilian witnesses to the incident. In 
situations in which there are no known witnesses, the report will specifically state this fact. In 
situations in which witnesses were present but the author of the report did not determine the 
identification, phone number, or address of those witnesses, the report will state the reasons why. 
c) The names of all other SPD employees witnessing the use of force and summaries of their 
statements. 
d) The supervisor’s evaluation of the evidence, including any material inconsistencies in the 
evidence or statements.” 
Para. 107. “SPD Policy 6.240.XII.B.11 already establishes a process by which the use of force 
packet is forwarded through the chain of command to the involved officer’s bureau commander. 
SPD will revise and clarify the process for review of a use of force report to incorporate the 
process detailed in this section of this Agreement.” 
Para. 108. “Upon completion of the supervisor’s use of force investigation report and packet, the 
investigating supervisor will forward the packet through the chain of command. The reviewing 
lieutenant will review the report packet to ensure it is complete and the investigation was 
thorough and reach findings as to whether the use of force was lawful and consistent with policy. 
Each higher-level supervisor in the chain will review the packet to ensure that it is complete, the 
investigation was thorough, and that the findings are supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence.” 
Para. 109. “When it appears to a supervisor that there is additional relevant and material 
evidence that may assist in resolving inconsistencies or improve the reliability or credibility of the 
findings, that supervisor should ensure that additional investigation is completed. When it appears 
to a supervisor that the findings are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
supervisor will modify the findings after consultation with the investigating supervisor and 
previous reviewers, and document the reasons for this modification, including the specific 
evidence or analysis supporting the modification. Any supervisor in the chain of command may 
discuss the modification with the investigating supervisor and/or reviewers. If any investigative 
deficiencies exist, the reviewer will initiate corrective action where appropriate. Every supervisor 
in the chain of command is responsible to assure the accuracy and completeness of the 
Investigation Reports completed by supervisors.” 
Para. 110. “When the precinct commander finds that the investigation is complete and the 
findings are supported by the evidence, the investigation file will be forwarded to the Use of Force 
Committee.” 
Para. 111. “At the discretion of the officer’s chain of command, or OPA in the case of potential 
misconduct, a use of force investigation may be assigned or re-assigned for investigation to FIT 
or to another supervisor, whether within or outside of the precinct in which the incident occurred, 
or may be returned to the Unit for further investigation or analysis. Where, after investigation, a 
use of force is found to be out of policy, or the investigation of the incident is lacking, the Chief or 
designee will direct and ensure appropriate corrective action, if warranted. When the use of force 
indicates policy, training, tactical, or equipment concerns, the Chief or designee will ensure also 
that necessary training is delivered and that policy, tactical, or equipment concerns are resolved” 
(Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Seattle, Document 3-1, filed July 27, 2012). 
641 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 363, filed February 7, 2017. 
642 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 374, filed March 23, 2017. 
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Eighth systemic assessment: early intervention system (EIS). 
The Monitor’s eighth systemic assessment, relating to the SPD Early Intervention 
System, was filed with the Court on March 23, 2017. 
In its 2011 investigation report, the Department of Justice found that the SPD’s 
“Early Intervention System” was “broken” (DOJ Investigation, 2011, p. 22). Specifically, 
the DOJ found that the EIS thresholds were 1) “far too high and interventions on officer’s 
behavior far too late,” 2) “the interventions that follow an EIS trigger happen far too long 
after the triggering incident;” and 3) EIS reviews by supervisors were “superficial at best” 
(DOJ Investigation, 2011, pp. 22-23).  In addition, the DOJ found that: 
SPD failed to track officers over time to see if interventions have 
successfully curbed the behavior that initially triggered the EIS; SPD allows 
the sergeant who initially signed off on the use of force subject to the EIS 
to review the EIS; officer participation in the EIS process is voluntary; and 
officer performance evaluations frequently fail to reference EIS 
interventions. (DOJ Investigation, 2011, p. 23) 
The Monitor reported that: 
Over the past few years, SPD has made relatively good progress in 
implementing an improved EIS. It has developed basic protocols for 
identifying officers whose conduct may require closer evaluation. The SPD 
has trained supervisors how to evaluate employee performance. It has 
employed fair, non-punitive interventions where performance required 
correction or closer supervision. (8th Systemic Assessment, p. 1) 
Although the Monitor found that the SPD “remains at some distance from full and 
effective compliance,” it had “achieved a level of progress that is reasonable under the 
circumstances.” As such, the Monitor found the SPD in “initial compliance” with 
paragraphs 157 through 163 of the Consent Decree.643 
 
643 Paragraphs 157 through 163 of the Settlement Agreement read as follows: 
Para. 157. “The City’s EIS system will continue to be used for risk management purposes and not 
for disciplinary purposes. SPD will monitor the EIS to ensure it is meeting its objective of 
providing SPD with notice before behaviors become problematic.” 
Para. 158. “SPD will review and adjust, where appropriate, the threshold levels for each of the 
current EIS indicator criteria, and the EIS indicators. The Monitor will review and approve the 
revised EIS threshold levels and indicators”. 
Para. 159. “SPD will revise its EIS policy to include a mechanism for review of an officer whose 
activity has already triggered a threshold for one of the EIS indicator criteria, so that the threshold 
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March 24, 2017 Declaration of Chief of Police in Support of 
SPD Body-Worn Camera Policy644 
Chief Kathleen O’Toole 
April 6, 2017 Ninth Systemic Assessment: Use of 
Force645 
Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Ninth systemic assessment: use of force. 
The Monitor’s ninth systemic Assessment, relating to the SPD use of force, was 
filed with the Court on April 6, 2017. 
The Department of Justice’s 2011 investigation of the SPD identified a pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional use of force, which included “[d]eficiencies in SPD’s training, 
policies, and oversight with regard to the use of force” (DOJ Investigation, 2011, p. 3). 
The Monitor acknowledged that since the time of the Settlement Agreement, the Court 
had approved two revisions to the SPD’s use-of-force policies (on December 17, 2013646 
and on July 27, 2015647) and that the SPD had engaged in extensive use-of-force 
training which had also been filed with the court over a two-plus year period.648 Perhaps 
 
level is lower if EIS is triggered again, where appropriate. For example, if an officer has 
participated in a certain number of uses of force in a six-month period, SPD will design a protocol 
for lowering the threshold for subsequent review.” 
Para. 160. “SPD will collect and maintain information related to supervisor, precinct, squad, and 
unit trends, consistent with the provisions in this section.” 
Para. 161. “SPD will collect, maintain, and retrieve information related to the following precinct-
level activity: 
a) uses of force; 
b) OPA complaints and their dispositions; 
c) number of individual officers who have triggered EIS reviews; and 
d) supervisor EIS reviews with officers.” 
Para. 162. “Supervisors should periodically review EIS activity of officers in their chain of 
command.” 
Para. 163. “SPD will revise its EIS policy and procedure, as necessary, so that interventions 
assist officers in avoiding potentially troubling behavior. Specifically, SPD policies and procedures 
will ensure that (1) the intervention strategy is implemented in a timely manner; (2) data regarding 
the implementation of the intervention is tracked in EIS; and (3) if necessary, the employee’s 
supervisor reviews the progress of the intervention strategy” (Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. 
Seattle, Document 3-1, filed July 27, 2012). 
644 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 380, filed March 24, 2017. 
645 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 383, filed April 6, 2017. 
646 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 115, December 17, 2013. 
647 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 225, July 27, 2015. 
648 U.S. v. Seattle, Document Nos. 144, 151, 152, 153, 165, 168, 199, 254 & 277 (filed between 
May 2014 and March 2016). 
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most importantly, the Monitor observed that at the time of the DOJ investigation, it would 
have been impossible to even conduct an assessment, because, prior to the beginning  
of the reform process, SPD officers often failed to report uses of force, force that was 
reported went unreviewed and when investigations were actually conducted, they were 
generally incomplete and inadequate (9th Systemic Assessment, p. 1, n. 3). 
Based on a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the force used by officers 
over the course of the implementation of the Consent Decree. The Monitor found that: 
overall use of force by the SPD is down – both across time under the 
Consent Decree and compared to the time period studied by the original 
DOJ investigation. Overall, use of force has gone down even as officer 
injuries have not gone up and crime, by most measures, has not increased. 
At the same time, the force that SPD officers do use is, by and large, 
reasonable, necessary, proportional, and consistent with the Department’s 
use of force policy. (9th Systemic Assessment, p. 2) 
Based on the conclusion that “officers are using less force overall, without 
negatively impacting officer safety or public safety, and are using force consistent with 
law and SPD policy in those increasingly infrequent instances when force is deployed,” 
the Monitor concluded that the SPD was “in initial compliance with Paragraphs 69 to 90 
of the Consent Decree.”649 
 
649 Paragraphs 69 to 90 o the Consent Decree read as follows: 
Para. 69. “Officers’ actions should increase public safety, be effective and constitutional, and 
embrace principles of procedural justice. In order to achieve this balance in the application of 
force, the Department commits (a) to maintaining a police force that is highly trained and 
knowledgeable, not only on matters of law and professional standards on use of force, but also 
on matters of reporting, investigating, and reviewing uses of force; and (b) to engaging with and 
educating the public on the appropriate use of force.” 
Para. 70. “Although the City and SPD dispute the patterns or practices of excessive force alleged 
in DOJ’s Report, the Parties nevertheless agree that SPD uses of force, regardless of the type of 
force or weapon used, and consistent with Graham v. Connor, should be guided by the following 
principles. 
a) Officers should use de-escalation techniques, when appropriate and feasible, in order to 
reduce the need for force. 
b) As a general principle, consistent with law enforcement objectives, officers should de-escalate 
the use of force as resistance decreases, while staying in control and as safety permits. 
c) The number of officers on scene may increase the available force options and may increase 
the ability to reduce the overall force used. 
d) Officers should use improvised weapons, such as flashlights, only in compliance with a proper 
policy and training on impact weapons. 
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e) Officers should be trained that a hard strike to the head with any impact weapon, including a 
baton, could result in death, and any strikes to the head should be consistent with policy and 
training. 
f) Officers normally should not use reportable force against handcuffed or otherwise restrained 
subjects unless necessary or reasonable under the circumstances to stop an assault, escape, or 
as necessary to fulfill other legitimate law enforcement objectives. 
g) Officers should not use force against individuals who only verbally confront them and do not 
impede a legitimate law enforcement function. 
h) As soon as practicable following a reportable use of force, SPD should ensure that the incident 
is accurately and properly reported, documented, and investigated.” 
Para. 71. “SPD will revise, as necessary, its use of force policies, procedures, and/or training 
consistent with the principles above.” 
Para. 72. “A fundamental goal of the revised use of force policy will be to account for, and review 
or investigate, every reportable use of force and, where necessary, to reduce any improper uses 
of force while serving to direct resources to the most serious uses of force.” 
Para. 73. “Consistent with current practice, when SPD conducts its review of the implementation 
of the revised use of force policies, it will seek the timely input of the relevant members of the 
Training Section, line officers, supervisors, and PSS.” 
Para. 74. “Revisions to SPD’s weapons-specific policies, procedures, and training will be guided 
by the principles contained in this section.” 
Para. 75. “The use of force policies will address the use and deployment of all authorized force 
weapons that are available to SPD officers. The specific policies for each force weapon will 
provide guidance for each weapon’s use.” 
Para. 76. “The weapon-specific policies will continue to include training and certification 
requirements that each officer must meet before being permitted to carry and use the authorized 
weapon. Officers will only carry weapons authorized by the Department. SPD will consult with the 
Monitor as to whether and when each uniformed officer should be required to carry at least one 
Less Lethal Device.” 
Para. 77. “SPD will implement policies for each of the following weapons using these guidelines.” 
Para. 78. “Officer Discharges of Firearms will continue to be tracked as critical firearms 
discharges in EIS as uses of force. SPD will continue to document critical firearms discharges in 
SPD’s annual use of force report.” 
Para. 79. “The CED policy will continue to contain the training and tactics guidance regarding 
Less-Lethal Options and SPD’s Annual CED Recertification Course, and other sources, and will 
continue to incorporate the following guidelines: 
a) A verbal warning should be given before use unless it is unsafe to do so or if it compromises a 
legitimate law enforcement objective. 
b) As with the initial CED application, each subsequent application is a separate application of 
force that must be individually justified as reasonable. 
c) All CED users will be trained in: 1) the potential risks of prolonged or repeated applications; 2) 
the appropriate procedures following a CED application; 3) the required documentation of a CED 
application in a use of force report; and 4) the appropriate use of the CED in drive stun mode. 
d) All CED users will also be trained in the considerations of the additional environmental hazards 
such as flammable materials or falling hazards that may preclude the use of a CED. 
e) All CED users will also be trained on the consideration of unique characteristics of the subject 
such as age, frailty, pregnancy and other medical conditions. 
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f) CED users will not intentionally target the subject’s head, neck, or genital area unless to protect 
officer or public safety, or to accomplish a legitimate law enforcement objective.” 
Para. 80. “Officers will continue to receive annual CED certifications consisting of physical 
competency, weapon retention, SPD policy, including any policy changes, technology changes, 
and scenario-based training.” 
Para. 81. “SPD will continue to implement integrity safeguards on the use of CEDs to ensure 
compliance with SPD policy, including conducting random and directed audits of CED 
deployment data. The audits will compare the downloaded data to an officer’s reports on use of 
force. Discrepancies within the audit will be addressed and appropriately investigated.” 
Para. 82. “When a supervisor or FIT conduct investigations of CED use in Type II or Type III 
investigations, the investigator will assure that the use of force report thoroughly describes each 
CED application and that the CED data is downloaded and that data analysis is included in the 
use of force report.” 
Para. 83. “SPD will continue to track CED applications as uses of force in EIS and continue to 
include CED data and analysis in its use of force annual report.” 
Para. 84. “The OC Spray policy and training will incorporate the evolving guidance contained 
within the SPD Post-Basic Law Enforcement Academy (“BLEA”) course on Less-Lethal Force as 
well as guidance from the medical community. The policy and training will include at least the 
following guidelines: 
a) Officers will use OC spray only when such force is reasonable, including when used for crowd 
dispersal or protection. 
b) Unless it presents a danger to the officer or others, or compromises a legitimate law 
enforcement objective, officers should use a verbal warning to the subject or crowd that OC spray 
will be used and defer using OC spray a reasonable amount of time to allow the subject to comply 
with the warning. 
c) After the initial application of OC spray, each subsequent spray must also be reasonable and 
the officer should reevaluate the situation accordingly. 
d) The application of OC Spray on persons in restraints such as handcuffs must be consistent 
with a legitimate law enforcement objective, or to protect officer or public safety.” 
Para. 85. “Officers will continue to be trained in and follow protocols developed by SPD on their 
responsibilities following OC Spray use, including minimizing exposure of non-targeted individuals 
and decontamination of exposed subjects. Officers will continue to request medical response or 
assistance for subjects exposed to chemical spray when they complain of continued effects after 
having been decontaminated, or they indicate that they have a pre-existing medical condition 
(e.g., asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, heart ailment, etc.) that may be aggravated by chemical 
spray.” 
Para. 86. “Officers will use only agency-issued or approved OC Spray.” 
Para. 87. “SPD will continue to maintain written documentation of the number of OC Spray 
canisters annually distributed to, and utilized by, each officer. Analysis of OC deployments will 
continue to be included in SPD’s use of force annual report and tracked in EIS as a use of force.: 
Para. 88. “SPD will incorporate in its use of force policies specific provisions concerning the use 
of impact weapons and guidelines for use. Officers will be trained and certified for department-
approved impact weapons before being authorized to carry these weapons. Officers will also be 
recertified at reasonable intervals. Use of any improvised impact weapons will fall under the same 
guidelines and officers will be required to articulate how the use of the weapon was objectively 
reasonable. Consistent with current policy, impact weapon use will be limited to situations in 
which such force is reasonable and consistent with training, for example, when it is necessary to 
protect the officer, the subject, or another party from immediate physical harm.” 
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DePolicing. 
Importantly, in the 9th Systemic Assessment, the Monitor examined and 
addressed ongoing allegations of “de-policing” as it related to the implementation of the 
Consent Decree.650 As previously noted, in May 2014, more than one hundred Seattle 
police officers filed a lawsuit (later dismissed) alleging that the newly imposed use of 
force policies had resulted in officers shying away from appropriate uses of force, over 
fear of being punished for simply doing their job.651 
In his 9th systemic assessment, the Monitor first acknowledged the allegations of 
depolicing:  
some critics of the Consent Decree raised concerns early on that it would 
lead to an increase of crime in Seattle. For one thing, they argue that 
preventing officers from using necessary force would discourage them from 
being proactive (the “de-policing” explanation). For another, they say that 
it encourages criminals by changing their risk-reward calculus in favor of 
more criminal activity (the “rational criminal” explanation). (9th Systemic 
Assessment, p. 59) 
 
Para. 89. “When a supervisor or FIT conduct investigations of impact weapon use in Type II or 
Type III investigations, the investigator will assure that the use of force report thoroughly 
describes each impact weapon strike that the officer recalls. Consistent with current training 
policy and practice, impact weapons should not be used on persons who are handcuffed and 
under control or otherwise restrained persons under control, or persons complying with police 
direction.” 
Para. 90. “Analysis of data regarding the use of impact weapons will continue to be included in 
SPD’s use of force annual report and tracked in EIS as a use of force” (Settlement Agreement, 
U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 3-1, filed July 27, 2012). 
650 The monitor had previously commented on his awareness of allegations of “depolicing” in his 
2nd and 4th semi-annual reports. In his 5th semi-annual report, the monitor also identified 
“encouraging signs” that SPD officers were “not attempting to address unconstitutional policing 
issues by unacceptably reducing policing” (5th semi-annual report, p. 5). 
651 Allegations of “de-policing” were not new to the Seattle Police Department. In fact, such 
allegations were being made well before the DOJ investigation took place. After the police 
shooting of an African American man on May 31, 2001, there were claims that SPD officers were 
engaging in depolicing for fear they would be called “racist” for engaging in legitimate 
enforcement activities (Seattle Times, 6/26/2001; Tizon, A. & Ith, I. (2001, August 2). Stats 
contradict `de-policing' claims - East Precinct officers say they have backed off after racism 
charges, but numbers say otherwise. Seattle Times). In addition, in 2007, it was reported that 
SPD officers responding to a City council-sponsored survey were claiming that officers were 
engaging in depolicing out of fear of receiving citizen complaints and the subsequent investigation 
of those complaints by the OPA. (Seattle Times, 5/1/2007). In addition, a column in the Seattle 
Times in early 2011, before the announcement of the DOJ investigation, quoted the President of 
the Seattle police union as instructing his officers to take a more “passive” approach to their jobs 
in order to avoid citizen complaints and allegations of excessive force. (Seattle Times, 
(2/20/2011). Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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However, like the Seattle Times, when reporters looked into allegations of de-
policing in 2001 (8/2/2001), the Monitor found no evidence of de-policing taking place 
with respect to the implementation of the Consent Decree. The Monitor reported that his 
team “tested whether evidence of [de-policing could] be found in patterns of crime 
reporting during the 28 months of the present assessment.” Although the Monitor found 
a significant statistical correlation between Group A crimes reported in Seattle and 
changes in SPD uses of force, he found that “contrary to predictions” the statistical 
correlation between the two was “positive: as crime goes up, so does use of force.” The 
Monitor reported that “consequently, not only does it not appear that decreased use of 
force has been associated with increased crime, it is actually the opposite: crime is 
highest when officers have used the most force.”652 
The Monitor team went on to test the association of the overall crime numbers 
and SPD use of force numbers, by dividing Group A crimes into two different groups: 
personal crimes and property crimes. The Monitor found that “there is no obvious 
correlation between [SPD’ use of force and crime incidence … Specifically, a statistical 
analysis of both property and person crime indicates that neither is a significant correlate 
of the use of force.” The Monitor further found that, in fact, “SPD officers are using more 
force when personal crime is higher” which the Monitor found once again “runs contrary 
to the predictions of both the de-policing and rational crime explanations, which would 
predict that crime would be higher where use of force levels were lower” (9th Systemic 
Assessment, p. 62). 
Ultimately, after having conducted their statistical analyses, the Monitoring team 
concluded that  
we] suspect[] – though cannot definitively prove at this time with the 
available data – that the decreasing numbers of use of force over time have 
been driven by a reduction in inappropriate, unnecessary, or 
unconstitutional force rather than a reduction in lawful and necessary force 
vital for crime-fighting. (9th Systemic Assessment, p. 62)653 
 
652 The Monitor subsequently concluded that “there is no evidence to support either the de-
policing or the rational criminal explanations which would predict a negative correlation (as uses 
of force decreases, crime increases).” (9th systemic report, p. 60). 
653 These conclusions were consistent with statements by the police chiefs in Washington D.C. 
and Pittsburgh who argued that claims of de-policing in those cities were “a myth” (Chanin, 2012, 
pp. 183-187). 
338 
Still, claims of de-policing continue to be legion, with Seattle officers at the 
forefront of making these claims.654 
May 3, 2017 Court Order approving SPD Draft Body 
Worn Video Policy655 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
May 21, 2017 City Council approves Police Accountability 
Ordinance656 
Seattle City Council 
June 18, 2017 Tenth Systemic Assessment: Stops, 
Search & Seizure657 
Seattle Police Monitor 
 
Tenth systemic assessment: stops, search & seizure. 
The Monitor’s Tenth (and last) systemic assessment, relating to the SPD Stops, 
Search & Seizure, was filed with the Court on June 18, 2017. The report addressed “two 
basic issues,” first, the constitutionality of SPD “stops and frisks” and, second, disparities 
with respect to SPD stop activities (10th Systemic Assessment, p. 3) 
In what the Seattle Times referred to as “a major milestone,” the report found the 
SPD to be in compliance with the Consent Decree with respect to stop-and frisk 
practices (Seattle Times, 6/20/2017).658 The Times speculated that as a result of the 
completion of the ten systemic assessments, the court could find the SPD in “full 
compliance with all or part of the court order,” although the paper recognized that “the 
timing could be influenced by November’s mayoral election and protracted contract 
issues with police unions” (Seattle Times, 6/20/17). 
As a result of his review of SPD detentions taking place between July 1, 2015 
and January 30, 2017, the Monitor found that “vast majority” of stops and frisks were 
“adequately justified” and “most stops were appropriately limited to a reasonable scope 
 
654 See Chanin & Sheets, 2018, p. [“The views of one Seattle Police Department officer clearly 
illustrate the concept [of de-policing]: ‘[p]arking under a shady tree to work on a crossword puzzle 
is a great alternative to being labeled a racist and being dragged through an inquest, a review 
board, an FBI and U.S. attorney investigation and a lawsuit,” citing Leo J., July 30, 20101, 
Cincinnati cops out, U.S. News & World Report, 131, p. 10]. Also citing, L. Byron, August 3, 2012, 
Are Seattle Police officers holding back?, KING 5 News. Retrieved April 9, 2016, from 
http://www.king5.com/story/news/local/seattle/2014/08/03/13146738/. 
655 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 390, filed May 3, 2017. 
656 Miletich, S. (2017, May 23). City council approves police oversight system with historic 8-0 
vote. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
657 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 394, filed June 18, 2017. 
658 Miletich, S. (2017, June 20). Monitor: SPD making gains on reforms. Seattle Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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and reasonable duration as required under law and SPD policy” (10th Systemic 
Assessment, p. 5). The Monitor found that “the number of stops and detentions of 
individuals that are not supported by sufficient legal justification is exceedingly small. 
Importantly, an individual’s odds of being a subject of a ‘bad’ stop do not depend on that 
individual’s race” (10th Systemic Assessment, p. 109). This finding was important due to 
the Department of Justice’s 2011 original assertion that “confusion” existed amongst 
SPD officers, at that time of the DOJ investigation, about legal standards relating to 
stops and searches (DOJ Investigation, 2011, p. 6). 
Ultimately, the Monitor made the following findings: 
… because SPD’s officers have the appropriate legal and policy 
justification for stops and frisks in a vast majority of instances, the 
Department is in initial compliance with Consent Decree paragraphs 138 
through 144 addressing stops and detentions.659 Informed both by prior 
 
659 Paragraphs 138 through 144 of the Settlement Agreement read as follows: 
Para. 138. “The Parties agree that pro-active policing is necessary to accomplish strong 
community-based policing and effective crime control, and that police-community contacts should 
be conducted in accordance with the rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States. SPD should ensure that investigatory stops and 
detentions are part of an effective law enforcement objective. The Commission may make 
recommendations to the City on any changes to SPD policies, practices, or training regarding 
stops and detentions based upon community input and best practices.” 
Para. 139. “To achieve these outcomes, SPD will adhere to the requirements below.” 
Para. 140. “SPD will revise, as necessary, the Social Contact, Terry Stop, & Arrest Policy, 
Section 6.220, to ensure that the definitions of Social Contact and Terry Stops explicitly conform 
to constitutional requirements. Specifically, the policy will (1) define Social Contacts and non- 
custodial interviews as encounters that are voluntary and consensual; and (2) prohibit 
investigatory stops where the officer lacks reasonable suspicion that a person has been, is, or is 
about to be engaged in the commission of a crime.” 
Para. 141. “SPD will continue to require that officers be able to specifically and clearly articulate 
reasonable suspicion when they conduct investigatory stops or detentions, or conduct field 
interviews for Terry stops.” 
Para. 142. “SPD will provide all SPD patrol officers with in-service training on an annual basis, 
based on developments in applicable law and SPD policy, sufficient to address the following 
topics: 
a) the importance of police-community contacts for effective policing and community relations and 
trust; 
b) Fourth Amendment and related law; SPD policies, and requirements in this Agreement 
regarding investigatory stops and detentions; 
c) First Amendment and related law in the context of the rights of individuals to verbally dispute 
officer conduct; 
d) legal distinction between social contacts, non-custodial interviews, and investigatory Terry 
stops; 
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monitoring of bias-free policing training and the fact that most SPD stops 
appear to not be subjecting people of some races to more legally 
impermissible stops, at least with respect to the Fourth Amendment, the 
Monitor finds that SPD is initial compliance with paragraphs 145 through 
152 addressing the creation of the bias-free policing policy, officer training, 
and supervisory responsibilities. (10th Systemic Assessment, p. 11)660 
 
e) distinction between various police contacts according to the scope and level of police intrusion; 
and 
f) the facts, circumstances, and best practices that should be considered in initiating, conducting, 
terminating, and expanding an investigatory stop or detention, including when an individual is free 
to leave, and when an officer might identify him or herself during a contact.” 
Para. 143. “Additionally, SPD will provide all officers with regular roll call trainings regarding social 
contacts, non-custodial interviews, and investigatory stops and detentions.” 
Para. 144. “Consistent with SPD policies and procedures, absent exceptional circumstances, by 
the end of each shift, a supervisor will continue to obtain and review his/her supervisees’ incident 
reports and any other reports that document the basis for investigatory stops and detentions to 
determine if they were supported by reasonable suspicion and consistent with SPD policy, 
federal, or state law; and determine if the officer requires review of agency policy, strategy, 
tactics, or training” (Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 3-1, filed July 27, 
2012). 
660 Paragraphs 145 through 152 of the Settlement Agreement read as follows: 
Para. 145. “The Parties agree that SPD should deliver police services that are equitable, 
respectful, and free of unlawful bias, in a manner that promotes broad community engagement 
and confidence in the Department. Officers should treat all members of the Seattle community 
with courtesy, professionalism, and respect, and should not use harassing, intimidating, or 
derogatory language.” 
Para. 146. “SPD will revise, as necessary, the Unbiased Policing policy, in conjunction with the 
Commission, to provide the following clear guidance: 
a) Clarifying that the policy against biased policing extends to all protected classes under state, 
federal, and local laws, including race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, age, religion, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, or disability in making law enforcement decisions. 
b) Reaffirming that officers may not use race, ethnicity, or national origin in determining 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, unless race, ethnicity, or national origin is used as part 
of a suspect(s) description. 
c) Reaffirming that officers will (1) not engage in, ignore, or condone bias based policing; (2) be 
responsible for knowing and complying with the policy; and (3) report incidents where they 
observe or are aware of other officers who have engaged in bias-based policing.” 
Para. 147. “The Parties recognize that training on issues of bias present in our society is 
complicated and critical. SPD, in conjunction with the Commission, will develop and provide 
training on bias-free policing for all patrol and other relevant officers, supervisors, and command 
staff. SPD will develop a training curriculum, with input from the Commission, that builds on 
existing discriminatory policing training, determine the appropriate modality or combination of 
modalities (scenario-based, classroom, academy, etc.) and training assessment tools. Training 
development should consider the following topics.” 
Para. 148. “Patrol officers: 
a) constitutional and other legal requirements related to equal protection and unlawful 
discrimination, including the requirements of this Agreement; 
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Regarding Court Review of Accountability 
Ordinance661 
Judge James Robart 
July 17, 2017 Seattle Executive Order 2017-03: 
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Mayor Ed Murray 
August 1, 2017 Memorandum to Chief of Police: “Analysis 
re: ‘Full & Effective’ Compliance with the 
Consent Decree”663 
Rebecca Boatright, Chief Legal 
Officer, SPD 
Brian Maxey, Chief Operating 
Officer, SPD 
September 7, 2017 Court Order Approving Portions of 
Accountability Ordinance664 
Judge James Robart 
 
b) strategies, such as problem-solving policing, procedural justice, and recognizing implicit bias, 
to avoid conduct that may lead to biased policing or the perception of biased policing;  
c) precinct-level cultural competency training regarding the histories and cultures of local 
immigrant and ethnic communities.” 
Para. 149. “Supervisors and command staff: 
a) what constitutes discriminatory policing under state, federal, and constitutional law; 
b) how to identify discriminatory practices when reviewing investigatory stop data, arrest data, 
and use of force data; and how to respond to a complaint of discriminatory police practices, 
including conducting a preliminary investigation of the complaint in order to preserve key 
evidence and potential witnesses; 
c) how to evaluate complaints of improper pedestrian stops for potential discriminatory police 
practices; and 
d) engaging the community and developing positive relationships with diverse community 
groups.” 
Para. 150. “SPD leadership and supervising officers will continue to reinforce to subordinates that 
discriminatory policing is an unacceptable tactic, and officers who engage in discriminatory 
policing will be subject to discipline.” 
Para. 151. “In consultation with the Commission, SPD should consider whether to revise SPD 
Manual 5.140 to identify supervisory responsibility in responding to allegations of discriminatory 
policing.” 
Para. 152. “If an individual affirmatively states that he or she is the subject of discriminatory 
policing, the officer’s supervisor should, where reasonable, respond to the scene and determine if 
additional action, including a complaint to OPA, is warranted” (Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. 
Seattle, Document No. 3-1, filed July 27, 2012). 
661 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 397, filed June 23, 2017. 




663 Received from research participant. On file with author. 
664 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 413, filed September 7, 2017. 
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September 8, 2017 Monitor Files Compliance Status Report 
(arguing City not yet in Compliance).665  
Monitor Bobb 
September 12, 2017 Mayor Ed Murray Resigns666 
Seattle Times reports on Email sent by 
Chief O’Toole stating SPD in compliance 
regardless of Monitor Compliance 
Report)667 
Mayor Ed Murray 
Chief Kathleen O’Toole 
September 13, 2017 Bruce Harrell appointed Interim Mayor668 By City Council 
September 18, 2017 Tim Burgess appointed Interim Mayor669 By City Council after resignation 
of Bruce Harrell 
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Decree670 
Peter Holmes, Seattle City 
Attorney 
October 13, 2017 DOJ’s Memorandum in Support of City’s 
Request for Declaration of Full & Effective 
Compliance671 
CPC Response in favor of finding of 
compliance.672 
Annette Hayes, US Attorney for 
Western District of Washington; 
John Gore, Acting Asst. AG 
 
7.3.3. Full & Effective Compliance & Beyond 
By October 13, 2017, both parties and the CPC were arguing to the court that the 
City should be found in “full and effective compliance” with the Settlement Agreement. 
The only holdout was the Monitor, who used precatory language in a September 8, 2017 
filing, wherein although he acknowledged the SPD had “reached major milestones” as 
determined by the ten systemic assessments, he also opined that “the ten assessments, 
all clearly important, nevertheless do not constitute all the requirements of the Consent 
 
665 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 416, filed September 8, 2017. 
666 Seattle Times Editorial Board (2017, September 13). Mayor Murray right. Seattle Times 
[“Mayor Ed Murray did the right thing resigning Tuesday. Allegations from his past were getting in 
the way of Seattle’s present and its future”]. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com.  
667 Miletich, S. (2017, September 12). Seattle Police dispute monitor on reform compliance. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
668 Beekman, D. (2017, September 14). ‘A time for healing,’ temporary mayor vows. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
669 Beekman, D. (2017, September 19). Seattle gets third Mayor in less than a week. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
670 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 419, filed September 29, 2017. 
671 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 422, filed October 13, 2017. 
672 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 421, filed October 13, 2017. 
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Decree” (Compliance Status Report, p. 3).673 The Monitor identified important remaining 
issues, including questions surrounding a controversial police shooting of a 30-year-old 
African-American mother of four. The Monitor also commented that he had previously 
identified instances of disparate policing and noted that “[a]ccordingly, SPD and the City 
must now consider what may be driving that disparity, whether such disparity is 
unwarranted, and, if that disparity is unwarranted, what steps may be taken to ensure 
greater equity” (Compliance Status Report, p. 17). The Monitor also noted “the 
importance of the resolution of current changes pending in Seattle’s institutional system 
of accountability and the conclusion of the current labor negotiations between the City 
and the police officer unions” (Compliance Status Report, pp. 17-18). Finally, the Monitor 
reminded the Court that the Inspector General position, “perhaps the single most 
important guarantee that the SPD will continue to practice constitutional policing beyond 
the life of the Consent Decree,” had still not been filled (Compliance Status Report, p. 
18). 
By the end of November, however, the Seattle Times was reporting that “sources 
not authorized to publicly discuss the matter contend that Bobb [since the time of the 
filing of his status report], has somewhat softened his position.”674 
November 28, 2017 Term of Mayor Jenny Durkan begins675  
January 10, 2018 Order Finding Initial Compliance with 
Consent Decree676 
US District Judge James 
Robart 
 
On January 10, 2018, Judge Robart found the City in “full and effective 
compliance” with the Settlement Agreement. In making his finding, Judge Robart 
commented on the concerns previously expressed by the Monitor: “[t]he court is 
cognizant of these concerns and understands that the City must address them going 
forward. Indeed, the City acknowledges that ‘[r]eform will continue in the sustainment 
period’” (Order Finding Initial Compliance, p. 13). The Judge commented that,  
 
673 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 416, filed September 8, 2017. 
674 Miletich, S., (2017, November 23). Judge looking into shooting of Lyles, SPD union contract. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
675 Beekman, D. (2017, September 29). In busy first day as Mayor, Durkan crisscrosses City. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
676 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 439, filed January 10, 2018. 
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[f]ulfilling Phase I is an enormous milestone and one in which the City and 
SPD should take pride, … Nevertheless, the court cautions the City and 
SPD that this does not mean their work is done. In many ways, Phase II is 
the most difficult portion of the Consent Decree to fulfill … The ability to 
sustain the good work that has begun is not a foregone conclusion, … It 
will require dedication, hard work, creativity, flexibility, vigilance, 
endurance, and continued development and refinement of policies and 
procedures in accordance with constitutional principles. (Order Finding 
Initial Compliance, p. 14) 
Judge Robart concluded that “[i]f collective bargaining results in changes to the 
accountability ordinance that the court deems to be inconsistent with the Consent 
Decree, then the City’s progress in Phase II will be imperiled…” (Order Finding Initial 
Compliance, p. 15). 
March 13, 2018 Court Order Approving Phase II 
Sustainment Period Plan677 
Seattle Police Monitor; Judge 
James Robart 
June 18, 2018 Court approval of Revisions to SPD Bias-
Free Policing & Crisis Intervention 
Policies678 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
August 13, 2018 Carmen Best appointed as SPD Chief679 Appointed by Mayor Durkan 
August 14, 2018 Court approval of SPD Revisions to Use-
of-Force Policy680 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
October 23, 2018 
October 26, 2018 
Orders Scheduling a Status Conference 
regarding Police Union (SPOG) 
Contract681 
Judge James Robart 
November 19, 2018 Court Order approving revisions to SPD 
Voluntary Contacts, Terry Stops and 
Voluntary Detention policies682 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
December 3, 2018 Order to Show Cause Whether the Court 
Should Find that the City has Failed to 
Maintain Full and Effective Compliance 
with the Consent Decree683 
US District Judge James Robart 
December 12, 2018 Order approving revisions to SPD Use-of-
Force policy 
US District Judge James Robart 
 
677 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 448, filed March 13, 2018. 
678 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 453, filed June 18, 2018. 
679 Beekman, D. (2018, August 14, 2018). Carmen Best voted in as Seattle police chief. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
680 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 477, filed August 14, 2018. 
681 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 485, filed October 23, 2018; Document No.487, filed October 
26, 2018. 
682 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 501, filed November 19, 2018. 
683 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 504, filed December 3, 2018. 
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December 17, 2018 Order approving revisions to SPD Early 
Intervention System policy 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
January 2, 2019 Order Holding Case in Abeyance and 
Modifying Deadlines Until USDOJ 
Appropriations are Restored 
USDOJ; Judge James Robart 
January 29, 2019 Order Lifting Stay and Extending 
Deadlines 
Judge James Robart 
April 19, 2019 Order Scheduling Status Conference Re: 
OSC 
Judge James Robart 
May 21, 2019 Order Finding City of Seattle Partially 
Out of Compliance with the Consent 
Decree; Order to Parties to Formulate a 
Methodology for Assessing Accountability 
Regime to Achieve Consent Decree 
Compliance684 
US District Judge James 
Robart 
 
Sixteen months later, after the Durkan administration negotiated away some of 
the provisions of the City’s “Police Accountability Ordinance,” Judge Robart was finding 
the City “partially out of compliance with the Consent Decree.” In doing so, Judge Robart 
ruled against both of the parties (the City and the DOJ) who had argued in tandem that 
since the Settlement Agreement did not specifically address issues of police 
accountability, any issues or concerns relating to the union contract being in conflict with 
the Accountability Ordinance were not within the jurisdiction of the court.685 The court 
ruled that, 
although the Consent decree contains no explicit mandate concerning the 
arbitration process or the burden of proof therein, the Consent Decree 
expressly requires the City, when ‘establish[ing] or reorganiz[ing] a 
government agency or entity whose function includes overseeing . . . 
investigating, or otherwise reviewing the operations of SPD,’ to ‘ensure 
these functions and entities are consistent with the terms of the [Consent 
Decree]. Further, the United States and the City have acknowledged that 
any accountability system proposed or instituted by the City may not 
conflict with either the terms or the purposes of the Consent Decree. 
(Consent Decree ¶ 219.) (Order Finding the City Partially Out of 
Compliance, pp. 6-7) 
 
684 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 562, filed May 21, 2019. 
685 See, U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 512, filed December 17, 2018 [City of Seattle’s Response 
to Court’s Order to Show Cause]; Document No. 528, filed February 13, 2019 [United States’ 
Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause]. 
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In his order, Judge Robart was particularly critical of both the City and the DOJ 
for their positions suggesting that police accountability was not within the four corners of 
the Settlement Agreement: 
The City and the United States may not repudiate [] repeated past 
representations to the court—concerning the old accountability system’s 
inadequacy, the need for reform, and the court’s jurisdiction in this area—
for the sake of political expediency today. Both expressly by their words 
and implicitly by their actions and lack of objection, the parties have 
acquiesced in the court’s review of the Accountability Ordinance and, more 
generally, SPD’s accountability systems as a part of assessing whether the 
City has sustained full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree 
in Phase II. The court initiates that review now, and as described below, 
finds the City to be out of compliance with respect to its accountability 
systems. (Order Finding the City Partially Out of Compliance, p. 10) 
Judge Robart then ordered the parties, “with the assistance of the Monitor and 
the CPC, to formulate a methodology (1) for assessing the present accountability 
regime, and (2) for how the City proposes to achieve compliance” (Order Finding the 
City Partially Out of Compliance, p. 14). 
May 23, 2019 Court Order approving revisions to SPD 
Crisis Intervention, Bias-Free Policing & 
Employee Conduct Policies686 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
July 2019 City retains 21CP Consultants to review 
Accountability Systems687 
Seattle Mayor’s Office 
August 16, 2019 Court Order approving revisions to SPD 
Use-of-Force policy.688 
Judge James Robart 
October 15, 2019 Order Regarding City’s Motion to Approve 
its Accountability Methodology [including 
order to parties to submit joint proposal 
regarding Monitor’s role in assessing 
compliance on Accountability]689 
Judge James Robart 
November 15, 2019 Order approving revisions to SPD 
Voluntary Contacts, Terry Stops and 
Detention policies690 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
 
686 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 563, filed May 23, 2019. 
687 Miletich, S. (2019, July 15). Mayor’s approach to Seattle police reforms could prolong 
oversight, council members say; union offers to talk. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
688 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 580, filed August 16, 2019. 
689 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 585, filed October 15, 2019. 
690 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 592, filed November 15, 2019. 
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December 13, 2019 “An Assessment of the City of Seattle’s 
Police Accountability System”691 
21CP Consultants 
January 21, 2020 Court Order approving revisions to SPD 
Early Intervention System policy692 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
May 7, 2020 Parties Stipulated Joint Motion to 
Terminate Paragraphs 68-168 of the 
Consent Decree693 
DOJ; City of Seattle 
May 11, 2020 NAACP Opposition Declaration to Motion 
to Dismiss Consent Decree694 
NAACP King County President 
Carolyn Riley-Payne 
 
On May 7, 2020, even though the City had taken no action to renegotiate its 
contract with SPOG and made no revisions to its police accountability structure as 
ordered by the court almost a year earlier, the City and the DOJ filed a joint motion to 
terminate those portions of the Settlement Agreement where the Monitor’s systemic 
assessments had previously found compliance. The motion was an attempt to ensure 
that the City would no longer be bound by any parts of the Consent Decree outside of 
the area of police accountability. Within four days of filing that motion, the NAACP of 
Seattle King County went on record with the Seattle City Council opposing that request. 
The CPC promised to file a motion regarding the request by early June.695 
Before the CPC could even opine on the motion,696 however, protests broke out 
all over the United States, to include in Seattle, over the May 25, 2020 murder of George 
Floyd by officers of the Minneapolis Police Department. Within ten days of George 
Floyd’s death, and less than one week after protests begin in Seattle, the City moved to 
withdrawal its motion, with City Attorney Holmes stating that, 
we are about to witness the most vigorous testing of our city’s 
accountability systems, … it’s become clear to me that we need to pause 
before asking U.S. District Judge James Robart to terminate [portions of 
the Consent Decree] so that the City and its accountability partners can 
 
691 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 598, filed December 13, 2019. 
692 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 607, filed January 21, 2020. 
693 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 611, filed May 7, 2020. 
694 Retrieved from https://www.seattlekingcountynaacp.org/press-releases-and-
statements/presidents-statement-read-at-seattle-city-council-today-on-ending-the-consent-
decree. 
695 Miltetich, S. (2020, May 25). Local, Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
696 The CPC did eventually file an opposition to the motion to dismiss five days after the City 
withdrew its request. (See, U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 622, filed June 9, 2020). 
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conduct a thorough assessment of SPD’s response to the demonstrations. 
(Seattle Times, 6/9/2020)697 
Mayor Durkan agreed saying: “We need to take a pause … With what’s going on right 
now, we need to engage more people” (Seattle Times, 6/9/2020). 
May 25, 2020 Murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis 
Police Department officers698 
 
May 29, 2020 Seattle Police Accountability Protests 
Begin699 
 
June 1, 2020 OPA announces processing of “12,000 
individual complaints concerning 
the Seattle Police Department’s (SPD) 
response to th[e] weekend’s 
demonstrations”700 
Office of Professional 
Accountability. 
June 4, 2020 Notice to Withdraw City of Seattle’s 
Pending Motion [to dismiss portions of 
consent decree]701 
City of Seattle 
June 4, 2020 King County Labor Council Motion on 
SPOG to acknowledge systemic racism in 
SPD and negotiate police accountability702 
Chief Best appears on “Face the Nation”703 
King County Labor Council 
 
 
Chief Carmen Best 




697 Miletich, S., Beekman, D. Hellman, M. & Greenstone, S. (2020, June 3) As complaints pour in 
about police at Seattle protests, city will withdraw request that could lift federal oversight. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
698 New York Times (2020, September 12). What we know about the death of George Floyd in 
Minneapolis. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html. 
699 Takahama, E., Beekman, D., Greenstone, S. & Roberts, P. (2020, June 2). Durkan promises 
to meet with Seattle protest organizers: ‘The plan has to come from community voices.’ Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
700 Brazile, L. (2020, June 1). 12,000 complaints filed against Seattle Police after weekend of 
protests, KUOW-NPR, Retrieved from https://kuow.org/stories/12-000-complaints-filed-against-
seattle-police-after-weekend-of-protests. 
701 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 621, filed June 4, 2020. 
702 Kroman, D. (2020, June 4). Address racism or get out. Crosscut.com. Retrieved from 
https://crosscut.com/2020/06/labor-council-seattle-police-union-address-racism-or-get-out. 
703 Face the Nation (2020, June 4). Transcript: Chief Carmen Best. [Chief Best suggested that: 
“This is a pivotal moment in history, … We are going to move in a different direction, and policing 
will never be the same as it was before”]. Face the Nation. Retrieved from 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-chief-carmen-best-on-face-the-nation-june-14-2020/. 
704 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 622, filed June 9, 2020. 
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June 17, 2020 King County Labor Council expels SPOG 
from Council705 
King County Labor Council. 
August 11, 2020 Chief Carmen Best Resigns706  
 
7.3.4. Special issues relating to Consent Decree implementation 
There were a number of isues that challenged the implementation of the Seattle 
cosent decree; all of which could be found to have existed in other jurisdictions as well. 
Many of these issues were the result of local politics and the resultant ability of the 
Seattle police unions to impede reforms (to include the implementation of a body worn 
camera program, limits on the hiring of outside Deputy and Assistant Chiefs, police 
accountability, and civilian oversight of the police). Others were common to all 
jurisdictions facing consent decrees (to include the costs of implementation and the 
impact of federal politics on the process as a whole). 
The Seattle police unions & implementation. 
On May 15, 2019, the Seattle Times commented that: “[the Seattle Police 
Officer’s Guild] SPOG has complained about and fought many of the reforms, including 
the now-required use of body cameras, and bitterly criticized federal oversight and the 
civilian-led Office of Police Accountability (OPA)” (Seattle Times, 5/15/2019).707 And, in 
fact, the implementation of any number of reforms associated with the Consent Decree 
raised the ire of both Seattle Police Department unions, usually with them insisting that 
 
705 Kroman, D. (2020, June 17). King County Labor Council expels Seattle police union. 
Crosscut.com. Retrieved from https://crosscut.com/2020/06/king-county-labor-council-expels-
seattle-police-union. 
706 Beekman, D. (2020, August 11). Police Chief says she will step down. Seattle Times [“Seattle 
Police Chief Carmen Best says she will step down in the wake of protests against police brutality, 
criticism over the Police Department’s response and votes by the City Council to shrink the police 
force and cut her wages.”]; see also, Beekman, D. (2020, August 12). Best: Budget cuts, 
disrespect drove her decision. Seattle Times [Chief Best noted that the City Council’s plan to cut 
the SPD budget would result in newer officers, “who are most likely to be officers of color,” losing 
their jobs.” Note Walker’s conclusion that the hiring of newer, more diverse police workforces had 
the potential of improving officer receptivity to reform-oriented training (Walker, 2012, p. 84) 
707 Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (2019, May 15). Federal judge finds Seattle partially out of compliance 
with police reform deal. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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any changes relating to police accountability were the subjects of mandatory bargaining 
and could not be unilaterally imposed by the City outside of contract negotiations.708 
The unions became embroiled in any number of Consent Decree related reforms 
to include, the mandated use of body-worn cameras for SPD officers, the hiring of 
Deputy and Assistant Chiefs from outside the SPD, and the provisions of the City 
Council’s Police Accountability Ordinance. 
Politics & the police unions. 
As previously noted, the police reform literature is replete with references to 
police union opposition to reform and the difficulties inherent in ensuring fair and 
consistent discipline and accountability for misconduct. Not only is Seattle no exception 
to this issue, but given the history of the City as “a union town,” union issues have 
tended to dominate many of the police reform conversations in the City. 
In 2014, the Seattle Police Officer’s Guild (SPOG) was admitted to the King 
County Labor Coalition, described as “a union of unions” and the relationship between 
the police union and the labor community was being called “uncommonly close.” SPOG 
joined the Coalition “on the urging of its former president, Ron Smith, and the ties grew 
closer when Kevin Stuckey, who is black, took over as president” (Crosscut, 
6/4/2020).709 
By 2018, labor council representatives were hosting a press conference calling 
on the Seattle City Council to ratify a new contract with SPOG (Crosscut, 6/4/2020). 
According to one research study participant, “it was strategic on [the union’s] behalf to 
have other labor with us when [they] were going through contract negotiations with the 
City as [organized labor] had a strong political influence on Council.”710 
 
708 See, Chapter 7.8, infra. 
709 According to Crosscut: “Stuckey made a show of advocating for labor causes outside of his 
own, including on behalf of new scheduling laws before the Seattle City Council and for nurses 
striking outside of Swedish hospital.” Kroman, D. (2020, June 4). Address Racism or Get Out. 
Crosscut.com. Retrieved from https://www.crosscut.com. 
710 And, in fact, SPOG was able to get the support from other unions, not just in pressuring the 
City Council to approve a contract granting significant pay raises to officers, but in also pressuring 
Council members not to try to reopen the contract even after it was criticized for being non-
compliant with the Consent Decree (see, Chapter 7.8, infra). 
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The 2018 SPOG contract would end up being a turning point (in the wrong way) 
for consent decree implementation, ultimately being a primary reason for Judge Robart 
to find the city partially out of compliance with the Consent Decree (U.S. v. Seattle, 
Document 562, p. 13).  
SPOG certainly had a poor reputation among community activists in Seattle. In 
2014, The Stranger, an alternative newspaper in Seattle, referred to SPOG as “a club of 
retrograde good old boys that embodies the most toxic aspects of cop culture” (The 
Stranger, 4/16/2014).711 The Stranger particularly took aim at the SPOG newspaper, The 
Guardian, 
After a spate of misconduct cases arose in 2010, eventually resulting in the 
US Department of Justice finding that Seattle police have a pattern of using 
excessive force, editorials began appearing in the SPOG newspaper, the 
Guardian, attacking political leaders who supported reform, opposing the 
reform plan, and calling to overturn programs intended stop racial profiling. 
The city's Race and Social Justice Initiative is “an assault on traditional and 
constitutional American values,” one Guardian piece declared. Efforts to 
combat racial profiling were “socialist policies” perpetrated by “the enemy” 
(with “the enemy” being city officials who wanted to work on the racial 
profiling issue). Another piece, published the same year a cop threatened 
to “beat the fucking Mexican piss” out of an innocent man, argued cops 
should be allowed to call citizens “bitch” and “n***a” (asterisks appeared in 
the original). SPOG compared the Justice Department's investigation to the 
federal government's bloody standoffs at Waco and Ruby Ridge. They said 
the city attorney charging an officer with assault after the officer kicked a 
teenager lying on the ground was “a calculated and evil move.” They sued 
to block the police reform plan after it was approved by a judge. And they 
said that several assistant chiefs partnering with elected officials to 
implement early reforms were a sign that “the enemy” had found “new 
allies... at the very top of SPD.” (The Stranger, 4/16/2014) 
Given the allegations against SPOG, the DOJ might have been better served by 
joining SPOG as a party in the §14141 litigation, as was done in Montgomery County in 
2000 and the City of Buffalo in 2007.712 That tactic may have given the Court more 
 
711 Holden, D. (2014, April 16). Reform in Reverse. The Stranger. Retrieved from 
https://www.thestranger.com. 
712 In two DOJ actions, relevant unions were included as parties (see, Amended Memorandum of 
Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and the City of Buffalo, New York 
and the Buffalo Police Department, and the Police Benevolent Association, Inc. July 9, 2007. 
Retrieved from https://perma.cc/7WGA-RV2Q; and Memorandum of Agreement Between the 
United States Department of Justice, Montgomery County, Maryland, the Montgomery County 
Department of Police, and the Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc. 
Retrieved from https://perma.cc/44US-AELU 
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authority over the collective bargaining process that ultimately derailed the City’s road to 
compliance. 
Police accountability and the unions. 
The first sign that Consent Decree implementation might be going off the rails 
with respect to the union rank and file was when on July 21, 2016, it was announced that 
rank and file officers had “overwhelmingly rejected a four-year contract with the city, 
dealing a major setback to Seattle Mayor Ed Murray in his efforts to obtain police-
accountability measures.” The vote was overwhelmingly against the contract with 823 
votes against and only 156 votes in favor of the contract (Seattle Times, 7/21/2016). 
Participants commented that this was the first sign to the Murray administration that the 
union leadership, which was at that time working collaboratively with Chief O’Toole, 
simply could not deliver on accountability-related reforms. During a subsequent court 
hearing on August 15, 2016, Judge Robart was quoted as saying: “the court and the 
citizens of Seattle will not be held hostage for increased payments and benefits” (Seattle 
Times, 8/16/2016). 
On October 20, 2016, the Seattle Police Management Association, representing 
Seattle Police Lieutenants and Captains, filed an unfair-labor-practice compliant with the 
Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) alleging that the City Council was 
prohibited from moving forward with police accountability legislation without first 
bargaining the issues with the union.713 By December 1, 2016, the Seattle City Attorney 
was seeking judicial intervention from Judge Robart believing that the SPMA grievance 
could have a “material effect” on the timing of the accountability measures, which he 
believed to be tied to Consent Decree compliance. The Judge declined to intervene after 
meeting with the parties on January 4, 2017, remarking that without knowing what was 
going to happen he did not want to “muck[] around” in the dispute (Seattle Times, 
1/5/2017).714  
 
713 Miletich, S. (2016, December 1). City asks judge overseeing police reform to step into union 
dispute. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
714 Miletich, S. (2017, January 5). Judge declines to intervene in SPD-reforms dispute. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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As previously noted, the Seattle City Council eventually passed a police 
accountability ordinance on May 21, 2017.  
On July 26, 2017, SPOG filed its own unfair labor practices complaint regarding 
the Mayor’s Executive Order, issued on July 17, 2017, ordering the implementation of a 
body-worn camera program for SPD officers. The union grievance was filed even after 
Judge Robart had refused, on July 18, 2017, to approve draft police accountability 
legislation until he was informed what provisions would be subject to bargaining with the 
union. Judge Robart, quite famously proclaimed during that hearing that: “the citizens of 
Seattle are not going to pay blackmail for Constitutional policing” (Seattle Times, 
7/19/2017a).715 
By January 2018, however, the Police Accountability Ordinance was the subject 
of a SPOG compliant as it related to changes made by the ordinance with respect to 
who and how the SPD would investigate allegations of police misconduct. Once again, 
the union argued that the accountability ordinance provisions relating to discipline were 
the subject of mandatory bargaining (Seattle Times, 1/3/2018).716 The grievances were 
eventually dropped by the union after a contract contradicting a number of the provisions 
of the accountability ordinance was approved by the rank and file on September 21, 
2018 (Seattle Times, 9/21/2018).717 
In a letter dated October 22, 2018, Mayor Durkan and Chief Best informed Judge 
Robart of the tentative agreement (TA) which they suggested “advance[] the core 
reforms and requirements of the Consent Decree and provides a national example of 
civilian-led accountability.” The letter highlighted that “the TA fully implements the Court 
approved body camera policy, the duties of the Inspector General under the 
Accountability Ordinance and continues the historic civilianization of complaint 
investigations at the Office of Professional Accountability.” The letter closed that “the 
City is confident that this TA ensures continuous improvement at the Seattle Police 
 
715 Miletich, S. (2017, July 19). Federal judge: ‘The citizens of Seattle are not going to pay 
blackmail for constitutional policing.’ Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
716 Carter, M. (2018, January 3). Police union files complaint about reform. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
717 Miletich, S. (2018, September 21). Rank & file vote to ratify contract. Seattle Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Department and moves beyond the standard of Constitutional police services and closer 
to a community where all – including the most marginalized – feel safe.”718 
On November 13, 2018, the City Council approved the tentative agreement 
(Seattle Times, 11/14/2018).719 The City submitted a “Notice of Final Collective 
Bargaining Agreement & Proposal for Review” to the court on November 30, 2018.720 On 
December 3, 2018, Judge Robart issued an “Order to Show Cause Whether the Court 
Should Find That the City Has Failed to Maintain Full and Effective Compliance With the 
Consent Decree,” requiring the parties and the CPC to present their arguments in favor 
or against such an order.721 
Interestingly, the contract included language that required a presumption of 
termination for officers who engaged in dishonesty, but also required that such findings 
be supported by a “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof. This, even though 
the Court had previously ruled, at the behest of the DOJ, that such a standard would be 
in conflict with the Consent Decree.722 In filings dated October 29, 2018 and February 
13, 2019, however, the DOJ reversed its stance. The DOJ argued that its previously held 
position that adding a “clear and convincing evidence burden without any clear basis 
could potentially undermine public confidence – a goal of the Consent Decree Process,” 
was in fact, incorrect: 
As discussed in our October 29, 2018 brief, this analysis was in error as it 
failed to account for the fact that the use of the clear and convincing 
standard (1) was not new; and (2) had a clear basis for inclusion. See (Dkt. 
490) at 8-9. Namely, the use of the clear and convincing standard 
accompanied the addition of heightened accountability through the 
presumption of termination. (U.S. Response to Order to Show Cause)723 
 
718 U.S v. Seattle, Document No. 484, filed October 22, 2018. 
719 Miletich, S. (2018, November 14). City Council Oks police-union contract; deal faces scrutiny 
by federal reform judge. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
720 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 503, filed November 30, 2018. 
721 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 504, filed December 3, 2018. 
722 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 357, filed January 6, 2017. 
723 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 528, filed February 13, 2019. The change-of-position on this 
issue, made by the DOJ, led some research participants to conclude that federal politics was 
potentially influencing the DOJ’s work on the Seattle Consent Decree. 
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On February 20, 2019, the CPC weighed in on the issue, opposing both the City 
and the DOJ. The CPC argued that  
[n]otably, the parties to the CBA’s have not provided the court with an 
inventory of which aspects of the Accountability Ordinance they consider 
preempted or in conflict with the CBAs. While the City lists a few areas, 
SPOG has remained silent as to its interpretation, reserving the ability to 
contend later that much larger swathes of the Accountability Ordinance are 
abrogated. (CPC Response to Order to Show Cause)724  
The CPC then went on, in a declaration prepared by the former OPA Auditor, to identify 
36 specific areas where the SPOG and SPMA Collective Bargaining Agreements 
differed with the Police Accountability Ordinance.725 
 
724 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 531, filed February 20, 2019. The CPC also pointed out that 
“[t]hese CBAs don’t just require a higher standard for dishonesty, or even for a narrow range of 
serious misconduct. The CBAs have in effect eliminated the preponderance standard for all 
serious misconduct” (p. 20). 
725 See, U.S. v. Seattle, Document 533, Appendix A, filed February 20, 2019 (Declaration of 
Judge Anne Levenson (Ret.)) with the following differences specified: 
“1. The SPOG CBA requires that CBA language prevails over any City ordinance whenever the 
CBA conflicts with an ordinance provision. The SPMA CBA states that City ordinances are 
paramount except where they conflict with the express CBA provisions. The City's position is that 
if there is any inconsistency (not just direct conflict) between the Ordinance and CBA language, 
the CBA language supersedes. 
2. Ensuring a fair and effective accountability system is not a stated purpose in either CBA, which 
will affect how all of the ambiguous provisions will later be interpreted whenever there is a dispute 
or disciplinary challenge 
3. The CBAs do not ensure all ranks are treated equally in the accountability system. 
4. Failure to incorporate disciplinary appeal reforms: ▪The CBAs maintain use of arbitration and 
grievances for disciplinary challenges, in addition to the PSCSC, thus continuing to allow forum-
shopping. 
5. Failure to incorporate disciplinary appeal reforms: “A preponderance of the evidence” for the 
burden of proof and the standard of review will no longer be the standard for a wide range of 
serious misconduct, including dishonesty. 
6. Failure to incorporate disciplinary appeal reforms: ▪The SPOG CBA does not prohibit City 
employees or recent SPD employees from being on the PSCSC, and neither the SPOG nor 
SPMA CBA require all appellate decision-makers to have subject matter expertise. 
7. Failure to incorporate disciplinary appeal reforms: ▪If certain employees choose arbitration, 
their hearings will bar access by the public, complainants, and the media. 
8. Failure to incorporate disciplinary appeal reforms: ▪Timelines for appeals, intended to reduce 
delays in appellate proceedings and final resolution, will now differ depending on the appellate 
route chosen by the employee. 
9. The CBA provisions stating that employees must be complete and truthful in OPA 
investigations preempt SPD policy requiring honesty in all communications, and the CBAs define 
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dishonesty as intentionally providing false information or incomplete responses to specific 
questions regarding material facts, instead of using an objective standard. 
10. The CBAs continue to bar the imposition of discipline, regardless of the misconduct, if an 
investigation exceeds 180 days even by a single day. The calculation of the timeline and 
extensions are unclear and union approval of extensions is required 
11. Failure to incorporate reforms related to investigations of criminal misconduct: ▪The CBAs 
continue to limit OPA’s authority in investigations of criminal misconduct, which often involve the 
most serious types of misconduct. 
12. Failure to incorporate reforms related to investigations of criminal misconduct: ▪The SPOG 
CBA forecloses OPA authority, yet requires that the 180-day timeline continues to run, when 
allegations are referred for criminal investigation, other than when the misconduct occurred in a 
different jurisdiction or is under review by a prosecutor. 
13. The SPOG CBA sets a four-year statute of limitations and provides for a limited set of 
exceptions. Discipline for serious misconduct, including dishonesty and Type III use of force, is 
barred if the complaint is made more than four years after the incident, and the statute of 
limitations is still a bar to accountability when misconduct is concealed by peers, supervisors, or 
subordinates. 
14. The SPOG CBA requires secondary employment reforms be bargained, further delaying this 
long overdue reform, despite an Executive Order having been issued. 
15. The SPOG CBA does not provide OPA and OIG full subpoena authority 
16. The CBAs do not provide that all relevant OPA and SPD personnel records be retained, or 
that all records be retained for the time period recommended to better ensure accountability. 
17. The SPOG CBA limits the OPA Director’s authority to establish the most effective mix of 
sworn and civilian investigative staff, limits civilian investigators to only two, and either limits or 
forecloses civilian investigators involvement when allegations may result in termination. 
18. The SPOG CBA limits the OPA Director’s authority to manage rotations and transfers of 
sworn staff, not providing the OPA Director the discretion to determine the most effective mix of 
sworn and civilian investigators. 
19. The SPOG CBA allows accrued time, such as vacation time, to be used by an employee to 
satisfy disciplinary penalties that are supposed to be unpaid days off 
20. The CBAs allow evidence that should have been disclosed during an OPA investigation to be 
first raised in the due process hearing or on appeal. 
21. The CBAs do not give the Chief managerial latitude to place employees on leave without pay 
when the Chief determines it is necessary. 
22. The SPOG CBA undercuts management authority to set performance standards and take into 
account OPA history in assignment to and transfer from specialty assignments 
23. The SPOG CBA diminishes the certainty of other timelines intended to reduce delays. 
24. The SPOG CBA does not ensure complainant anonymity and may not allow investigation of 
allegations identified after classification. 
25. The CBAs do not require inclusion in the OPA file or disclosure to complainants, the public, 
the City Attorney, and oversight entities of changes in findings or discipline made by the Chief, or 
require any notifications or public transparency when discipline or findings are later changed as a 
result of an appeal. 
26. The CBAs do not include the terms of ongoing separate agreements, so that any impacts can 
be known. (Note: Possible impact; the Court needs additional information.) 
27. The CBAs do not adopt recommendations to establish an effective mediation program and do 
not provide for consultation with the CPC and OIG in reforming the program. 
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Judge Robart ultimately agreed with the CPC and, on May 15, 2019, found the 
City partially out of compliance with the Consent Decree. 
Ultimately, the question has to be asked: Why would Mayor Durkan, who was 
responsible for insisting that Seattle enter into a consent decree with a court-appointed 
 
28. The CBAs provide for only a pilot rapid adjudication program, do not adopt some 
recommendations to establish an effective program, and do not provide for consultation with the 
CPC and OIG in establishing the program. 
29. The SPOG CBA limits SPD’s authority to use civilians in a range of SPD managerial and 
operations positions 
30. The SPOG CBA requires the Chief to take notes and share them with SPOG when meeting 
with a complainant prior to making a discipline decision 
31. The SPOG CBA requires OPA to share its investigation plans with SPOG. 
32. The SPOG CBA cites an agreement of the parties on the OPA Manual, but it does not state 
the specifics of that agreement. 
33. Other Area Requiring Attention: The SPMA CBA refers to a separate agreement regarding 
the CPC, the terms of which are not known 
34. The SPOG CBA does not make clear that the CAO represents SPD in disciplinary challenges 
35. The SPOG CBA requires OPA interviews to be conducted in an SPD facility. 
36. The SPOG CBA allows employees terminated for cause to purchase their service weapons, 
while the Ordinance bars such employees from later obtaining a concealed carry license under 
the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act. 
37. The CBAs do not recognize the advisory role of accountability system entities in providing 
expertise in setting the City’s bargaining agenda and for ongoing guidance during negotiations. 
38. The SPOG CBA extends the problematic terms for OPA investigations to EEO investigations. 
39. The CBAs do not disclose all collective bargaining re-opener topics and timelines, and do not 
recognize the advisory role of accountability system entities in providing expertise in these 
discussions. 
40. There are inaccuracies in the CBAs, including improper references to responsible entities. 
41. There are inaccuracies in the SPOG CBA concerning SPD investigative units. 
42. There are inaccuracies in the SPOG CBA concerning City law. 
43. The SPOG CBA language is overly broad in defining when Garrity should be used. 
44. The status of SPMA and City bargaining of body-worn video (or, if complete, the final 
agreement) should be made public. 
45. The SPOG CBA provisions for the City’s contribution to paying the salary of the SPOG 
President appears problematic. 
46. The SPOG CBA does not establish who is responsible for paying for the resolution of 
disputes concerning the salary of the SPOG President. 
47. The SPOG CBA does not give supervisors authority to approve or manage SPOG 
representative’s time requests. 
48. SPD Policy 2.050 requires amendment of all written directives and procedures to align with 
terms of CBAs.” 
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monitor in the first place (when she was the U.S. Attorney) put herself in the position of 
negotiating a contract that would ultimately derail the Consent Decree reform process? 
Study participants have suggested that in Seattle, Durkan needed union support 
to get elected and re-elected and for any future political aspirations, to include the 
Governorship or federal elective office: “Washington is a very labor-oriented state – she 
will need the unions to get the support she needs.”726 Research participants further 
pointed to SPOG’s involvement in the King County Labor Council as a political axe that 
was wielded in support of seeking a contract with the union, at almost any cost.727  
Next, one has to question as to how the City Council (which was in 2012 
aggressively pro-consent decree) could be complicit in such an action? Study 
participants observed that by the time the Tentative Agreement got to Council, their 
hands were figuratively tied. The union membership and the City Administration had 
agreed to a long-awaited contract with the police that included provisions relating to 
body-worn cameras, an Inspector General and a more civilianized OPA; the City Council 
simply could not get “into the weeds” of the agreement and was under the same political 
pressure as was the Mayor. 
The fact that the CPC was the only organization to challenge the collective 
bargaining agreements with the unions, and was ultimately successful, highlights their 
ultimate influence as a civilian oversight mechanism and was certainly not something 
 
726 As recognized by the Seattle Times after Mayor Durkan put forward the tentative contract with 
SPOG, “Durkan found herself facing a powerful police union, with a long history of trading reforms 
for money, most recently with the backing of organized labor. Rather than seizing on perhaps a 
once-in-a-generation opportunity to fundamentally alter the police union’s power, Durkan, who 
has a past record of challenging the guild, has chosen to take what she regards as a more 
realistic approach” (Miletich, S., (2019, August 17). Durkan to make SPD reforms ‘top priorities’ 
— in due time. Seattle Times, 8/17/2019a). The murder of George Floyd in 2020, however, may 
have been a turning point with respect to police union influence over politics in Seattle. On June 
18, 2020, the King County Labor Coalition voted to expel SPOG from its membership even after 
SPOG’s board of directors acknowledged in a letter directed to the Coalition that “institutional 
racism exists not only in the criminal justice system but more broadly,” and its President met with 
council delegates in an effort to allow the union to remain as a member of the Coalition 
(Crosscut.com, 6/16/2020). 
727 Recall that Labor council representatives had “even hosted a press conference in 2018, calling 
on the Seattle City Council to ratify [the] new contract with the police union.” (Crosscut.com, 
6/4/2020). 
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that was anticipated when they were first created by the Memorandum of 
Understanding.728 
Body-worn cameras. 
Similar to the police accountability issues, the Seattle Consent Decree did not 
require the SPD to adopt a body worn camera program. However, the Monitor argued 
forcefully in his fifth semi-annual report that body worn cameras were “a key tool for 
accountability and transparency.” Mayor Murray, after failing to obtain an agreement 
from the union to implement a body worn camera program without a pay increase, went 
ahead and implemented the program through an executive order, which almost 
immediately resulted in the filing of an unfair labor practice grievance by SPOG with the 
Public Employees Relations Commission. Although SPOG was ultimately rebuffed by 
Judge Robart who declared that “[t]he citizens of Seattle are not going to pay blackmail 
for constitutional policing,” the issue was not ultimately resolved until the City, through 
the new collective bargaining agreement, agreed to compensate officers an additional 
two percent for wearing body cameras. (Seattle Times, 6/22/2017;729 Hardaway, 2019, 
pp. 189-190). 
More than one research participant acknowledged it was likely a mistake not to 
include provisions for the implementation of a body-worn camera program in Seattle’s 
Settlement Agreement. As stated by one participant intricately involved in the 
implementation process, “the general lesson is that when you excluded fundamental 
stuff from a consent decree, the shit will still hit the shore…nature abhors a vacuum.” 
Hiring of outside deputy and assistant chiefs. 
As part of the City’s proposal to reform the SPD, the City Council, Mayor Murray 
and the new Chief of Police, Kathleen O’Toole, all agreed that she needed the authority 
 
728 This remarkable success belies the comments of some members of the CPC that the 
organization ultimately was a “toothless tiger,” whose recommendations were commonly ignored 
by the City. 
729 Miletich, S. (2017, June 22, 2017). SPD body cameras stalled over. Seattle Times [“More than 
a month after a federal judge approved the Seattle Police Department’s long-awaited proposal to 
equip officers with body cameras, the timing for the rollout remains clouded amid tense labor 
negotiations. The Seattle Police Officer’s Guild, which has a history of trading wage hikes for 
reforms, has asked for extra pay of about 1 ½ percent for officers who wear body cameras, 
according to three sources familiar with the talks”]. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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to hire Deputy and Assistant Chiefs from outside the SPD to “bring in new blood” and 
avoid insular decision-making. The Seattle Police Management Association (SPMA), 
however, opposed this proposal, which required a change in City Ordinance to take 
place.730 
The ordinance change was enacted in January 2014, leading to a May 7, 2014 
unfair business practice grievance by the SPMA who argued that it negatively impacted 
promotion opportunities for SPD Captains and, as such, was a subject of mandatory 
bargaining. Although the grievance was initially rejected by a state public-employment 
board in June, 2014 (Seattle Times, 6/4/2014), the dismissal was later vacated with a 
hearing on the issue held in February 2015 (Seattle Times, 2/25/2015).731 The issue was 
ultimately resolved when the SPMA dropped their complaint after the city agreed “to 
establish a leadership-development program to assist captains and lieutenants in 
developing skills to move up the ladder or to make them attractive to other departments.” 
Only then, was Chief O’Toole permitted to hire two new assistant chiefs from outside the 
SPD (Seattle Times, 3/12/2015).732 
Civilian oversight. 
As the Monitor opined in his September 2017 status report, he believed the 
Inspector General position to be “perhaps the single most important guarantee” of 
consent decree sustainability (Compliance Status Report, p. 18). In this area, the 
Monitor was in conflict with the CPC, in what some study participants referred to as “a 
turf war” over control of the civilian oversight functions in Seattle. Participants suggested 
that the CPC came into the discussion with the desire to control the various police 
oversight functions, and in fact, when lobbying in favor of an initial draft of the 
accountability ordinance, CPC members strenuously argued that the CPC needed the 
 
730 “The ordinance, enacted in January, repealed a 1978 restriction that limited the police chief to 
selecting senior commanders from the current pool of captains and lieutenants” (Miletich, S. 
(2014, June 4). Panel rebuffs police union bid to limit new chief’s hirings. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com). 
731 Miletich, S. (2015, February 25). Police union seeks to block chief’s hiring of outsiders. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
732 Sullivan, J. (2015, March 12). Police Chief and her new team. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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authority to formerly evaluate both the Inspector General and the OPA Director (Seattle 
Times, 5/18/2017).733 
Although the CPC ultimately lost its battle to control the other Seattle oversight 
organizations, the new Police Accountability Ordinance did make the CPC a permanent 
body. But the road to a permanent CPC was described as “rocky” by virtually all of the 
participants involved in CPC-related issues. One knowledgeable participant suggested 
that one of the reasons for ongoing conflicts was that the Seattle consent decree was 
not clear on giving the commission “a process by which they would have had to be 
seriously engaged as a primary stakeholder or given powers that established it as a 
permanent entity with established powers.” The participant suggested that having more 
defined authority for the commissions would have allowed the “conversation to be more 
about substance, rather than process and personality.” 
Costs. 
In the current research, the costs of the implementation of the Consent Decree 
were a consistent concern of virtually all of the participants (to include community 
members involved in pressuring the city to reform). Many participants expressed 
concern that the Monitor himself appeared to be treating the City as a “cash cow;” 
although other participants decried these criticisms as unfounded and demeaning to the 
Monitor’s integrity.  
As noted by one SPD union leader, “the Monitoring team had a laundry list of 
stuff they wanted and it was breathtakingly expensive. Money well spent? Probably 
not…” However, that same participant continued to question the foundation of the DOJ’s 
investigation and contrary to most participants, questioned even the need for reform of 
SPD training.  
Even so, some community participants and CPC members described feeling 
“ripped off” by the Consent Decree process. According to one CPC member: “the DOJ 
appeared to suggest that any resistance to consent decree spending is an opposition to 
police reform – however, fiscal prudence does not equate to opposition to police reform.” 
Another community member described the Consent Decree as “a blunt instrument that 
 
733 Miletich, S. (2017, May 18). Citizen panel campaigns to expand. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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takes a huge amount of money and time.” A civil rights organization leader commented 
that, 
there was a lot of grumbling about having to pay for the reforms. 
Community members noted that if the City had just fixed everything 
five to ten years ago, as we had asked, we wouldn’t have to be spending 
the money on the DOJ and the Monitor. 
From the perspective of Mayor McGinn’s administration, the City in 2012 had 
really serious budget problems: “we were trying to preserve policing the best we could, 
we were juggling things around to maintain staffing levels and response times, and then 
we had the Monitoring Team with their signature IT project that was expected to cost 
millions.” 
According to a high-ranking member of the SPD, “we had to do a lot of financial 
gymnastics, frankly, it turned into a shell game with the city turning a blind eye to ensure 
we were able to get into compliance.” According to that same participant, “everyone, 
including the DOJ wanted to deemphasize how much it was costing; eventually we got 
there, but it did require the City getting money into the department, sometimes in 
disingenuous ways.” Another high-ranking member of the SPD, however, disagreed, 
claiming the department simply had to be “innovative” in how they managed city funds 
and emphasized other funding opportunities in order to help achieve the necessary 
changes. Yet another member of the SPD command staff believed that the Consent 
Decree implementation “was too expensive: training, CIT, first aid, firearms training, they 
were all unfunded mandates that required money to come from different parts of the 
SPD and other city departments … on top of that, paying the Monitoring team was 
excessive.” 
Another high-ranking city official referred to the whole process as “ironic” noting 
that  
if we had just spent the money on the police department in the first 
place, the costs would have been dramatically less than the cost of the 
Consent Decree … we could have saved all the additional costs of 




As previously discussed, the academic literature relating to consent decree 
enforcement is replete with references to the political nature of §14141 enforcement, 
noting more aggressive enforcement under Democratic administrations and a more 
passive use of the §14141 enforcement options under Republican administrations – with 
the Trump administration, to a large extent, shutting down §14141 investigations and 
denouncing the use of consent decrees against local police. 
Within the SPD’s command staff, the DOJ’s investigation report was perceived to 
be no more than “a political hit” on the SPD in order to give the Obama administration 
“an easy win” in the police reform arena. Some participants observed that consent 
decrees tended to be dependent on “the ebb and flow of federal politics … under 
Obama, there was an upsurge – we just happened to get caught in it.” 
The decision of the DOJ to support the City’s position that police discipline and 
accountability was not part of the requirements of the Consent Decree was particularly 
controversial. While some participants believed that the DOJ decision to argue against 
discipline and accountability being considered part of consent decree compliance was 
the result of political pressure from the Trump administration; others believed that it was 
a reasonable position taken by professional prosecutors given the contractual nature of 
the Consent Decree and a philosophy of federalism which generally assumes local 
control of policing functions.734 Judge Robart, eventually ruled that discipline and 
accountability was an essential part of the Seattle Consent Decree and Monitor Bobb 
agreed with the Judge, noting in his final report that: 
As early as June 2014, in our Third Semiannual Report, the Monitoring 
Team recognized that the disciplinary system the was a failure. “Events 
during the last six months have made clear that SPD’s disciplinary system 
is byzantine and arcane. Providing SPD officers and the Seattle community 
with a rational, reasonable disciplinary system will require swift and 
sustained effort. It is difficult to envision the SPD reaching full and effective 
compliance with the Consent Decree without a well- functioning system for 
 
734 And, in fact, this was not the first time that the DOJ and a defendant-city unsuccessfully 
argued to a federal judge in a consent decree case that the city should be found in compliance. In 
Los Angeles in March, 2006 (during the second term of the Bush Administration), the City of Los 
Angeles, with the support of the DOJ, requested that the court “loosen some of the Consent 
Decree requirements.” The Judge, however, rejected the motion, and instead extended the 
Consent Decree for an additional three years, “openly questioning the Justice Department’s 
commitment to its own case” (Kupferberg, 2008, p. 150). 
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imposing discipline on police officers found to have violated SPD policy.” 
The Team agreed to remain available for technical assistance with respect 
to the discipline system. The Department never requested that technical 
assistance despite our conclusion that “an irrational and convoluted system 
cannot be allowed to systematically undo the accountability that a host of 
other policies and practices are intended to foster.” … The consent decree 
will not end until the “bizarre and arcane” discipline and accountability 
systems are fixed. (Bobb, 2020, p. 7) 
Interestingly, determining whether or not the City and the DOJ’s positions were 
reasonable depends more on a person’s philosophical perspective with respect to 
consent decree litigation than anything else. If a consent decree is perceived as a 
binding legal contract to be interpreted narrowly in the interest of recognizing the 
inherent local nature of policing, the position that discipline and accountability were not 
part of Seattle’s consent decree compliance would be persuasive. If, however, one 
interprets the Consent Decree in a more holistic manner, where the contract is being 
used to ensure effective and Constitutional policing in the long-term, a working discipline 
and accountability system would be essential to maintaining a sustainable program of 
reform. 
As a result of the change in the political winds, many of the research participants 
kept out a watchful eye for any changes in DOJ positions that may have been more 
consistent with the philosophies of the Trump administration as opposed to the prior 
Obama administration. And, many of these participants specifically identified the DOJ’s 
willingness to reverse its position on the standard of proof needed to terminate an officer 
and its willingness to oppose the judge’s out-of-compliance finding, to be more 
consistent with the Trump ideology, than that of the Obama administration.735 
 
735 Even so, when Judge Robart first made his finding of full compliance, the CPC concurred with 
that decision and suggested in an October 13, 2017 filing that the DOJ’s motives in supporting 
the “full and effective compliance” finding was not motivated by political concerns: “It is important 
to call out our belief that the United States’ position in this case at this juncture is fully consistent 
with the mandate and approach brought to bear from the outset in 2011 by the Civil Rights 
Division and the local U.S. Attorney’s Office.” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 421, n. 1; Miletich, 
S. (2017, October 14). Justice Dept supports finding of full compliance. Seattle Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.seattletimes.com.) 
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7.4. Seattle Consent Decree Implementation – The View 
from the Top 
The perspectives and thoughts of those in charge of the implementation effort, to 
include Judge Robart, DOJ spokespeople, the Seattle police chiefs and the court-
appointed Monitor, offer an important perspective on the status and progress of the 
implementation efforts throughout the course of the Seattle federal reform effort. In fact, 
public comments by these officials ranged from supportive to dismissive and from 
cajoaling to collaborative, depending on the timing of the statement and the perspective 
as to how much force needed to be used to attain the ultimate goal of long-term 
sustainable police reform. 
7.4.1. The Judge736 
The story of the implementation of the Consent Decree can also be told through 
the in-court statements and orders of the U.S. Federal District Court Judge assigned to 
the Seattle consent decree litigation, James Robart. The judge’s statements were 
extensively reported by Seattle news outlets and include substantive opinions and 
conclusions in written orders of the court. Assigned randomly to the Seattle case at its 
inception in 2012, Judge Robart was appointed to the federal district court by President 
George W. Bush on December 9, 2003. Robart was a 1973 graduate of the Georgetown 
University Law Center. Prior to his appointment, Robart was a civil litigator in private 
practice, reportedly gaining a reputation as “a highly respected corporate lawyer.”737 
Outside of the Seattle Consent Decree litigation, Robart became best known for 
his February 3, 2017 ruling when he granted a nation-wide temporary restraining order 
against President Trump’s executive order on travel and immigration. Trump 
 
736 Given that the Seattle litigation has not yet been concluded and Judge Robart’s positions on 
the implementation of the Consent Decree are well documented in the media and in his written 
orders, Judge Robart was not asked to participate in this study. 
737 See, U.S. District Court biographical information, located at: 
https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/judges/robart-bio. 
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subsequently attacked Robart on Twitter, saying the decision was “ridiculous” and 
referred to Robart as “a so-called judge.”738  
Judge Robart was subsequently defended in the media by former United States 
Attorney Michael McCay, referred to as “active in Republican politics in Washington 
State,” who referred to Robart as “a smart, thoughtful guy and very even-tempered.” 
Then former-U.S. Attorney Jenny Durkan, described Judge Robart as “a very strict 
federal judge who believes in the rule of law… I think he truly believes in the 
independence of the judiciary, to the marrow of his bones.” According to the New York 
Times, Durkan “added that Judge Robart needed to be seen in the context of the 
moderate Republican traditions of the Pacific Northwest.” McKay and Durkan were 
reportedly the leaders of a bipartisan selection committee that vetted federal judges for 
recommendations to the Bush administration in 2003 and recommended Robart’s 
appointment to the federal judiciary (New York Times, 2/4/2017). 
Over the course of the Consent Decree litigation, Judge Robart was particularly 
active and expressive in his comments from the bench. His statements and orders 
ranged from supportive, to cajoling, critical and, sometimes dismissive. While the end of 
the story has not yet been written, the judge’s statements, thus far, help to provide a 
picture of a City and a police department sometimes accepting and sometimes 
struggling with the external pressure placed upon them to reform: 
Table 7.4. Public Statements of Judge Robart 
Date Statement 
Aug. 24, 2012 Judge gives “provisional approval” to settlement. Robart states that the funding and 
appointment of the Monitor was “the linchpin to making this work.” Robart likens the 
Monitoring job to: “the talents of ‘a lawyer…a deputy chief, a deputy mayor and 
being able to change his clothes in a phone booth” (Seattle Times, 8/25/2012).739 
 
738 Thomas Fuller (2017, Feb. 4). New York Times, ‘So-Called’ Judge Criticized by Trump Is 
Known as a Mainstream Republican. New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/james-robart-judge-trump-ban-seattle.html. 
739 Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (2015, August 25). Judge wants more say on Seattle police reform - 
He says monitor is key, must have resources. With provisional OK, clock starts on deadlines. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
Nov. 28, 2012 Robart compares the proposed costs of Seattle monitoring to other cities: 
suggesting that “Seattle was neither paying for an expensive foreign car or a cheap 
one but was getting a ‘nice solid American car’ in the middle of the cost range.” 
Robart suggests that the entirety of “the burden was not on the SPD – the ‘other 
50% of the process’ falls on the community to report crime and act as partners with 
the police…[b]oth need to forge a new partnership, listening to each other and 
working together” (Seattle Times, 11/29/2012). 
March 12, 2013 Judge approves a first-year blueprint for reforming the SPD “but issues a blunt 
warning to the city that he is unhappy with the political infighting that cluttered the 
negotiations.” (Seattle Times, 3/13/2013a).740 
The Judge addressed an injunction filed by the Seattle Police Officers’ Guild and the 
Seattle Police Management Association in state court to prevent consent decree 
implementation from interfering with their contract or collective bargaining rights: 
asserting he was “not aware of any jurisprudence which allows a state court to tell 
me what to do in my settlement agreement.” He considered the efforts to be “a 
further distraction” from implementation of the Settlement Agreement. 
The Judge “highlighted what he called ‘significant milestones’ reached to date: the 
settlement agreement and appointment of a monitor, the development of a first-year 
plan and the appointment of a Community Police Commission (CPC) by the mayor” 
(Seattle Times, 3/13/2013a). 
Nov. 26, 2013 Judge denies CPC’s motion to formally intervene in the case, “citing concerns that it 
might slow the process of reforms,” but grants the CPC amicus curia status (U.S. v. 
Seattle, Document No. 106; Seattle Times, 12/12/2013). 
Dec. 17, 2013 Judge approves SPD use-of-force policy; opines in written order that the role of the 
court and the Monitor “is not to dictate policies to the SPD, but rather to insure that 
the Proposed Policies conform to the requirements of the Consent Decree, the 
United States Constitution, and judicial decisions interpreting the City’s 
constitutional obligations.” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 115). 
April 3, 2014 An “exasperated” judge warns that the SPD may be under court supervision until 
2019 “unless it significantly improves the progress of reform that have lagged as a 
result of missed deadlines and mismanagement.” Robart states that “what will not 
be tolerated is a lack of will.” Robart “referred to problems in the police discipline 
system, saying they ‘exploded this year’ when the interim police chief dismissed a 
number of cases”; Robart “cautioned that in the future, notwithstanding the 
department’s labor contracts, he reserved the right to unilaterally change 
unconstitutional results as a ‘last resort’” (Seattle Times, 4/4/2014).741 
 
740 Carter, M. (2013, March 13). Federal Judge Oks blueprint. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
741 Miletich, S. (2014, April 4). SPD needs reforms now, judge warns city. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
Aug. 19, 2014 “Despite what he labeled an unexplainable delay [in getting a data management 
system into place] 25 months into the process, Robart said he would grant [an] 
extension because there was no other choice in order to get the job done right… 
We have an unfortunate situation in Missouri, the same problems that led to the 
settlement agreement in Seattle – use of force and tracking such incidents, training, 
stops and detentions, bias-free policing and supervision of officers – are at issue in 
Ferguson.” Robart opined that “in Seattle people will be deprived of constitutional 
policing until [a data management system was] ‘up and running’…We don’t need 
armored personnel carriers. We need the public to support us.”  
“Robart referred to resistance to change among some in the ranks, pointing to a 
federal lawsuit filed by more than 100 Seattle officers on May 28 challenging the 
constitutionality of new use-of-force policies drafted under the settlement 
agreement.”  
“To those individuals,” Robart said, “I simply say: ‘Get over it. The train has left the 
station. It’s not going to turn around. The good old days are not coming back.” 
(Seattle Times, 8/20/2014).742 
June. 30, 2015 Favorably noting SPD de-escalation training as profiled in the New York Times on 
6/27/2015, “I am so pleased that my city is not New York, not Charlotte, not 
Baltimore…” (The Stranger, 6/30/2015).743 
“Robart praised [Mayor] Murray, Police Chief Kathleen O’Toole, the city’s police 
unions and many officers for their commitment to reform and making Seattle a 
national model for change” (Seattle Times, 7/1/2015).744 
Referring to a recently publicized agreement between the Mayor and the CPC to 
make the CPC a permanent body: “The parties seem to have run off the railroad … I 
don't really care what accord was reached last night. None of it will be put into effect 
until you bring it back here…It strikes me reading these news reports that we have 
various groups seeking to grab power, … And that's not going to happen because 
the court is the one who controls the settlement agreement” (The Stranger, 
6/30/2015). 
Dec. 20, 2015 Letter from Judge Robart to CPC: “Unfortunately, the current campaign on the part 
of some CPC’s members to perpetuate CPC’s own existence — prematurely — 
demonstrates a lack of perspective with regard to the broader police reform process 
which the court, in its role of overseeing the entire ... Consent Decree, cannot afford, 
…” (Seattle Times, 12/21/2015).745 
 
742 Miletich, S. & Beekman, D. (2014, August 20). Judge scolds Seattle police but agrees to later 
deadline. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
743 Herz, A. (2015, June 30). Federal Judge, Decrying Local Attempts to “Grab Power,” Says He’s 
the Boss of Police Reform. The Stranger. Retrieved from https://www.thestranger.com. 
744 Miletich, S. (2015, July 1). Federal judge blasts plan to expand power of SPD review board. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com 
745 Miletich, S. (2015, December 21).  Future of citizen police panel uncertain. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
Aug. 9, 2016 Court orders Police Accountability Legislation to be submitted to the court before 
consideration by the City Council. “The parties’ proposal is inefficient in that it 
deprives the City of critical court guidance in shaping SPD accountability systems to 
ensure that the elements adhere to the terms and purpose of the Consent Decree, 
…The parties’ proposal also potentially places the court in the undesirable position 
of having to ‘veto’ completed legislation” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 305). 
Aug. 15, 2016 Reacting to the Seattle Police union’s rejection of a tentative contract: “To hide 
behind a collective-bargaining agreement is not going to work… The court and the 
citizens of Seattle will not be held hostage for increased payments and benefits…I’m 
sure the entire city of Seattle would march behind me.”  
Commenting on SPD Leadership: “I think we have the right person [Chief O’Toole] 
to [achieve compliance].” 
Noting that 41% of national shootings by police were of blacks who represent 20% 
of the population: “Black lives matter.” (Seattle Times, 8/16/2016). 
Jan. 4, 2017 Robart warns Seattle Police Management Association not to “conclude that ‘running, 
hiding or sticking one’s head in the sand’ will allow it to avoid the requirements of 
constitutional policing” (Seattle Times, 1/5/2017). 
“Based on overall progress under the ‘enlightened leadership’ of Police Chief 
Kathleen O’Toole and the assistance of the court’s monitor, Merrick Bobb, the city is 
in position to reach full compliance with the Consent Decree in 2018 and be ‘free of 
me’” (Seattle Times, 1/5/2017). 
July 18, 2017 “The citizens of Seattle are not going to pay blackmail for constitutional policing.” 
Addressing “rumblings” that the City would be found in full compliance, “It’s not 
going to happen” noting the DOJ’s new leadership was not supportive of the use of 
consent decrees. “Seattle police have become a model of how to do things right. 
But questions remain…” (Seattle Times, 7/19/2017a). 
Sept. 7, 2017 Court order: “Until the collective-bargaining process is complete, the court cannot be 
assured the [Police Accountability] Ordinance, as it stands today, is a final product” 
(U.S. v. Seattle, Document 413). 
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Date Statement 
Jan. 10, 2018 Robart finds the City in “full and effective compliance” with the Consent Decree. 
“The credit for these dramatic improvements goes in large part to the diligent and 
on-going work of the SPD – both its rank and file officers and it’s command staff.” 
“The court also wishes to highlight the exceptional work of Chief Kathleen O’Toole 
during her tenure with SPD in sustaining the significant progress noted above, …In 
particular, the court commends Chief O’Toole on her leadership in developing a 
more community-based policing approach for SPD. These efforts are receiving 
national attention and are making a difference in the level of trust the community 
places in SPD.” 
Robart explains that the SPD must maintain compliance over the next two years as 
part of Phase II: “In many ways, Phase II is the most difficult portion of the Consent 
Decree to fulfill…The ability to sustain the good work that has begun is not a 
foregone conclusion. It will require dedication, hard work, creativity, flexibility, 
vigilance, endurance, and continued development and refinement of policies and 
procedures in accordance with constitutional principles.” 
“If collective bargaining results in changes to the accountability ordinance that the 
court deems to be inconsistent with the Consent Decree, the City’s progress in 
Phase II will be imperiled.” 
(U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 439). 
Oct. 23, 2018 Court Order seeking information on tentative contract between City and Seattle 
Police Officer’s Guild (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 485). 
Nov. 5, 2018 Referring to new police union contract, “When the city takes the position that there’s 
nothing in there that is inconsistent with the Consent Decree, I don’t believe that to 
be accurate.” 
“Salary is not my issue … I saw it creep in what I thought was a pretty sleezy way. 
Let’s take that one off the table and let’s concentrate on the constitutional reform.” 
Referring to 2% bonus pay for wearing body cameras, “What I hear is a two percent 
bribe for them to follow an order that I have already entered in the case” (The 
Stranger, 11/6/2018).746 
Dec. 3, 2018 On his own motion, Robart issues an “Order to Show Cause Whether the Court 
Should Find that the City has Failed to Maintain Full and Effective Compliance with 
the Consent Decree.” 
Order comments on arbitration board’s decision to reinstate an officer fired for 
excessive force: “Although this single incident may be insufficient for the court to 
rescind the City’s Phase II status under the Consent Decree, it raises the specter 
that the new CBA’s rejection of reforms in the Accountability Ordinance will 
undermine the progress that the City has made to date and stymie its efforts to 
complete Phase II in little more than a year” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 504). 
 
746 Black, L. (2018, November 6). Seattle’s Police Union Contract Had a Tough Day in Court. The 
Stranger. Retrieved from https://www.thestranger.com. 
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Date Statement 
May 15, 2019 Court hearing on OTC re: compliance: 
Robart plays a June 2014 dashcam video in court showing an SPD officer punching 
a handcuffed prisoner. [Officer was terminated by Chief O’Toole and later reinstated 
by an arbitrator]. 
“Robart took part of the morning to review the history of attempts at police reform in 
Seattle, dating back to the mid-1990s and an incident in which an SPD homicide 
detective reportedly stole $10,000 from the apartment of a man who had been killed 
by police and then tried to return it with the help of his Sergeant … Robart said 
addressing the issue of officer accountability remains the primary stumbling block 
before the department’s removal from federal oversight.” 
Judge orders City to come up with a working plan to address future compliance. 
(Seattle Times, 5/15/2019). 
May 21, 2019 Order finding City “Partially Out of Compliance with the Consent Decree.” 
“The City and the United States may not repudiate these repeated past 
representations to the court—concerning the old accountability system’s 
inadequacy, the need for reform, and the court’s jurisdiction in this area—for the 
sake of political expediency today. Both expressly by their words and implicitly by 
their actions and lack of objection, the parties have acquiesced in the court’s review 
of the Accountability Ordinance and, more generally, SPD’s accountability systems 
as a part of assessing whether the City has sustained full and effective compliance 
with the Consent Decree in Phase II. The court initiates that review now, and as 
described below, finds the City to be out of compliance with respect to its 
accountability systems.” 
(U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 562, p. 10). 
Oct. 15, 2019 Robart warns the city not to use an outside consultant report to justify its current 
accountability system: “[such] exercise will be a failure, reform will be delayed, and 
full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree will recede further into the 
future.”  
Robart criticizes the DOJ for its “largely unhelpful response” in continuing to argue 
that accountability fell outside the scope of the Consent Decree. 
(U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 585). 
 
Issues regarding judicial oversight over the Seattle consent decree. 
Of course, not all observers will support the presiding judge and his or her 
decisions, regardless of whether the judge is following law, precedent and generally 
accepted procedure and process. 
In this case, Robart was widely perceived as having been an “activist” judge and, 
in a number of situations, disagreed with the parties (the City and the DOJ), sometimes 
going along with the position of the Monitor and/or the CPC and sometimes seeming to 
forge his own way ahead. The Judge’s August 15, 2016 declaration that “Black Lives 
Matter,” made after criticizing the police union for “holding the City ‘hostage’” in their 
contract negotiations, reportedly drew “a startled, audible reaction” from the courtroom 
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audience (Seattle Times, 8/16/2016). Further the judge’s December 3, 2018 “Order to 
Show Cause Whether the Court Should find that the City has Failed to Maintain Full and 
Effective Compliance with the Consent Decree” was issued on his own motion,747 with 
the court ordering the parties to brief issues including “whether the court’s understanding 
of the [] events is accurate?”748 
Perhaps most significant was the Judge’s decision to find the City partially out-of-
compliance over the objection of both parties, the City of Seattle and the DOJ. Although 
the CPC argued in favor of the out-of-compliance finding,749 and the Monitor appeared to 
be in support of the judge’s decision, the court’s decision to overrule the position of both 
the plaintiff and the defendant, appeared to participants to be the very definition of 
“judicial activism.” 
The Judge also repeatedly referred to news coverage in court hearings and 
asked the parties to respond to such reports, rather than relying on the parties to bring 
forward all issues on their own.750 Finally, Judge Robart’s judicial demeanor was not one 
of a passive arbiter of the facts. In fact, he was repeated referred to in the media as 
taking on passionate positions while adjudicating the case.751 
 
747 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 504. Although it seems likely that the motion may have been 
brought as a result of private conversations with the Monitor. 
748 The court had noted that the collective bargaining agreement with SPOG was inconsistent in 
significant parts with the previously passed Accountability Ordinance and that an officer ordered 
terminated by Chief O’Toole for an excessive use of force had been reinstated by an independent 
arbitrator (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 504, pp. 5-8). 
749 U.S. v Seattle, Document No. 531, filed February 20, 2019. 
750 See, for example, The Stranger (6/30/2015) [where Judge Robart reportedly stated that “he 
was ‘very frustrated and upset’ by what he's been reading in local news outlets about an 
agreement reached last night between Mayor Ed Murray and the Community Police Commission 
(CPC) to jointly give the commission permanent civilian oversight status through council 
ordinance;” Anzel Herz, (2015, August 26). Federal Judge Calls The Stranger's Reporting on 
SPD “Inflammatory,” but It's Clear He Learned from It. The Stranger. Retrieved from 
https://www.thestranger.com. 
751 See, for example, Seattle Times, 4/4/2014 [which describes Judge Robart as “exasperated,” 
warning that the SPD “could be under court supervision until 2019 unless it significantly 
improve[ed] the progress of reforms that have lagged as a result of missed deadlines and 
mismanagement”]; Seattle Times, 7/7/2015 [Judge Robart referred to as “lambast[ing] efforts to 
expand the authority of a citizen review board without the court’s approval;” Miletich, S., July 19, 
2017, Judge declines to approve PA legislation. Seattle Times [Judge Robart quoted as saying: 
“The citizens of Seattle are not going to pay blackmail for constitutional policing”]. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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As would be expected, not all stakeholders were supportive of the entirety of the 
judge’s orders relating to the Consent Decree. The DOJ lawyers themselves were 
somewhat dismissive of the judge’s decision to find the City out-of-compliance with the 
Consent Decree, over their objection, when they responded to the Court’s request for 
input on the City’s methodology for assessing the City’s accountability scheme, by 
“maintain[ing] its position that the choices and decisions the City makes with respect to 
its police accountability system (beyond those expressly stated in the Consent Decree) 
are outside the scope of the Consent Decree” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 574, p. 
2).752 Some study participants suggested that the DOJ position was reflective of the 
Trump administration’s desire to get out of the “consent decree business;” while other 
study participants noted that the DOJ’s position was largely consistent with its prior 
positions viewing Consent Decrees as contracts, with federal reform efforts generally 
limited to the “four-corners” of Settlement Agreements. 
According to one study participant: “people did not know how to read the Judge. 
He was always posturing…even though he [tends to] make good decisions in the end.” 
Some participants were quite supportive of the judge, but critical of the Monitor: 
if he [Judge Robart] had the right monitor, he would have been the 
perfect judge for this case; but the Monitor brought the wrong issues 
before him at the wrong time with the wrong recommendations … and 
the judge got distracted.”  
Other participants felt that the Judge would sometimes “beat the city over the head” 
about things [the City] could not control. 
Judge Robart was also criticized by City participants, in part, for his reported 
tendency to “take what he reads in the paper as gospel…we don’t get to refute what’s in 
the paper…he does a lot of breast beating, but with no real affect.” 
7.4.2. The DOJ Perspective 
In its public statements, the DOJ used its bully pulpit to pressure city leaders to 
cooperate with the reform effort. The DOJ message, similar to the ongoing messaging 
 
752 Which comment was found by the Judge in his “Order re: City’s Accountability Methodology” to 
be a “largely unhelpful response” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 585, p. 3). 
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provided by Judge Robart, were sometimes critical and/or cajoling and, at other times, 
positive and supportive: 
Table 7.5. DOJ Public Statements 
Date Statement 
September 2011 Assistant Attorney General Tom Perez (USDOJ Civil Rights Division), in 
announcing the DOJ investigation: “effective, accountable policing is critical for any 
healthy community…The Justice Department’s interest is in ensuring that the 
people of Seattle can rely on their Police Department to protect public safety and 
respect their rights” (Seattle Times, 9/3/2011). 
December 2011 AAG Tom Perez was quoted in the Seattle Times as saying that “the department’s 
practices to assure accountability and public trust are ‘broken’ and that the only 
sure fix is through court-ordered, long-term reform and an outside special monitor to 
oversee it” (Seattle Times, 12/17/2011). Tom Bates, the executive assistant U.S. 
Attorney in Western Washington is quoted as saying: “We continue to be 
encouraged that the Seattle Police Department is taking positive steps to implement 
reforms, and we will continue to work with city and SPD leaders to institute real and 
lasting change” (Seattle Times, 12/22/2011). 
February 2012 AUSA Bates: “There is a sense of urgency to get things done…Having this [a 
proposed Consent Decree] lingering and looming isn’t good for anyone” (Seattle 
Times, 2/3/2012). 
May 2012 AUSA Bates: “The budget numbers being projected by the City are simply wrong. 
The cost of any agreement will not be remotely close to the figure cited today. We 
are confident that once the City understands our proposed agreement, it will 
conclude that what we cannot afford is further delay … Constitutional policing does 
not inhibit or hamstring good policing, and it is irresponsible to suggest it does” 
(Seattle Times, 5/15/2012). 
May 16, 2012 Letter to Seattle City Attorney from Jonathan Smith, Chief of the DOJ Special 
Litigation Section, responding to City’s counter-proposal for Settlement Agreement: 
“"We are particularly troubled and surprised that the City has not included any 
measures to respond to the issues of discriminatory policing, community 
engagement, or the City's accountability system, [and asserted that the city was 
making the] process unnecessarily contentious and personal, [increasing the risk of] 
unnecessary litigation” (Seattle Times, 7/8/2012). 
May 23, 2012 Letter to Seattle City Attorney from Jonathan Smith, Chief of the DOJ Special 
Litigation Section: “accused the city of going ‘backwards’ on its agreement to accept 
a consent decree and a monitor. He wrote the city now was proposing that all 
remedies, including those that address use of force, be covered in a memorandum 
of understanding that would not be subject to court oversight and independent 
monitoring.” Smith noted that “while the Justice Department appreciate[s] that 
bargaining through incremental moves is a ‘common negotiation strategy – this is 
not a common matter…The goal of this case is to accomplish essential reforms to 
the Seattle Police Department, Real solutions require a comprehensive approach, 
not piece meal bargaining” (Seattle Times, 6/26/2012a).753 
 




July 2012 AAG Perez “joked that Seattle Mayor Mike McGinn’s fingerprints were all over the 
[settlement] agreement” (Seattle Times, 7/29/2012a).754 
August 2012 “During an hourlong court hearing Friday afternoon, Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael 
Diaz and Assistant City Attorney Jean Boler outlined the settlement agreement, 
calling it a ‘fair, adequate and reasonable’ way to resolve the Justice Department's 
contention that Seattle police routinely use excessive force and exhibit troubling 
signs of biased policing” (Seattle Times, 8/25/2012). 
October 2012 AUSA Bates: “this [the appointment of the Monitor] is a critical milestone…The 
focus for everyone is coming together around meaningful reform and positive 
change” (Seattle Times, 10/31/2012).755 
January 2013 Thomas Bates, executive assistant U.S. Attorney, Western Washington: “We are 
very much focused on moving forward. There is a strong agreement in place with 
an experienced monitor and firm court oversight. We don’t see any reason why the 
reforms required by the agreement can’t take root in the Seattle Police Department” 
(Seattle Times, 1/23/2013).756 
March 2013 Upon approval of the first monitoring plan, a written statement by AUSA Bates 
stated as follows: “The City’s agreement clears the way for the Court to approve the 
plan, which will guide reform efforts, … The Monitoring Plan lays out a collaborative 
and timely approach to implementing reforms that provides clear guidance and 
deadlines for the Seattle Police Department” (Seattle Times, 3/9/2013). 
August 2013 Executive Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas Bates regarding CPC request for 
continuance to consider the draft use-of-force policies: “We plan to ask the court to 
extend the deadline for public comment, including from the CPC and unions, so that 
everyone has sufficient time to review the policies and make recommendations, 
…We need to make sure reform efforts — and the deadlines that were created as 
part of Monitoring Plan — stay on track while doing everything we can to get reform 
right. The community’s input will help us get it right” (Seattle Times, 8/22/2013).757 
December 2013 Regarding the adoption of a new SPD use-of-force policy: “This policy will help 
ensure that the people of Seattle have a police department that respects the 
Constitution, secures the safety of the public, and earns the confidence of the 
community,” Acting Assistant Attorney General Jocelyn Samuels, director of the 
Civil Rights Division, said in a statement” (Seattle Times, 12/18/2013).758 
 
754 Lynn Thompson (2012, July 29). McGinn struck balance with DOJ – Intense engagement led 
to policing agreement. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
755 Miletich, S. (2012, October 31). Stakes large in reshaping Seattle police, monitor says. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
756 Miletich, S. & Carter, M. (2013, January 23). SPD official quits new reform job. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
757 Carter, M. (2013, August 22). Judge is asked to delay new use-of-force policy for police. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
758 Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (2013, December 18, 2013). Judge OKs detailed rules on when, how 
police can use force. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
February 2014 After attending an “all-parties summit…to discuss the city’s 18-month effort to 
address excessive force and biased policing,” Acting Assistant Attorney General 
Jocelyn Samuels told a news conference that “Constitutional policing and effective 
policing go hand in hand” (Seattle Times, 2/5/2014).759 
April 2014 In a letter signed by the Chief of the Special Litigation Section and U.S. Attorney 
Durkan, the city was criticized for producing work plans to train officers in the new 
use of force policies that “were not serious attempts to move reform forward” and 
“dug us in a deep hole, from which we have had to climb out over the past two 
months.” The letter acknowledged that Mayor Murray “inherited” problems from the 
prior mayoral administration but noted that “while some delays are understandable 
as the new leadership gets up to speed, the reforms required by the Consent 
Decree cannot wait … None of us can afford halfhearted efforts or box-checking 
measures.” The letter was further critical of the prior administration for inflating the 
cost of the reform effort by including initiatives that were “matters entirely unrelated” 
to the federal intervention: “It is unclear whether this was the result of sloppy 
accounting, or a purposeful attempt to stack costs and attribute them to the reform 
process, …While the public has a right to know the budgetary impact, it also is 
owed accuracy…” (Seattle Times, 4/2/2014).760 
June 2015 After Judge Robarts ordered the City to present plans with respect to a new Police 
Accountability Ordinance to the court, U.S. Attorney Hayes was quoted as saying 
that “the DOJ looks forward to ‘reviewing the results’ of local efforts to push forward 
reform ‘as soon as they are presented to us, and along with the City and the 
Monitor, presenting those to the Court for review and approval before they go into 
effect’” (The Stranger, 6/30/2015). “As the court made clear, the Consent Decree 
forms the bedrock for police reform in the City of Seattle and the community plays a 
vital role in the reform process” (Seattle Times, 7/1/2015). 
 
759 Miletich, S. (2014, February 5). Officials: Significant Progress on Police Reform. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 




June 2015 Vanita Gupta, Acting Assistant AG, Civil Rights Division, in a meeting with the 
Community Police Commission “called the commission a ‘model’ for other cities 
undergoing reform efforts” (Seattle Times, 9/24/2015).761 Attorney General Loretta 
Lynch at a forum at the Northwest African American Museum: “From Ferguson to 
Baltimore and from Cleveland to New York City, we have witnessed the pain and 
the unrest that can ensue when trust between law-enforcement officers and the 
communities they serve is damaged, broken, or lost, … In many cases, these 
tensions have their roots in a long and difficult history of inequality, oppression and 
violence, and they speak to issues that have tested our country’s unity since its 
inception … They will not be overcome with easy solutions or simple strategies. ... 
But as Seattle’s recent experience can attest, real progress is possible” (Seattle 
Times, 9/25/2015). U.S. Attorney Hayes: “the consent-decree driven organizational 
and operational changes around crisis intervention are taking root …We are seeing 
that the new policies and training implemented as part of the reform process are 
keeping both officers and the community safe, … The SPD data demonstrates 
officers are applying best practices from across the nation and that is making a 
difference. Trained and empowered police officers using discretion and de-
escalation has led to positive results, including a growing number of referrals for 
mental health and substance abuse services” (Seattle Times, 9/7/2015).762 
November 2015 Commenting on a positive report from the Monitor regarding SPD’s new Force 
Review Board process: Annette Hayes, the U.S. Attorney for Western Washington 
noted that: “Critical to lasting reform is having internal systems and structures in 
place that provide consistent oversight and accountability, and real-time feedback 
to help a police department continually improve, …That is what SPD now has with 
the Force Review Board.” (Seattle Times, 11/25/2015).763 “Your [the CPC’s] role is 
critically important and to the extent that you're feeling like we need to hear that 
voice and the work that you're doing more effectively and more authentically—that’s 
something we'll be discussing” (The Stranger, 9/24/2015).764 
August 2016 A “DOJ statement” regarding Judge Robart’s order requiring the city to submit a 
draft Police Accountability Ordinance to the court for approval: “This is an important 
step forward and an opportunity for the City — its elected officials and community 
stakeholders — to come together to propose an approach that reflects best 
practices of accountability and is consistent with the terms and purposes of the 
Consent Decree, …” (Seattle Times, 8/10/2016).765 
 
761 Miletich, S. (2015, September 24). We’re ignored, citizen police panel tells official from Justice 
Department. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
762 Sullivan, J. (2015, September 7). SPD report: Minimal force used in contacts with mentally ill. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
763 Miletich, S. (2015, November 25). Federal Monitor praises SPD Force Board. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
764 Herz, A. (2015, September 24). CPC to the feds: we’ll go back to protesting the police if we’re 
ignored. The Stranger. Retrieved from https://www.thestranger.com. 
765 Miletich, S. (2016, August 10). City told to hold off on Police Reform Plan. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
April 2017 Remarking on the Monitor’s assessment of SPD uses of force, U.S. Attorney Hayes 
issued a written statement: “This positive assessment is a credit to the men and 
women of SPD, from line officers to command staff. They have embraced reform, 
made it their own, and fundamentally changed what is happening on the streets of 
Seattle” (Seattle Times, 4/7/2017a).766 
October 2017 U.S. Attorney Hayes, regarding DOJ’s recommendation that Judge Robart grant the 
City’s request to be found in “full and effective compliance” with the Consent 
Decree: “We have not come to this conclusion lightly… Career civil rights attorneys 
and police-practices experts have spent more than five years investigating SPD, 
overseeing the creation of new policies and training, and independently reviewing 
the relevant data and the results of assessments conducted by the Court-appointed 
Monitor that examined the implementation of the Consent Decree’s requirements 
…” (Seattle Times, 10/14/2017).767 “The net result is that SPD’s use of force, stops, 
and related data show that it has complied with all of the terms of the Decree, and 
has eliminated the pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing that led to DOJ’s 
investigation and findings” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 422, p. 2). “This 
conclusion does not mean the police department is perfect, nor does it end the hard 
work required under the Decree, … There is more to do and issues that need to be 
addressed. Rather, this milestone represents the end of one chapter and the 
beginning of another” (Seattle Times, 10/14/2017). 
January 2018 U.S. Attorney Hayes refers to the order finding initial compliance as a “milestone 
[and a] credit to the hard work of SPD and City leadership, engaged community 
members including the Community Police Commission, and SPD officers whose 
dedication to the mission is essential to reform” (Seattle Times, 1/11/2018).768 
February 2019 Arguing against a finding that the City was out of compliance with the Consent 
Decree due to issues regarding the police union contract and an arbitration decision 
unfavorable to the City, the DOJ argued that: “Unless there is reason to believe that 
the individual incident of misconduct reflects a systemic problem, an individual 
incident does not serve as the basis for finding a failure of sustained compliance” 
(U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 528, p. 5). In addition, the DOJ argued that the 
City’s practice of using independent arbitrators to review SPD discipline did not 
violate the Consent Decree (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 528, pp. 5, 9-18). 
May 2020 DOJ filing in support of City’s Motion for Termination of Consent Decree (U.S. v. 
Seattle, Document No. 618-1). 
 
 
766 Miletich, S. (2017, April 7). Monitor: Dramatic Turnaround for SPD on use-of-force reform. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
767 Miletich, S. (2017, October 14). Justice Dept. Seattle Times [“The Department of Justice, 
which nearly six years ago stunned the Seattle Police Department with its finding that officers too 
often used excessive force, urged a federal judge Friday to grant the city of Seattle’s request to 
be found in ‘full and effective compliance’ with court-ordered reforms.”] 
768 Miletich, S. & Carter, M. (2018, January 11). Seattle Police Reforms. Seattle Times [“In a 
landmark ruling, U.S. District Judge James Robart on Wednesday found the Seattle Police 
Department in ‘full and effective compliance’ with court-ordered reforms imposed on the city more 
than five years ago after a string of high-profile incidents involving use of force.”] 
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Based on a review of public statements made by the DOJ and information 
provided by study participants, it appears clear that the Seattle investigation was 
ultimately the result of the ACLU letter (signed by representatives of 34 community 
groups) asking for the investigation after a number of high-profile incidents. Seattle was 
already on the DOJ’s “radar” due to the same incidents. Contrary to the beliefs of the 
SPD command staff, the DOJ, when enforcing the provisions of §14141 do not just 
target the worst departments in the country – the litigation strategy includes identifying 
departments who can serve as examples for other departments. Given that the DOJ had 
not yet established a presence in the Pacific Northwest and the fact that Seattle had a 
progressive political base and a tax base which could finance a reform effort, it appeared 
to have the potential of being an “easy win” and an opportunity to show how effective 
§14141 litigation could be.  
“Seattle could be seen as an opportunity … this is a city that should be 
able to do better … a city where there would be significant buy-in and 
the political will to change … a department that had the capacity, 
resources and sophistication to reform and do it really well.”  
Study research participant 
 
The Perspective of U.S. Attorney Jenny Durkan. 
One particular stakeholder became positioned in such a unique way as to 
warrant individual scrutiny of her public statements over the course of the DOJ 
investigation and consent decree implementation. As previously noted, Jenny Durkan 
served on both “blue ribbon” panels that evaluated SPD accountability issues (the 1999 
“Citizens Review Panel” that recommended the creation of the Office of Professional 
Accountability where she was described as a “Seattle Attorney and former Executive 
Counsel to the Governor” (Citizen Review Panel, 1999, p. 2) and the 2008 “Police 
Accountability Review Panel” where she was described as “a prominent Seattle attorney 
known for successful criminal and civil litigation, and for her continued civic leadership” 
(Police Accountability Review Panel, 2008, p. 15). Durkan served as the first Citizen 
Observer on the Seattle Police Firearms Review Board from 1997 to 2000. She also 
served in 2003 as a member of the bipartisan committee that recommended Judge 
Robart for appointment to the federal bench. Durkan was appointed as the United 
States Attorney for the Western District of Washington by President Obama in October 
2009, approximately 21 months after the release of the Police Accountability Review 
380 
Panel Report. In that capacity, she was one of the primary recipients of the December 3, 
2010 ACLU letter which called for a DOJ investigation of the SPD and one of the two 
principal signatories of the December 16, 2011 DOJ investigation report.   
Durkan resigned as the U.S. Attorney in September 2014 and announced her 
candidacy for Mayor of Seattle on May 11, 2017, shortly after then-Mayor Ed Murray, 
who had been credited for moving the Consent Decree reform process forward, 
withdrew his candidacy for re-election after becoming the subject of allegations of sexual 
abuse by members of his family. Murray endorsed Durkan’s candidacy, and she was 
sworn in as Mayor of Seattle on November 27, 2017 after winning the November 7, 2017 
municipal election.769 Durkan launched her campaign for re-election on February 7, 
2020.770 
Durkan is the only person known to have served as both a plaintiff (as the 
appointed U.S. Attorney for Western Washington) and a defendant (as Mayor of Seattle) 
in an ongoing §14141 lawsuit. That, along with her historical knowledge of SPD issues of 
accountability, put her in a unique position in the history of §14141 enforcement actions. 
As one would expect, Durkan had her supporters and her detractors amongst study 
participants within the City and the SPD. While some participants believed that her 
motives in pursuing the investigation and consent decree were politically motived,771 
others believed her motives to be pure and her position that a consent decree and court-
appointed monitor were required to “hard bake” police reform into the SPD culture, to be 
based on her extraordinary knowledge of systemic problems within the SPD and its 
accountability structures. 
 
769 Biographical information for Durkan can be found at: www.jennydurkan.com; 
https://lovequotessweetdreams.com/jenny-durkan-wife/; 
http://www.seattle.gov/mayor/newsroom/about-the-mayor; Beekman, D. (2017, November 7). 
Jenny Durkan defeats Cary Moon to become Seattle’s first woman mayor since the 1920s. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from Jenny Durkan defeats Cary Moon to become Seattle’s first woman 
mayor since the 1920s | The Seattle Times. 
770 Beekman, D. (2020, February 27). Seattle Mayor Durkan launches bid for reelection. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from Seattle Mayor Durkan launches bid for reelection | The Seattle Times. 
771 More than one participant suggested that Durkan’s actions in pursuing a consent decree was 
motivated by a desire to obtain an appointment from the next Democratic Presidential 
administration. Other participants suggested that Durkan always harbored the desire to be 
elected Mayor of Seattle and was “lying in wait” for an opportunity to parlay her police oversight 
efforts into a successful political campaign in a City known for its progressive politics. 
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Durkan’s comments as U.S. Attorney were sometimes supportive of the SPD, 
and at other times, critical and are summarized below, chronologically: 
Table 7.6. Public Statements of U.S. Attorney Jenny Durkan 
Date Statement 
April 6, 2011 “Without trust, police officers can’t do their jobs.” 
“Durkan says her team will examine issues of trust and make recommendations 
to the department. ‘Officers rely on citizens to give them good information, to let 
them patrol their streets, …Trust goes to the heart of safety. They have to trust 
that they’re welcome—that they can get out of their cars and be safe. It's the 
linchpin to good policing” (The Stranger, 4/6/2011). 
December 16, 2011 At the time of the release of the DOJ investigation findings: 
“Durkan…repeatedly expressed optimism that the department will see its way 
forward and embrace change. Both she and Perez repeatedly praised the 
Department of its cooperation.”  
“We are also aware of — and sensitive to — the very real and raw feelings 
some residents of Seattle, particularly members of our diverse communities, 
have toward the Seattle Police Department, …We know there is work to be 
done. I am hopeful this will change, too” (Seattle Times, 12/17/2011). 
March 30, 2012 “Whatever solutions we arrive at have to be part of a court-ordered 
agreement…I’m optimistic and I have every expectation that the city and the 
[Justice Department] will reach an agreement.” 
“I think what I’m most encouraged about, though, is that I saw the mayor and 
the chief of police side-by-side saying they support reforms” (Seattle Times, 
3/31/2012). 
May 11, 2012 “Part of ‘20/20’ heartens me very much…The framework is all there to get an 
agreement, … And at the end of the day, I still believe we will get to an 
agreement because the alternatives are just not good for anybody. Think about 
the impact of litigation to the city and the department.”  
“You know that, over the years, we've had episodic issues in Seattle with the 
police. What has happened is that a panel will be appointed and come up with 
ideas, and a checklist will be made of reforms, and then they get put on the 
shelf.”  
“We have to have specifics for each of the areas ... timetables, supervision and 
accountability, … We need them to put meat on the bones” (Seattle Times, 
5/12/2012).772 
April 8, 2013 Commenting on resignation of Chief Diaz and appointment of Interim Chief 
Pugel: 
“[Diaz] oversaw the first steps of the implementation of reforms within the 
Seattle Police Department, … I am grateful for his partnership and service, and 
wish him well.” 
 
772 Carter, M. (2012, May 12). Durkan: City must flesh out its 20-20 proposal. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
“[Pugel has shown] he can step up and lead… To move us forward, he will 
need to guide and implement the full range of reforms and set clear 
expectations and direction for every officer” (Seattle Times, 4/9/2013)773 
April 27, 2013 Responding to Monitor’s First semi-annual report: “We are at a new juncture — 
where all eyes and efforts must be on the road ahead, …Getting reform right, in 
a way that increases public safety and public confidence, has to be a priority for 
everyone in the department” (Seattle Times, 4/27/2013). 
December 11, 2013 To the CPC: “What you say matters, …But it’s important to know where and 
when to push. We will take the pushing and shoving, but as the Department of 
Justice we will fight to maintain a two-party agreement.” 
“You don’t own the community, …And you are not the only people getting 
community input” (Seattle Times, 12/12/2013). 
December 18, 2013 Regarding the adoption of a new SPD use-of-force policy: “This is a major 
milestone in the reform process that will help rebuild trust and foster greater 
accountability” (Seattle Times, 12/18/2013). 
January 18, 2014 Commenting on approval of anti-bias and stop & frisk policies: “These new 
policies will set the national standard and are a huge step forward” (Seattle 
Times, 1/18/2014).774 
January 29, 2014 Upon the appointment of Interim Chief Bailey by Mayor Murray: “The next 
several months are critical to the reform process, and the commitments by all 
parts of city government are essential for success.” 
“Done right, the new chief of police will have the necessary framework to lead 
the Seattle Police Department to be the national model for urban policing” 
(Seattle Times, 1/30/2014).775 
April 3, 2014 “There has been a marked change in the last 90 days.” 
“It is a marathon, not a sprint” (Seattle Times, 4/4/2014). 
April 16, 2014 Commenting on the unity between Mayor Murray and other elected officials: 
“There is one message: Reform is here, it’s going to happen” (The Stranger, 
4/16/2014). 
May 29, 2014 Commenting on a lawsuit filed by Seattle Officers alleging new SPD use-of-
force policies were putting officers in danger: “[The policy was created] with the 
police, by the police and for the police.” 
Commenting on the unified message from SPD command to officers: “Reform is 
under way. Get on the train, or leave.” 
“Nobody can say the use-of-force policies make things harder for police officers, 
because they haven’t been implemented yet” (Seattle Times, 5/30/2014).776 
 
773 Carter, M., Miletich, S. & Green, S. (2013, April 9). Rocky Tenure Over. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
774 Miletich, S. & Carter, M. (2014, January 18). Judge approves SPD’s anit-bias, stop policies. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
775 Miletich, S. (2014, January 30). Bailey: It’s time for new SPD ‘roadmap.’ Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
776 Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (2014, May 30). U.S. Attorney swings back at lawsuit filed by Seattle 
cops. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
April 6, 2017 After resignation as U.S. Attorney; responding to DOJ’s move to “pause” 
consent decree cases: “When they used force, 75 percent of the time it was 
against someone in a mental-health crisis or drug and alcohol crisis, …Now it’s 
an infinitesimal amount. That makes a huge difference on the streets, and it’s 
better for cops” (Seattle Times, 4/6/2017).777 
 
Overall, it does appear that once Durkan’s Office was fully engaged in the reform 
effort, her comments were mainly supportive suggesting the importance of the success 
of the reform effort to her own legacy. Of course, after Durkan was later elected as 
Mayor of Seattle (see Section 7.6.1, infra), her role changed and, as expected, her 
statements tended to be even more supportive of the City’s position as the defendant in 
the Consent Decree litigation process. 
7.4.3. The Seattle Police Chiefs 
“There’s no question that some of these consent decrees are arduous and 
complicated, but they will (force cities to) provide the kind of resources the 
department very often needs,”  
Chuck Wexler, Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum, 
Quoted by Seattle Times, April 6, 2017 
 
There were five Seattle police chiefs whose tenure covered the period of the 
establishment of the Consent Decree (2012) through the 2020 protests on policing. They 
included three permanent Chiefs (John Diaz, Kathleen O’Toole and Carmen Best) and 
two “interim” Chiefs (Jim Pugel and Harry Bailey).778 Each Chief provided his or her own 
perspective on how to approach the DOJ reform effort. Chief Diaz started the process 
with a generally antagonistic approach, followed by interim Chiefs Pugel and Bailey who 
were publicly more supportive of the reform effort, but who were also part of the SPD’s 
“old guard” command staff and, at times, spoke accordingly. It was only with the 
appointment of Chief O’Toole that, according to research participants, there was no 
 
777 Gurman, S. (2017, April 6). Justice Dept. wants pause in consent-decree cases. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
778 A third iterim Chief (Adrian Diaz) was appointed by Mayor Durkan on September 20, 2020, 
following the resignation of Chief Best and after data collection was completed in this research 
project. 
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space between the Mayor and the Chief with respect to the need to push reform efforts 
forward. With the appointment of Chief Best, however, even though she was the first 
female African American Chief in Seattle, she was “born and bred” within the SPD and 
was perceived as less able to push forward aggressive reforms within the department. 
The public comments of each Chief highlight what was commonly described by research 
participants as a “one step forward” and “one step back” road to reform. 
The experience of Chief John Diaz. 
As previously noted, SPD Assistant Chief John Diaz was first appointed Interim 
Chief by Mayor Nickels after Chief Gil Kerlikowske was appointed “Drug Czar” by 
President Obama in March, 2009. As an SPD insider,779 within hours of the DOJ’s 
findings being revealed, Chief Diaz was defending the department against the DOJ’s 
perceived attack: “I want to make this clear … The department is not broken.” Further, in 
an email to officers sent just before the DOJ report was made public, Diaz wrote: “We 
have many reasons to question the validity and soundness of the DOJ's conclusions. At 
this time, the city's simple request is to examine the data, methods and analyses used in 
support of these allegations and to reach these conclusions” (Seattle Times, 
12/17/2011). 
Diaz had previously referred to the DOJ investigation as “a free audit,” although 
neither he nor his command staff ever acknowledged that the investigation was, in fact, 
warranted. As reported by the Seattle Times in September 2011: “Diaz and Kimerer, the 
deputy chief, disputed any notion that the department has been too complacent. ‘I can’t 
remember a period of resting on laurels,’ Kimerer said. ‘It’s been a very, very dynamic 
place’ (Seattle Times, 9/3/2011). 
As of February 2013, the Monitor was seeking to determine “the degree to which 
the Chief, Assistant and Deputy Chiefs, and Captain communicate an honest 
endorsement and a thorough understanding of the letter and spirit of the Settlement 
Agreement and the factors that led to it” (Monitoring Plan for the First Year, 3/5/2013, p. 
19).780 In response to that draft plan, Chief Diaz seemed to prove the Monitor’s point 
 
779 Even though he was perceived as an “SPD insider,” Diaz was the first minority chief in the 
history of the SPD (Seattle Times Staff (2018, January 10). Timeline of Seattle Police Reform. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com). 
780 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 59, filed March 5, 2013. 
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when he disputed the DOJ investigation report findings in a response to the draft plan 
and referred to the DOJ’s concerns about biased policing as mere “allegations” (Seattle 
Times, 2/27/2013, 3/1/2013).781 
Study participants noted that Diaz later acknowledged that fighting the DOJ at 
the outset ended up being a bad idea and that a more collaborative approach with the 
DOJ would have avoided unnecessary conflict and assisted in the reform process in the 
long-term. 
When Diaz announced his retirement in April 2013, he continued to advocate on 
behalf of the SPD as a dynamic, learning organization:  
Across the country, people look at the Seattle Police Department as a 
department willing to try new innovations, new experiments, … It’s in the 
DNA of this organization. A lot of places aren’t willing to try new things 
because there’s a risk attached to it. (Seattle Times, 4/9/2013) 
Diaz retired shortly before the publication of the Monitor’s first semi-annual 
report. In the introduction to the report, Diaz was mentioned almost in passing: 
The Monitor commends the City of Seattle and the Seattle Police 
Department (SPD or Department) for the progress that has been made—
and there has been considerable progress—but cautions that compliance 
has only begun and that full and effective compliance remains for the 
future. We acknowledge Chief Diaz for his many years of service and 
devotion to the SPD and welcome interim Chief Jim Pugel. We look forward 
to working with him…We have had several useful and productive meetings 
with Chief John Diaz, interim Chief Jim Pugel and Assistant Chief Michael 
Sanford, former Compliance Coordinator Steve Brown, and his successor, 
Bob Scales… (1st semi-annual report, p. 1) 
Diaz was described by some study participants as a “weak chief” and by others 
as having a “quiet leadership style.” Then-U.S. Attorney Jenny Durkan commented that 
Diaz “oversaw the first steps of the implementation of reforms within the Seattle Police 
Department … I am grateful for his partnership and service, and wish him well” (Seattle 
Times, 4/9/2013). 
 
781 Miletich, S. (2013, February 27). McGinn, Holmes clash on police-reform oversight. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com; Miletich, S. (2013, March 1). An old clash 
ignites McGinn Holmes split over police reform. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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The experience of Interim Chief Jim Pugel. 
Interim Chief Pugel was another SPD insider, promoted from the rank of 
Assistant Chief to replace Chief Diaz until a permanent successor could be named. In 
the Monitor’s Second semi-annual report, he commented positively on Chief Pugel’s 
“open-mindedness and responsiveness to our inquiries and requests” and saw 
willingness “on the part of some SPD executives and supervisors to entertain feedback 
and to engage in meaningful and constructive discussions…” (2nd semi-annual report, 
pp. 2-3).  Even so, the Monitor found that  
the SPD’s resistance to the Settlement Agreement [was] not abating with 
adequate speed … it is unfortunate that there is still resistance to the notion 
that police officers and their supervisors must be accountable for misuse 
of force and discrimination and must challenge themselves to embrace new 
approaches. (2nd semi-annual report, pp. 5-6) 
Upon being appointed, Chief Pugel made a number of comments with respect to his 
perspectives on the federally mandated Consent Decree: 
• “Some feel the settlement contract when too far; some said it didn’t go far 
enough … We all agree, though, that we are where we are. A federal judge has 
spoken.” 
• “Yes, there was a lot of turmoil … [Diaz] was at the tip of the sword without a 
road map, with a lot of competing interests … It’s past … It’s all done. It’s past … 
We’re all moving forward…” (Seattle Times, 4/11/2013).782 
Although Pugel announced that the SPD was “moving forward” and consent 
decree controversies were in the past, in true SPD form, Pugel expressed his surprise 
upon receiving the DOJ investigation report and noted that the Department had “some 
university professors looking at that, using a scientific and academic approach, to see if 
we really were at 20 percent.” Although Pugel did acknowledge that “huge” changes 
were taking place and that use-of-force incidents had not previously been well 
documented, he also downplayed the changes that were needed by saying that “[w]e’re 
still going through the motions, but the motions are more thorough and analytical” 
(Seattle Times, 4/11/2013). 
 
782 Green, S. (2013, April 11). The man who will soon lead SPD. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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When the existence of a 1986 Department-sponsored video was leaked to the 
media that showed Pugel and other officers dressed as homeless men and singing a 
parody song to the tune of “Under the Boardwalk,” Pugel pointed to the leak as 
highlighting that there were “pockets of resistance” within the SPD who were trying to 
undermine his efforts to reform the Department (Seattle Times, 4/26/2013).783 
On his first day in office, Pugel went ahead and changed the SPD motto from 
“Preventing crime, enforcing laws, supporting public safety” to “Excellence, justice, 
humility, harm reduction.” By May, 2013, the Monitor, while speaking to City Council, 
argued that Chief Pugel “needs to address concerns in the department about federally 
mandated reforms and make clear that the settlement agreement to enforce them is ‘not 
going to go away.’” The Monitor acknowledged that Pugel told him, shortly after his 
appointment, that “the department needed to put the turmoil behind it and move forward 
with the reforms” (Seattle Times, 5/8/2013).784  
During Pugel’s tenure as Chief, research study participants noted that although 
there was some momentum when he was appointed Chief, the SPD was not getting the 
direction from the Monitoring Team and the DOJ that they wanted:  
We were told we needed to do better and needed to fix it, but they would 
not give us real direction on what was necessary for success; instead, 
there was lots of second guessing without much guidance or leadership 
… We wondered why they did not seem to have a playbook given how 
many consent decrees they had done. 
By December 1, 2013, Pugel had demoted two Assistant Chiefs, one in charge of 
the Department’s Technology Operations, after the Monitor’s draft Second semi-annual 
report included “harsh criticism” of the SPD’s progress in that area (Seattle Times, 
12/1/2013).785 
Effective January 1, 2014, the SPD adopted its new use-of-force policy. Upon the 
approval of the policy by Judge Robart, Chief Pugel issued a statement saying: “Today, 
 
783 Carter, M. (2013, April 26). Interim Police Chief Regrets Old Video Mocking Homeless. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
784 Miletich, S. (2013, May 8). Interim Chief Needs to Back SPD Reforms, Monitor Says. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
785 Seven, R. (2013, December 1). Shake up – 2 police officials demoted. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
388 
the Seattle Police Department took another step forward in our efforts to provide 
effective, humane and constitutional policing to our city” (Seattle Times, 12/18/2013). 
When Mayor Murray was sworn in on January 1, 2014 one of his first actions was 
to fire Chief Pugel and replace him with a retired Assistant Chief, Harry Bailey. Pugel 
supporters have suggested that Murray replaced Pugel at the behest of the police union 
who had endorsed Murray over McGinn. 
The experience of interim Chief Harry Bailey. 
Chief Bailey served a tenure of less than six months, from January 9, 2014, until 
the confirmation of Chief O’Toole on June 23, 2014. Bailey’s tenure was almost 
immediately impacted by his decision to dismiss six disciplinary cases, at the union’s 
request, after prior requests had been turned down by Chief Pugel. Bailey’s unilateral 
action in that regard highlighted the highly dysfunctional disciplinary system and 
subjected the Chief and the Mayor to universal condemnation from civil rights groups 
and the City Council (Seattle Times, 2/27/2014).786 
Even so, in the Monitor’s Third semi-annual report, released in June 2014, the 
Monitor commented positively on Bailey’s tenure, noting that “[t]he Monitoring Team 
respects Interim Chief Bailey’s contributions to the Seattle community throughout his 
career” and complementing Bailey for promoting a new Assistant Chief to head the 
Department’s “newly fashioned Bureau of Compliance and Professional Standards” (3rd 
semi-annual report, p. 8). 
The experience of Chief Kathleen O’Toole. 
After a national search, Mayor Murray ended up hiring Kathleen O’Toole as 
Seattle’s first female permanent Chief of Police. Chief O’Toole had remarkable 
progressive credentials, having previously served as the Police Commissioner for the 
City of Boston and the first Chief Inspector of the Garda Inspectorate in Ireland. She had 
also recently served as the court-appointed Monitor for the East Haven Connecticut 
Police Department.787 
 
786 Miletich, S. (2014, February 27). Reversals of 6 SPD Misconduct Cases Face New Review. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
787 For 2014 biography of Chief O’Toole, see Seattle's next Police Chief - Mayor Murray. 
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Chief O’Toole’s work was credited by the Monitor for bringing the SPD into 
compliance with the Consent Decree. In his final report, the Monitor was effusive in his 
praise for O’Toole: 
On June 23, 2014, Kathleen O'Toole became Chief of the SPD. Thereafter, 
there was a sea change in the attitude of the SPD executives toward the 
Consent Decree, the court, and the Monitor. Chief O'Toole, under the 
direction of Mayor Murray, had as her overriding goal full implementation 
of the Consent Decree as rapidly as practicable. She achieved that 
goal…Chief O'Toole and the Monitor were most often of one mind and were 
in constant communication. As Monitor, I spoke with the Chief on close to 
a daily basis. When I was in Seattle, as I was every 2 to 3 weeks, I would 
meet the Chief for breakfast along with other members of the Team, and 
we would frequently meet her also for dinner… 
At the end of the day, however, no one on the city side was more critical to 
this process than Kathy O'Toole. She was the pivot around which all the 
progress turned. If there ever was an ideal of a progressive police chief 
who understood and embraced reform at the same time as she could put 
herself in the shoes of the rank-and-file officer and understand him or her 
completely, it is Kathleen O'Toole (Bobb, 2020, pp. 7-8). 
O’Toole was well received in the media and a review of her media quotes 
provides some insight into how she approached her job as an “outsider” Chief, trying to 
change the culture of the SPD and get it into compliance with the Consent Decree, while 
also trying to be supportive of the work of SPD’s rank-and-file. 
Table 7.7. Public Statements of Chief Kathleen O’Toole 
Date Statement 
May 19, 2014 “Within minutes of being named as Mayor Ed Murray’s choice for the 
position, she rattled them off [themes to be pursued as Chief]: tirelessly 
working to restore public trust; rebuilding pride in a wounded department; 
improving the quality of life and reducing violence in neighborhoods; and 
operating the department as an effective and efficient business.” 
“We have to acknowledge mistakes of the past. … Nobody dislikes rogue 
cops more than good cops. If people make honest mistakes, we’ll stand by 
them.” (Seattle Times, 5/20/2014).788 
June 5, 2014 To City Council Safety Committee considering her confirmation as Chief: 
“It’s time to go out [into] every neighborhood in the City… [I want] to hit the 
ground running” (Seattle Times, 6/5/2014).789  
 
788 Miletich, S., (2014, May 20). O’Toole Picked for SPD, Eager to Outline Goals. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 




June 23, 2014 At the time of her confirmation as Chief: “I want members of the Seattle PD 
to hold your heads high, …We’re going to work together and we’re going to 
accomplish some great things” (Seattle Times, 6/24/2014).790 
June 26, 2014 Commenting on meeting with representatives of officers who filed a lawsuit 
against the new SPD use-of-force policy: “I think litigation should be the last 
resort because it undermines the spirit of cooperation going forward. … I 
thought it was a great dialogue, …I wanted to hear their perspective. I felt it 
was a productive meeting…There’s no question it undermines that spirit of 
cooperation I want to promote,” (Seattle Times, 6/26/2014).791 
August 27, 2014 “The Seattle Police Department is moving full speed ahead in 
implementation of the Consent Decree and will not be distracted in the 
process… [the] vast majority of SPD officers are entirely committed to 
modernization and reform.” (Seattle Times, 8/29/2014).792 
September 30, 2014 Upon issuing a directive reducing the amount of paperwork necessary with 
respect to minor uses of force: “We saw instances where we had 
overreporting, … police officers have been erring on the side of caution and 
writing reports even when not necessary… Force is a necessary 
component” [of police work] … [proper and legal force] should be employed 
as needed.”  
“I am not aware of any injury that has resulted from an officer hesitating to 
use force under current SPD policy, … I expect officers to take appropriate 
actions and not use the force policy as an excuse” (Seattle Times, 
9/30/2014).793 
October 20, 2014 Commenting on the lawsuit filed by 100+ Seattle officers against the SPD’s 
new use-of-force policy being dismissed by the court: ““As Chief, I will 
ensure that our officers have the policies, training, equipment and support 
to do their jobs safely and effectively” (Seattle Times, 10/21/2014).794 
 
790 Miletich, S. (2014, June 24). O’Toole, confirmed as police chief, promises a force ‘second to 
none.’ Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
791 Miletich, S., (2014, June 26). O’Toole and Officers Met Privately to Discuss Suit. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
792 Miletich, S. (2014, August 29). SPD Cops: City ‘playing politics’ with lives. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
793 Miletich, S. (2014, September 30). Chief Says Less Paperwork OK for minor use of force. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
794 Miletich, S. (2014, October 21). SPD Officers’ Suit Over Use of Force Thrown Out. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
March 2, 2015 “I’m trying to ... breathe some life back into the place and get people 
enthusiastic about getting out and doing police work and recognizing good 
police work, … We all want the same thing at the end of the day, … We 
want this to be the model that others look to for constitutional policing and 
reform.”  
Commenting on relationship with SPOG President Ron Smith: “I think he’s 
demonstrated some very principled leadership in recent months as we’ve 
faced challenges, … Every indication is that he is entirely onboard for 
reform in this organization. He represents his members well, as he should. 
But he certainly hasn’t been an impediment to change, nor has his board of 
directors.” 
“[O’Toole] is fond of saying change and cultural reform can’t be dictated” 
(Seattle Times, 3/2/2015).795 
April 16, 2015 Commenting on the improved relationship with SPOG: “There will always 
be a professional tension in the relationship; it doesn’t mean it has to be 
contentious, … At the end of the day, we want the same thing: to restore 
pride and get through the Consent Decree” (Seattle Times, 4/16/2015).796 
April 17, 2015 Commenting on Judge Robart’s approval of SPD de-escalation training: 
“The Seattle Police Department is proud to be at the forefront in providing 
this innovative de-escalation training to our officers, … We will continue to 
work collaboratively with the Department of Justice and Monitor Merrick 
Bobb to implement the Consent Decree and enhance community trust” 
(Seattle Times, 4/17/2015).797 
June 16, 2015 “O’Toole, citing her recent attendance at a conference of major-city police 
chiefs, said she was approached by others asking about reform because 
Seattle is at the ‘leading edge of this stuff’” (Seattle Times, 6/16/2015). 
June 27, 2015 “I was trained to fight the war on crime, and we were measured by the 
number of arrests we made and our speed in answering 911 calls… but 
over time, I realized that policing went well beyond that, and we are really 
making an effort here to engage with people, not just enforce the law” (New 
York Times, 6/27/2015).798 
 
795 Miletich, S. (2015, March 2). Chief Aim: Re-energize SPD. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
796 Sullivan, J. (2015, April 16). A ‘Mellowed’ Leader at Helm of SPD’s Union. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
797 Miletich, S. (2015, April 17). Federal Judge OK’s key step in court-ordered SPD reforms. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
798 Williams, T. (2015, June 27). Long Taught to Use Force, Police Warily Learn to De-escalate. 




June 30, 2015 “Reform is not easy, but I remain enthusiastic that we are at the forefront of 
police reform, … We are addressing decades of institutional culture and 
embedded practices. This change sometimes requires difficult 
conversations” (New York Times, 6/30/2015).799 
September 7, 2015 Commenting on SPD data showing officers using minimal force in contacts 
with the mentally ill: “We’re doing far more work related to service than we 
are enforcement, … Policing goes way beyond law enforcement, this 
underscores that” (Seattle Times, 9/7/2015). 
September 23, 2015 Commenting on “Anti-reform Rhetoric” contained in SPOG Newspaper, The 
Guardian: “The Seattle Police Department is moving full speed ahead in 
implementation of the Consent Decree, as evidenced by recent data. The 
vast majority of SPD officers are entirely committed to modernization and 
reform. Individual commentary should not be seen as a barometer for the 
progress we have made, which has been substantial” (The Stranger, 
9/23/2015). 
October 2, 2015 Commenting on a public survey showing improvements in public 
satisfaction with SPD: “The men and women of Seattle Police Department 
continue to enhance community trust every day, … While much work 
remains, this latest survey shows measurable progress” (Seattle Times, 
10/2/2015).800 
January 10, 2016 Commenting on invitation to attend the State of the Union Address in 
Washington D.C.: “I have to believe that collaborative effort led to this 
invitation, … Certainly we are not done, but I think we’re definitely ahead of 
the curve, …” (Seattle Times, 1/10/2016).801 
November 21, 2016 Commenting on results of 2016 Presidential Election: “We are on the road 
to reform, … We have our road map, our consent decree. We’ll continue to 
work with many of the same people in the Department of Justice. So none 
of the political developments will deter us. We’re moving full speed ahead 
with the plan” (Seattle Times, 11/21/2016).802 
April 7, 2017 Commenting on Monitor’s report showing overall reduction in SPD use-of-
force: “…this reduction in the use of force cannot be attributed to anything 
other than what can now be statistically shown: officers in the field are de-
escalating volatile situations with regularity and skill, putting in practice the 
training that has established Seattle as a national leader in policing reform” 
(Seattle Times, 4/7/2017a). 
 
799 Williams, T. (2015, June 30). Seattle Police Investigating 2 Officers Shown in Report, New 
York Times. Retrieved from Williams, T. (2015, June 30). Seattle Police Investigating 2 Officers 
Shown in Report, New York Times. 
800 Carter, M. (2015, October 2). Public’s Opinion of SPD Improves over last 2 years. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
801 Miletich, S. (2015, January 10). O’Toole to be Sitting with First Lady. Seattle Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
802 Miletich, S. (2016, November 21, 2016). SPD reform ‘locked down’ but Could Trump ‘Let it all 
Die’? Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
June 20, 2017 Responding to findings by the Monitor that SPD was in-compliance with 
“Stop & Frisk” reforms: “Preliminarily, we are heartened that this report is 
consistent with ... data we released earlier in May, which demonstrates our 
ability to similarly analyze and assess our activities, … We are also, 
obviously, pleased that we were found to be in compliance with the material 
sections of the Consent Decree. In the coming days, we will be parsing 
through this report to determine how we continue to move forward in 
partnership with the community to better identify factors underlying any 
disproportionalities in the data” (Seattle Times, 6/20/2017). 
July 17, 2017 Commenting on the Mayor’s Executive Order Requiring SPD to implement 
use of Body-Worn Cameras: “No one is more committed to equipping 
officers with body cameras than I am. As studies and our own pilot 
(program) have shown, body cameras are critical tools, not just for holding 
all involved to account for their actions, but also to enhance safety of 
officers and community members. …We have received favorable 
responses from officers who have been involved in our pilot program, and 
with their assistance and that of the community, have worked diligently and 
collaboratively to design a policy that strikes the appropriate balance 
between transparency and privacy in often sensitive circumstances” 
(Seattle Times, 7/17/2017).803 
September 12, 2017 Email to Department responding to Monitor’s report that SPD had yet to 
comply with court-ordered reforms which included a 47-page memo from 
“two top aides” that took the position that the SPD was in full and effective 
compliance:804 “I am requesting that the Mayor’s Office and City Attorney 
highlight these compelling arguments and conclusions in the City’s 
response to the Monitor’s filing…Sadly, in our very challenging business, 
the next controversy or tragic event is always on the horizon. In such cases, 
we welcome fair scrutiny and accountability. We have institutionalized 
systems to ensure careful, transparent investigation and analysis. At the 
same time, you should be commended for the hundreds of thousands of 
contacts you skillfully and compassionately handle every year.” 
“Each day department members ask me where we stand in terms of 
compliance. Believe me, I wish I had a definitive answer. Nonetheless, 
please know that I am incredibly proud of the real, measurable success you 
have achieved over the past few years” (Seattle Times, 9/12/2017).805 
 
803 Miletich, S. (2017, July 17). Rebuffing Union, Mayor Murray Orders Seattle Police to Begin 
Wearing Body Cameras. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
804 The memo, dated August 1, 2017, signed by the SPD’s chief legal officer (Rebecca Boatright) 
and the Chief Operating Officer (Brian Maxey) concluded that there “can be no dispute that 
Seattle Police Department has not only met ... but exceeded and continues to exceed” the terms 
of the Consent Decree. … To the extent that concept is now ambiguous, it is so only because the 
Monitor, in his semi-annual reports, through his technical assistance, and in the scope of review 
laid out through his assessments has effectively inserted a nebulous, amorphous, wholly 
subjective standard of care that cannot be reconciled with either the language of the Consent 
Decree or … evidentiary requirements…].” Memo on file with author. 
805 Miletich, S. (2017, September 12). Seattle Police Dispute Monitor on reform compliance. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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According to SPD insiders, when O’Toole took command, “SPD command staff 
were not entirely enthusiastic about the process – they were in denial and they resisted, 
fighting it every step of the way…and communicated it to the troops.” O’Toole tried to 
spread the message, however, that “it [was] all water over the dam. The agreement had 
been negotiated; you can spend your time whining, but we need to send out a positive 
message.” 
Chief O’Toole announced her retirement from the SPD in early December 2017, 
citing health issues relating to her husband (Seattle.pi.com, 12/6/2017);806 she was 
replaced by Deputy Chief Carmen Best, who O’Toole promoted early on in her tenure 
(Seattle Times, 12/8/2017).807 
The experience of Chief Carmen Best. 
Chief Best took office as the Interim Chief, effective January 1, 2018. She was 
eventually chosen as the SPD’s next permanent Chief in August 2018, after a national 
search by Mayor Durkan. Although she was originally left out of the list of finalists by the 
Mayor’s selection committee, community pressure resulted in her being made a finalist 
when another candidate dropped out and she was then chosen by Mayor Durkan to lead 
the SPD (Seattle Times, 5/26/2018, 5/30/2018, 7/9/2018 & 7/18/2018a).808 
Upon confirmation, Best reportedly reverted back to an old way of doing business 
when she eliminated civilians previously chosen by Chief O’Toole from her command 
staff. According to one SPD insider:  
[Chief Best] reverted back to people she had known for years and could 
trust and reverted back to relying on sworn and not unsworn. … [she] 
reverted back to a more traditional mindset of sworn in-charge, with 
civilians not going outside their lane. 
 
806 Burton, L. (2017, December 6). Seattle PD Chief O’Toole Calls it Quits Seattlepi.com. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattlepi.com/local/crime/article/Seattle-PD-Chief-O-Toole-calls-it-
quits-12403970.php. 
807 Green, S. (2017, December 8). Deputy Chief ‘all in,’ Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
808 Miletich, S., (2018, May 26). 3 on list for Seattle Police Chief. Seattle Times; Miletich, S. & 
Beekman, D. (2018, May 30). Durkan defends omitting Best from Short List for SPD Chief. 
Seattle Times; Miletich, S. (2018, July 9). Reversal: Best leads field for Top Cop. Seattle Times; 
Miletich, S. & Beekman, D. (2018, July 18). Best, once rejected, now Mayor’s pick for Top Cop. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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By July 15, 2019, when controversy was swirling as a result of Judge Robart’s 
decision to find the City partially out-of-compliance with the Consent Decree and 
members of City Council were calling for the re-negotiation of the police union contract, 
Chief Best was using familiar terminology, consistent with the SPD command staff of old: 
 We really need the support of our public officials and our public for the 
officers…we need them to stand up for the work that the officers, the men 
and women have done for this organization. We are losing good people, 
and we know that it’s because they feel like they are not supported by public 
officials and we need to have that done. (K5 News, 7/15/2019)809 
This message was a long way off from the message delivered by then-SPOG 
President Ron Smith when, during Chief O’Toole’s tenure he reportedly said that 
“officers who have a problem with the politics in Seattle had the option to ‘leave and go 
to a place that serves your worldview’” (Seattle Times, 4/16/2015). 
Chief Best was best known for her strong abilities in reaching out to the 
community. Research participants with knowledge of her work in the department noted 
that even before Chief O’Toole promoted Best to Assistant Chief, she was well known as 
a “fixer,” a police supervisor who could communicate effectively with community and 
present the SPD in the best possible light. Amongst community member study 
participants, it was widely believed that but for community pressure put on the Mayor, 
Best would have been passed over for promotion to Chief, in favor of an outside 
candidate.810 
 
809 K5 News (2019, July 15). Seattle City Council ‘disappointed’ in mayor’s approach to police 
reform. K5 News. Retrieved from https://www.king5.com/video/news/local/seattle-city-council-
disappointed-in-mayors-approach-to-police-reform/281-74bb7be0-ce36-405e-98d1-
41cbc011e793. 
810 Interestingly, in his final report, Monitor Merrick Bobb, while effusive about the work of Chief 
O’Toole in the implementation effort, made only passing remarks regarding Chief Best, praising 
her personality and community support as well as her reason for resigning, but making no other 
observations regarding her tenure: “Following Kathy was Chief Carmen Best, Seattle’s first 
African American Chief, a warm, engaging person with a charming public presence and the 
enthusiastic support of the Black community and its leaders. Following efforts to cut the SPD 
budget and her pay, she recently resigned.” Perhaps most telling, however, was the Monitor’s 
conclusion that, at the time of Best’s resignation, the SPD was “at its nadir” and desperately [in] 
need[] of a new chief from outside the organization to put it back together” (Bobb, 2020, p. 9). 
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Table 7.8. Public Statements of Chief Carmen Best 
Date Statement 
December 8, 2017 Commenting on Chief’ O’Toole’s retirement: ““We’ve worked side by side since 
the beginning and have a really good relationship. I will be sad to see her go, … 
She’s a joy to be around, and I’ve learned so much from her … I do feel like the 
protégé who is ready [to lead] …” 
On her selection as Interim Chief: “Reform doesn’t end ... It’s an iterative 
process, it’s continuous, … Everything is about relationships. It’s important we 
treat people right, we engage with the communities we serve and build 
relationships with them. It doesn’t even feel like work… Just the other day, we 
did ‘Coffee with a Cop’ in Columbia City and Alki. We’re in uniform, answering 
questions, talking to the community. I felt like I was making a difference. It was 
like, I’d almost do this for free, … I feel absolutely ready to lead a major 
organization, … I’m all in” (Seattle Times, 12/8/2017). 
May 26, 2018 After being advised she did not make the final list for permanent Chief: “I wish 
the candidates the best — each of them should know how fortunate they will be 
to lead officers who have a commitment to public safety and reform” (Seattle 
Times, 5/26/2018). 
July 18, 2018 After being nominated by Mayor Durkan to serve as permanent Chief: “We will 
move ahead with a culture of continuous improvement and innovation” (Seattle 
Times, 7/18/2018a). 
March 5, 2019 Responding to union officials claim that consent decree reforms were “hindering 
police work:”  
“We have been in full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree since 
January 2018, and have been moving forward with sustainment ever since…” 
(Seattle Times, 3/5/2019).811 
May 22, 2019 Responding to Judge Robart’s order finding the City “partially out-of-compliance” 
with the Consent Decree: “The Court’s ruling ... affirms both that the reforms put 
in place under the Consent Decree have truly taken root in our operations and 
that the Department has embraced a culture of continuous improvement and 
innovation … I appreciate the Court highlighting an issue around which there is 
much discussion nationally. As the practice of modern policing continues to 
rapidly evolve to meet increasingly complex demands, it is equally important that 
the systems by which we are held accountable keep pace in a manner that 
ensures full transparency and due process for all” (Seattle Times, 5/22/2019).812 
 
811 Miletich, S. (2019, March 5). Reforms cited as hindering police work. Seattle Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
812 Miletich, S. & Carter, M. (2019, May 22). Judge: Seattle Police Discipline Falls Short. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
July 15, 2019 Responding to City Council criticism of SPD: “I don’t need another survey or 
another exit interview to know that one of the issues is that we really need the 
support of our public officials and our public for the officers… we need them to 
stand up for the work that the officers, the men and women have done for this 
organization. We are losing good people, and we know that it’s because they 
feel like they are not supported by public officials and we need to have that 
done” (K5 News, 7/15/2019; Seattle Times, 7/16/2019).813 
Asked about the Consent Decree and possibly reopening contract negotiations: 
“We’re going to do all that’s required of us.” (Seattle Times, 7/16/2019). 
January 14, 2020 Regarding negotiation of new SPOG contract: “All of these issues will be brought 
to the table as some point … I’d love to give you a definitive answer if I had one.” 
Regarding the City falling out of consent decree compliance: “Not everything 
went as we wanted … But we really are striving to make sure that we are 
continuously improving and innovating” (Seattle Times, 1/15/2020).814 
June 2, 2020 Speaking to a crowd of protestors, with Mayor Durkan, “I stand with you, … I 
really stand with you. I understand the hurt and the anger that everyone feels, 
especially after the death of George Floyd … As a Black woman, I feel the same 
pain you feel and just because I wear the uniform, that doesn’t change that” 
(Seattle Times, 6/2/2020).815 
 
813 Green, S. (2019, July 16). Violence stretched police thin, Chief Says. Seattle Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
814 Lambert, K. (2020, January 15). Police chief says accountability will be addressed. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
815 Takahama, E., Beekman, D., Greenstone, S. & Roberts, P. (2020, June 2). Durkan Promises 
to meet with Seattle protest organizers – “The plan has to come from community voices,” Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
June 14, 2020 Commenting on protests regarding the murder of George Floyd:  
“I know standing there watching and listening that we're going to change in 
policing. We have to. It has to be a movement that involves everybody, … And 
we need to reimagine and re-figure out, if you will, how we're going to move 
forward as a country and as an organization to make things better for everybody. 
It’s incredibly difficult, but with every challenge, there’s opportunity. There’s 
opportunity to move forward and bring people together and get positive change. I 
absolutely believe that.” 
“I absolutely believe in accountability. But I think it’s- we’ve moved away from 
using the word reform. We were under a consent decree and the Seattle Police 
Department for almost a decade. We followed every rule and everything that 
was asked of us to do, yet here we are—that’s what the Consent Decree is. And 
essentially, they laid out a roadmap and a game plan for us to follow while they 
reviewed us with a federal monitor. But what I- what I believe, especially after I 
was at a march yesterday, or the day before yesterday with Black Lives Matter, 
and I was looking at the 60,000 people that were there, signs saying, you know, 
defund the police, stop police brutality, you know, no qualified immunity. And 
there were thousands of people carrying those particular signs. And I just 
realized it was a moment, an epiphany, that this is a pivotal moment in history. 
We are going to move in a different direction and policing will never be the same 
as it was before” (Face the Nation, 6/14/2020).816 
From the time of her appointment, through the time of her retirement, Best 
consistently argued that the SPD was in full compliance with the Consent Decree and, 
sometimes complained at the apparent lack of public support from City Council and 
community members critical of the SPD. In this sense, at least until the George Floyd 
protests, Best communicated more like the “inside” Chiefs who preceded Chief O’Toole 
than like Chief O’Toole the “outside” reformer. 
7.4.4. The Perspective of the Court-Appointed Monitor 
Prior to being appointed as the court-appointed Monitor for Seattle, Merrick Bobb 
was considered by some to be “the Godfather” of civilian oversight of law enforcement. 
His work on the Christopher Commission for the LAPD and the Koltz Commission for the 
LA County Sheriff parlayed him an appointment in 1993 as the “Special Counsel” for the 
LA County Sheriff. In that capacity he was the nation’s first municipally appointed police 
monitor, writing semi-annual reports on issues and concerns regarding the largest 
Sheriff’s Department in the United States until 2014, when his program was finally 
 
816 Brennan, M. (2020, June 4). Transcript: Chief Carmen Best, Face the Nation. Retrieved from 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-chief-carmen-best-on-face-the-nation-june-14-2020/. 
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replaced by a new Los Angeles County Office of the Inspector General. As the President 
of the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC), Bobb and his consultants worked 
on police accountability projects in more than 14 jurisdictions throughout the United 
States.817  
However, as previously noted, Bobb’s appointment was controversial and made 
in opposition to the wishes of the SPD and the Mayor with his tenure being controversial 
as well. Bobb had strong supporters and detractors among the study participants. 
Supporters strongly believed that, without Bobb’s rigorous demands and strong 
personality, the SPD would never have been able to achieve reform. Detractors, which 
included some participants who would otherwise have been expected to support Bobb, 
believed his style to have been overbearing and uncompromising and actually hindered 
or delayed reform efforts. There was also a strong sense among some participants that 
Bobb was “milking the system” and overcharging the City for his services. As with other 
prior monitors, as noted by the 2013 PERF symposium, Bobb was also alleged to have 
had a “conflict of interest” in that he had a financial interest in “keeping the case going” 
(see, PERF, 2013, p. 2). 
Amongst criticisms of the Monitor’s job, were concerns that the Monitor was too 
forceful about what he wanted to happen and wasn’t necessarily strategic in his 
approach – as described by one participant: “he would go through obstacles, not around 
them, which was not necessarily the best approach for Seattle.” Some participants 
involved in the implementation effort noted that the Monitor’s aggressive approach put 
the DOJ in a mediation role which “fundamentally shifted the dynamics of the reform 
process.” It was also suggested by some participants that the Monitor, like the Judge 
was “sometimes driven by anecdote, rather than data.”  These same participants 
maintained that sometimes both the DOJ and the City would be “in a chorus…telling him 
to stay in his lane.” 
It was also suggested that the Monitor was never able to develop any deep or 
strong ties to the community, and in particular, that his relationship with the CPC could 
 
817 See, PARC website, located at https://www.parc.info.  PARC’s website lists projects conducted 
in the cities of Cleveland, Denver, Farmington NM, Eugene OR, King County WA, Los Angeles, 
Milwaukee, New Orleans, Pasadena, Portland, Seattle, Walkill NY, the University of California at 
Los Angeles, as well and numerous other projects throughout the country. 
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have been improved. And, in fact, there was substantial criticism by the CPC of both the 
Monitor and Judge Robart for what was perceived as a paternalistic approach to the 
community. A few members of the CPC suggested that they, having brought the DOJ to 
Seattle, were more qualified to bring reform to the SPD than the Court and the Monitor, 
who were perceived to be outsiders with no real understanding of the needs and 
expectations of the Seattle community.818 
Perhaps the most passionate criticism of Bobb’s work was expressed by the two 
top civilians appointed by Chief O’Toole to be the Chief Operating Officer and the Chief 
Legal Officer of the SPD. In an August 1, 2017 memo they alleged that “the Monitor, … 
[had] effectively inserted a nebulous, amorphous, wholly subjective standard of care that 
cannot be reconciled with either the language of the Consent Decree or … evidentiary 
requirements…” And, as a result, they believed it to be virtually impossible for the SPD 
to achieve compliance other than based on the Monitor’s personal, subjective 
interpretation of the totality of the evidence. 
Even so, the Monitor’s reports tended to be well-balanced, and while sometimes 
critical of the SPD, were also sometimes effusive in his praise. The Monitor’s public 
statements also tell a story of implementation efforts over the period of consent decree 
implementation: 
Table 7.9. Public Statements of Monitor Merrick Bobb 
Date Statement 
October 31, 2012 Commenting on his appointment as Monitor: “The stakes are very large … 
“[People will] hopefully see[] that I am a fair, honest and credible source of 
information… I do not hesitate to disagree if I must and I call them as I see 
them” (Seattle Times, 10/31/2012). 
November 28, 2012 Commenting on his first-year budget of $880,000: “I think it’s fair and 
reasonable in all respects” (Seattle Times, 11/29/2012). 
 
818 One example of conflict in this regard, was the Monitor and Court’s support for body-worn 
cameras, which the CPC initially opposed on privacy grounds. Eventually, however, even the 
CPC appears to have come around to the need for a body-worn camera system. 
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Date Statement 
January 17, 2013 Email to City Budget Office: “… we decline in the future to go through the 
humiliating, time-consuming, and obstructionist process we went through this 
morning where we were required to justify each pillowcase in the Seattle 
apartment, a toolkit to put together furniture bought at IKEA, or a $5.99 
corkscrew, among other trivialities, … Although we are happy to answer 
legitimate inquiries, we cannot abide being treated as if we were suspects being 
grilled about theft from the city, …We are professionals and expect to be 
treated as such. … I’m not certain that we can currently say we are getting 
cooperation from the city regarding the Monitoring or movement toward full and 
effective implementation of the Consent Decree” (My Northwest, 2/21/2013). 
February 21, 2013 “We each took a tone we later regretted, followed by mutual apologies, …”  
“Bobb said his team has taken a ‘careful and prudent approach to how Seattle 
taxpayer money is spent,’ and called the conflict a ‘small dust-up’” (My 
Northwest, 2/21/2013).819 
March 11, 2013 Commenting on negotiations over First Year Monitoring Plan: “People of 
goodwill worked to bring about a rapprochement,” … Connie Rice, who is a 
dear friend of mine and a friend of the mayor’s. The willingness to talk 
developed on both sides. We talked, the mayor approved the Monitoring plan, 
and we’re off and running” (Seattle Times, 3/12/2013).820 
March 12, 2013 “Bobb told the court that the department has been cooperative and that he and 
his team have had gotten almost everything they’ve asked for. ‘We enjoy good 
access’” (Seattle Times, 3/13/2013a). 
March 13, 2013 “What the department needs to do is fully and effectively comply with all the 
requirements in the Consent Decree, … That includes not only changing use of 
force policy. It also means dealing with discriminatory policing. … If you have 
the resources and the will, that speeds things up, … When those have come 
together, then some of these consent decrees have wrapped up in five years or 
less” (Q13 News, 3/13/2013).821 
 
819 According to one study participant, the incident never really “blew over.” Instead, the Monitor 
subsequently met with the Mayor and changed what was originally a collaborative tone to a more 
confrontational one. Reportedly the Monitor told the Mayor, “’you’ve taken a couple of cracks at 
me and that has not worked,’ … so he was then in full on - I’m the boss mode. … We knew then 
that there would be no future collaboration …that’s the message he conveyed.” 
820 Miletich, S. (2013, March 12). Outsider eases feud at City Hall. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 




May 7, 2013 “In a briefing on his first official report, which he issued April 26, Merrick Bobb 
said the absence of an explanation from the top has spawned ‘urban myths’ 
and ‘scary stories’ within the department regarding the scope of the agreement” 
(Seattle Times, 5/8/2013). 
Regarding issues of SPD officers not turning on their video systems: “We’ve 
had some discussions with the SPD about the in-car video situation, … It 
troubled us that there were eight officers present at a particular incident and not 
one of the cameras was on, even though there was sufficient time to, for some 
of the officers to turn on their cameras” (Seattle Times, 5/9/2013).822 
Commenting on state of SPD’s Early Intervention System to City Council 
Committee: “It’s a mess, [and it undermines the city’s ability to do] robust risk 
management” (Seattle Times, 5/10/2013).823 
April 3, 2014 Speaking to the court about the status of implementation: “Merrick Bobb … said 
he agreed that a ‘new spirit of cooperation’ had been forged with the city, but 
added that it’s still unclear whether the Police Department is on track to comply 
with the court requirements.” 
“He said there was still a question whether old fights within the department 
could be put aside in favor of dealing with the ‘deep and serious problems’ cited 
by Robart.” 
“Bobb noted the Police Department was about 20 years behind major law-
enforcement agencies in tracking, managing and analyzing officer performance” 
(Seattle Times, 4/4/2014). 
July 16, 2014 
 
Statement to City Council regarding officer complaints that new SPD use-of-
force policies created a “chilling” work environment: “I think it is more a myth 
than reality that officers are being chilled.” 
“Over time, Bobb said, officers should find that the policies are not as disruptive 
as they fear”  
“Chief O’Toole is a very quick study, very sensitive to these issues, 
understands what’s going on and has a plan,” (Seattle Times, 7/17/2014).824 
June 23, 2015 Email to Chair of City Council’s Public Safety Committee: “You have asked me 
in my capacity as monitor to provide you with my views of possible legislation 
concerning the Community Police Commission, … Given the progress of the 
SPD in the last six months, as detailed in our most recent semiannual report, 
we are moving forward toward a time when it will be right to consider what form 
of civilian oversight is best for Seattle in the future, … I respectfully would 
appreciate an opportunity to explore these matters with the Department of 
Justice and city prior to any legislation being considered or acted upon” (Seattle 
Times, 6/25/2015).825 
 
822 Miletich, S. (2013, May 9). Cameras. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
823 Op Ed. (2013, May 10). Integrate SPD Data. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
824 Miletich, S. (2014, July 17). Federal Monitor says O’Toole ‘a very quick study’ as Chief. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com.  
825 Beekman, D. (2015, June 25). Monitor asks Harrell to hold up on police legislation. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
December 16, 2015 Seattle Times summary of Bobb email to CPC: “Bobb stressed that he had 
been a ‘zealous advocate’ of civilian oversight of law enforcement for 25 
years…. He added that he and Robart both believed ‘marked improvement’ in 
the relationship between Seattle police and diverse communities formed ‘the 
bedrock upon which and full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree 
will be built’ … Bobb pledged to listen to the CPC before fashioning an 
accountability plan. He also noted the CPC, early on, had been given friend-of-
the court status that allowed it to provide its views and put its stamp on each 
significant policy under the reform effort. ‘Any concern that CPC will not have 
similar influence on structural reform for greater accountability is incorrect,’ he 
wrote. But Bobb wrote that he was only an agent of the court, and that it was 
Robart who ‘must address your desire for a greater role’” (Seattle Times, 
12/21/2015). 
August 1, 2016 Letter to Judge Robart summarized by Seattle Times: “The federal monitor 
overseeing Seattle police reforms is recommending that allegations of officer 
misconduct be reviewed by civilians rather than sworn officers, a dramatic 
proposal that would fundamentally alter how internal investigations have been 
handled throughout the department’s history. … In his letter, Bobb lists a 
number of measures Robart could require in the legislation, ranging from 
civilian-controlled internal investigations to the appointment of a civilian 
inspector general with broad oversight powers. … Included would be subpoena 
power for the Police Department’s internal-investigation unit, the Office of 
Professional Accountability (OPA), allowing it to compel witnesses outside the 
department to produce evidence or testimony. … In his letter, Bobb noted when 
the Consent Decree ends ‘the continued existence of civilian oversight will be 
the responsibility of the City’” (Seattle Times, 8/4/2016).826 
August 3, 2016 “Bobb, in an interview Wednesday, said the CPC’s letter suggests he and 
Robart are foreclosing community-based oversight of the department. ‘That’s 
far from the case,’ said Bobb, calling such oversight a ‘bedrock’ principle” 
(Seattle Times, 8/4/2016). 
November 21, 2016 Statement to Seattle Times regarding the potential impact of the Presidential 
election: “I don’t expect the change of administration will have a material impact 
on the full implementation of the Consent Decree” (Seattle Times, 11/21/2016). 
March 30, 2017 Commenting on SPD practice of allowing officers to watch body-worn camera 
video footage before writing reports: “In short, officers may get an inappropriate 
opportunity to ‘get their story straight’ before reporting to the department 
precisely what occurred in a force incident…” (Seattle Times, 3/30/2017).827 
 
826 Miletich, S. (2016, August 4). Federal police monitor wants – misconduct reviews by civilians. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 




September 8, 2017 Commenting on what was required for “full and effective compliance:”  
“One cannot unscramble an egg or turn a cake back to its original ingredients, 
… Thus, the nub of the question is whether various Consent Decree and court-
ordered reforms have been ‘baked in’ and are resulting consistently and 
predictably in constitutional policing” (Seattle Times, 9/9/2017).828 
February 28, 2019 Commenting on the importance of accountability and police discipline on 
compliance: “Those issues are of such sufficient moment that one cannot judge 
the status of sustainment without them,” (Seattle Times, 3/1/2019).829 
September 8, 2020 At the time of his resignation from the position of Seattle Monitor: “The SPD is 
at its nadir…It desperately needs a new chief from outside the organization to 
put it back together. It needs leadership.” 
“The consent decree will not end until the ‘bizarre and arcane’ discipline and 
accountability systems are fixed. This will perforce necessitate statesmanship 
and compromise by the police unions to restore proper management 
prerogatives.” 
“I will not miss the endless jockeying and some runaway egos, … The mayor, 
city council, city attorney, [Community Police Commission], and other 
community groups and organizations must really try to work together and not at 
cross purposes.” 
“[The SPD] can get back to the place where Kathy O'Toole left it and Carmen 
Best took over. Many of the same excellent people are still there. A wise chief 
of police will gather them up; empower them; bring in new good people, sworn 
and civilian, from around the country to leadership positions, … and get the job 
done” (Bobb, 2020; Seattle Times, 9/9/2020).830 
 
Up until his resignation as Monitor in 2020, Bobb’s public comments generally 
matched his semi-annual and assessment reports (See Section 7.3.2, supra). It was only 
upon his resignation from his position that Monitor Bobb made some of his most critical 
comments, after specifically noting that he was no longer speaking as a representative 
of the federal court (Bobb, 2020, p. 1).831 
 
828 Miletich, S. (2017, September 9). Seattle Police have yet to comply with some of the key 
requirements. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
829 Miletich, S. (2019, March 1). Monitor cautions Seattle police contract may jeopardize federal 
compliance. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
830 Carter, M. (2020, September 9). Seattle Police monitor resigns, says PD at ‘nadir’, calls for 
outside chief. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
831 In his “final” report, Bobb specifically comment that: “Because I am no longer Monitor, I can 
speak my mind more freely…I write this document solely to reflect my own opinions. I no longer 
speak as monitor, and nothing I say should imply Judge Robart’s agreeing or disagreeing with 
me” (Bobb, 2020, n. 1). 
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Monitor Bobb’s final report suggested that the SPD, like other police agencies 
under consent decrees in the past, had backslid over the course of the sustainment 
period, and under the tenure of Chief Best. And his conclusions appeared to be 
collaborated both by a number of SPD insiders as well as the SPD’s apparent poor 
performance during the George Floyd protests. That said, the monitor and other study 
participants as well agreed that the Consent Decree reform process had created a 
stronger foundation upon which a strong, outside, reform-minded chief could put the 
SPD back on track. The question at this time is, whether Mayor Durkan’s successor will 
go in that direction, or rely on local “talent” instead. 
7.5. Consent Decree Implementation – The View from the 
Front Lines 
“When the elephants fight, it’s the grass that suffers” 
African Proverb 
 
While the implementation timeline as seen by court orders, monitor findings and 
media accounts provides an excellent sense of how the Seattle Consent Decree 
implementation process progressed, the perspectives provided by those personally 
involved in the implementation of these externally mandated reforms are an important 
component in understanding the successes, the challenges and the failures as they 
relate to reform implementation and sustainability. This chapter discusses the many 
issues and concerns raised by members of the monitoring team, city officials, staff, 
federal government and police stakeholders who were personally involved in trying to 
implement the reforms during this almost decade-long process. 
This section explains where resistance to the Consent Decree originated as well 
as both critical and supportive commentary on the overall process. The section includes 
stakeholder discussions of their viewpoints on the DOJ and its investigation, the monitor 
and his work in support of consent decree implementation, what compliance should and 
did look like, the costs and benefits of the reform effort and the challenges associated 
with police culture and ensuring police accountability. Once again, these research study 
participant comments highlight the rocky road that was the reform effort and how the use 
of police use-of-force theory could be used to better pave the road to successful reform. 
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7.5.1. Implementation through the eyes of the Stakeholders 
Disappointment and disillusionment prevailed among SPD and municipal 
government stakeholders early on in the Seattle Consent Decree process while federal 
attorneys appeared to have anticipated a “quick win” based on Seattle’s progressive 
politics and substantial wealth when compared to other cities that had been previously 
subject to federal intervention. 
On the municipal government and police side, there was complete shock and 
surprise – first, there was the expectation was that the City would receive no more than 
a technical assistance letter, as opposed to a Consent Decree;832 and second, the 
findings – particularly the finding that 20% of SPD uses of force were unconstitutional – 
were completely unexpected and disputed.833 It was widely believed amongst the SPD 
and City staff that the 20% number was “grossly inflated” and based on an inadequate 
methodology; city stakeholders were further aggrieved that the DOJ refused to share its 
data or its methodology outside of its published report, unless the City actually entered 
into litigation with the DOJ – described by more than one study participant as “a 
behemoth, the largest law firm in the country.” 
7.5.2. Seattle Police Department Voices 
While there was disagreement amongst SPD employees as to whether a consent 
decree, with the appointment of a monitor, was really necessary to achieve change, 
study participants agreed that the Department had become isolated from the Seattle 
community and was suffering from a “good old boy” form of leadership wherein the same 
 
832 As noted by one SPD insider: “We expected the investigation, but we thought we were doing a 
good job. We had no concern at all that they would find a pattern or practice. Agencies all across 
the country were consulting with SPD – we assumed that if DOJ saw everything, they would not 
have any concerns. So, their findings came as a complete shock when we were called in that 
night. It was completely out of the blue.” Others, outside of the SPD provided a different 
perspective: “They should have known. They should have been able to read the tea leaves.  The 
process was intended to give them a head’s up, but they instead viewed it through the John Diaz 
lens of a free audit – they thought they could control the narrative.” 
833 The investigation made the following finding: “When SPD officers use force, they do so in an 
unconstitutional manner nearly 20% of the time. This finding (as well as the factual findings 
identified below) is not based on citizen reports or complaints. Rather, it is based on a review of a 
randomized, stratified, and statistically valid sample of SPD’s own internal use of force reports 
completed by officers and supervisors” (DOJ Investigation Report, p. 4). 
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group of officers would be rotated through the command staff regardless of whether the 
Chief was appointed from within the ranks or from outside the department. 
On the whole, however, it was widely perceived that the overall culture of the 
department was not in and of itself, “broken.” As mentioned by one SPD officer: “Like 
any other large department, we have only a small fraction of employees who engage in 
misconduct…” 
Concerns were expressed regarding the Monitoring Team’s approach to 
misconduct. One SPD supervisor worried that the Monitoring Team “did not have any 
sense of proportionality when it came to misconduct.” The participant believed that the 
department was “nitpicking officers” and disagreed with the Monitor’s assessment that 
the increase in internal complaints was a good thing;834 instead, the participant opined 
that it was indicative of a “corrosive” new culture where “everyone is ratting each other 
off.” 
In one unique instance, a participating officer acknowledged that an internal SPD 
review of the files provided to the DOJ did, in fact, confirm that “20% of the cases were 
fundamentally problematic.” At the same time, however, convincing arguments were 
made that the DOJ report inaccurately summarized many of the underlying incidents 
described in the DOJ report.835 In fairness, however, the City Attorney’s evaluation of the 
 
834 In the Monitor’s Fourth Systemic Assessment report, released in January 2016, he observed 
that “[a]bout one-third (39 percent) of OPA [Office of Professional Accountability] complaints were 
initiated by SPD – with an officer, supervisor, or other internal source such as OPA itself or the 
Force Review Board. This is a remarkable number given that, during DOJ’s 2011 investigation, 
internal complaints were ‘rare to non-existent” (Fourth Systemic Assessment, p. 21). 
835 I was unable to obtain access to a confidential memorandum that was prepared by a Deputy 
City Attorney evaluating the DOJ investigation report in comparison to the use-of-force reports 
that were provided to the DOJ. However, multiple participants described it as a probing 
memorandum that convincingly represented the DOJ summaries of use-of-force incidents as 
deficient. In addition, similar conclusions were reached by Seattle University Professor Matthew 
Hickman who examined Seattle Police uses of force and, in a May 20, 2012 op ed, concluded 
that: “DOJ is negotiating from a position based on factual errors as well as errors of omission, 
gross misrepresentations, apparent statistical errors, and other substantive flaws…” Hickman 
provided some specific examples of problematic findings in the DOJ report: “For example, the 
DOJ report presents a number of incidents that certainly have some shock appeal: 
In one such incident (pg. 12 of the report), DOJ is critical of multiple officers involved in using 
force to determine whether the suspect was armed, while not adequately assessing the level of 
risk posed by the suspect. This incident involved a large house party at which a stabbing 
reportedly had occurred. DOJ omitted the fact that a bleeding victim was present at the scene 
who stated that he had been cut. The victim also gave a description of the suspect. DOJ also 
omitted that additional witnesses described the suspect, indicated that he was violent, and stated 
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DOJ report was never made public and the DOJ never had the opportunity to respond to 
its conclusions, In any event, even amongst SPD employees and staff, there was 
widespread recognition that the SPD was in need of reform at the time of the DOJ 
investigation; the only real area of contention was whether that reform needed to be 
externally driven and to what extent the reform actually required court intervention and 
the assistance of an independent monitor. 
 
that he was in the house. DOJ instead focused on the fact that the subject contacted in the house 
was inebriated, possibly passed-out, of slight build, and did not speak English as a first language. 
He was lying on his chest with hands concealed and would not respond to commands to show his 
hands to officers. DOJ contends that the suspect did not pose sufficient risk to officers to merit 
the force they used in order to establish that the subject was not secreting the knife.  
DOJ summarizes another incident (pg. 13 of the report) in which “… an officer used his baton to 
pry the man’s mouth open …” so that another officer could remove drugs from the suspect’s 
mouth. The idea of someone prying open a person’s mouth with a baton is surely a shocking 
scenario that conjures images of broken teeth and lots of blood. However, if one reads the actual 
use of force report, one will find that the officer very carefully and deliberately used the padded 
end of his baton as a bite-block so that his partner could avoid being bitten as he fished out 
several rocks of cocaine, evidence that the subject was trying to hide and possibly swallow. The 
subject was not injured and stated this fact to supervisors. To be clear, this is not an appropriate 
use of a baton and the officer was counseled about this. DOJ strangely offers this case as an 
example where “SPD officers too quickly and unreasonably resort to the use of impact weapons,” 
although the baton was not actually used in the manner of an impact weapon.  
In another incident (pg. 11 of the report), DOJ is critical of the officers involved for not making use 
of Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) officers in handling a suspect with mental health issues. If one 
reads the actual use of force report, one will find that in this very unfortunate incident, a CIT 
officer actually was on scene, a clear factual error on DOJ's part.” 
Finally, Hickman attacked the DOJ’s 20% finding: “Likewise, the notion that 20 percent of uses of 
force are excessive or unconstitutional reflects an ignorance of the scientific literature on police 
use of force. I am proceeding through the approximately 1,200 cases using the two dominant 
methodologies reported in the field of criminal justice for estimating use of excessive force, 
neither of which were used or even referenced by DOJ in their investigation. One is a static 
approach that compares, as a ratio, the highest level of force used by police in comparison to the 
highest level of suspect resistance. The other is a dynamic approach that considers the sequence 
of events in terms of actions of the suspect versus actions of the officer, allowing some 
consideration of escalation along the force continuum. I don't know if DOJ was unaware or simply 
ignored the literature on use of force, but either case is simply inexcusable. Using these 
methodologies, it is highly unlikely that the distribution of force incidents would reflect a figure as 
high as 20 percent being labeled excessive. Based on published studies employing these 
methods to analyze police use of force in other cities, a more reasonable figure would be about 2 
percent. In addition to these concerns, if we assume that DOJ is using a somewhat liberal 
definition of excessive force, we begin with the notion that the 20 percent figure is somewhat high 
to begin with. We add to that a strong likelihood that DOJ failed to re-weigh their much ballyhooed 
stratified random sample, thus giving additional weight to oversampled cases (such as baton 
cases) and leading to a biased estimate in the direction of excessive force. Finally, we add a 
margin of error to the estimate, which — based only on the content of the DOJ report — I 
estimate to be in the neighborhood of plus or minus 5 percent. All this is to say that the 20 
percent figure is certainly inflated” (Crosscut, 5/20/2012). 
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When asked how SPD got into the position of requiring externally driven reform: 
one officer described a general feeling shared by many: 
How did SPD get there? Hubris; SPD officers had a fundamental 
misunderstanding on what Washington law was on stop and frisk and 
treated suspects as having the burden of proving there was no probable 
cause to search – there was a fundamental breakdown in understanding 
the law and its application to contact on the street. 
With respect to the JT Williams shooting, SPD trainers were of the strongly held 
opinion that training deficiencies were responsible for the officer’s conduct; however, 
other SPD officials questioned why the shooter was not prosecuted and noted that he 
was, in fact, fired, without any need for federal intervention. 
7.5.3. City Government Voices 
City government stakeholders noted that JT Williams shooting as “a tipping 
point…[a] discipline, policy and training issue…There was zero reason to fire on JT 
Williams; the fact that SPD had an officer who would do that was a tipping point.”  
City government stakeholders were also aware of the SPD’s poor record of 
ensuring accountability for misconduct. One government official was particularly 
disgusted with the inadequacy of discipline imposed during the tenure of Chief 
Kerlikowske opining that officers “got puny discipline” for even serious misconduct. The 
official noted that the first review of Seattle Police took place as early as the 1990’s and 
that there was a “cycle of crisis, reform, and backsliding” such that external intervention 
was required. 
Challenges to DOJ methodology & findings. 
At least part of the reason for Mayor McGinn’s skepticism of the need for formal 
DOJ intervention was a result of the DOJ’s unwillingness to disclose the methodology 
behind its substantive findings and the opportunity that it gave for SPD command staff to 
cast the DOJ’s investigative conclusions into doubt.836 
 
836 A number of research participants strongly believed that the SPD was merely using the 
unwillingness of the DOJ to share its workpapers as an excuse to deny its findings. According to 
one City insider: “if the DOJ had done anything other than say ‘there is nothing to see here,’ we 
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In a May 20, 2012 op-ed piece (written while the DOJ and the City were engaged 
in mediation trying to negotiate a settlement agreement), Professor Hickman 
aggressively presented the SPD-perceived dilemma:  
How can a city negotiate with opponents whose modus operandi consists 
of making dramatic allegations in the public arena, refusing to explain how 
they arrived at their conclusions, and then threatening to sue if the city fails 
to immediately roll over on its back and accept a consent decree and court-
appointed monitor? (Cross Cut, 5/20/12) 
Hickman’s final report, published in December 2012, purported to provide a 
“thorough descriptive statistical analysis of use of force incidents in Seattle,” using “the 
same reports that were used in a recent Department of Justice investigation concerning 
the use of excessive force.” (Abstract, p. 3). The study attempted to replicate the DOJ’s 
finding that 20% of SPD uses of force were excessive or unconstitutional. The report 
found only 3.5% of the force cases reviewed could be identified as “potentially 
excessive” (p. 5). Professor Hickman acknowledged that identifying excessive use of 
force cases in policing “can be a subjective process” (p. 8). 
Hickman presented his preliminary findings as follows:  
I can report that based on what I have reviewed thus far, there is no sign 
that DOJ is negotiating with the City in good faith. I say this because DOJ 
is negotiating from a position based on factual errors as well as errors of 
omission, gross misrepresentations, apparent statistical errors, and other 
substantive flaws. 
A review of the cases provided to the DOJ by a lawyer in the Seattle City 
Attorney’s Office reached similar conclusions. That memo was described by multiple 
study participants (although not provided to me due to its continuing confidential status), 
as echoing Professor Hickman’s findings, particularly as it related to those cases 
described by the DOJ in their investigation report as being presented inaccurately and 
incompletely in almost every single instance. According to one SPD research participant: 
I think people in the SPD (and the city as a whole) dug in more 
thoroughly and strongly because the perception was that the DOJ had 
nothing, this is B.S., there’s no data, there’s no empirical evidence – it 
 
would have had same the resistance … the findings simply offended the SPD self- image that ‘we 
are the model.’” 
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was that perception and belief that bolstered and sustained internal 
resistance. 
The participant continued that: “If the Mayor, the City Council and the City Attorney 
would have been roughly on the same page and everyone was saying ‘some of these 
things look like early warning signs of problems’ –opportunities for change would have 
improved.”  
Other participants disagreed, alleging that the underlying problem was that the 
SPD command simply disagreed with the DOJ findings and refused to acknowledge that 
they were not the professional and respected department that they had convinced 
themselves they were. 
DOJ, however, took the position that if the City wanted to challenge the findings, 
they would need to do so through litigation, not through informal discovery. DOJ appears 
to have believed that the methodology-transparency issue was something the SPD 
made up to justify their refusal to buy-in to the DOJ’s ultimate conclusions. 
SPD command staff, on the other hand, believed themselves to be a national 
leader in policing and for them to be told they were doing something wrong was simply 
unacceptable. After Mayor McGinn met with Chief Diaz, he ultimately sided with the 
Department and, according to study participants, the “political will” went in the wrong 
direction, leading the SPD to take a passive-aggressive approach to the DOJ’s 
externally imposed reform effort. 
As described by one of the SPD study participants: “the 20% finding – it was 
completely spurious without evidence to support it – it was the conclusion of a retired 
Midwest small city chief – it was outrageous – so the beginning wasn’t great.” According 
to another participant: “The 20% finding set up a conflict that was not really necessary. If 
you’re accused of something you did not do – most human beings will push back.” 
According to another SPD insider,  
the command staff wouldn’t have been resistant to a more tailored and 
narrowly focused reform effort. No one would have resisted a more 
honest sort of attempt to fix an actual wrong. But since that was not 
how it was presented, no one wanted to play ball on the Department 
side. 
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One particularly troubling aspect of the SPD’s reaction to the City showed how 
SPD officials inaccurately perceived the DOJ’s findings and statements. While the DOJ 
report referred to a “broken” early intervention system (DOJ investigation report, p.22), 
and U.S. Attorney Durkan used the term “broken” a number of times in the statement 
she made when announcing the DOJ investigation, all such terms were used in 
reference to broken systems, not a “broken department.”837 In addition, U.S. Attorney 
Durkan noted that “the trust between the Seattle police department and the people of 
Seattle [was] broken and [in need of repair[].”  In response to the use of the term 
“broken,” as previously indicated, Chief John Diaz stated publicly: “’I want to make this 
clear. The department is not broken” (Seattle Times, 12/17/2011). Unfortunately, what 
SPD staff heard was more akin to a fiction that Chief Diaz was refuting, rather than the 
actual findings.  An in fact, an SPD insider specifically commented on the use of that 
term: “that really hurt … did we have things we needed to do - absolutely …  Many 
things needed to change – but we were not ‘fundamentally broken.’”838 So, unfortunately, 
even though the DOJ was using precise language, people in the SPD were interpreting 
that language in an inaccurate and imprecise way – and then responding to it in a 
negative manner. 
Study participants from within the City, SPD and DOJ differed on whether or not 
Seattle could have achieved reform on their own. As was noted by the ACLU, the City 
had many opportunities to clean up the SPD’s issues with use-of-force and 
accountability, but seemed unable to do so, particularly with a command staff and a 
police union who appear to have been able to control outside police chiefs for the last 
three decades. 
On the DOJ side, the opportunities for success seemed well placed in Seattle; 
there was a police department which was dealing with ongoing community issues, a 
progressive electorate who could be expected to support police reform and a city with 
enough of a tax base to fund the reform effort. As noted by many participants on all 
sides of the implementation effort – at the beginning, Seattle seemed like it would be an 
 
837 See statements of U.S. Attorney Jenny Durkan and Assistant Attorney General Perez, Chapter 
7.2, supra. 
838 Even though the DOJ investigation report lauded the SPD for its willingness to cooperate and 
for improvements made over the course of the investigation, the message heard by command 
staff seems to have been purely negative: “The DOJ painted us as a really bad police 
department, even though we weren’t.” 
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“easy win.” However, by all accounts, it was not and, in fact the Consent Decree remains 
solidly in place eight years after it was implemented and has seen three Mayors come 
and go and now three permanent Police Chiefs as well.839 
Why was Seattle not given the opportunity post-DOJ investigation to achieve 
reform on its own? According to one SPD study participant:  
It appeared to be cooked from the beginning. I think the U.S. Attorney 
and DOJ figured that SPD had a lot of problems; we had enough 
vulnerability to push the City into doing something and enough 
resources to fix the problem – they believed it would be an ‘easy win’ – 
but it turned out not to be. 
According to the Monitor, “intransigence in the Police Department during the first year of 
the settlement agreement, marked by efforts to defeat the agreement and objections to 
[the Monitor’s’ role],” led to delays in the development of permanent solutions to the 
SPD’s problems (Seattle Times, 8/20/2014). 
At least at the beginning of the implementation process, study participants 
described a faction of the SPD that insisted that they could hold the DOJ and the 
Monitoring Team to the “four corners of the Settlement Agreement;” that faction 
“attempted to put the Monitor in a box and tried to control the implementation effort, 
which turned out to be an epic strategic blunder.” The DOJ was reportedly astonished by 
the initial reaction from the SPD – they had expected to be welcomed into the city, akin 
to a prior collaborative effort that took place in Las Vegas: “We put the DOJ in a position 
 
839 Chief Diaz resigned April 2013, saying “it is time,” shortly after the release of an independent 
review report which was “highly critical of SPD’s planning for the May Day [2012] protests” 
(Carter, M. and Miletich, S. (2013, April 3). May Day report slams police, Seattle Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.seattletimes.com. He was replaced by Assistant Chief Jim Pugel, who served 
until shortly after Mayor Ed Murray took office and replaced him on January 9, 2014 with a retired 
Assistant Chief, Harry Bailey. Bailey served until the confirmation of the next permanent Chief, 
Kathleen O’Toole on June 23 2014. When Chief O’Toole announced her retirement on December 
6, 2017, citing health issues suffered by her husband, she was replaced by Assistant Chief 
Carmen Best as Interim Chef. Best was eventually confirmed as the permanent Chief on August 
13, 2018. On August 11, 2020, Best announced her retirement after the Seattle City Council 
voted to cut the police force budget by approximately $3.5 million and reduce the wages of SPD 
command staff. When announcing her retirement, Chief Best ironically used similar language to 
that used by Chief Diaz used when he retired: “This was a difficult decision for me, but when it’s 
time, it’s time,” (Visser, N. (2020, August 11). Seattle police Chief abruptly retires After City 




where they could not back off, because of the way that the Mayor and the Chief attacked 
them; it left them no room to back off.” 
According to one particularly well-placed person in the reform effort, however: 
DOJ did itself a disfavor by overstating their case and overstepping their 
bounds. It would have been better to convince the city that they needed 
to do the reforms. Instead, the DOJ put the city in a position where they 
had no choice. If the DOJ had been more transparent and reasonable, 
we could likely have brought the city along… 
But there are those who believe that it would have been impossible for SPD to 
change without aggressive intervention by the DOJ: As per one participant, “the initial 
report that was issued was absolutely necessary and could not have been avoided to 
enforce reform.” However, that same participant believed that once the investigation was 
completed, it would have been better for the City to take a collaborative approach – 
which was not actually done until the election of Mayor Murray. 
Systemic issues of concern. 
It was widely agreed that Seattle’s accountability systems “were outdated and 
archaic.” As one SPD insider commented that “the DOJ investigation was not an 
indictment of individual officers as much as it was an indictment of the City for failing to 
support its work force.” Another SPD insider remarked that, 
at the end of the day, it was a management issue; with a few outliers, 
officers will do what you want them to do – as long as you are clear in 
your expectations and train them accordingly … there was no need to 
break down the department and rebuild it – at least at the officer level.  
In addition, it was noted that before the Consent Decree, “only two to three hundred of 
the officers would show up for training, but management would do nothing about it.” 
Arguments for the Consent Decree 
As previously noted, many of the participants, both inside and outside of the 
SPD, believed that a Consent Decree, with a court-appointed Monitor was, in fact, 
necessary to achieve any level of systemic reform. The following comments well-
represent participant arguments in favor of the need for external intervention: 
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• “I am still irritated about fact that [the SPD was] doing things wrong 
and they knew it … the Department needed to change, but they were 
not going to do it on their own.” 
• “They believed they were a perfect police department; so, a hammer 
was necessary – merely saying the Chief wants this would not have 
achieved sustainable reform.” 
• “While the Department was not ‘broken,’ the union had too much 
power and management would not stand up to them. There was no 
capacity for how do we make deep philosophical bureaucratic change 
within a fairly entrenched department.” 
• “A consent decree was necessary. Seattle is a discursive political 
process. They will process everything to death. They needed to 
decide what they were doing and the Consent Decree helped 
everyone focus; success could not be achieved without it from a 
political standpoint; it was the only way to get everyone on a 
common agenda.” 
• “The SPD was in desperate need of updating…. with respect to clarity 
of policy, training and systems of review. The DOJ was correct that 
there were no good systems. Given how Seattle works, a consent 
decree was the only way that the political engine of the city was 
going to be able to muster the resources to change the SPD. It 
pushed the city to look externally for a chief and build a data 
system…it’s what initiated systemic and sustainable change in the 
department.” 
• “At the time of the Consent Decree, the rank and file would have 
said we were an organization ‘in crisis’ – but for the Consent Decree, 
however nothing would have been done about it.” 
• “I don’t think they would have gotten there without CD – they simply 
did not have the institutional will to get there without outside 
intervention.” 
• “A lot of the issues the SPD were facing would not have gotten the 
attention they needed without a consent decree… particularly with 
the Mayors we had, a hammer was needed.” 
• “Even with an overt attempt by DOJ to be more transparent; I’m not 
sure that would have resulted in the sort of critical self-reflection 
that SPD would have needed to engage in to make them open to 
reform.” 
• “The big breakthroughs that did happen could not have happened 
without the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree was absolutely 
necessary. Seattle had a humongous institutional arrogance – they 
loved to say they were Number 1, even when they were not.” 
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While many of the participants who would be expected to have been supportive 
of the use of a consent decree and a court-appointed monitor did, in fact, make 
supportive comments (e.g., community members and persons generally affiliated with 
the DOJ reform effort), what was surprising was the number of City and SPD personnel, 
who might otherwise have been expected to be dismissive of externally forced reform, 
who did not believe that the SPD was cabable of reforming itself. Even so, many of 
these research participants believed that there were times, over the course of the reform 
effort, that either the DOJ, Judge Robart or the monitor could have used less “force” to 
ensure reform. This was even in the face of common public statements in support of 
collaboration or positive comments regarding the Department’s work by the DOJ, Judge 
Robart and the Monitor. City-centric research participants consistently noted that even 
where positive comments were made, they were usually accompanied by messaging 
that the SPD still had “a long way to go” to complete the reform effort and the lack of 
objective measures to define actual compliance. 
Why Seattle? And why a consent decree? 
Over the course of the research into Seattle, the question was raised over and 
over again: “How did Seattle become the subject of a DOJ investigation and Consent 
Decree?” SPD participants, in particular, seemed to have a hard time fathoming why the 
DOJ would not be focusing on the worst departments in the country and they repeatedly 
failed to recognize that the DOJ might have an interest in a more tactical and nuanced 
approach to §14141 enforcement, particularly given its limited resources. 
According to study participants with knowledge of the decision-making process, 
the decision to choose Seattle was complicated. The City seemed replete with crisis 
intervention issues, which had not yet been a focus of a consent decree and the 
application of the Consent Decree process to such issues presented significant 
opportunities. In addition, it was an opportunity for the DOJ to “fly its flag” in the Pacific 
Northwest for the first time. That, in conjunction with an engaged local U.S. Attorney and 
a loud, organized and broad-based community, gave the DOJ all the reasons it needed 
to take a close look at how the process might play out. As one participant commented: 
“Just comparing yourself to New Orleans, Detroit or the Chicago doesn’t vindicate you… 
417 
just because you don’t shoot people on bridges or bury bodies in the middle of the night 
does not mean you are okay… it’s all a matter of perspective.”840 
While some participants suggested it was “just politics;” others did offer more 
nuanced perspectives: 
• “Consent decrees happen when the police department the public 
wants deviates from the police department they get. The deviation 
factor between what Seattle wanted and what Seattle had (a 
woodcarver getting shot within 10 seconds of being contacted by an 
officer) along with very organized, articulate and savvy civil rights 
organizations who knew how to raise the temperature, made Seattle 
an excellent subject for a DOJ investigation.” 
• “The travesty of Seattle is that if you plotted these places on a 
spectrum, the scope of Seattle’s problems was a lot less than other 
cities – Seattle is not Cleveland, Detroit, New Orleans or 
Albuquerque – the problems in those cities are more massive and 
systemic; Seattle, nonetheless, had a problem that the police 
department’s method of policing was divorced enough from what the 
community wanted that the community requested DOJ 
intervention.” 
A knowledgeable outsider also observed that, 
Seattle’s police accountability activists were highly organized and 
influential; which did not leave the DOJ with a lot of options given the 
data they provided – any U.S. Attorney would have had to worry about 
charges that he or she did not act in the face of data demanding 
intervention. You just can’t turn a blind eye to it. Seattle was a ‘house 
divided’ which gave the DOJ both the opportunity and the responsibility 
to come in. 
Even among those participants who did not believe a consent decree and a 
court-appointed monitor were required for sustainable change, there was widespread 
agreement that the SPD was a troubled organization: 
• “We didn’t get into this overnight – it was over time. We slipped 
down the slippery slope.  We took officers’ word for what happened 
and we were not doing any real reviews.” 
• “There had been a void of leadership under Chief Kerlikowske, and 
then you had Chief Diaz, who was not really suited for the position, 
 
840 At the same time, some participants were perplexed by the fact that the DOJ chose the SPD 
for intervention instead of the King County Sheriff: “Definitely there were people [at SPD] not 
doing their jobs and there were systemic issues, but King County was doing nothing about their 
problems; at least Seattle had some process.” 
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a weak leader and part of the good-old-boy network, taking care of 
each other…” 
• “Yes, we were in need of reform at the time. We had not looked at 
our policies for years.” 
While many research participants credited the Consent Decree process with any 
number of successes, others questioned whether change could have happened without 
a consent decree, specifically by using a more collaborative process. As noted by one 
participant: “If either party had approached it differently, Seattle may have been a perfect 
place for a collaborative agreement.” As stated by another participant,  
the Consent Decree is a blunt instrument that takes a huge amount of 
money and time – if I had my druthers, we would have gone the 
collaborative reform route – we should have started there, set up the 
benchmarks and then proceeded accordingly. 
One City official commented that, 
 DOJ could have had everything they wanted if they had asked for 
voluntary compliance without the issuance of a consent decree; instead, 
they went the route where they had all the power – the city became 
powerless against the DOJ, the Monitor and the Judge. This was more 
about power and politics than it was about a desire to reform. 
At the same time, however, other participants noted that the SPD had a history of 
offering to collaborate, but instead tended to use those opportunities “as a stalling tactic 
to wear people down.” 
Amongst the participants who believed a consent decree was unnecessary, the 
following observations were made: 
• “Our problems did not cry out for the type of systemic reform that 
everyone howled about at the time. SPD did not require the 
sweeping reforms that the DOJ asserted in needed in 2012;” 
• “A consent decree creates a litigious relationship – it provides an 
incentive for the city not to identify any problems that have not 
already been identified by the DOJ or the Monitor.” 
• “The problems of the SPD were similar to that of other large police 
department, but these problems did not equate to unconstitutional 
policing practices.” 
Overall, however, the arguments against the need for a consent decree and a 
court-appointed monitor did seem to ring hollow. Regardless of the legitimacy of the 
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DOJ’s 20% finding or their specific conclusions on specific cases, no one has really 
argued that the department’s accountability systems (including internal data collection, 
early intervention, disciplinary, force investigations and crisis intervention) were actually 
working at the time of the DOJ intervention. Whether the SPD may have been able to 
correct these systems with a more collaborative form of reform, however, is certainly an 
open question. Regardless, the SPD’s lack of processes to adequately evaluate their 
own officer’s conduct would certainly explain how SPD command staff could have been 
so surprised at the DOJ’s findings – they had not looked introspectively at their work for 
such a long time, so they had no idea where they were failing. 
On the other hand, there was a widespread belief that the Consent Decree 
process had gone on for far too long:841 
• “I think the Consent Decree has held us back from progressing at 
this point; we are now counting widgets; why in the 3rd Quarter of 
2019 are we talking about force used a year ago? If we are spending 
time doing an audit of force from a year ago, it’s holding us back 
from doing what needs to be done now. We need to move on.” 
• “It has dragged on now for more than 8 years. At some point, 
everyone wonders when we will hit the necessary threshold for full 
compliance.”   
• “We went through phases – first we fought them, then we embraced 
them, now we are at the part where we just want to get rid of them 
– we just want to check the boxes and get them to leave.” 
 
841 It should be noted, however, that interviews in support of this research were conducted prior to 
the murder of George Floyd and the accompanying protests that led to a widespread belief that 
the SPD had failed to improve as originally believed. As observed by then-outgoing Monitor Bobb 
in his final report, “Let me then first speak soberly about the recent demonstrations and protests. 
SPD’s performance left many observers disappointed and crestfallen, if not disturbed profoundly 
by what looked like multiple instances of excessive force, as if lessons learned and techniques 
trained under the Consent Decree were lost, or, at least, set aside” (Bobb, 2020, p. 2). In addition, 
shortly after the controversies erupted relating to the policing of protests in Seattle, the City itself 
withdrew its motion for a finding of compliance stating that since the time the City first moved to 
terminate portions of the Consent Decree (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 611, filed 5/7/2020) 
“unprecedented levels of protests have occurred in the City that engaged the Seattle Police 
Department (“SPD”) in significant crowd management actions. These actions are governed by 
policies implemented under the Consent Decree, including crowd management and use of force. 
Further, these actions will be subject to review through many of the processes put in place by the 
Consent Decree, including the Force Investigation Team, Force Review Board, and Office of 
Police Accountability. The Parties make no assumptions regarding the propriety of SPD’s actions 
during these protests, or what the appropriate outcomes of these processes will be, but, at this 
time, believe additional time is necessary to ensure that termination of Paragraph 69-168 remains 
appropriate” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 621 (filed 6/4/2020). 
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As identified by these participants, and as recognized by Chanin (2012), there is 
often a diminishing point of return for any effort. And it does certainly seem that Seattle 
has reached and progressed past that point of return in many of the areas covered by 
the Consent Decree. Even though the City and the DOJ withdrew their request to for the 
dismissal of portions of the Consent Decree after the much criticized SPD response to 
the George Floyd protests (U.S. v. Seattle, Doc. No. 621), it has to be asked why the 
parties could not be allowed to enter into a transitional agreement that would ensure that 
police accountability reform issues are addressed in the next and last stage of the 
federal reform effort, instead of forcing the department to continue to be governed by 
what is now reasonably perceived as an overreaching and historical document? 
Costs 
One of the greatest sticking points for Seattle research participants has always 
been the cost of the Consent Decree. As previously noted, the cost of the Monitoring 
Team, on its own, was estimated to be $800,000 in the first year of the Consent Decree 
alone. Even for Seattle, a relatively wealthy jurisdiction, that cost was a relatively hard 
pill to swallow. As noted by one City staffer: 
There are three concerns when it comes to policing; the police need to 
be effective, constitutional and within a budget – you have to balance 
these needs, and accepting unlimited federal oversight will ultimately 
result in your inability to police within a budget. 
On the other hand, many participants spoke of the City’s own failure to invest in 
the SPD and the fact that the costs of the Consent Decree were required to ensure 
current and future investment sufficient to ensure effective and Constitutional policing. In 
addition, participants suggested that improvements in the management of police use-of-
force would lead to substantive reductions in liability, which in other cities had been 
identified as exceeding the administrative costs of reform. 
7.5.4. SPD Resistance to the Consent Decree 
Police resistance to the Consent Decree has been described as widespread at 
the time implementation first began. According to many participants, the Consent Decree 
was “a hard pill to swallow,” particularly in the face of the perception that DOJ had 
overreached and “padded their findings.” As remarked by an SPD insider: “The people in 
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SPD dug in more thoroughly and strongly because of the perception that the DOJ really 
had nothing, no data, no empirical evidence, which ended up bolstering internal 
resistance.” 
The inability of the City’s politicians to agree on the court-appointed Monitor 
caused additional stress and resistance. Arguments between the Mayor and the SPD on 
the one side, and the City Attorney and the City Council on the other, over who should 
be appointed as Monitor became a very public feud, with the eventual pick being forced 
on the Mayor by Council. This made the work of the Monitor even more difficult at the 
beginning, as he was forced to work with Mayoral staff and SPD command who were 
distrustful of his every act.  
In addition, it was suggested that the SPD was resistant to the idea of giving any 
third party, regardless of who it was, the type of full access and ability to question basic 
cultural norms that are the hallmarks of an effective monitor. As mentioned by one SPD 
officer: 
The “thin blue line” is really a “thick blue line.” Although there were good 
cops who wanted to see reform and who were disgusted with the “old 
boy” approach to police management, no one could publicly admit there 
was any good that would come from the Consent Decree, they would 
have become a pariah in the department. 
According to one officer involved in early implementation efforts, “command staff 
would show up at meetings to make sure we stayed on message – their intent was to 
slow things down… if you got too far-off message, you would find yourself not invited to 
meetings.” Another officer commented that “certain of the higher echelon who fought the 
Consent Decree ‘tooth and nail’ took all the people in their sphere of influence down that 
rabbit hole.” The same officer observed that even to this day, “we still have command 
staff going around saying it was ‘all bullshit.’”  
Over time, members of the monitoring team observed “an emerging shell within 
the City and SPD who understood, who saw around the corner; but there were those 
who were lost. Those who wanted to accomplish reform couldn’t really pop up and 
operate until the old guard was out.” 
Although in the early years, the SPD was mostly described as engaging in 
“passive resistance,” participants also described attempts to actively deceive the DOJ 
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and the Monitor. One participant described the workplace situation as “awful,” noting that 
“there was so much change and turmoil, it was too much, nothing was ever consistent.” 
The same participant described one instance where information was provided up the 
chain of command that was “not what people wanted to hear,” the participant spoke of 
having to get the information directly to the Chief to avoid being forced to change the 
information by the chain-of-command.   
A number of research participants broke down the implementation effort into 
phases. The first phase, under Chief Diaz, involved both passive and active resistance 
from the command staff and the police unions, although some good policy work was said 
to have been completed – particularly as it related to the use-of-force policy, the Crisis 
Intervention policy and the Bias Free Policing policy. A second phase began once 
Interim Chief Pugel took office, and even though under Chief Bailey resistance again 
“reared its ugly head,”842 the second phase continued and was strengthened by the 
leadership of Chief O’Toole. That phase has been described as “involving a unique 
alchemy between the stakeholders, those in the trenches doing the work. We were 
aligned as to where we needed to go…that made it productive and easier to do what 
needed to be done.” However, when the policy work was mostly completed and the 
assessments began, “the wheels came off the bus … the Mayor resigned and Seattle 
politics interfered … before that, things were very productive.”  
As noted by one participant, by 2014, “there was an emerging shell within the 
City and SPD who understood, who saw around the corner, but there were still those 
who were lost … a tremendous amount of this was personality driven, that’s just how 
Seattle works.”843  
Within SPD, research participants described significant internal strife. Personnel 
who cooperated with the Monitoring Team were described as having been “summarily 
 
842 According to one City insider: “During the Bailey administration, the union was basically 
running the 9th floor over at the SPD.” 
843 In an interesting footnote to his final report, Monitor Bobb specifically commented on SPD 
resistance to one member of his team: “The SPD did not believe at first that Monitoring Team 
lawyers could help police officers analyze force, and the SPD loudly and repeatedly moaned that 
the Monitoring Team’s Peter Ehrlichman was being disrespectful and abusive. Putting aside the 
obvious ironies inherent in police making such complaints, Peter, although not the most gentle 
and politic individual, nonetheless was masterful and very smart, teaching a great deal about 
dispassionate analysis, logic, cross examination, and respectful skepticism to all those willing to 
listen” (Bobb, 2020, n. 8). 
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executed over time.” One participant suggested that but for command staff’s resistance, 
“we could have been done in two years.” In accord with the original intent of Mayor 
McGinn and Chief Diaz, participants described “a faction of the department that insisted 
‘we can hold them to the four corners of the agreement” and who attempted to “put the 
Monitor in a box and tried to control him,” which was further described as “an epic 
strategic blunder.” Research interviews were replete with examples of personal 
animosity, and the use of personal attacks to “effectively undermine the work” of those 
involved in the implementation efforts. 
Other SPD personnel noted however, that the resistance to change the was 
observed was to be expected as part of any bureaucratic policing culture:  
There was resistance; there are two things cops don’t like, the way 
things are and change… there was institutional resistance, but we just 
plowed forward – it’s a paramilitary organization; you just have to say: 
“this is the way it’s going to be folks.” 
7.5.5. Criticism of the DOJ investigation findings 
As noted by one participant, “the DOJ had an excellent brand, … as such, 
whatever they concluded, the general public would accept as fact.” However, the same 
could not be said of SPD officers and command staff and City employees who worked 
closely with them. Chafing at what they perceived to be a secret methodology with 
findings made by “a retired Midwest small-city Chief,” SPD staff believed the findings to 
be “spurious” and the conclusions to be “an answer in search of a question – just a 
political process – an end to a means...” 
Even participants who might otherwise have been expected to be supportive of 
the DOJ investigation had their own criticisms:  
DOJ did not conduct the investigation as well as it might…the findings 
were exaggerated; throwing the 20% number at the City without 
proving it really set them off and put them on edge and made them 
think that they were getting a bum deal and that the fix was in … if the 
conclusions had been more reasonable, perhaps the DOJ could have 
brought the City along … the 20% still sticks in their craw. 
Amongst the rank and file, officers described the DOJ investigation report as “a 
slam” on themselves and fellow officers. It was suggested that the DOJ took the position 
they did because of “a politically weak Mayor and Chief” faced by “activist community” 
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that was not representative of the community-at large. SPD officers, on the whole, 
readily accepted the command staff’s viewpoint that the DOJ was acting in an 
“underhanded” way, by refusing to release the process by which they reached their 
conclusions, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the process in its entirety. 
Other participants suggested that the initial DOJ strategy was, however, a 
necessary one. Although it was noted that “SPD felt punched in the mouth from the 
findings letter, which got everything off on the ‘wrong foot,’” some participants believed 
that a litigation strategy of putting your strongest case forward, “to make sure there is no 
doubt that there is something rotten in the state of Denmark” was a necessary evil, to 
ensure the Department would be kowtowed enough to accept the need for a Consent 
Decree. Other participants (including the one quoted below) suggested that the SPD 
would have reacted negatively, no matter what the DOJ had done:  
I think any department that has reform imposed on them will have 
arguments that it was not deserved and they will quibble with the data 
and they will fight back when they perceive their autonomy has been 
weakened – so even if DOJ had given them the data they would have 
resisted. I don’t think it would have been helpful at all to give them data. 
At the same time, one City-insider commented that “a consent decree is not a solution, it 
is a tool and like any tool it is most effective in the hands of a skilled craftsman … 
sometimes you need a hammer, sometimes a scalpel and sometimes a Sawzall.” The 
insider was left to question whether the DOJ came out with its hammer too soon. 
According to one member of the SPD command staff: “the DOJ report created an 
adversarial mood; rather than a ‘we’re in this together and going to do it together’ 
message.” Interestingly enough, however, when U.S. Attorney Durkan and Assistant AG 
Perez made their statements at the time of the release of the report (see, Chapter 6.2, 
infra), the overall message was one of support and collaboration for the work that 
needed to be done to ensure effective and Constitutional policing in Seattle. Even so, 
the actual DOJ report was perceived as unnecessarily “breaking down” the Department, 
before “building it back up;” and as noted by one member of SPD Command staff: “that’s 
not a great way to improve an organization.” 
Even with the criticisms made by research participants, it should be noted that a 
Seattle Times investigation published three months before the DOJ investigation was 
completed, provided significant support for the DOJ’s conclusions. On September 3, 
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2011, the Seattle Times published a front-page “special report” finding “a culture of 
mistrust” as “behind the woes” of the SPD, “a department that long prided itself as 
professional and progressive.”844 
The Times reported that when faced with allegations of misconduct by Seattle 
police officers, SPD command staff and union leaders often responded with the 
message that “other cities have it worse:” (Seattle Times, 9/3/2011). 
According to the Times, “In retrospect, it was the Police Department’s sense of 
self-satisfaction that blinded top commanders to festering issues.” The Times, reported 
that interviews with “past and present officers and department officials, along with 
community and government leaders, … provide an inside view of how the failure of 
police officials to recognize problems effectively obscured breakdowns in training, 
supervision and community relations.” The Times also found, 
a corrosive distrust [having] developed between rank-and-file officers and 
the command staff, marked by crippling battles over officer discipline … 
resulting [in] the emergence of an increasingly powerful police union that 
has aggressively defended its members and attacked its critics … and an 
‘incredibly pervasive attitude of cynicism’ that took hold throughout the 
department.845 
Even so, SPD Command Staff and City representatives believed that “the DOJ 
pulled their investigative findings out of their ass.” According to one insider: 
Normally in litigation, you would get an articulation of facts from the 
other party – not just, ‘we are going to bring the weight of the federal 
government against you’ … they killed themselves with the 20% finding; 
it suggested that the SPD was one of the worst police departments in 
the country … when the City compared the DOJ report to the actual files, 
the facts were just not true … For whatever reason, the DOJ wanted 
Seattle in a consent decree – they saw it as an easy win … the City would 
 
844 “A rare civil-rights investigation of the Seattle Police Department indicates federal officials have 
decided it's too late for police and city leaders to address the issues on their own” (Seattle Times, 
9/3/2011). 
845 The article included a reference to a meeting between an assistant chief and SPD Sergeants 
that took place earlier in 2011 relating to officer protests over the discipline of an SPD Sergeant. 
The assistant chief reportedly likened SPD officers “to a herd of wildebeests crossing the 
Serengeti – ‘some just don’t make it.’” The Times reported that “not long afterward, a doctored 
photograph was circulated among officers showing [the Chief and a Deputy Chief] posed over a 
dead wildebeest” (Seattle Times, 9/3/2011). 
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be rich enough to fix any problems and the DOJ would get the credit for 
it. 
Probably the most telling criticism of the DOJ investigation came from a research 
participant working for the City at the time the investigation report was released who 
spoke to the lack of procedural justice perceived by the SPD and the McGinn 
administration:  
Upon reading the DOJ investigation, the SPD intimately realized it was 
a political process which included falsehoods; how could you be a police 
officer and see this as anything other than a power play? What they saw 
was a DOJ modeling behavior that was inconsistent with the values 
portrayed by the DOJ brand. The ultimate question becomes: What are 
we teaching our police about justice in America if this is how DOJ handles 
an investigation? 
7.5.6. General criticism of the process 
Research participants had plenty of complaints about the DOJ during the 
implementation process as well. More than one participant suggested that too much 
authority was given to the DOJ as a result of the Consent Decree and there was a lack 
of collaboration as a result. In reality, however, enough participants acknowledged that 
the command staff under Chief Diaz were resistant and defiant to the DOJ and the 
Monitor and, as such, it makes little sense to suggest that the DOJ and the Monitor, 
under such circumstances, needed to be more collaborative than they actually were. The 
willingness of the DOJ and the Monitor to work collaboratively appears to have been 
established when, once Chiefs Pugel and O’Toole took over, collaboration appeared to 
be the word of the day. 
The longevity of the Consent Decree was also the topic for criticism from the 
City. According to one SPD insider: “One of the reasons we have not done the 6th pillar 
of the Obama 20th Century policing plan – officer wellness – is because we are so 
focused on the DOJ rule-oriented and adversarial approach of the Monitoring Team.” 
The same insider noted that when Attorney General Eric Holder (2009-2015) visited 
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Seattle, his approach was “adversarial” in nature; when Seattle was later visited by 
Attorney General Loretta Lynch (2015-2017), her words were “inspirational.”846 
In addition, City-centric research participants were quick to criticize the Monitor 
and Judge Robart based on their perception that, over time, consent decree 
implementation became a “wide open process that would not be concluded until the 
Monitor and the Judge subjectively concluded that the problems are solved.”847 
Whereas, in other Cities, Monitors had attempted to quantify compliance using social 
science language relating to 95% levels of certainty (see, Chapter 3.1, infra), the Seattle 
Monitor used more subjective terms such as identifying “the nub of the question [as] 
whether various Consent Decree and Court-ordered reforms have been ‘baked in’ and 
are resulting consistently and predictably in constitutional policing” (Compliance Status 
Report, p. 2). In reality, this has been an ongoing area of debate: in general, the DOJ 
and affected police departments have seemed to follow the concept that a consent 
decree should be interpreted like a contract, with a literal interpretation of its content; 
whereas, community members and police reformers tend to believe that a decree should 
be interpreted in a more holistic manner as to better ensure sustainability of reforms. 
Later on, in the process, during the tenures of Chief Pugel and O’Toole, the 
message from the Chief’s Office was for staff not to dwell on the DOJ investigation – one 
suggestion was that the DOJ had been “hoodwinked by some less than capable 
consultants,” but that it was “water under the bridge” and there were real problems at the 
SPD that needed to be solved in order to repair relationships with the community. Even 
so, a number of participants on the City-side noted that “the Consent Decree is all about 
who has ‘the power.’ SPD was powerless against the Monitor, the DOJ and the Judge … 
the was more about power and politics than it was about a desire to reform.” 
 
846 Once again, it can be noted that during the tenure of AG Holder, there was still widespread 
resistance to the Consent Decree implementation being reported; by the time AG Lynch took 
office, the Seattle consent decree experience was looking more like “a success.” 
847 Another participant referenced the DOJ’s position in a similar way: “DOJ told us the SPD was 
‘sick,’ and that they would tell the SPD how to get ‘better’ and when they are healed.” 
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7.5.7. Was a Consent Decree Really Necessary to Achieve the 
Necessary Reform? 
Some participants suggested the SPD command staff would not have been 
resistant to a more tailored and narrowly focused reform effort. “No one would have 
resisted a more honest sort of attempt to fix an actual wrong. But since that was not how 
it was presented, no one wanted to play ball on the Department side.” There was 
speculation SPD command that a technical assistance letter was going to be the 
outcome –– and suggestions amongst some participants that a such a TA letter would 
have been readily accepted and acted upon. 
Even so, many study participants, from both inside and outside the department, 
felt differently; they believed that a Technical Assistance letter would not have had any 
chance of achieving real reform. They believe the Department would have engaged in a 
“slow walk” or would have announced programs that would have been painted as 
solutions to the use of force and bias issues, but that would not really have gone 
anywhere. Many comments were made about the SPD’s “good old boy culture” which 
always seems able to preserve the status quo. 
7.5.8. Implementation Challenges 
Political divisiveness has been identified as one of the primary challenges 
towards achieving police reform in the absence of federal intervention: “If council and the 
Mayor and the City Attorney would have been roughly on the same page and everyone 
was saying some of these things look like early warning signs of problems – there would 
have been greater opportunities for change.” 
The City was also described as “being like a multi-headed hydra,” with the City 
Attorney, the Mayor, SPD, the CPC and the City Council all having different viewpoints 
and agendas and sometimes being “at complete odds with each other.” As one 
implementation insider observed: “you will not find such a level of independence 
between entities anywhere other than Seattle, … there are enormous dynamics between 
the different City agencies … it’s just not typical.” And, in fact, politics and personality 
conflicts were described by virtually all study participants as creating challenges in the 
implementation process. There were charges made by multiple participants that lawyers, 
on both sides. could not put their experiences as litigators at the door and caused 
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unnecessary conflict between the SPD, the Monitor and the DOJ. In addition, as was 
seen prior to the filing of the Consent Decree, the various political actors seem to have 
had a large variety of different agendas and motives when it came to policing issues in 
the City. As specifically noted by one participant: “A tremendous amount of this was 
personality driven – that’s just how Seattle works.” 
In addition, some speculated that Mayor McGinn resisted reform because he 
may have thought the U.S. Attorney, Jenny Durkan, was “stealing the show from him.” 
Mayor McGinn was actually defeated by Ed Murray, who ran on a platform of 
collaboration with DOJ. When Mayor Murray was forced to resign due to allegations of 
child molestation made against him, Durkan won the open election for Mayor.  A number 
of participants (including the one quoted below) suggested that Durkan,  
was putting herself in a position to kick him (McGinn) out of office. So, 
he had to make whatever she was trying to do fail – if he could stop the 
Consent Decree in its tracks that would have stopped Durkan in hers.848 
Participants had a lot to say about the challenges faced over the course of the 
implementation process. As described by one participant, and a constant refrain by 
others within SPD, was that “there was so much change and turmoil and there were so 
many bosses in a short time frame – it was too much, nothing was ever consistent.” 
Virtually all participants agreed that there was a significant lapse in 
communication between command staff and rank and file officers: “There was never 
adequate communication to rank and file as to what was going on.” According to one 
SPD insider: “Mayor McGinn’s initial opposition to DOJ intervention resulted in no one 
learning about the positives of the Consent Decree; everyone remained insulted and 
offended by the 20% finding which they simply believed was idiotic.” 
In addition to the challenges faced at the beginning of the implementation 
process, there were continuing challenges over time. City participants perceived the 
overall tone from the Court and the Monitor to be, “the SPD is making progress, but 
there is still a long way to go.” That tone was not seen as particularly helpful in the long 
 
848 Given Durkan’s history with police reform in Seattle, this explanation seems unlikely. While it 
certainly seems likely Durkan would have recognized the potential for career or political 
enhancement as the result of her being a leader in the reform effort, it seems unlikely that she 
would have planned to move directly from her position in the DOJ into Seattle City politics, with 
the intent to run against McGinn. 
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term. A number of participants suggested that the message needed to be more positive 
and “a lot of good happened that positively impacted people’s lives,” but that message 
always seemed to get lost in the mix. According to one SPD insider:  
Where Seattle went wrong was all positive messaging was coopted, it 
was almost as though officers were being considered “a necessary evil” 
and the job of the department was to control their natural bad 
tendencies. That perception was demoralizing to officers, particularly 
those who come into policing to “wear the white hat.” 
An SPD insider suggested that “the greatest challenge was trying to get officers 
to understand why we needed certain policies and training, but we have not done a good 
job of messaging things in a way that officers understand.” That insider believed that 
much of the blame for this failure needed to be placed on command staff: “Procedures 
are in place, oversight is in place, but you can’t remove personalities; you may want 
things to be systemic, but personalities do have an impact, so command staff needs to 
be chosen very carefully.” 
A perceived failure to get input from officers on the street was seen as another 
challenge to implementation efforts. As mentioned by one participant: “the top-down 
nature of the communications has always been a flaw in the process and a challenge 
through implementation … it’s just amazing how little new supervisors knew about the 
Consent Decree and the reasoning behind policy decisions.” 
One other thing we did not anticipate was how much oxygen would be 
taken up by issues that were not addressed in the Consent Decree [e.g. 
Body Worn Cameras and Police Discipline and Accountability]; if it were 
to be done over again, it would either need to be more comprehensive, 
like in New Orleans, or more surgical, like in Portland … the general 
lesson is that when you exclude fundamental stuff, the shit will still hit 
the shores … nature abhors a vacuum. 
While the Monitor’s assessment reports themselves were relatively positive, and 
ultimately included language which supported the court’s eventual finding of “full and 
effective compliance,” the actual creation of those reports was described by a number of 
participants as “a hot mess.” Some City-centric participants credited the City with 
rewriting extensive portions of the Monitor’s reports, claiming that the initial drafts were 
completely inadequate. Even so, none of those conflicts were ever aired publicly and, at 
least, the public face of the assessment reports appeared generally positive, with the 
City progressing towards compliance. 
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Additional challenges were perceived to be the result of an aggressive approach 
on the part of the Monitor. A critical mass of the participants interviewed believed the 
Monitor was not strategic enough in his implementation approach and that his 
aggressiveness ended up putting the DOJ in a mediation role, “which fundamentally 
shifted the dynamics of the reform process.” The Monitor was described by some 
participants as “going through obstacles, instead of around them, which was ‘very not’ 
the ‘Seattle way.’” Other participants, however, strongly believed an aggressive 
approach to monitoring was a necessary evil, in order to overcome both active and 
passive resistance on the part of the SPD, particularly in the early stages of the 
implementation process. And it appears that at least one participant who stated that he 
warned the Monitor before he began his work that “the work would be contentious, 
alienating and polarizing, … you will become the ‘pinata of the population,’ to include the 
small cadre of people who had been involved in police accountability in Seattle for a ¼ 
century or more.” 
Another critical mass of participants complained about the length of the overall 
process. As noted by one City insider: “I don’t feel as though the Department is getting 
any credit and it won’t ever get out of the decree.” In addition, it has been suggested that 
“consent decree fatigue” has caused the SPD to be  
gun shy of everything … their training people are so busy doing what 
the Monitor wants, they can’t do anything that is innovative, even if it 
would increase their efficiency, they are just tapped … as long as the 
Monitor is there, they can’t balance the use of their resources. They 
won’t even do what could make their work easier. 
According to that same participant: “There was a huge benefit to having a Monitor to get 
the momentum going, but the longer it drags on, the greater the risk of the pendulum 
swinging back.” 
7.5.9. Data system challenges. 
One of the most difficult challenges facing the City was the need to create a data 
analytics platform that would allow SPD command staff to actively monitor officer use-of-
force and activity. Participants tended to agree that but for the Consent Decree, the data 
analytics platform would never have been funded by the City and, that although the 
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implementation effort was expensive and painful, it could be counted on as one of the 
most significant accomplishments of the Consent Decree. 
Participants actively involved in pushing reform forward credited Chief O’Toole’s 
work in seeking a technology upgrade “as revolutionizing how the SPD did what they do, 
instead of just thinking of it as a consent decree thing … It was the right time to use this 
as an opportunity to take the department hugely forward.” Participants also opined that 
the widely perceived successes attributed to crisis intervention could not have been 
accomplished without the creation of the data platform. 
7.5.10. Force Review – A Consent Decree Success Story 
At the beginning of the Monitoring process, the Seattle Times reported that much 
of the Monitor’s criticisms were focused on the Firearms Review Board, which was 
initially responsible for reviewing police shootings prior to being replaced by the Use-of-
Force Board.849 Laster Monitor reports lauded improvements made in the SPD’s 
administrative review of police-involved shootings (3rd Semi-annual Report, pp. 3, 55-
60; 2nd Systemic Assessment: Force Review Board, 11/24/2015). 
Participants also commended improvements in the review of force by the SPD; 
although a critical mass of participants remained unhappy about the road to 
implementation, believing that the Monitoring Team used more force than necessary to 
improve the work of the Board. The Monitor, however, had a different perspective as he 
noted in his concluding report (Bobb, 2020, n. 8); even so, participants almost 
universally recognized that the changes that resulted from Monitoring Team intervention 
were positive overall. 
According to one SPD insider: “I initially saw the Force Review Board as 
unnecessary, but I have done a 180 on that.” SPD participants acknowledged that the 
 
849 The Monitor’s criticism of the SPD’s Firearms Review Board, as described in a draft of the 
Monitor’s 2nd semi-annual report, was summarized by the Seattle Times as follows: “Bobb 
leveled his harshest criticism at the department’s Firearms Review Board (FRB), which has 
moved to keep the monitor ‘at bay’ and has barred the director of the Office of Professional 
Accountability, which investigates allegations of officer misconduct, from its proceedings. The 
FRB procedures ‘do not guarantee anything close to a thorough, fair and impartial investigation,’ 
the draft report says. ‘Instead, they continue to permit the possibility of collusive, biased, or 
inaccurate testimony’” (Seattle Times, 11/16/20130). 
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prior system was “antiquated” and that “the reports coming up the chain of command 
were a mess … the review system was garbage.” One participant commented that  
the Force Review Board was originally a rubber stamp … there was a 
battle with the Monitoring team who was angry with the lack of progress 
and less than honest information being provided by command staff … it 
was a painful process, but once there was a change of command, it was 
time well spent. 
The same participant noted that  
the FRB is the only entity that sits across of uses of force in the 
Department, looking at everything and ensuring systemic reviews of 
patterns and trends, equipment and training … it really has the potential 
to make the SPD so much better … officers are so much safer and 
performing better now than before. 
Participants noted that one of Chief O’Toole’s first priorities was to fix the FRB:  
there was way too much officer advocacy going on at the board and 20 
to 40 people in the room – that’s a crowd, not a board … it got trimmed 
down to 6 board members and the support staff and chair and became 
much more manageable. 
As an example of good work on the part of the Board, it was noted that the board 
“kept finding cases of officers using batons in disturbing ways.” The Board ended up 
making a recommendation to command staff that officers stop carrying a baton as their 
sole less than lethal option. As noted by one participant: “It was validating to see a 
concern identified during the DOJ investigation addressed by the FRB and implemented 
by the Department as part of a holistic review process.” 
However, sustainability remains a significant issue of concern. As observed by 
an SPD insider,  
the force review process is a strong system with a dedicated leader at 
the top; even so, currently, FRB recommendations are just background 
noise because no one at the command level is taking these things in, 
triaging them and putting them into a strategic plan. The system is now 
there, what is missing is a command staff with a strategic vision and the 
ability to implement that vision. Now, they just tend to be reactionary. 
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7.5.11. Crisis Intervention - Another Consent Decree Success 
Story? 
While the SPD’s new Crisis Intervention Training was recognized by participants 
as a success story, there were some participants who believed the SPD would have 
gotten there even without the Consent Decree. Some participants suggested that “the 
pump was already primed” for a successful program. As observed by one participant: 
“homeless issues and mental health issues were coming to a head regardless.” One 
reason for the believing the CIT program’s success was not necessarily attributable to 
the Consent Decree was that the CIT program is voluntary and self-selecting; contrary to 
other aspects of the Consent Decree. However, it was also almost universally 
recognized that without the data platform created as a result of the Consent Decree, the 
SPD would have been unable to count the uses-of-force used against people in crisis. 
Stakeholders acknowledged that before the creation of a data platform, the SPD “had no 
clue how much force they were using against people in crisis.” With the platform in 
place, the SPD was able to collect and share data with mental health providers and 
“prevent police involvement in the first place.” 
According to insiders, the CIT program took off quickly and was primarily 
facilitated by the DOJ. An engaged SPD Commander was crediting with helping to write 
the necessary policies, push the training and collect the data. The effort was described 
as “truly collaborative” with the SPD working together with the mental health community 
and the courts resulting in dramatic decrease in uses of force against people in crisis. 
And while at least one participant suggested that the CIT program succeeded “in spite of 
the Consent Decree,” participants believed the Department is now a national leader in 
this area, commenting that “SPD now has the ability to put out a report that no one else 
can…” 
As recognized by one person close to the implementation process: “from my 
perspective, the CIT program was the absolute gem that evolved from the Seattle police 
reform effort.” 
7.5.12. Department Leadership 
When speaking to how the SPD got to the point of federal intervention, it was 
often stated that the problems went back as far as Chief Kerlikowske’s original attempt 
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to take an aggressive stance on discipline. After receiving a “vote of no confidence” from 
the rank-and-file, Chief Kerlikowske became weak on discipline and was engaged more 
nationally than locally. According to one SPD insider:  
We didn’t get into this overnight – it was over time, we went down the 
slippery slope, … there had been a void of leadership under Chief 
Kerlikowske and then he was replaced by Chief Diaz who was not suited 
for the position and who allowed a ‘good old boy network’ who took care 
of each other.”850 
Interim Chief Pugel was described by some participants as “a good soldier” who 
would work to implement the reforms desired by the Mayor.851 Other participants 
suggested, however, that since Mayor McGinn never actually embraced the reform 
effort, it was “hard to get traction with Pugel … even so, there was some good 
groundwork being laid by the minions at the time.” 
Regardless of participant opinions of Chief Pugel, his termination by Mayor 
Murray, and his replacement by interim Chief Bailey, was widely reviled. As described by 
one SPD participant, Bailey’s selection was perceived as “a political pay-off to the 
union.” Another participant observed that: “not until the appointment of Chief O’Toole 
was there ‘no daylight’ between the Mayor and the Chief.” In fact, the ultimate selection 
of Chief O’Toole appeared to bring the reform effort back to the table at all levels of the 
organization. As mentioned by the one participant, with support from many other 
participants: “we needed a ‘cleaner;’ someone to come in, clean up, make enemies and 
then retire – we needed someone ‘not of this culture,’ a real change agent.”  
 
850 One city official observed that the SPD Command staff at the time of Chief Kerlikowske’s 
retirement in 2009 was commonly referred to as “the high fiving white guys.” 
851 At the same time, the cultural resistance faced by Pugel appeared to have been significant as 
described by a participant actively involved in the implementation effort: “When Pugel came in – 
the top staff at the SPD were still ‘good old boys.’ It was a pretty tight generational group of white 
males who thought they were on the forefront of being an open progressive department, but were 
not. They were professionally in-bred, with no outside influences in their command staff – so the 
SPD had stagnated in keeping up with progressive policies and practices. They all grew up in 
same ‘family,’ so there was not a lot of challenging or questioning of each other. Pugel tried to 
reposition the SPD but struggled to do so – everything he knew was how SPD did things. He had 
buy-in from some parts of the community, but other parts were suspicious. Unfortunately, his 
whole power base was still within the structure of the SPD – he could not really be an agent of 
change.” Another participant suggested that “although Pugel did appear to have a sensitivity and 
feel for reform, at the end of the day he was not going to cut loose his best friends, the people he 
grew up with in the Department, some who didn’t have a reform bone in their bodies. He simply 
could not see that it was in the best interest of the Department to clean house.” 
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Even so, there was criticism of Chief O’Toole’s approach. According to one SPD 
command officer:  
Chief O’Toole was all about centralizing authority; she felt that would be 
a better way to control what was happening, but all it really did was to 
further neuter the Lieutenants and Captains who were ultimately getting 
it from all sides. 
In addition, it was noted that Chief O’Toole was raised in an East Coast policing 
environment, where demoted Assistant Chiefs and reassigned command officers are 
able to retire with free medical coverage. In the SPD, however, even when demoted or 
reassigned, command officers stayed in the Department waiting for their medical 
coverage to vest.  
She tried to get captains to retire by putting them in spots where they 
had no responsibility, but they would not leave … so, they were creating 
all these new jobs for Captains and it became a bit of a circus.852 
Looking back at Chief O’Toole’s tenure reveals her to have been a great 
tactician. After establishing strong relationships amongst the Monitor and his team and 
the DOJ, she was able to solidify the support of SPD command staff and rank and file 
officers when on September 8, 2017, she sent an email to all SPD officers, attaching a 
47-page memo authored by her Chief Legal Officer and Chief Operating Officer (both 
civilians), arguing that the SPD should be found in full compliance with the Consent 
Decree (Seattle Times, 9/30/2017).853 According to one high level SPD insider: “The 
release of the memo was an emotional boost – it was the ultimate push towards 
compliance.” 
Even so, there were participants who suggested that there was not necessarily a 
“cause and effect” as a result of Chief O’Toole’s appointment. They suggested that 
 
852 With respect to the reassignment and demotion of members of command staff throughout the 
process, one SPD outsider observer, with strong connections within the department observed 
that: “There were people in the higher echelons who were shills for the Police Guild, foot draggers 
– it was good that those people were removed from their leadership positions. But some good 
people got swept up in that too – which was ultimately a serious loss for the department.” 
However, other participants suggested that all of the replacements made by Chief O’Toole were 
absolutely necessary. As noted by one SPD officer: “It was 100% good that all the chiefs were 
replaced, they led us down that rabbit hole.” 
853 Miletich, S. (2017, September 30). Seattle says police in compliance. Seattle Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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“change was happening anyway.” Although virtually all participants noted that she was 
well liked and “the right person for the job at the right time.” 
Although Chief O’Toole’s replacement, Carmen Best, the first African-American 
female to lead the SPD, was described by the Monitor as “warm, engaging, good-
humored, and pleasant to work with” (Seattle Times, 8/11/2020),854 most participant 
expressed concern over what was described as almost a “return to normalcy” over the 
course of her tenure. Civilians promoted to leadership positions by Chief O’Toole were 
subsequently demoted or reassigned by Chief Best. As observed by one participant, but 
with the agreement of others: 
the current Chief’s strength is community engagement – but that is not 
enough to sustain the reforms … the next Chief has to come from the 
outside and be immersed in the work of PERF (the Police Executive 
Research Forum),855 IACP (the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police),856 and the Major City Chiefs [Association].857  
Another participant observed that Chief Best  
grew up in the SPD; she grew up and advanced and got to where she is 
through a variety of Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs that 
weren’t the greatest; she never worked outside of the SPD and did not 
have the overall vision that Chief O’Toole obtained through her variety 
of service. 
The general consensus amongst participants, with the exception of a number of very 
passionate community members, was that although Chief Best wanted to “do the right 
thing on reforms,” the culture of SPD was too entrenched and required external 
experience and pressure to overcome its long-term resistance to change.858 
 
854 Kamb, L. & Carter, M. (2020, August 11). Faded dream: Carmen Best’s career aspirations to 





858 As of 2020, participants described a resurgence of resistance within the new SPD command 
staff: “Within the current administration, [higher level command staff] is undermining many of us – 
we have a Deputy Chief who is ‘old school’ and has not embraced the reforms in his heart. He 
tends to be trying to be ‘one of the guys,’ which is not his role and is not helpful. When command 
staff undermines a system that is in place, it can negatively impact sustainability.” 
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During Chief Best’s tenure, participants noted that “the systems are there” for 
managing the SPD beyond the Consent Decree, but as noted by one former high-
ranking official:  
what is missing is a command staff with a strategic vision and the ability 
to implement that vision … whereas under Chief O’Toole, there was a 
strategic plan; now, there’s just a constant diversion of resources and 
the appearance of a command staff suffering from Attention-Deficit-
Disorder. 
Another City insider commented that under Chief O’Toole “there was usually unanimity 
between her and her people; under Chief Best it seems more fractured.”  
7.5.13. Opinions about the Monitor and the Monitoring Team 
Given the selection process, the question could be asked whether the Monitor 
and the Monitoring Team were set up for failure and to what extent they needed to be 
evaluated, at least at the beginning of the implementation, through the use of some sort 
of grading curve. Regardless, Merrick Bobb, the Monitor, clearly had a large personality 
which loomed over the implementation process. Bobb had strong supporters and strong 
detractors, according to both media reports and research participants. And, in the end, it 
became impossible to predict where those supporters and detractors would come from, 
as they bridged the gap between community, police, city leadership and active 
participants in the reform effort. 
According to his detractors, the Monitor’s big personality and strongly held 
personal opinions were sometimes an impediment to the implementation effort.859 “There 
were meetings where the Monitor would slam his hands on the table and insist on “his 
way or the highway,” which according to participants was considered contrary to the 
“Seattle Way” which has even been defined as a term on “Wikepedia.”860 According to 
participants, other members of the Monitoring Team and DOJ would then have to go 
 
859 More than one participant described the Monitor’s “style” as sometimes “imperious.” 
860 “The ‘Seattle process’ or ‘Seattle way’ is a term stemming from the political procedure in 
Seattle and King County, and to a lesser extent other cities and the Washington state 
government. The term has no strict definition but refers to the pervasively slow process of 
dialogue, deliberation, participation, and municipal introspection before making any decision and 
the time it takes to enact any policy.” Seattle process - Wikipedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seattle_process. 
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back behind the scenes, sometimes without the knowledge or authorization of the 
Monitor, and try to gain compliance through a more collaborative and cooperative 
process. 
Within the City, the resistance to the Monitor as a result of the selection process 
never went away. According to one SPD insider: “The Monitor was chosen by the City 
Attorney, it was a fraud from the get-go; his philosophy was rooted in 1990’s police 
reform, with no collaboration and a lack of data-based introspection.”  
Other participants suggested that if the Monitor appeared to be “imperious” or “a 
my-way-or-the-highway type of guy,” it was only after “you backed him into a corner.” 
One SPD participant observed that  
Merrick was easy to talk to as long as he believed you were smart 
enough to talk about a topic and you were candid … if you were not 
candid, that would be a fatal flaw and would turn him into a wall … he 
was eerily good at figuring out when someone was trying to pull 
something over on him. 
While some participants criticized the Monitor for bullying people into compliance, 
others argued strongly that he well understood the need to “bring people along” in any 
reform effort. At the same time, some of his supporters noted that “you could reach a 
pretty good place with the Monitor in terms of collaboration, but you have to couch it in a 
certain way, and be diplomatic and strategic in how you dealt with him.” 
In addition, the Monitor had his supporters amongst high level command staff at 
the SPD. According to one high level participant: “I had some very spirited conversations 
with Merrick … we developed a mutual respect and fondness, it is amazing the adversity 
he has overcome … while I would get frustrated or annoyed at times, the conversations 
were very productive.” 
Perhaps most interestingly, much of the feedback received about the Monitor 
spoke to his personality and how that impacted people’s perceptions of his work. 
Ironically, the same participants have agreed that individual personalities within SPD and 
City government were largely responsible for much of the chaos that impacted the City’s 
response to the DOJ investigation and challenges in implementing police reform overall. 
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For many City participants, there were real concerns regarding the cost of 
monitoring and the inherent conflict-of-interest for persons involved in the monitoring 
effort:  
There’s a real conflict motive in monitoring – it’s a decent paycheck and 
the Monitor has lost some credibility here – it feels like it’s a gravy train 
– even though he is sometimes positive, there is still the feeling that he 
wants to keep a toehold in the Department. 
And that perspective appeared to be further exacerbated by City staff perception as to 
the way the Monitor framed the road to compliance: “The way the Monitor framed ‘initial 
compliance’ was how the Consent Decree defined ‘final compliance.’” Under these 
circumstances, City and SPD staff constantly questioned the motives of the monitor and 
the compensation he received for doing his work. 
When it came to the Monitoring Team, once again, there were mixed reviews. 
Some SPD members found the team, on the whole, to “be very reasonable and wanting 
to know how to make changes to help the department be better.” Other participants 
expressed concern about the competency of the team. Some participants (using similar 
arguments used in attacking the DOJ investigation) asserted that the SPD “had zero 
reason to believe that the Monitor’s experts had the education, experience or training to 
even conduct the evaluations.” And, in fact, a number of participants claimed that the 
assessments written by the Monitoring Team required extensive edits and that draft 
reports never found the city to be in compliance until after the drafts were edited by the 
DOJ. 
Participants provided some very specific criticism as it related to SPD training 
reform. One SPD staffer with knowledge of the training reform efforts had strong 
criticism of the Monitoring Team’s work in this area: 
They had their team and they had a couple of ‘experts’ and they came 
in and opined on the state of SPD training and what it should look like 
– we had just overhauled our field training – we were using an FTO 
model from San Jose which was an innovation in 1968, we spent a lot 
of time and effort refining it, modernizing it, we hired an educational 
consultant who spoke about knowledge acquisition, etc.; we spent about 
two years doing that; we had a focus group with employee 
representation from across the organization – we used a stratified group 
of knowledge experts – we did a thorough job of it. Then, this retired 
guy from California came in and rolled back the clock to 1968. The 
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Monitoring Team said it was “a job well done” – we said “you guys are 
clowns.” 
More than one SPD participant believed that the Monitoring Team refused to 
view any of the SPD Lieutenants and Captains as “credible managers,” but instead 
viewed them “as part of the problem” and asserted that “it was personality driven, not 
competency driven.” However, as stated previously, other participants argued that the 
Monitoring Team evaluated the worth of those SPD command officers according to their 
willingness to embrace reform and work collaboratively toward a positive result. 
Overall, Monitor Bobb clearly took an aggressive approach to his work. It is 
arguable that without his intervention, the Wearable Camera System and a working data 
platform may not have come into fruition. And, in fact, given the resistance that the SPD 
initially had to reform efforts, by all appearances an aggressive Monitor was necessary 
in order to push the reform effort forward. At the same time, the Monitor would likely 
have achieved greater success had he come up with more objective criteria for 
measuring compliance; even though his more holistic approach does appear to be in 
accord with my own recommendations for future success in the application of Section 
14141 enforcement (See, Section 9.1, infra). One continuinig concern, however, was the 
assertion by some very credible research participants that the amount of money paid to 
the Monitor was excessive (both in terms of hourly rates and excessive hours), that the 
Monitor was incentivized to continue his activities due to a profit motive,861 and my own 
observation that no public accounting of the Monitoring Team charges has been 
published since 2017. The Monitor’s final report, however, outlining the challenges he 
faced and the successes he achieved, was quite compelling and consistent with many of 
the observations of this project’s research participants. 
 
861 It is can be extremely difficult to evaluate this type of argument as regulators are often 
accused of “trying to justify their own existence.” As noted by former Denver Independent Monitor 
Nicholas Mitchell: “You just kind of have to take that in stride because every regulated entity 
usually makes that claim” (Denverite (2021, February 4). Denver’s former law enforcement 
watchdog talks thinning out jails, slaying dragons and the future of DPD. Denverite.com. 
Retrieved from An exit interview with Denver's former police and jailing watchdog Nick Mitchell - 
Denverite, the Denver site! 
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7.5.14. Compliance 
The issue of whether and when the City achieved compliance has been another 
issue of controversy. According to the Monitor’s first timeline, published on November 
30, 2012, the City was expected to come into compliance with the Consent Decree by 
August 2015. In fact, the Monitor’s first systemic evaluation report (out of ten) was not 
even published until September 2015 (See, 1st Systemic Assessment: Force 
Investigation & Reporting, 9/24/2015). As previously noted, SPD Command under Chief 
O’Toole, asserted that the SPD was in compliance in a memo dated August 1, 2017 (five 
years after the Consent Decree was entered). Five months later, on January 10, 2018, 
the Court found the City in “initial compliance,” even though the Monitor had expressed 
“concerns” about compliance levels over the course of his ten assessments. By the end 
of the same year, however, the Court issued an “Order to Show Cause Whether the 
Court Should Find that the City has Failed to Maintain Full and Effective Compliance 
with the Consent Decree” based on a questionable new contract with the police union 
and questions and concerns regarding police accountability overall. The City was found 
partially out-of-compliance by the Court on May 21, 2019, but one year later the City and 
the DOJ filed a stipulated order to dismiss key components of the decree.862 That motion 
was later withdrawn by the City after the protests associated with the death of George 
Floyd in June 2020. 
Interviews for this project were conducted during the first quarter of 2020, prior to 
the City filing its motion to dismiss portions of the Consent Decree. At the time of the 
interviews, City participants asserted that “we’ve accomplished everything we can 
achieve under the Consent Decree … it’s the community that will continue to hold our 
feet to the fire.” City participants strongly believed that the court’s decision to find the city 
partially out-of-compliance, was a decision that was outside the Consent Decree 
“contract,” but indicated no intent to appeal the Court’s decision. 
 
862 The Monitor, at least publicly, was silent on this stipulated request, with his last status report 
having been filed with the court on September 8, 2017 (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No 416) and 
with him not having appeared at the May 15, 2019 court hearing finding the City partially out-of-
compliance with the Consent Decree (See, Court Video, Part 10, located at: 
https://www.uscourts.gov/cameras-courts/united-states-america-v-city-seattle). 
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Other City participants suggested that the Consent Decree timeline had run its 
course:  
There is an optimum time as to when changes take place and then there 
needs to be some positive reinforcement, rather than just the 
hammering of the negative … the longer this drags on, the greater the 
risk of the pendulum swinging back. 
7.5.15. The Value (and Challenges) of Collaboration 
Participants were specifically asked about their thoughts regarding the value and 
challenges associated with attempting “collaborative reform” as opposed to more top-
down and externally forced reform efforts. Once again, significant differences of opinion 
emerged, with some participants believing that too much force was used on Seattle and 
that a more collaborative approach would have been more successful and other 
participants believing that Seattle required a great deal of external force before any 
change could actually occur. 
One civilian member of SPD believed that the Las Vegas collaborative reform 
effort, in response to questionable police shootings was a proactive approach which 
could have worked well in Seattle.863 This was even though this same participant was 
quite supportive of the monitoring team efforts and acknowledged the challenges faced 
with a resistant and reactionary SPD command staff. Another SPD insider, also 
supportive of the DOJ reform effort, suggested that  
if there is a way to keep the jurisdiction at the table so you can go in 
and reassess and look at the level of engagement, it would avoid our 
current situation where we are in a “check the boxes” mode. 
As noted by another participant, who had the opportunity to view the process 
from a more global perspective opined that “consent decrees happen with the police 
department the public wants deviates from the police department the public gets.” That 
participant believed that the Consent Decree was necessary and that collaborative 
reform would not have been effective:  
Seattle needed something that was going to solve the collective action 
problem. Seattle is a discursive political process. They will process 
 
863 Regarding prior USDOJ collaborative reform efforts, including in Las Vegas, see, USDOJ, 
2017b, p. 50; Cole, et al, 2017; Collins, et al, 2017. 
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everything to death. They needed to decide what they were doing – and 
the Consent Decree helped everyone to focus – reform could not have 
been achieved without the Consent Decree from a political standpoint – 
we could not otherwise have gotten everyone on a common agenda. 
Even this participant acknowledged, however, that  
there may have been room for something more holistic … where 
problems are caused by deficient policies, or training, there may be 
other solutions that could be done more quickly and at less cost – maybe 
a grant would have been of more assistance. 
At the same time, however, it was recognized that the process did become more 
collaborative once there was a change in the City administration and there was more 
consistency in the messaging to officers from the Mayor and the Chief’s Office. 
According to one officer, “it felt like we were being punished at the beginning, but it 
became much better once it became more collaborative.” 
Looking at the DOJ’s initial litigation strategy, which involved an effort to force a 
consent decree on an otherwise unwilling City administration, it was observed that “the 
DOJ put its strongest case forward” and adhered to a litigation and communication 
strategy intended to ensure compliance. Based on past history, it was clear that the DOJ 
did not think a technical assistance letter would be sufficient and that more was required. 
As a result, however, there were some City participants who felt that even though they 
were not opposed to reform, they were “struggling to find a voice in the process;” 
something that was difficult given the DOJ’s strongly held positions and the strength of 
the DOJ brand among generally progressive Seattle voters. 
Even so, within the SPD, there was some agreement with the DOJ’s position. As 
noted by one member of the SPD command staff:  
If Seattle had an organizational culture that was willing to be 
collaborative, we would not have gotten a consent decree. The Chief 
was not willing to take a flight to D.C., like the Las Vegas Sheriff, to ask 
‘what do you want me to do?’ We had a command staff who would just 
not listen to any criticism. People who were Assistant Chiefs could not 
be told that they were not as good as they thought they were. Chief 
Kerlikowske had created a story about how good we were and that 
became an impenetrable wall. 
This was not the only participant to have suggested that some proactive work by 
the Mayor or the Chief could have resulted in a technical assistance letter and more of a 
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“wait-and-see” attitude from the DOJ: “The City had a chance at one point to go the 
technical assistance route – it was never fully fleshed out, but they did not go along with 
that option, so the DOJ hit them with the Consent Decree.” 
One high-level City official noted that at the time of the DOJ investigation, police 
command staff and the Mayor’s office were “adamantly opposed to even the 
investigation.” That official suggested that  
even an overt act by the DOJ to be more transparent would not have 
resulted in the sort of critical self-reflection that SPD would have needed 
to engage in to make them more open to reform … If either side had 
approached it differently, Seattle would have been a perfect place for a 
collaborative agreement. 
The official continued that: “If you had political leadership recognizing the need for and 
willing to pay for change; the right chief and commanders in place; and some 
cooperation from the Guild, it could have done it collaboratively. But those are three big 
ifs.” Another City official believed that “a more cooperative approach on the part of the 
City toward the DOJ would have ended up with a more reasonable solution other than a 
consent decree.” 
Other participants suggested that the aggressive nature of the DOJ’s initial 
approach also had a negative impact on rank-and-file officers, believing that “the union 
could have been brought along if DOJ had acted more collaboratively.” 
As noted by an SPD leader, “the only way change works is if people buy-in. You 
don’t accomplish that by sticking needles in people’s eyes.” The same participant 
suggested that, 
sometimes the DOJ and the Monitoring Team thought that the process 
had to be adversarial to get things done – but I think when it becomes 
adversarial, it interferes. While you may need some professional tension 
to end up with the best result – it’s all about relationships and 
authenticity at the end of the day. 
Of course, the problem is that it goes both ways. If one stakeholder is unwilling to 
work collaboratively and cooperatively toward a common purpose, it is hard to criticize 
the other stakeholder for taking a more aggressive approach. And, in fact, that is the 
very theory used to underly police use-of-force. The argument appears to suggest, 
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however, that the DOJ and the Monitoring Team may have been better able to de-
escalate any confrontations coming from positions of power. 
And, in fact, there were Seattle City participants who claim that, at the beginning, 
the SPD was “bending over backwards to be cooperative.” They claim they were telling 
the DOJ “you don’t have to pull the trigger on a consent decree, we will do whatever you 
think is necessary,” but that then-U.S. Attorney Durkan was convinced that the only way 
to “hard bake in” reforms was through a consent decree. These participants suggested 
that any SPD resistance was the result of a lack of collaboration on the part of the DOJ, 
“so, we basically gave up and stopped trying to comply with the Consent Decree and just 
did what the DOJ wanted us to do.” 
In retrospect, it is impossible to predict whether a less aggressive initial approach 
by the DOJ would have succeeded or not. In reality, however, credible research 
participants strongly suspected that the SPD was in need of a major jolt to replace its old 
guard with a new guard that would be more responsive to community concerns and a 
less insular approach to policing. 
7.5.16. Opinions Regarding the “CPC” Experiment 
The Seattle consent decree, with the creation of a Community Police 
Commission (CPC) has been used as an example of community engagement going 
above and beyond prior consent decree experiences. The DOJ, in their 2017 report 
evaluating 20 years of §14141 litigation highlighted those portions of the Seattle decree 
that involved community engagement, to include the “establish[ment of] a Community 
Police Commission with diverse membership and broad authority to review and provide 
input on police reform and to receive and incorporate community feedback” (DOJ, 
2017b, p. 29). 
The CPC concept, as it relates to consent decree litigation, was an attempt to 
bridge the gap between the traditional litigation landscape and community 
engagement.864 In fact, however, the CPC involvement in the implementation process 
 
864 Whose idea it was to create the CPC and include it in the Memorandum of Agreement 
accompanying the Consent Decree, became an issue during Mayor McGinn’s reelection 
campaign in 2013. While campaigning, McGinn reportedly claimed credit for “fighting” for the 
inclusion of the CPC in the MOA. This led to a highly unusual response from the DOJ (in the form 
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became a challenge for the City, the DOJ and the Monitor, with the CPC eventually 
attempt to intervene in the litigation as a party, and subsequently taking advantage of 
being granted the right to submit amicus briefs to the court, often in opposition to 
positions taken by either the City, the DOJ and/or the Monitor.865 
According to McGinn administration insiders, the creation of the CPC was about 
giving the then-Minority Executive Director’s Coalition, part of McGinn’s political 
constituency, a stake in the implementation of police reform in Seattle. The creation of a 
CPC including a number of MEDC members would provide an opportunity for community 
stakeholders to hold the DOJ, the Monitor and the Judge to task. These actions were in 
support of the following concern: “how did we end up in a situation where 
disenfranchised communities find themselves at the wrong end of bias and we have 
decided that three well-off White men are the ones who will have the power to address 
that?” 866 As such, the CPC was specifically intended to exist to “try to counteract the 
power that was given to those men.” 
Conflicts between the CPC, the SPD, the DOJ and the Monitor have been well 
publicized,867 and study participants had much to say about the CPC and to what extent 
its existence actually engaged community in the reform process. 
 
of a letter to the CPC from U.S. Attorney Durkan and the Chief of the Special Litigation Section of 
the DOJ in Washington), contradicting McGinn’s claim and asserting that the DOJ had formally 
proposed a “Community Monitoring Board,” more than a month before the settlement was finally 
signed. (Brunner, J. (2013, October 23). DOJ says it didn’t fight Community Police Panel. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com). 
865 See, Table 7.17, infra, for list of court filings made on behalf of the CPC over the course of the 
Consent Decree litigation. 
866 Referring to City Attorney Holmes, Monitor Bobb and Judge Robart. 
867 Seattle Times (8/22/2013) [“The Community Police Commission (CPC) is asking the federal 
judge overseeing reforms in the Seattle Police Department to postpone implementing a sweeping 
new use-of-force policy because the community and the department’s rank-and-file haven’t had 
enough time to review it];” Seattle Times (12/12/2013); Miletich, S. & Beekman, D. (2015, June 
10). Mayor at Odds with Civilian Panel Over Its Role in Shaping Police Policy. Seattle Times; The 
Stranger (6/3/2015); Seattle Times (7/7/2015); The Stranger (9/24/2015); Seattle Times 
(9/24/2015); Miletich, S. (2018, October 18). Council urged to reject police contract. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. [“In a major setback for Seattle Mayor 
Jenny Durkan, the city’s Community Police Commission unanimously voted Wednesday to urge 
the City Council to reject the city’s proposed contract with Seattle’s largest police union”]; Miletich, 
S. (2019, February 21). Panel challenges SPD Labor Deal. Seattle Times; Carter, M. (2019, 
March 8). Seattle Responds to Police Commission’s Concerns in Court. Seattle Times; Miletich, 
S., August 9, 2019, s, Citizen Panel Rejects Durkan Plan to Address SPD Accountability Flaws. 
Seattle Times; Seattle Times (9/21/2019); Miletich, S. (2020, July 7). Panel: City hasn’t met 
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Participants acknowledged that Seattle was the first time the DOJ and a local 
jurisdiction decided to include the creation of a citizen panel in a consent decree. But 
given the particularities and dynamics of Seattle, and the people chosen by Mayor 
McGinn to be on the CPC, it was quickly recognized that a purely advisory committee 
“was not going to pass muster.” One particularly prescient research participant 
commented that  
while the community must be given a voice, once the ‘cat’s out of the 
bag’ you can’t put it back in … it surprised me that no one quite realized 
that dynamic. I was surprised and chagrined that others were shocked 
by the subsequent actions and positions taken by the CPC. 
One of the most significant challenges for the CPC was highlighted by the 
question of “who speaks for the community?” That is a particularly difficult question when 
faced with a diverse community and, in fact, the CPC was specifically challenged by 
then-U.S. Attorney Durkan who, at one point, lectured them that: “you don’t own the 
community… and you are not the only people getting community input” (Seattle Times, 
12/12/2013). Another participant opined that,  
although the CPC has been very effective in a lot of ways, it has never 
been “the voice of the community,” it has been driven by its 
commissioners who are activists or people in the field… they are 
representatives of the community, but they don’t necessarily represent 
the community. It has morphed into a completely independent body. 
From the perspective of those working on consent decree implementation, it was 
recognized that while “on paper” the CPC seemed to be a workable program, in reality, 
attempting to limit such a group to only making recommendations, some (or even many) 
of which would not be followed, turned out to be a recipe for frustration and conflict. 
According to research participants, there ended up being much frustration on the 
part of the SPD and the City, who would spend months negotiating with the CPC with 
ultimately the CPC coming back and saying: “it’s not good enough – we are going to tell 
community and the court we are dissatisfied.” The final dynamic included the Monitor 
 
judge’s request for police-accountability remedies. Seattle Times [“A citizen watchdog panel on 
Monday accused the city of Seattle of dodging a judge’s request for proposals to fix police-
accountability flaws, saying the city’s response suggests it doesn’t appreciate the need for 
reforms that will bring it back into full compliance with federal mandates”]. 
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who was reportedly “put off by some initial banal interactions and was not interested in 
having additional cooks in the kitchen.” 
Participants tended to agree that all the various stakeholders appeared to 
perceive themselves as the experts in the areas under discussion and, as such, 
disagreements were not easily resolved. The dynamics were, apparently, not improved 
by the publicly stated beliefs of some CPC commissioners that the Monitor and the 
Judge were members of a “police reform industrial complex” who were unconcerned with 
and could not be trusted to keep the interests of the community in mind. 
Within the City, participants believed that the CPC did an excellent job of “using 
raw political power to the maximum advantage, but for their own purposes.” Another 
participant referred to the CPC members as “bareknuckle street brawlers.” As noted by 
one participant, “there were a lot of sophisticated politically savvy people on the CPC, 
and some who saw their position as a way to amplify their political power.” Other 
participants referred to the CPC as “very leftist” and including “lots of damaged people 
who could not get over past issues with the police.” One high level City Official 
commented that “the CPC did not like externally imposed reform; they wanted to be a 
police commission like Los Angeles or Minneapolis and were being led towards wanting 
to hire the Chief.” 
Even so, many research participants perceived the CPC to be generally 
ineffective. Some blame was attributed to Mayor McGinn, who reportedly “put strong but 
biased advocates on the CPC, which sent a bad message to the police.” Within the SPD, 
the CPC has sometimes been referred to as “a joke.” And a number of SPD participants 
questioned the CPC’s “value added” and suggested that “they don’t have a stick, they’re 
just noise.” 
At the same time, it was universally recognized that the CPC has “put in untold 
thousands of hours of uncompensated work … and got smarter as they went along.” 
However, with the election of Mayor Murray and then Mayor Durkan, a number of the 
most vocal commissioners were not reappointed and research participants openly 
questioned what impact new commissioners would have on the CPC in its future 
iterations. 
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7.5.17. Thoughts about the Costs and Benefits Associated with 
Externally Driven Reform 
A primary argument against externally driven reform, as repeatedly expressed by 
Mayor McGinn, was the concern that local resources would be depleted from other 
important City functions without giving due consideration to the totality of the city’s 
needs.868 According to one SPD insider: “the Monitoring Team had a laundry list of stuff 
they wanted and it was breathtakingly expensive.” That insider questioned whether “it 
was really true that we had to spend $10 million a year on our training programs in order 
to be effective?” 
A high-level official at SPD commented that in order to fund consent decree 
compliance,  
we had to do a lot of financial gymnastics to which the City turned a 
‘blind eye’ … Everyone, including DOJ wanted to de-emphasize how 
much it was costing … We eventually got there, and it did force money 
to be given to the Department, but we got there in a disingenuous way. 
Another high-level official in the O’Toole administration described the process somewhat 
differently: 
A lack of resources did not impact implementation at all. We didn’t have 
a blank check, so we had to be innovative. We had to show the city’s 
budget director that we were trying to be responsible managers. No one 
was really managing before – we had to get overtime handled and 
convince that we were not using our funding irresponsibly – you have 
to look at yourself in the mirror before start asking for more funds. We 
got grant money to assist us with our community policing micro plans 
and we volunteered to be the Guinea pigs with tech companies to 
implement technology. We had a great foundation to fund some officer 
safety and equipment initiatives. The most expensive thing was 
technology, but we had good people creating RFP’s and forcing vendors 
to sharpen their pencils – we held their feet to the fire. Having the 
Consent Decree helped to get the funding, but we were able to 
emphasized other funding opportunities. 
 
868 Miletich, S. & Carter, M. (2012, May 11). $5 million cost to Fed’s Plan Mayor Says. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. [“Raising the specter of painful cuts to 
parks, fire protection and human services, Mayor Mike McGinn said Thursday he has tentatively 
set aside $5 million a year to pay for the U.S. Justice Department’s proposed plan to reform the 
Seattle Police Department”]; Seattle Times, 5/11/2012. 
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These two perspectives, shared by officials who would have been expected to 
provide a consistent message helps to demonstrate the complexity of the environment in 
which the reform effort took place. Each of these participants appeared to hold honest, 
but different, opinions on how the reform effort was financed even though they appeared 
to be on the same side with respect to the need for reform and the importance of 
financing those reforms. 
The irony of SPD complaining about the cost of reform, was not missed by one 
City official who opined that: “If they had just spent the money to reform the SPD at the 
outset, it would have been much less than the cost of the Consent Decree and would 
have saved the extra cost of the Monitoring Team and the process.” 
One participant noted the ultimate benefit of externally driven reform to the City 
and the SPD: “The consent decree was a motivator towards change – it was the ‘sword 
of Damocles’ hanging over their heads.” 
7.5.18. Consent Decree Successes and Failures 
Successes 
Research participants were generally in agreement on the areas where the 
Consent Decree saw success:  
• “One of the favorable outcomes of the Consent Decree was it really 
formalized out training process overall and injected some objectivity 
into the development of training, which had been previously driven 
by particular training Captains or Bureau Chiefs.” 
• Although there was substantial criticism within the SPD about the 
length of the new use-of-force policy and how quickly the new policy 
was implemented, most participants believed that it was quite 
effective in changing the way the Department approached force. 
• Although some participants suggested that the SPD was well on its 
way with respect to improving its crisis intervention training and 
response, it was widely agreed that the CIT program improved 
dramatically during the implementation period. One City official 
noted that: “Crisis intervention, alone, that was worth the price of 
admission…” 
• While some SPD participants objected to how the Monitoring Team 
went about addressing deficiencies in the review of force, 
participants widely agreed that great strides have been made by the 
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Department in its investigations and reviews of use-of-force 
incidents. Participants generally agreed that prior to the Consent 
Decree, “the review process was garbage” and that “officers are so 
much safer and better at using force now.” A number of participants 
credited the new Use-of-Force Board as being “a crowning 
achievement,” and with not just exposing individual cases and 
instances of excessive or out-of-policy uses of force, but also 
identifying deficiencies in training, policy, and supervision that “led 
to systemic changes that are there to stay.” Even so, there is a 
strong contingent of SPD officers who believe that as a result of the 
Consent Decree, the disciplinary system has been overused and that 
officers are sometimes held to too high a standard when it comes to 
force incidents. In addition, concerns were expressed as to the 
sustainability of this reform based on a lack of vision from the current 
command staff. 
• The City now has a working data platform. All participants tended to 
agree that without the Consent Decree, long-needed data systems 
would not have been funded. A number of participants noted that 
the Crisis Intervention System is reliant on the upgraded data 
platform and believe that without this work, the SPD would never 
have been successful in the implementation of its crisis intervention 
program. 
• Many participants were supportive of the creation of the new 
Inspector General’s Office and the current Inspector General 
received significant support. Those same participants tended to also 
note that civilian oversight (in the form of the OPA and the CPC), in 
general, received stronger support as a result of the Consent Decree. 
• Although the Consent Decree did not specifically require the SPD to 
obtain Body Worn Cameras (BWC) for its officers, the Monitor, and 
subsequently the Court, strongly pushed for the purchase and 
implementation of the BWC system. Participants generally agreed 
that the system is now functioning effectively and is a strong factor 
in favor of ensuring accountability and resolving community 
complaints. As noted by more than one participant, “the addition of 
Body Worn Cameras to the conversation was nothing less than 
revolutionary.” 
• Most participants agreed that supervision of officers has improved, 
and credited the Consent Decree with eliminating the use of “acting” 
Sergeants and moving Sergeants into the same shifts as the officers 
they supervise; which had been considered a significant weakness 
in prior efforts to ensure officers received the supervision and 
support they needed. However, some SPD insiders noted that 
Sergeants, in fear of being criticized for failing to conduct competent 
line investigations, have taken to forwarding everything to the OPA 
resulting in “a lost generation of Sergeants who are not critically 
evaluating their subordinates.” In addition, supervisors continue to 
complain about excessive amounts of paperwork that has to be 
completed to generate use of force investigation reports: “That 
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means the Sergeant is not out supervising or teaching, only 
grading.” 
However, participants were in wide disagreement over the extent to which 
consent decree implementation actually impacted SPD culture. One civilian oversight of 
law enforcement practitioner made a particularly dramatic and unexpected observation, 
suggesting that post-consent decree implementation, “officers are more willing to admit 
when they have done something wrong – not just defend, defend, defend.” 
Failures 
Perhaps the most dramatic finding of this research was the realization of just how 
traumatic the implementation process was to most, if not all, of the participants “working 
in the trenches.” A significant majority of participants described emotions one would 
expect from a person suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome. Many participants 
expressed feelings of “relief” at the conclusions of interviews, noting how cathartic it was 
to discuss their experiences. The levels of stress experienced by stakeholders 
throughout the City, the SPD, the Monitoring Team and the DOJ appears to have been 
palpable. 
Participants expressed dismay over what appeared to be a lack of objective 
standards to assess the actual status of reforms and when those reforms would actually 
be completed. As expressed by one participant: “There was no clear, articulable 
conception… it was all over the place … not even the Court articulated a clear vision of 
how he would determine compliance.” Another perspective that was heard quite 
frequently involved the tone from the Monitor and the Court: “it was always that SPD was 
making progress, but there was still a way to go.” Participants suggested that message 
contributed to a type of “consent decree fatigue” that was not conducive to long-term, 
sustainable reform. 
Participants consistently expressed dismay at the failure to send a positive 
message to the rank and file and ensure that they were aware of the positives of the 
reform process. As suggested by one SPD officer: “change management and the lack of 
support [internally] for the process was the biggest failure.” 
Another SPD officer suggested that the Monitor’s oft-told message that better 
documentation of incidents would actually help officers would never be accepted by line 
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officers. He suggested that “there was no reward for officers for ‘accountability’ and 
fundamentally that is where it failed.” The officer also suggested that by the point that the 
Monitor began his formal assessments, he “started backpedaling and rewarding the 
department with positive assessment reports that we did not deserve” and which allowed 
the Department to start arguing it was in compliance. The officer also noted that the 
creation of Administrative Lieutenant positions that the Monitor supported, to enhance 
the efficiency of force reviews, simply diffused frontline Sergeant responsibilities and has 
resulted in continuing supervision failures on the part of the line Sergeants. More than 
one participant suggested that “the biggest problem at SPD continues to be supervisory 
failures to manage officer behavior.” 
Multiple participants observed that the failure of the Consent Decree to address 
issues of accountability ended up being a fatal flaw. The result was that “the Consent 
Decree used up all the capacity” and accountability became “the bastard step-child” of 
reform. 
Multiple participants also noted that neither of the two police unions (SPOG or 
SPMA) was ever fully brought into the reform process. 
And even though many timelines were missed, a number of participants noted 
that too much change, over too short a period of time led to animosity on the part of the 
rank and file and was “like cold water in your face… the reformers forgot that it needs to 
be a two-part process, reform, then creation… somehow the creation part just got left 
out.” 
7.5.19. Organizational Change 
Participants had quite a lot to say about the SPD and its capacity to change as 
an organization: 
• As noted by one SPD participant: “every department has a different 
culture and different traumas that have been dealt with in different 
ways … organizations are like people, they are just as dependent on 
experiences, on their DNA and their future actions are hard to 
predict.” This participant believed that the only way to reform the 
SPD was to bring in a Chief who could be a “change agent…able to 
come in, make enemies and then retire.” Other participants agreed 
with that vision, noting that “at the end of the day, there was 
recognition that the SPD command staff had reached a level where 
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they were petrified, they had to be cleaned out at the leadership 
level; you needed to shake things up.”  
• In order to reform the SPD, one participant involved in 
implementation observed that it was necessary to “move from 
personality to process.” It was remarked that was a particular 
challenge given the history of SPD leadership and Seattle politics. 
• Another participant argued that “bottom line: if you do not bring the 
police with you, the attempt at reform will absolutely fail.” 
• “There was no need to break down the department and rebuild 
it…you don’t build a great team by punishing players and making 
themselves feel bad about themselves; you can frame it otherwise.” 
The participant believed that while the SPD had “definitely moved to 
a better place,” the reform effort “did not do a great job on change 
management.” 
• Even so, participants in the reform effort believed that SPD “rank 
and file have come a long way, perhaps even unconsciously…it’s rare 
to get someone to embrace something they don’t like, but it’s a mask 
that eats into the skin, once you have done something right for 
years, it’s hard to going back to doing it wrong; it becomes part of 
your reality.” 
• One SPD participant had a particularly bleak outlook on the ability of 
the organization to change: “If you are going to do a massive 
change, you better do it fast before resistance can build. If you allow 
the opposition to coalesce under a shared narrative that will oppose 
you to the end, you will lose the people who were willing to support 
change.” This participant believed that there was resistance among 
command staff that outlasted Chief O’Toole and which empowered 
the rank and file to wait out the reforms. This participant commented 
that “the Monitor believed that in order to change behavior, you have 
to get buy-in, but the organizational management literature shows 
it’s much easier to just change behavior and let the hearts and minds 
follow… and there was no possibility of winning the hearts and minds 
in the SPD.” 
• “Morale slips and there is an opportunity for backsliding as far as 
Department culture goes, the longer the Consent Decree goes on. 
There is an optimum time as to when change takes place and then 
there needs to be some positive reinforcement, rather than just the 
hammering of the negative.” 
• One SPD insider suggested that “in order to connect and invest in 
the Department, you need to go to roll calls – but we weren’t able 
to do that – internal communications were flawed, therefore, internal 
change management was flawed.” 
• “In order to change, the SPD needed a sense of urgency, they 
needed someone who recognized the department would be better in 
the end as a result of this effort and who was willing to emphasize 
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the positives. We tried to create a culture of innovation that went 
beyond the parameters of the Consent Decree…” 
One generally agreed-upon aspect of SPD culture, however, was that the SPD 
command staff would never have changed nor would have been able to change their 
perspective without federal intervention. And while participants, as indicated above, 
disagreed on various aspects of how well change was implemented, virtually all agreed 
that it was necessary. In the end, it is clear that without some form of federal 
intervention, whether it had been more holistic than legalistic, the SPD would still be 
providing a level of policing that would propel it from crisis to crisis even more so than it 
does today. 
7.5.20. Organizational Change & Trauma 
As previously noted, the trauma experienced by those involved in the change 
process was palpable:  
• “I knew it was going to be awful going into the department and try 
to implement a consent decree that no one wanted – I knew it would 
be difficult but I underestimated how much.” 
• “Very few people emerged from the process feeling elevated or 
satisfied by it.” 
• “It was so over the top…” 
• “It’s hard to get across how tense and stressful it was: ‘the DOJ 
wars…’ 
• “It had quite the emotional impact…” 
• “I suffered a lot over this. I have had to come to grips with it and 
am a lot calmer than I was before. It’s not histrionic to say this did 
destroy some people psychologically.” 
• “A lot of people got stepped on during the process.” 
• “It was cathartic to participate in [this] interview. The work was 
extraordinarily difficult and exhausting.” 
In fact, a number of participants noted that they believed the process had destroyed or 
derailed their careers. 
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Once again, it is difficult to adjudge the extent to which the benefits of how the 
federal intervention was implemented may have outweighed the negative impacts 
associated with outside mandated change. In the end, however, the consensus appears 
to be that the SPD is a better organization than it was prior to the federal intervention 
effort and that any personal costs associated with that effort were outweighed by the 
organizational benefits enjoined by the entire Seattle community. 
7.5.21. The Challenges Associated with “Police Culture” 
Identifying the “culture” of the SPD is, as one would expect, a difficult endeavor. 
Once again, the answer you get is dependent on the person you ask. SPD leaders both 
publicly and privately have opined that the SPD culture promotes service and is devoid 
of any acceptance of corruption. Community activists saw a culture of “thuggery” and a 
willingness on the part of officers “to protect their own.” The DOJ investigation itself 
noted that internal complaints against officers were virtually non-existent at the time of 
the investigation. So, what was the “culture” of the SPD and how did it assist or detract 
from implementation efforts? 
• According to one SPD insider: “The October 2009 assassination of 
SPD Officer Tim Brenton was a traumatic event for the department. 
The reaction as a department was to ‘bunker down,’ to protect their 
own and that is still there. They are making good changes, tracking 
uses-of-force and implementing crisis intervention techniques, but 
the culture has not changed; line staff hasn’t changed as to their 
feelings on how to treat people. The inability to critically self-analyze 
– it’s a continuing problem for the department.” 
• Other SPD members disagree: “The culture of supervision has 
certainly changed. Before the Consent Decree, our Sergeants tended 
to take care of their guys, who would really have to ‘go off the 
reservation’ to lose their support. We have been reminded that 
supervision is actually a responsibility, not just an increase in pay.” 
• According to a former SPD officer, however: “The culture of the SPD 
and how to protect itself was set in the era of traditional corruption 
and continues to this day…” 
• An SPD command officer suggested that: “SPD culture has always 
been very good at reporting serious misconduct, but there has been 
a tolerance for rudeness and sloppiness and it has certainly been 
debatable as to what is excessive force. The consent decree changed 
that culture to a certain extent; it feels like we are overreporting, 
which is killing morale and demoralizing the department.” 
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• According to a participant involved in the implementation of reform: 
“The norms and culture have shifted, even if not acknowledged by 
the SPD. Things that were acceptable six years ago are not 
acceptable now…” 
• According to one SPD civilian: “The police culture is toxic. I don’t 
think we affected the culture. They remain incredibly sensitive to any 
criticism or even the suggestion that there is a need to improve.” 
• One department overseer suggested that “culture impacted the 
Consent Decree and the Consent Decree impacted the culture. The 
SPD had some brutal cops, but not a brutal culture – what you saw 
was the result of very poor use-of-force training that emphasized 
street fighting to pre-emptively end force before it began.”  
In attempting to determine to what extent Seattle’s police culture may have been 
impacted by the Consent Decree, it is interesting to compare the 2010 “Mexican piss” 
case, wherein an officer used a racial slur in front of other officers, none of whom 
reported the offensive comment to supervisors, to an incident that took place in 2020, 
wherein an officer was ultimately fired for referring to an African-American arrestee as 
“Kunta Kinte” in front of other officers. The comment was not made publicly, and the 
comment was reported by the witnessing officers without any outside influence.869 The 
difference in SPD officer response to similar offensive racially-inspired comments seems 
to suggest improvements in SPD’s overall culture of accountability over the past ten 
years. 
7.5.22. On “Depolicing” 
As discussed in Chapter 4.6, an ongoing debate relating to the efficacy of 
externally-driven reform relates to charges that officers will have a reduced tendency to 
engage in proactive policing activities that may, otherwise, benefit the community 
(Rushin & Edwards, 2017; Chanin & Sheets, 2018; Devi & Fryer, 2020).  
Also as previously indicated, in his 9th Systemic Assessment, the Monitor 
examined and addressed ongoing allegations of “de-policing” as it related to the 
implementation of the Consent Decree and found no evidence of de-policing (9th 
Systemic Assessment, Use of Force, pp. 59-60). Even in the face of those facts, 
 
869 Kamb, L. (2021, January 17). Seattle Police Chief fires officer for racist remark after fellow 
officers report him. Seattle Times. The Times also reported that SPOG had declined to appeal the 
officer’s termination. 
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however, as with other departments that faced consent decrees, SPD officers 
participating in this research claimed that the implementation of the Consent Decree in 
Seattle resulted in police being less effective and less willing to enforce the law: 
• “I sense that officers are more timid and unwilling to get involved in 
any issues. It’s more of a group response now – no cop is going to 
enter into a use-of-force situation without the backup, but that 
causes budget issues, and causes a loss of efficiency. And then 
there’s all the report writing….so police do less…” 
• “There was the position, ‘you want compliance, we’ll give you strict 
compliance’ … Officers were choosing not to engage in a way that 
may have put them in a position to use force and don’t know how to 
engage without using force, so they’re just not engaging at all.” 
• “I believe it happened; I’ve seen the numbers and they were 
drastically reduced…I do not know if lasted or how long it lasted.” 
• “the Consent Decree caused chaos and confusion and caused de-
policing.” 
• “The Monitor asserted no de-policing, but his reports were not based 
on evidence or facts and no one wanted [to hear anything to the 
contrary].”  
• “There were some officers who were just afraid to contact people; 
proactivity equated with a complaint…” 
In a Seattle Times article, published in May 2014, three years before the 
Monitor’s Ninth Systemic Report, it was reported that the SPD officers who were 
challenging the new use-of-force policy in federal court, alleged that the new use of force 
policies had  
created ‘hesitation and paralysis’ among officers, stripping them of their 
constitutional and legal right to make reasonable, split-second judgments 
in the line of duty … As a result, officers are afraid to do their job for fear of 
being second-guessed over burdensome, complicated and voluminous 
policies. 
The suit further alleged that “[a]side from evidence that officers are hesitating and/or 
failing to use appropriate and lawfully justified force to address threats safely and 
effectively, there is evidence of a dramatic decrease in proactive police work to 
investigate and stop crime” (Seattle Times, 5/29/2014). 
 The article further referenced an SPD report that “revealed steep drops in the 
enforcement of lower-level crimes, traffic offenses and infractions in recent years as 
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officers shave displayed less willingness to seek out illegal activities” (Seattle Times, 
5/29/2014). However, on June 2, 2014, the CPC issued a press release about that same 
report, which had been presented by an SPD analyst on May 14, 2014, stating that: 
[t]he presentation, a Power Point showing raw data on traffic and 
pedestrian citations and misdemeanor charges filed in Seattle Municipal 
Court from 2005-2013, has been erroneously referred to as a ‘report,’ and 
cited as concrete evidence of so-called de-policing. It was neither. 
Instead, the CPC reported that: “[t]he May 14 presentation … was a first step in the 
department’s efforts to review data with the CPC to identify areas in which alternative 
approaches might reduce enforcement disparities without compromising public safety.” 
The CPC concluded by noting that the presentation could be interpreted, in a positive 
way, as indicative of improvements in policing as a result of the Consent Decree:  
In the view of the CPC, the data presented on May 14 do not present any 
clear evidence of so-called “de-policing.” While some of the trends could 
reflect decreased productivity, that is not clear, and in fact, the lower levels 
of citation and arrest in some areas may likely reflect the Department 
moving in directions that DOJ, the CPC and many other community leaders 
have long called for: de-escalation of minor incidents, crisis intervention 
training for engaging mentally ill individuals, and community-based 
diversion of many quality of life-type offenses. Additionally, the CPC 
believes it is quite likely that some if not many of these developments are 
cause for commendation of the department. (CPC Press Release, June 2, 
2014) 870 
As previously noted in Section 4.6 and 7.3.2, no objective proof of depolicing was 
identified as a result of the Seattle DOJ investigation and intervention. Instead, it 
appears likely that any depolicing that may have taken place would be attributable to 
underlying issues of police accountability and public scrutiny not specifically related to 
the federal reform effort. 
7.5.23. The Challenge of Managing Police Accountability 
As noted by a number of participants, the Consent Decree’s failure to specifically 
include requirements regarding police discipline and accountability, led to a concurrent 
reform track, which ultimately resulted in the City Council, at the urging of the CPC, to 
 




pass an “Accountability Ordinance,”871 which was later scaled back by the contract 
entered into between the Seattle Police Officer’s Guild and the City. As previously noted, 
it was that contract that, in part, ultimately led to the City being found “partially out-of-
compliance” with the Consent Decree.872 
Both the City and the DOJ opposed the “out-of-compliance” finding, which was, 
however, supported by the CPC and the Monitor.873 
A minority opinion among research participants, but one that resonates given the 
implementation history in Seattle, is that joining the police union as a party to the 
Consent Decree and, thereby putting contract negotiations within the purview of the 
federal court, could have potentially led to an earlier resolution of the accountability 
issues. Although court hearings would likely have become more combative and 
challenging, overall, it seems likely that Judge Robart would have been able to manage 
the process effectively.  
Participants noted, however, that, once again, politics interfered. By this point in 
time, Mayor Durkan and City Attorney Holmes were solidly behind the SPD and the 
police unions, arguing that the City was in compliance and the union contract did not 
divert from the Consent Decree. The CPC, members of the City Council, and the Seattle 
Oversight mechanisms (the Inspector General and the OPA Director), however, believed 
that the ultimate contract negated important parts of the Accountability Ordinance. To 
 
871 Ordinance No. 125315, passed June 1, 2017, located at: 
http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/Legislation/2017AccountabilityOrdinance_0
52217.pdf. 
872 U.S. v. Seattle, Document 562, filed May 21, 2019. 
873 Although the Monitor’s February 2019 “Sustainment Plan Update Report” did not specifically 
support an out-of-compliance finding, research participants acknowledged that the Monitor and 
the Judge were in full agreement that discipline and accountability issues needed to be 
considered as integral parts of consent decree compliance. As noted by one participant, “If 
there’s no accountability, the Consent Decree is made a nullity. What is the point of a consent 
decree if you don’t have discipline and accountability?” In his report, however, the Monitor left it 
up to the Judge to determine whether or not the SPD was in compliance: “It is important to note 
that crucial issues around discipline, accountability, the collective bargaining agreement, and 
accountability legislation, all bearing upon the sustainment of compliance, are currently pending 
before Judge Robart. Those issues are of such sufficient moment that one cannot judge the 
status of sustainment without them. Thus the Monitoring Team does not draw any conclusions at 
this stage whether the SPD remains or does not remain in compliance in whole or in part. 
Whatever the case may be, the SPD performs well in many areas” (Sustainment Plan Update 
Report, p. 2). 
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add confusion, the DOJ took the side of the City and the Monitor was aligned with CPC, 
vocal City Council members and Seattle civilian oversight. While the Judge ultimately 
took the side against the union contract, to this day the contract remains in effect, with 
Mayor Durkan only promising to make changes in the disciplinary and appeal processes 
“top priorities,” but not until the contract negotiations for 2021 (Seattle Times, 
8/17/2019a). 
And while many research participants pointed to the discipline system as 
“broken” from the perspective of holding officers accountable for misconduct, other 
participants referred to the system as being broken from another perspective. According 
to one civilian oversight practitioner:  
While the Monitor’s efforts have been largely systemic, officer 
accountability has been the focus, leading to an increase in the number 
of officers being investigated by OPS – at one point 60% of the 
department was under investigation – that is evidence of a broken 
system. 
With the CPC charged in the Memorandum of Understanding with reviewing the 
structure of Seattle’s Accountability System,874 and no other mention of accountability or 
discipline in the Consent Decree, some participants believed the DOJ and the City put 
the issue of accountability “at the kid’s table,” thus assuring that it would be a continuing 
problem for the SPD and the Seattle community.  
7.6. Seattle Consent Decree Implementation – Political 
Voices 
As noted by virtually all participants and as made obvious by news coverage of 
the Consent Decree, City politics was not just largely responsible for SPD’s ability to 
maintain its own form of policing, even against community opposition, but was also an 
integral part of both the successes and challenges faced by those pushing forward the 
reform effort. The three Seattle Mayors whose tenure have covered the implementation 
period approached the DOJ reform effort in sometimes diametrically opposed ways, and 
with varying degrees of success given the positions taken by the City Attorney and 
members of the City Council. As explained by more than one participant, the City could 
 
874 U.S. v. Seattle, Memorandum of Understanding, July 27 ,2012, pp. 4-5 
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be described as “a multi-headed hydra” when it came to the different political agendas of 
the different politicians. This section highlights the comments and positions of this 
diverse group of very public stakeholders. 
7.6.1. The Seattle Consent Decree Mayors 
Consent decree experiences varied according to the Mayoral administration in 
place and the state of implementation. 
Mayor Michael McGinn. 
The incoming mayoral administration of Michael McGinn did not expect police 
reform to be at the top of his agenda when he took office on January 1, 2010. McGinn, 
known as a community activist and a former State Chair of the Sierra Club, ran his 
campaign largely on a transit platform opposing the construction of a tunnel to replace 
the aging Alaskan Way Viaduct, an elevated freeway that ran along the Seattle 
waterfront. McGinn ran as a political outsider with the support of groups described as 
“environmentalists, biking advocates, musicians, advocates for the poor, nightclub 
owners and younger voters (Puget Sound Business Journal, 8/8/2010).”875 He replaced 
Mayor Greg Nichols, who had previously served two four-year terms in office and who 
lost to McGinn and another candidate in the primary election.876 
Upon taking office, Mayor McGinn faced the need to find a permanent 
replacement for Chief Gil Kerlikowske, who had served as Chief from July 2000 through 
March 2009, when he was named as the “Drug Czar” by the Obama Administration. 
Former Mayor Nichols had chosen to replace Kerlikowske with a long-time SPD 
command officer, Assistant Chief John Diaz, who was then serving as interim Chief. On 
May 12, 2010, McGinn’s search committee proposed Diaz and two Northern Californian 
Chiefs as finalists for the position. Prior to McGinn’s ultimate decision, the SPD had not 
 
875 Lamm, G. & Wilhelm, S. (2010, August). The New Guard: Outsiders gain clout at Seattle City 
Hall. Puget Sound Business Journal. Retrieved from Outsiders gain clout at Seattle City Hall - 
Puget Sound Business Journal (bizjournals.com). 
876 See, Nickels biography, located at: http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/eng/Greg_Nickels. 
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had a permanent Chief selected from within its ranks in more than 30 years (Seattle 
Times, 5/12/2010).877 
McGinn ultimately selected Diaz to serve as his permanent Chief and Diaz was 
confirmed by City Council and sworn in as Chief on August 16, 2010 (Seattle Times, 
8/16/2010).878 Unfortunately for Chief Diaz, he had only two weeks to sit on his laurels 
before the shooting of native woodcarver John T. Williams would put police reform on 
the front burner of the McGinn administration’s political agenda. 
According to study participants, McGinn believed that Diaz was “a believer of 
incremental change from within.” However, when faced with the DOJ investigation 
findings in December 2011, Chief Diaz reacted like a true SPD insider when he reacted 
with “skepticism” at the DOJ’s findings. In the face of a statement by Assistant Attorney 
General Perez (who was in charge of the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division) that the SPD’s 
accountability structure and policy and training systems were “broken,” Diaz responded 
within hours of the release of the DOJ investigation report with a strong response: “I 
want to make this clear … the Department is not broken” (Seattle Times, 12/17/2011). 
Mayor McGinn later described his resistance to DOJ intervention as not a 
resistance to reform, but a resistance to “rolling over” and accepting DOJ’s prescription 
for reform. Both McGinn and Diaz, reportedly, were not willing to give up on the idea of 
self-initiated reforms, which, ultimately led to conflict with the DOJ during the negotiation 
of the Consent Decree and ultimately, was likely the downfall of the McGinn 
administration.879 
 
877 Miletich, S. (2010, May 12). Diaz picked as finalist for Seattle police chief - 2 Californians On 
List - McGinn must submit choice to City Council, which then will vote on confirmation. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
878 Seattle Times (2010, August 16). Now comes hard part - McGinn selects Diaz to lead police; 
Much to do to make Seattle a safer city. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
879 Many study participants criticized the response of Mayor McGinn and Chief Diaz, concluding 
that because of their opposition, there was a lack of “adequate communication” to the rank and 
file. According to participants, the opposition of McGinn and Diaz resulted in officers not learning 
about the potential positive ramifications of the Consent Decree: “instead, they focused on the 
20% finding which was perceived as having been the conclusion of some ‘idiot’ at DOJ who made 
that finding without cause.” 
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While negotiating the Consent Decree, Chief Diaz and the Mayor’s Office put 
forward a 20/20 plan, which was described by an SPD blog on March 29, 2012 as 
follows: 
Rather than waiting for the DOJ to deliver a list of demands in the form of 
a legally enforceable consent decree, the police department has drawn up 
a far-reaching list of 20 reforms to police practices, policies, and 
procedures to be put in place over the next 20 months. 
A number of high-profile incidents over the last few years have done a great 
deal of damage to the public’s trust of SPD. That has to be earned back 
through transparency, by improving public perception and bringing the 
police department into the 21st century. 
That’s why the 20/20 plan’s extensive overhaul is all about smarter, more 
efficient, more accessible, and equitable policing. 
“I’m committed to a police force that protects public safety, fights crime and 
treats every individual with dignity and respect,” Mayor McGinn said 
Thursday. 
Under the 20/20 plan, officers will receive training emphasizing things like 
communication skills, as well as de-escalation training so they’re better 
prepared for tough interactions out on the street, whether they’re dealing 
with a hostile crowd of protesters or individuals with mental illness and 
substance abuse issues. 
The department will also take a data-driven and technology-based 
approach to public safety, allowing the department to better monitor, 
respond to, and proactively address crime before neighbors feel unsafe in 
their own homes. 
Technical innovation will also allow the department to better track officers’ 
use of force, to make sure officers are properly using the authority the 
public has entrusted them with, and it will make public records and data 
even more accessible to the public. 
The department is also making efforts to become more accessible to 
Seattle residents, both by giving officers more opportunities to meet and 
interact with neighbors in the precincts they patrol, and by engaging with 
the public on social media like Facebook and Twitter. Seattle deserves to 
be able to see and understand how and why the police department 
operates the way it does. 
To make sure the community supports these reform efforts, the department 
has engaged with the Minority Executive Director’s Coalition (MEDC), 
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which made 90 recommendations to SPD, many of which were 
incorporated into the 20/20 plan.880 
In the blog, Mayor McGinn was quoted as saying, “Don’t let a good crisis go to waste, 
that’s how we’re viewing this.” Mayor McGinn was also quoted as “noting that the threat 
of a federal lawsuit and consent decree has ‘lent a sense of urgency’ to the department’s 
reform efforts: ‘There’s opportunity in here, and we’re looking to seize that.’” 
Although publicly, the DOJ was not specifically critical of the 20/20 plan,881 study 
participants noted that by all appearances, the plan was nothing more than an attempt 
by Diaz and McGinn to get out from under a consent decree with a court-appointed 
monitor, who McGinn and Diaz had publicly referred to as a potential “shadow-Chief” or 
“shadow-Mayor.”  
And, according to study participants, McGinn and Diaz publicly proposed the plan 
without consulting with or providing prior notification to either the elected City Attorney or 
members of the City Council. In fact, the plan was announced almost immediately after 
attempts to reach consensus between the Mayor and other Seattle elected officials on 
the City’s response to the DOJ investigation had failed. 
Also, according to study participants, although Diaz himself did not attempt to 
thwart reform, there was certainly “malicious compliance” from elsewhere within the SPD 
command staff. Study participants identified the lack of ownership over the Consent 
Decree by Diaz (and by extension, McGinn) as providing SPD command staff with the 
“cover” they needed to passively and quietly resist reforms in every way possible. Even 
so, as indicated in the Seattle Monitor’s semi-annual reports, significant policy work was 
developed during the first two years of the implementation process; although virtually all 
participants agree that much more could have been achieved had Department command 
staff bought into the reforms from day-one. 
 
880 Retrieved from https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2012/03/29/spd-2020-a-vision-for-the-
future/#:~:text=Under%20the%2020%2F20%20plan%2C%20officers%20will%20receive%20traini
ng,individuals%20with%20mental%20illness%20and%20substance%20abuse%20issues. 
881 The Seattle Times reported the DOJ’s response to the 20/20 plan as follows: “[U.S. Attorney] 
Durkan declined to say whether she believed the mayor's plan to roll out the 20 police-reform and 
anti-crime initiatives in 20 months would satisfy the issues raised by the investigation. ‘I think 
what I'm most encouraged about, though, is that I saw the mayor and the chief of police side-by-
side saying they support reforms,’ she said” (Seattle Times, 3/31/2012). 
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Arguably, it was only when Ed Murray defeated Mayor McGinn at the polls in 
2013 and a new permanent Chief was appointed in 2014 did the SPD fully engage the 
reform effort.  
Mayor McGinn’s experience – the political background. 
Study participants noted that McGinn came into office with “major opposition.” 
The City Council had previously voted unanimously in favor of a replacement tunnel for 
the Alaska Viaduct freeway, which McGinn publicly opposed. The McGinn administration 
was, reportedly, perceived as consisting of “outsiders.” Members of the administration 
today believe that if McGinn had been “a member of the [Seattle Democratic] club,” 
“things would have gone down different” and believe that “Jenny Durkan would never 
have gone after someone in the democratic establishment.” 
Interestingly, the Seattle DOJ investigation was one of the first to include the 
local U.S. Attorney in a §14141 reform effort. A positive impact of such inclusion is the 
opportunity for more local involvement in the review of a department and the 
implementation of reform, based on a better understanding of local history, culture, 
politics and potential obstacles. Unfortunately, however, there is also the potential for the 
police and local politicians to perceive the local U.S. Attorney as a political threat and to 
imply bad motives to that person and their office. Local U.S. Attorneys are appointed by 
the federal government-of-the day and are expected to resign upon the election of a new 
Presidential administration; as such, in most cases, their longevity is limited, and is some 
cases, former U.S. Attorneys may have political aspirations in local government. As was 
proven in the case of Seattle, when former U.S. Attorney Durkan announced her plans to 
run for Mayor, in July 2017 (MyNorthwest.com, 7/3/2017).882 
If, in fact, the DOJ investigation was used as a political tool, it would have been a 
brilliant move – as it appeared to ultimately isolate the McGinn administration from part 
of its base – progressive white liberals who wanted the stain of a DOJ investigation to go 
away.  
 
882 MyNorthwest Staff (2017, July 3). Jenny Durkan: From running for Rainier to running for 
Seattle mayor. Mynorthwest.com. Retrieved from Jenny Durkan: From running for Rainier to 
running for Seattle mayor (mynorthwest.com). That all being said, there is no way to know what, if 
any, political aspirations then-U.S. Attorney Durkan may have had when the DOJ first announced 
its intent to investigate the SPD. 
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In the end, one has to ask why the incoming McGinn administration appeared so 
supportive of the SPD and so resistant to the DOJ? The answer appears to be in the 
populist nature of McGinn and his administration. While there is no question that McGinn 
supporters would be generally supportive of police reform, it was the issue of externally 
driven police reform, as opposed to community-driven reform, that appears to have been 
the sticking point. In addition, McGinn had recently chosen Diaz to lead the police 
department; it would not have been particularly politic to fire Seattle’s first Latino Chief 
and replace him with an outsider. Further, McGinn had an incentive to try to work with 
his Chief, who he believed was dedicated to incremental, long-term police reform. 
According to McGinn himself, it was important for him to give community a voice in the 
process and he was inherently suspicious of not just DOJ motivations but of their ability 
to come up with affordable and sustainable reform options.883 
McGinn and the DOJ. 
McGinn’s position on the DOJ’s investigative findings was certainly influenced by 
SPD command staff. And, by all accounts, the meeting between the DOJ and the City to 
discuss the DOJ’s findings went very poorly. The meeting was almost impromptu, at 
least as perceived by SPD command staff and City leadership, who were “invited” to 
meet with DOJ leaders and team members the night before the press conference 
announcing the DOJ’s findings. While the DOJ may very well have been seeking to 
avoid any “leaking” of their report to the media by not providing the SPD with a draft 
report or an advanced copy, the result was SPD command staff feeling “ambushed” by 
aggressive and critical findings that tore at the very core of the command staff’s 
professionalism and their ability to manage their own Department. 
At the meeting, where both the Chief and the Mayor were present, the 
conversation quickly denigrated to demands for the data supporting the conclusions that 
the SPD command staff claimed to be shocking and insulting. Those data demands 
were quickly followed by DOJ refusals to “go into the weeds” and clear instructions from 
the DOJ that such information would only be provided during discovery proceedings if 
the case were to go to litigation. The meeting, by all accounts, got “heated,” with the 
 
883 See, Transcript of May 11, 2015 podcast (Lisa Daugaard conversation with former Mayor 
Michael McGinn), on file with author. Retrieved from http://www.mikemcginn.co/podcast-
2/2015/5/11/lisa-daugaard-deputy-director-of-public-defender-association. 
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Mayor representing that the City “want[ed] to fix these things too,” but needed to see the 
underlying data and reportedly advising that: “[w]e want to understand what has gone 
wrong, so we can fix it.” SPD command staff claimed that the report was prepared 
without any consultation, with DOJ referring to prior conversations between DOJ experts 
and the SPD and with both sides disagreeing as to the content of those prior 
conversations. 
Eventually, Durkan asked to speak with the Mayor privately. Study participants 
who were later briefed on the meeting, described Durkan as implicitly threatening the 
Mayor with the potential consequences of getting into a fight with the DOJ and the 
potential political ramifications of the embarrassment that would be sustained by the 
SPD from revelations that would be made public in court. The Mayor, reportedly, had a 
visceral personal reaction wondering why there could not be a collaborative conversation 
and opposed to the idea that DOJ would be given the power to take over and dictate 
police reform in Seattle. This was likely the genesis for the Mayor’s later-stated belief 
that the DOJ was intent on putting into place a “shadow Mayor” or “shadow Chief” in the 
form of a court-appointed Monitor. 
Mayor Murray reportedly walked out of the meeting feeling personally bullied and 
insulted by what was perceived as a disrespect for the City’s intentions and the solutions 
the City and his newish administration had to offer. As noted by one City insider:  
So, this was not an atmosphere of good faith and collaboration. They 
were not interested in giving us any data and they published an 
inaccurate report. The Mayor was threatened by Durkan and told ‘not to 
fight us.’ So, the real impact internally was with respect to concerns 
regarding procedural justice. Are we working together or is this an 
adversarial relationship where we really don’t have a voice? It felt like 
it was the latter. In the end, we were really just struggling to have a 
voice in the process. 
At the same time, both the DOJ and the McGinn administration were fully aware 
of the challenges faced in forcing reform on the SPD command staff which had been 
referred to as “a Game of Thrones type of police leadership.” Due to Civil Service rules, 
Assistant Chiefs could only be demoted and not fired; upon being demoted, they would 
simply wait for the next administration to be repromoted. SPD leadership was referred to 
it as being “like crabs in a bucket – while some are going up, others are coming down.” 
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Even so, Mayor McGinn had faith in Chief Diaz, who he believed was “acting like a team 
player,” leading reform efforts and conducting “great outreach.” 
Ultimately, McGinn chose to aggressively negotiate the Settlement Agreement. 
His position, as reported by study participants, was that if he was going to lose re-
election over any conflict with the DOJ, at least he would get an agreement that 
achieved his goals. In other words, he did not intend to “roll-over” in negotiations and 
intended to insist that any reforms be generated from within the city. As such, McGinn 
did not want the Monitor writing Department policy, but wanted new policies to be 
generated within the SPD and then reviewed by the Monitor for compliance.  
Overall, McGinn’s reaction to the DOJ investigation appears to have been 
impacted by a number of factors: an interest in supporting his choice for police chief, 
reports from the City Attorney’s Office that the DOJ investigation was faulty,884 a 
preference for local and community control over policing, and a sense of a lack of 
procedural due process in the whole affair.  
According to one member of the McGinn administration, regardless of any other 
appearances, 
there was no resistance to reform, there was resistance to rolling over 
and accepting their [DOJ’s] prescription for reform … We hadn’t given 
up the idea of self-initiated reforms; at the same time, we could not 
telescope that we would accept a Consent Decree under any 
circumstances – that would have given the DOJ all of the power in the 
negotiations.885 
 
884 As has been previously mentioned, Mayor McGinn was presented with a confidential memo, 
prepared by a member of the City Attorney’s Office, that reportedly identified numerous mitigating 
facts that were excluded from the DOJ report and established that the DOJ report overstated 
case-specific problems identified over the course of the investigation. “Literally, [a Deputy City 
Attorney] took the DOJ report and added in the facts that were left out.” 
885 As reported in the Seattle Times, in June 2012, Mayor McGinn, went to Washington D.C. to 
meet with the Head of the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, in an attempt to establish a more 
collaborative approach to the negotiations. This meeting was scheduled after the City had 
received “two sternly worded letters … in May [from the Chief of the DOJ’s Special Litigation 
Section] questioning the city's willingness to negotiate in good faith.”  (Miletich, S. & Carter, M. 
(2012, June 12). McGinn, federal officials to discuss police changes - Source: Mayor to meet with 
DOJ's civil-rights chief Deadline near for consent decree between parties. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
According to study participants, McGinn went to Washington D.C. after conferring with other 
Mayors whose cities had been the subject of DOJ pattern or practice findings. In addition to 
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Another perspective, however, was that in Seattle, there was a savvy police 
department that ingratiated itself with the new Mayor and convinced him that they could 
improve themselves without any outside help. The 20/20 plan, proffered by the SPD and 
embraced by the Mayor, was, according to SPD insiders, really no more than “a 
repackaging of things already on the books – a grab bag that the Mayor could use to 
convince himself that he was effectively in charge.” 
McGinn Administration Experiences - Lesson learned. 
One potential lesson learned from the negotiation process was the negative 
ramifications of the short-term litigation strategies used by both the DOJ and the City at 
the early stages of the process. The DOJ, by refusing to share its data or methodology 
with the City, likely set back any real collaboration with the City by one to two years;886 
from the City side, the City’s counter-offer to the DOJ did not include any provisions 
relating to biased-policing – based in large part on the fact that the DOJ investigation did 
not find a provable pattern or practice of biased policing on the part of the SPD. As 
described by City research participants, City litigators had opined that the DOJ was 
overreaching wanting to include such provisions in the original proposal and would lose 
in court if attempting to force such provisions on the City. In reality, however, once the 
City’s position was leaked to the media, which was probably inevitable, McGinn’s 
constituency was “appalled” and McGinn had to re-engage with the DOJ on that issue 
(See, Seattle Times, 5/18/2012).887  
Given McGinn’s sense of populism, it is arguable that with the receipt of a 
Technical Assistance Letter, accompanied by the threat of a future Consent Decree, 
McGinn and Diaz could have achieved some semblance of reform. It is certainly 
questionable, however, as to whether that more limited “use-of-force option” by the DOJ 
 
meeting with Assistant Attorney General Thomas Perez, McGinn also met with at least one other 
high-level DOJ official; at each meeting, he reportedly argued that the DOJ appeared to be 
treating Seattle and his democratic mayoral administration no different than it was treating more 
notorious jurisdictions, such as the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department, led by conservative 
Sheriff, Joe Arpaio. 
886 Although it is also possible to argue that no real collaboration would have been forthcoming 
even if the DOJ had shared its data and methodology – in fact, it may be just as likely that SPD 
command staff would have used that information to simply attack the DOJ investigation report 
and further resist any externally driven reforms proposed by the DOJ. 
887 Miletich, S. & Carter, M. (2012, May 18). City's reply to DOJ omits issue of bias in policing - 
Response concentrates on excessive force Some community groups upset; others back strategy. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
472 
would have actually resulted in the type of reforms that were actually achieved by the 
Consent Decree, given the culture of complacency that existed within the SPD command 
staff that was unlikely to change without some form of external pressure. 
The decision to go straight to a litigation-based strategy, however, was certainly 
in conflict with a community-based concept of police reform that might very well have 
been supported by a critical mass of Seattle voters. And the decision resulted in the 
following blunt assessment of the overall reform process by one participant within the 
McGinn administration: 
How did we end up being in a situation where disenfranchised communities 
are finding themselves at the wrong end of bias and we have decided that 
three well off-White men [referring to Monitor Bobb, Judge Robart & City 
Attorney Holmes] are the ones that will have the power to address that? 
 
Table 7.10. Public Statements by Mayor McGinn 
Date Statement 
December 22, 2011 In a “strongly worded” letter to Chief Diaz after the DOJ investigation report 
was released: “This process of change cannot wait … We have heard from the 
public and now the federal government that more must be done … We agree. 
Let us be very clear: we are committed to reform.” 
In an interview with the Seattle Times, “We’re committed to making reforms 
here, but we need to work through with DOJ about what those reforms look 
like, … There’s not a recommendation that we say, ‘we can’t do that,’ or 
‘you’re wrong there.’ There are some we’ve done already; there’s some we 
started; and there are some we’re working toward … My objective is to have a 
highly professional police force that treats everyone with dignity and respect, 
and I think that’s a goal that is shared by a vast majority of officers” (Seattle 
Times, 12/22/2011). 
February 3, 2012 Statement by McGinn spokesman: “We are working to define the public 
engagement process…” (Seattle Times, 2/3/2012). 
March 30, 2012 “The 20 proposed initiatives are aimed at supporting a just and effective police 
force, … The changes we are proposing are intended to be lasting and 
sustainable ... whether or not they are included in a consent decree, ...” 
(Seattle Times, 3/30/2012). 
March 31, 2012 “We will negotiate in good faith…” (Seattle Times, 3/31/2012). 
May 10, 2012 Speaking to Seattle Times editorial board regarding the City’s 20/20 plan: 
“This is where we've put a stake in the ground marking what we know we can 
do…” (Seattle Times, 5/10/2012). 
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Date Statement 
May 12, 2012 “We fully cooperated with the Department of Justice during their eight-month 
investigation, … We offered our assistance during the three-and-a-half months 
they took to prepare their proposal. And we will respond within the six-week 
timeline we have said we needed for review … As the U.S. attorney said on 
KUOW today, the city has an agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office to not 
discuss negotiations in the press as we work in good faith toward a mutually 
acceptable agreement to support a just and effective police force” (Seattle 
Times, 5/12/2012). 
May 15, 2012 “[A consent decree] is not a sticking point for us … We are prepared to spend 
money – but not in a way that compromises public safety … [referring to the 
potential for ‘a shadow mayor’]” (Seattle Times, 5/15/2012). 
May 17, 2012 Statement by McGinn spokesman: “We shared our response with the 
Department of Justice today. It included a consent decree and a monitor. Our 
hope is to continue to work in good faith toward a mutually acceptable 
agreement that supports a just and effective police force” (Seattle Times, 
5/17/2012).888 
June 13, 2012 According to the Seattle Times: “McGinn said he sought the meeting with 
Perez because he already was on the East Coast and believed it would be 
“helpful if we got to know each other” (Seattle Times, 6/13/2012).889 
June 22, 2012 “Even without the mediator, progress is being made …”  
“McGinn said Thursday that … his discussion with Perez got the Justice 
Department back to negotiations and engaged in intense talks” (Seattle Times, 
6/22/2012). 
July 18, 2012 Responding to criticism from City Attorney: “It’s my job to work with Mr. 
Holmes, and I will” (Seattle Times, 7/18/2012).890 
July 27, 2012 According to the Seattle Times, “At Friday’s news conference, McGinn 
explained that three goals guided him throughout the negotiations: effective 
police reform, enhanced public safety and staying within Seattle’s budget” 
(Seattle Times, 7/29/2012a). 
October 23, 2012 Statement issued by McGinn spokesman, shortly after City Council voted to 
back Merrick Bobb for Monitor: “We know from the experience of other cities 
that reform efforts are successful when the police force buys in to the effort. 
Our office and others expressed concerns that Mr. Bobb would not be seen as 
an impartial monitor … We are disappointed that the Council did not listen to 
those concerns and that our reform efforts may prove more difficult as a result 
of their vote, … We believe that their vote was a mistake, but respect that this 
is now the City's position. Going forward, the mayor will roll up his sleeves and 
continue to work with all stakeholders to implement reform in our police force” 
(Seattle Times, 10/23/2012). 
 
888 Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (2012, May 17). Seattle awaits reaction to its proposed police fixes. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
889 Miletich, S. & Song, K. (2012, June 13). Seattle, U.S. leaders meet on 2 coasts in search of 
police fix. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
890 Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (2012, July 18). McGinn says Seattle can avoid a DOJ lawsuit. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
February 27, 2013 According to the Seattle Times: “In a strongly worded email, McGinn’s legal 
counsel, Carl Marquardt, accused [elected City Attorney] Holmes of an ethical 
breach of the attorney-client privilege as the city works to comply with a 
settlement agreement with the Department of Justice to curb excessive force 
and biased policing: ‘Executive branch departments are entitled to have legal 
representatives who respect confidentiality and represent their interests…’” 
(Seattle Times, 2/27/2013). 
March 5, 2013 According to the Seattle Times, “Declaring that ‘a lawyer shall abide by a 
client’s decisions,’ McGinn directed Holmes on Tuesday to obtain his written 
authorization before approving the Monitor’s far-reaching proposals. In a 
memo to Holmes, McGinn cited what he called his role as the city’s chief 
executive officer and chief law-enforcement officer” (Seattle Times, 
3/6/2013).891 
March 6, 2013 As reported by the Seattle Times: “In an interview on KIRO radio Wednesday 
morning, McGinn said he was sorry the fighting had escalated and signaled his 
intent to call a meeting with Holmes, Police Chief John Diaz and Merrick Bobb, 
the independent monitor tracking the reforms, in a joint effort to reach a 
binding accord. ‘I really regret that we’re at this position publicly,’ McGinn said. 
‘I really have to say that. It’s not where I think either of us want to be’” (Seattle 
Times, 3/7/2013b).892 
March 9, 2013 According to the Seattle Times: “McGinn’s office said in a statement that, after 
a ‘good conversation’ with Bobb, McGinn accepted the plan based on a 
‘mutual understanding that the plan is a living document’ that can be amended. 
The parties also will work together on timelines for adopting the reforms 
detailed in the settlement agreement, the statement said. McGinn and Bobb 
further agreed to hold regular meetings in an effort to ‘better align the work of 
the City and the Monitor on reform, which the City Attorney will also attend’” 
(Seattle Times, 3/9/2013). 
August 2013 In an interview with the West Seattle Herald [as reported by the Seattle 
Times]: “This [the CPC] is something I got into the agreement and isn’t 
something the DOJ initially wanted. I had to fight for it” (Seattle Times, 
10/23/2013). 
October 24, 2013 In a written statement to the Seattle Times: “I personally believe that excessive 
use of force and bias have been real and serous issues for a long time, and 
reflected systemic issues…” (Seattle Times, 10/24/2013).893 
 
891 Miletich, S. (2013, March 6). Officials’ fight over police escalates. Seattle Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
892 Miletich, S. (2013, March 7). Attempt [by Mayor to stem public battle with City Attorney]. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
893 Miletich, S. (2013, October 24). McGinn, Murray agree SPD engaged in excessive force. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
October 25, 2013 According to the Seattle Times: “In response to criticism from Justice 
Department officials, McGinn released a mostly conciliatory letter 
acknowledging the DOJ always had favored some form of community 
involvement in negotiating reforms of the Seattle Police Department. McGinn 
wrote that he was ‘somewhat surprised that DOJ is weighing in on these 
issues now’ — referring to the pre-election timing of the letter criticizing him, 
which was signed this week by U.S. Attorney Jenny Durkan and another top 
DOJ official” (Seattle Times, 10/25/2013).894 
December 18, 2013 “[Departing Mayor McGinn] commenting on judicial approval of use-of-force 
policies, ‘We are glad to see that the Monitor, SPD and DOJ have achieved 
this milestone, and that they involved the Community Police Commission’” 
(Seattle Times, 12/18/2013). 
 
As indicated by the quotes contained in Table 7.10, Mayor McGinn’s statements 
were consistent with what has been reported by research participants as his honestly 
held state of mind – that he should have been given the opportunity by the DOJ to 
pursue a reform effort from within the SPD and that the DOJ should not have formally 
intervened until after he had the chance to succeed or fail. Further, Mayor McGinn 
appeared to philosophically disagree with the idea of a top-down reform effort, instead 
preferring to see reform generally pursued by the community itself and, more 
specifically, by and through the CPC. 
Mayor Ed Murray. 
Unlike Mayor McGinn, when Mayor Ed Murray came into office on January 1, 
2014, after defeating McGinn at the polls, he had the benefit of knowing that at least one 
of the reasons for his electoral victory was a desire on the part of the electorate to 
achieve police reform as per the agenda set forth by the DOJ. Murray had run on a 
platform of collaboration with the DOJ and was elected with the endorsement of at least 
five members of the City Council. While McGinn appeared to relish being perceived as a 
political “outsider,” Murray was perceived as more willing to work with the democratic 
and business establishments of the City. (Seattle Times, 9/19/2013).895 Although both 
 
894 Brunner, J. (2013, October 25). McGinn seeks to set record straight re: DOJ-CPC. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
895 Brunner, J. (2013, September 19). Council’s Jean Godden backs Murray in mayoral race. 
Seattle Times. [“Jean Godden on Wednesday became the fifth Seattle City Council member to 
endorse state Sen. Ed Murray’s mayoral campaign, giving Murray the support of a majority of the 
nine-member council”]. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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were identified as “die-hard progressives,” Murray and McGinn were on opposite sides 
of the “tunnel debate” with McGinn opposing the tunnel and Murray having been the 
primary Senate sponsor of a bill financing the tunnel project while he was the chairman 
of the Senate Transportation Committee.896 
As described by the October 13, 2013 Seattle Times endorsement of Murray, 
although both candidates were progressive democrats, in the end, Murray appeared 
more likely to be able to successfully accomplish the tasks at hand: 
The two candidates for Seattle mayor are both die-hard progressives. They 
identify many of the same challenges ahead as the city reaches back to 
economic vitality. They even share some policy platforms. 
But the choice becomes clear on their widely different approaches to 
governing. State Sen. Ed Murray offers a return of pragmatic, effective 
leadership to City Hall.  
He has campaigned as the mayor who would lower the bridges after four 
years of a “fortress Seattle” mindset. This means the city embracing, rather 
than turning its back on the Port of Seattle and the jobs-rich maritime and 
industrial core; collaborating with federal police monitors; working more 
closely with Seattle Public Schools to bridge the achievement gap; and 
repairing frayed relations with Olympia, where Seattle has a critical wish 
list of legislative changes. 
Murray’s career highlight — an 18-year campaign to change the hearts and 
minds of colleagues in the Legislature about same-sex marriage — 
demonstrates the skill and temperament to do it. His experience and 
message have been a magnet for impressively diverse supporters — from 
big labor unions to the chamber of commerce, from rank-and-file police to 
ardent advocates for the homeless. 
Mayor Mike McGinn, as he often says, did learn on the job. But he remains 
at heart a grass-roots activist rather than a statesman, adept at finding and 
driving wedge issues for narrow political gain — even where they do not 
exist. It is telling that five City Council members who worked closely with 
McGinn now support Murray, the first time a council majority has opposed 
the sitting mayor in recent history. 
On core issues, Murray would be more effective. His administration would 
be far more likely to draw star-caliber, reform-minded candidates for the 
chief of police job; given that chance in 2010, McGinn whiffed. A strong 
chief is critical to repair the Seattle Police Department’s reputation and to 
 
896 See, Lindblom, M. (2018, November 19). Almost There. Seattle Times. [“Seattle’s waterfront 
Alaskan Way Viaduct, in service since 1953, will be replaced this winter by a four-lane Highway 
99 tunnel between Sodo and South Lake Union”]. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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quickly advance the reforms mandated by the city’s consent decree with 
the U.S. Department of Justice. 
To improve transportation and transit, Murray emphasizes a regional 
approach, including mending relations with state legislative leaders whom 
McGinn ripped in opposing the Highway 99 tunnel. Murray, a transportation 
budget-writer in the House and Senate, strikes the right balance between 
maintenance, which has suffered, and critical investments in mass transit, 
roads and freight mobility, which flow from state and regional partnerships. 
Murray has support from business leaders, but he needs to be reminded 
that taxes fund government. A $15-an-hour minimum wage, which he 
supports, comes at a cost. But he is more trustworthy than McGinn, who 
recently mocked Murray’s support from Amazon.com. What kind of a leader 
mocks a major part of the engine of his city’s economic recovery? 
As the economy begins to hum again, the next mayor has a chance to 
plumb the deeper and difficult chasms of Seattle — including making 
housing more affordable and narrowing education outcomes that break on 
color lines. Murray, a legislative dealmaker for nearly two decades, offers 
pragmatic leadership. McGinn, a progressive ideologue, has sown division.  
Come Nov. 5, Seattle voters should lower the bridges and elect Ed Murray 
mayor (Seattle Times, 10/13/2013, emphasis added). 
One of Mayor Murray’s first acts was to fire the then-interim Chief of Police, Jim 
Pugal, a former SPD Assistant Chief and appoint a retired Assistant Chief, Harry Bailey, 
as interim Chief. Murray immediately announced a national search for a new Chief: he 
reportedly advised Pugel that if he wanted to apply for Chief, he would need to resign as 
interim Chief (Seattle Times, 1/9/2014).897 
Mayor Murray faced his first police accountability challenge in February, when 
Chief Bailey, who reportedly had close relationships with the police union, overturned 
discipline that Pugel previously refused to change. The overturning of the discipline was 
poorly received by the Seattle media and resulted in significant public criticism. The 
decisions further resulted in a March 2, 2014, Seattle Times Op Ed piece, entitled: 
“Make police discipline coherent, transparent,” where the editorial board identifying the 
current police accountability system as “a joke that invites artful word play that can be 
used to string out and stall disciplinary proceedings seemingly forever” and arguing that 
 
897 Miletich, S. (2014, January 9). Seattle mayor ousts Pugel, picks new interim police chief. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. Murry was reportedly advised that if 
a currently serving interim Chief was a candidate for the position of permanent Chief, it would be 
harder to obtain qualified applicants from the outside. 
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“[t]he link between the consequences of marginalizing local checks and balances and 
the resulting need for federal intervention seems even more clear with this latest debacle 
(Seattle Times, 3/2/2014).”898 
In May 2014, the Mayor was faced with a civil lawsuit, filed by more than one 
hundred SPD officers, challenging the new use-of-force policy implemented effective 
January 1, 2014 as a result of the Consent Decree. Murray’s response to the lawsuit 
was described as “terse” by the Seattle Times:  
the Seattle Police Department is under a federally-mandated court order, 
in part because of a disturbing pattern of unnecessary use of force and 
other forms of unconstitutional policing, … The police department will 
comply with that court order. The City of Seattle will not fight the Civil Rights 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. This is not the 1960s.” (Seattle 
Times, 5/28/2014) 
Murray’s challenges with police reform began to end within six months of his 
inauguration when his national search for a new permanent chief resulted in the 
appointment of former Boston Police Commissioner, Kathleen O’Toole, a well-known 
and highly respected progressive police leader. With the appointment of Chief O’Toole 
as the new Chief of Police in June 2014, Mayor Murray solidified his place in the history 
of the implementation of the Consent Decree by ensuring that, for the first time since the 
signing of the Settlement Agreement, there was clear direction from both the Mayor and 
the Chief that Consent Decree compliance was a primary goal for the SPD. By August, 
2014, Monitor Bobb was telling Judge Robart that “Seattle’s new mayor, Ed Murray, 
along with O’Toole, City Attorney Pete Holmes and federal attorneys, [were] working 
together, leading to wholesale changes in the past month that bode well for success” 
(Seattle Times, 8/20/2014). 
Murray was able to work closely with the City Council on issues important to 
consent decree implementation. Shortly before Chief O’Toole’s appointment, the City 
Council passed a new ordinance which would allow O’Toole to appoint assistant and 
deputy Chiefs from outside the Department – a key part of eliminating the insular nature 
of the SPD’s command staff. When the Seattle Police Management Association (SPMA), 
the union representing Seattle police captains and lieutenants grieved the ordinance, 
 
898 Seattle Times (2014, March 2). Make police discipline coherent, transparent. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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claiming it was subject to mandatory bargaining, the President of the Council, Tim 
Burgess, came to the ordinance’s defense with a statement extremely critical of the SPD 
and supportive of the reform effort:  
The new chief faces huge issues, … The culture of the police department 
is stagnant. Basic management systems and protocols are lacking. 
Management accountability and core business practices are not well 
defined. Data systems are severely lacking. There are significant questions 
about use of resources and deployment of officers. The new chief will need 
very experienced and seasoned managers to create and sustain the 
change we want. (Seattle Times, 6/4/14) 
Table 7.11. Public Statements by Mayor Murray 
Date Statement 
October 24, 2013 Then-candidate for Mayor: “As I have said numerous times throughout this 
campaign, I agree with the DOJ that use of force was a problem at SPD … 
Unfortunately, the current mayor chose to fight the DOJ, and to fight the City 
Council, fight the City Attorney, and even fought the appointment of a nationally 
respected monitor…” (Seattle Times, 10/24/2013). 
November 21, 2013 Statement by then-Mayor-elect Murray: “During the campaign I talked about 
how public safety will be job one for my administration. Broadly speaking, this 
means restoring the morale of (the) police force, making critical reforms to our 
police force and, ultimately, building confidence in our police force across our 
many diverse communities” (Seattle Times, 11/21/2013).899 
January 18, 2014 Commenting on Judge Robart’s approval of the new SPD anti-bias policy: “The 
perception of racial bias in policing doesn’t just corrode the community’s trust in 
the police force, it erodes the morale of our officers, … Addressing this very real 
issue is among the most serious and urgent reforms the Police Department 
must undertake in the consent-decree process…” (Seattle Times, 1/18/2014). 
March 19, 2014 In a letter to City Council regarding the SPD disciplinary review process: “[It is 
too slow, very confusing and without the transparency, checks and balances 
and certainty officers and complainants alike deserve” (Seattle Times, 
3/20/2014).900 
April 1, 2014 In a letter responding to DOJ criticism against the SPD for failing to create 
adequate plans to implement the Consent Decree: “I cannot stress how 
appreciative I am of the DOJ’s recognition of the efforts we have made in the 
three months since taking office, … Nevertheless, as you rightly point out, there 
is much work to be done and we are committed to getting it done” (Seattle 
Times, 4/2/2014). 
April 3, 2014 “I agree with the judge that reform is moving at a glacial pace. … I have no 
disagreement, … It’s now my problem” (Seattle Times, 4/4/2014). 
 
899 Miletich, S. (2013, November 21). Consultant to advise mayor. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
900 Miletich, S. (2014, March 20). SPD misconduct findings won’t be reinstated for 6. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
August 22, 2014 Commenting on SPD officer suit to block implementation of new SPD use-of-
force policies: “This is not the 1960’s…” (Seattle Times, 8/22/2014).901 
August 29, 2014 “Speaking as chief law-enforcement officer of this city, the policy of this city is 
compliance with the federal court order. Officers may have their own private 
opinions about the court order, but noncompliance from employees of this city’s 
police department is not an option” (Seattle Times, 8/29/2014). 
October 20, 2014 Commenting on dismissal of the SPD officer law-suit against implementation of 
new use-of-force policies: “[the] dismissal of the suit today confirms that SPD’s 
use-of-force policy is both practical and constitutional, … Today we move 
forward with police reform and move past internal divisions over policy. The City 
and the officers who filed the suit share the same objectives: safety for the 
public, and safe working conditions for the officers who provide for the public’s 
safety. We can achieve both” (Seattle Times, 10/21/2014). 
November 12, 2014 According to the Seattle Times: “At a City Hall news conference, Murray 
unveiled his long-awaited plan to address revelations in February that his then-
interim police chief, Harry Bailey, had overturned misconduct findings against 
seven officers who had appealed their discipline. The ensuing furor exposed a 
lack of oversight and an appeals process some say is fraught with potential 
manipulation. ‘All told, these improvements represent a significant shift towards 
transparency and greater clarity for the discipline and appeals system, a system 
that until now, as I have said before, has been mired in fog of Byzantine 
procedures,’ Murray said” (Seattle Times, 11/13/2014).902 
November 24, 2014 “Seattle is not Ferguson … But, of course, Seattle is far from perfect” (Seattle 
Times, 11/26/2014).903 
December 16, 2014 Commenting on Monitor’s 4th semi-annual report: “We are making good 
headway and I am committed to keeping police reform moving forward” (Seattle 
Times, 12/16/2014). 
June 10, 2015 Responding to CPC criticism over accountability legislation: “I wish I hadn’t 
given a timeline, because it’s far more complex than I realized, …We’re seeing 
the Monitor and the federal court acknowledge that the police department is 
moving forward, … We haven’t seen that so much from the CPC ... and so that 
creates a certain tension … It’s important that we don’t turn over ... 
responsibility that belongs to the mayor, the council or the chief of police to the 
Community Police Commission, … Because if something goes wrong, it’s me 
and the chief and the council who will be held accountable” (Seattle Times, 
6/10/2015). 
June 16, 2015 Referring to the city’s efforts to work with the Monitor and the DOJ: “I think the 
collaborative process is paying off…” (Seattle Times, 6/16/2015). 
 
901 Miletich, S. (2014, August 22). City, federal monitor move to dismiss officers’ suit. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
902 Miletich, S. (2014, November 13). Mayor offers to fix system that governs cop discipline. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
903 Seattle Times staff (2014, November 25). Seattle can teach Ferguson a lesson. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
June 24, 2015 “The CPC believes we’re moving too slow and, as you can see from the 
Monitor’s letter, some parties to the Consent Decree believe we’re moving too 
fast, and we’ve been trying to manage that, … It was very helpful for the 
Monitor to say publicly what we’ve been hearing privately for some time … My 
obligation is to the U.S. Department of Justice and the federal court and if I 
have to part ways with the CPC on some issues to agree with the Justice 
Department and the court then that’s what will happen, … The wheels are back 
on, but I suspect the wheels will fall off several more times … I absolutely 
believe there will be tension between the council and me” (Seattle Times, 
6/25/2015). 
June 30, 2015 Commenting on court hearing where Judge Robart criticized a plan to expand 
the powers of the CPC: “The direction today from Judge Robart was clear: any 
reforms must align with the Consent Decree and be approved by the Court. As 
planned, I will be working with the Department of Justice, Federal Monitor, 
CPC, labor unions and City Attorney to achieve meaningful reforms to our 
civilian oversight system and improve accountability … [the judge] affirmed that 
the Seattle Police Department, under the leadership of Chief O’Toole, is making 
significant progress on police reform, rebuilding community trust and becoming 
a national model for urban policing” (Seattle Times, 7/1/2015). 
September 7, 2015 In response to an SPD report indicating a reduction in the amount of force used 
against the mentally ill: “Police officers are often the first to encounter those 
needing addiction or mental-health services, … We must continue to invest in 
the best training for our officers, as well as improved access to human services, 
to further improve outcomes for the most vulnerable” (Seattle Times, 9/7/2015). 
November 25, 2015 Statement in response to Monitor’s “praise” of SPD’s Use-of-Force Board, 
Murray thanked Chief O’Toole and noted that Monitor Bobb “recognizes a 
renewed culture of accountability at the Seattle Police Department” (Seattle 
Times, 11/25/2015). 
January 10, 2016 “Across the nation, communities are looking to Seattle and the reforms we’ve 
made regarding training, transparency and accountability, … While we still have 
much more work to do, it’s a strong statement that the administration is 
recognizing Seattle’s leadership on this national priority during the president’s 
final State of the Union” (Seattle Times, 1/10/2016). 
January 20, 2016 According to the Seattle Times: “O’Toole and Seattle Mayor Ed Murray spoke 
about the city’s police-reform work last week at a standing-room only gathering 
at the U.S. Conference of Mayors in Washington, D.C. ‘My point was it has to 
start at the top,’ Murray said afterward, citing his hiring of O’Toole in 2014 and 
her reshaping of the command structure” (Seattle Times, 1/28/2016). 
July 8, 2016 Commenting on his “struggles” with the Seattle police union: “I don’t get to 
choose what a union posts. I get to choose the chief of police, and that shows 
you the kind of leadership and communication I expect from the police 
department” (The Stranger, 7/8/2016).904 
 
904 Herz, A. (2016, July 8). Mayor on Police Union and Reform, It’s a Struggle. The Stranger. 
Retrieved from https://www.thestranger.com. 
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Date Statement 
February 1, 2017 Commenting on the sending of police accountability legislation to the City 
Council: “Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Eric Harris, Walter Scott and 
Freddie Gray, … And there’s another very important name that needs to be 
mentioned today: John T. Williams … All of this is tragic and all of this is real, 
but there’s a positive and inspiring story that we’re telling today,” (Seattle 
Times, 2/2/2017).905 
April 4, 2017 Commenting on the Trump administration’s decision to review federal consent 
decrees: “Our progress under the Consent Decree cannot be undone by empty 
bureaucratic threats. Our police department is well into the process of reform 
and will continue this work. We are too far along for President Trump to pull us 
away from justice” (Seattle Times, 4/7/2017a). 
July 17, 2017 Commenting on the issuance of an executive order directing the SPD to equip 
patrol officers with body cameras: “We have gone around and around and 
around trying to reach an agreement … We’re not there yet…” (Seattle Times, 
7/17/2017). 
July 18, 2017 “Judge Robart made it clear today that ensuring constitutional policing needs to 
be Seattle’s top priority, … Five years ago, when the previous administration 
was dragging its feet on meaningful reform, the relationship between police and 
Seattle’s communities of color was fractured. While we still have work to do, we 
have made significant progress since 2010, which the Court confirmed today.” 
(Seattle Times, 7/19/2017b). 
January 11, 2018 Former Mayor Murray statement on full compliance, [thanking the] “women and 
men of the Seattle Police Department who have created a national model for 
reform” (Seattle Times, 1/11/2018). 
 
Consistent with Mayor Murray’s platform to cooperate with the DOJ, and once he 
had hired Chief O’Toole to lead the way to reform, Murray’s public comments were 
solidly in favor of DOJ-led reform efforts, as well as the public comments and orders 
made by Judge Robart. As reported by research participants, this was the first time there 
was “no daylight” between the Chief and the Mayor as to where the reform effort needed 
to go. 
Mayor Jenny Durkan. 
U.S. Attorney Durkan found herself in an historically unique position on the date 
she was inaugurated as the Mayor of Seattle – she is and has been the only federal 
prosecutor to sit on both sides of the aisle during a §14141 litigation; first, as one of the 
 
905 Beekman, D. (2017, February 2). Mayor’s Bill. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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lead plaintiffs, seeking a Consent Decree against a City, and then subsequently, as the 
Chief Executive of that same City, all while the Consent Decree continued its course. 
After her role changed, her publicly stated positions segued over to a position 
supporting the termination of the Consent Decree at the earliest opportunity. The key 
issue facing Durkan ended up being the ongoing contract negotiations between the City 
and SPD officers who had been working without a contract for years. Ironically, it was 
the contracts that the Durkan administration negotiated with the Seattle police unions 
that eventually led to the City to being found partially out-of-compliance with the Consent 
Decree. 
Durkan was sworn in on November 28, 2017. Less than six weeks later, the City 
was found to be in “full and effective compliance” with the Consent Decree. As such, it 
was the clear expectation of the Durkan administration that all she would need to do is 
lead the SPD through its “sustainment period.” Even though Judge Robart described the 
sustainment period as “the most difficult portion of the Consent Decree to fulfill,” there 
was a clear expectation on the part of the City, the SPD and the DOJ (and perhaps, the 
Monitor), that by January 2019, the City and the SPD would be free of its Consent 
Decree obligations and that Mayor Durkan would be in a position to declare that the 
reforms that she began as the U.S. Attorney were now “hard baked” and sustainable. 
However, that expectation was not to become a reality. And, in fact, when the 
Monitor resigned from his position in September 2020, he referred to the SPD as being 
“at its nadir” with a “desperate[] need[] [for] a new chief from outside the organization to 
put it back together” (Seattle Times, 9/9/2020). 
Durkan’s public statements, after being sworn in as Mayor, show an 
administration trying to walk a careful balance between continuing her support for police 
reform and also supporting the Department that now answered to her (while, also, 
downplaying concerns regarding allegations of lack of SPD consent decree compliance). 
At the same time, however, Mayor Durkan strongly supported the contract that was 
eventually negotiated with the police unions and attempted to seriously downplay any 
conflicts with the previously passed Accountability Ordinance as well as the findings of 
Judge Robart that the contracts were, in fact, in conflict with the Consent Decree: 
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Table 7.12. Public Statements of Mayor Jenny Durkan 
Date Statement 
January 11, 2018 Commenting on the Judge’s recent order finding the City in “full and effective 
compliance” with the Consent Decree: “This is a very significant and good day 
for the city of Seattle, for the Police Department and for the community … The 
next two years are going to be critical … we know we’re not done …” (Seattle 
Times, 1/11/2018) 
Referring to the resignation of Chief O’Toole effective December 31, 2017 
(Seattle Times, 12/8/2017): “It will be critical we hire someone who can be the 
leader we need in this community to champion the reform process” (Seattle 
Times, 1/11/2018). 
January 14, 2018 “The training wheels are off…” (Seattle Times, 1/14/2018).906 
July 9, 2018 “A Seattle Police Department official on Monday disputed recent claims by the 
police union’s vice president that officers are leaving in larger numbers because 
of unhappiness about the city’s politics” (Seattle Times, 7/10/2018).907 
July 18, 2018 Statement from Mayor’s Office regarding police contract negotiations: “[The 
Mayor] believes it is in everyone’s interest to get a contract in place, … [The 
Mayor] agrees with SPOG that progress has been made, and remains hopeful 
a deal can be reached” (Seattle Times, 7/18/2018b).908 
November 6, 2018 In-Court statement regarding the contract negotiated between the City and 
SPOG: “We believe that every one of the parts of the tentative agreement not 
only meets the Consent Decree but also moves forward significant reforms 
under the accountability ordinance” (The Stranger, 11/6/2018). 
December 3, 2018 “We look forward to addressing the Court’s order, demonstrating that SPD 
remains in full and effective compliance with the federal Consent Decree that I 
signed as the United States Attorney” (Seattle Times, 12/4/2018).909 
 
906 Seattle Times Editorial Board (2018, January 14). A Laudable Victory towards Police Reform. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
907 Miletich, S. (2018, July 10). Police Official Disputes Officer Exodus Claims. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
908 Miletich, S., July 18, 2018, Progress Made in Collective Bargaining Agreement, Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
909 Miletich, S. (2018, December 4). Judge orders City, DOJ to explain rehiring of fired cop. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
December 11, 2018 Reacting to a Court Order for the City to produce information regarding the 
disciplinary process:910 “I think he [the Judge] is just being thoughtful.”  
“Mayor Jenny Durkan said Tuesday she wasn’t alarmed, and she is confident 
the city has a strong police-accountability system and has made adequate 
changes to the appeals process to satisfy Robart’s questions” (Seattle Times, 
12/12/2018).911 
December 18, 2018 “Judge Robart continues to take a thoughtful and thorough approach as he 
evaluates Seattle’s progress toward meaningful, lasting reform, and we will 
continue to be ready to address any additional requests or concerns Judge 
Robart may have” (Seattle Times, 12/19/2018).912 
February 28, 2019 Responding to Monitor concerns that the Seattle police contract could 
jeopardize consent decree compliance: “The Seattle Police Department 
continues to make significant progress on reforms … and I trust Judge Robart 
will continue his thoughtful and thorough approach as he evaluates Seattle’s 
progress toward lasting reform” (Seattle Times, 3/1/2019). 
March 5, 2019 Responding to complaints from the police union that consent decree reforms 
were “hindering police work” and negatively impacting on police recruitment and 
retention: “[the SPD] continues to make significant progress on reforms across 
all measures while making our city safer… We’ve seen the progress firsthand of 
culture change and how officers respond to crisis, which has been reaffirmed by 
the Department of Justice and the (court-appointed) Monitor, … None of these 
gains would have been possible without the dedicated work of our police 
officers” (Seattle Times, 3/5/2019). 
May 15, 2019 Responding to Court’s oral finding of partial non-compliance: “Overall, I am 
very, very heartened by the judge’s ruling today.”  
“Durkan … assert[ed] the media was doing a disservice by focusing on a few 
concerns rather than the hard work of officers in complying with the thrust of the 
Consent Decree” (Seattle Times, 5/15/2019). 
 
910 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 507: As part of  a December 10, 2018 order setting a briefing 
schedule on the Court’s December 3, 2018, “Order to Show Cause Whether the Court Should 
Find that the City has Failed to Maintain Full and Effective Compliance with the Consent Decree,” 
the Court required the city to provide: “(1) Copies of all briefings filed before the Disciplinary 
Review Board (“DRB”) that overturned former Chief of Police Kathleen O’Toole’s decision to 
terminate Seattle Police Department (“SPD”) Officer Adley Sheperd; (2) The written decision(s) of 
any and all arbitrators on the DRB panel that overturned Chief O’Toole’s decision to terminate 
Officer Sheperd; (3) A list, chart, or other document that details how the City’s collective 
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the Seattle Police Officer’s Guild (“SPOG”) alters any 
provisions of the Accountability Ordinance, see Seattle City Ordinance No. 125315; and (4) A list, 
chart, or other document that details how the SPD disciplinary system and appeals process under 
the CBA differs from the SPD disciplinary system and appeals process that existed at the time 
this action was initiated on July 27, 2012.” 
911 Miletich, S. (2018, December 12). More Info. Seattle Times [“A federal judge on Tuesday 
ordered the city of Seattle to produce broad information on the Police Department’s disciplinary 
procedures in the wake of an arbitrator’s decision to reinstate a Seattle police officer fired for 
punching a handcuffed woman.”] 
912 Miletich, S. (2018, December 19). Seattle Defends Police Reforms to Federal Judge after cop 
reinstated. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
May 22, 2019 “The Judge has ordered an assessment of the present accountability regime, … 
Given the reforms and the changes made to the entire accountability system ... 
an assessment of the accountability regime, how it compares to other models 
across the nation, functions as a system and its impact on officers, policing and 
community confidence can only benefit our city… It is notable that the judge did 
not strike down the Collective Bargaining Agreement, or any specific provision 
in the CBA. Together with the Department of Justice, we are evaluating the 
Court’s order regarding the accountability regime and its relationship to the 
Consent Decree. But regardless of the next legal steps, we have made clear 
that we will continuously assess and improve as a Department” (Seattle Times, 
5/22/2019). 
June 26, 2019 Statement from Mayor’s Office: “In the coming weeks, the City will be working 
to define the full scope of work and methodology to propose to the Court by 
working with community and accountability partners.” 
As reported by the Seattle Times: “After last week’s complaints from the 
community groups, the mayor’s office issued a statement saying the city 
remains in full and effective compliance with every area ‘required’ by the 
Consent Decree — a reference to the city’s successful completion of 10 formal 
assessments” (Seattle Times, 6/26/2019).913 
July 13, 2019 Letter sent to “concerned community groups:” “I believe our work on the Court-
ordered methodology will realize our shared goals of robust community 
participation and ensure the SPD remains in full and effective compliance with 
the goals of the Consent Decree” (Seattle Times, 7/13/2019).914 
 
913 Miletich, S. (2019, June 26). Panel for police reform created. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
914 Miletich, S. (2019, July 13). Judge gives Seattle more time to deal with any deficiencies in 
police reforms. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
July 15, 2019 Statement from Mayor’s Office, responding to an open letter from three 
members of Council requesting the Mayor re-negotiate the contract with SPOG: 
“Mayor Durkan, who led the Department of Justice investigation into SPD, has 
spent decades working on police reform and pushing for additional 
accountability. Mayor Durkan believes the City is responsible for constitutional 
policing, ensuring a police accountability system that builds trust, protecting 
public safety and upholding the rights of workers. She is grateful to the men and 
women of the Seattle Police Department who show up every day to make the 
city a better place, keep us safe, and show how good policing is effective policy. 
The Court ordered the parties, with the assistance of the Monitor and the CPC, 
to develop a methodology for assessing the ‘accountability regime.’ Since May, 
the City has been working to respond to the Court’s order. There have been 
multiple meetings with the Community Police Commission. In addition, the 
national experts hired to assist in doing the assessment ordered by the Court 
are meeting with the Community Police Commission and other stakeholders 
this week. In addition, they are working to meet with and seek input from the 
City Council in Executive Session and will have a public meeting with 
community. 
The City Council has been briefed twice by the City Attorney, and the Mayor, at 
her monthly meeting with Councilmember González, offered to meet on the 
Consent Decree. 
The City will not propose any potential next steps without the input of the 
Monitor, community, and our accountability partners, and without the review 
and approval of Judge Robart. We have a binding Collective Bargaining 
Agreement and also are obligated to respect state law governing labor 
relations. 
That process is underway, and the Court must approve this plan. After this 
process is complete, the City can work with the DOJ, SPD, the Monitor, City 
Council, community, and accountability partners to move forward on next steps 
and will then seek the Court’s approval. 
The City looks forward to the opportunity to engage with the community to 
receive input on the development of our methodology for assessing the 
accountability regime. We also look forward to engaging with the broader 
community as we respond to the Court’s order and ultimately, have the Consent 
Decree fully lifted.”  
(Seattle City Council Insight, 7/15/2019).915 
August 9, 2019 Written Statement to Seattle Times responding to CPC’s “rejection” of City’s 
Accountability Plan: “We look forward to reviewing the written feedback from all 
parties including the CPC. The City will continue listening and looking at how 
we can best incorporate feedback from community members and accountability 
partners into the methodology that will be proposed for the Court’s approval” 
(Seattle Times, 8/10/2019).916 
 
915 Retrieved from https://sccinsight.com/2019/07/15/the-war-of-words-over-police-accountability-
heats-up-in-city-hall/. 
916 Miletich, S. (2019, August 9). Citizen Panel rejects Durkan plan to address SPD accountability 
flaws. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
August 16, 2019 “Durkan spokesperson Stephanie Formas said Friday that the mayor and Police 
Chief Carmen Best are ‘wholly committed to true community-based policing, 
and a department that is accountable, effective and continuously improving.’ 
The mayor has helped push significant reforms, including many aspects of the 
police-accountability ordinance, Formas said. Included was the guild’s 
acceptance of body cameras on officers and the creation of an independent 
inspector general, with broad oversight powers and unfettered access to the 
department. ‘Far from having ‘fatigue,’ both she and Chief Best understand that 
reform is never done, Formas said” (Seattle Times, 8/17/2019a). 
August 16, 2019 Joint written statement by City Attorney Holmes & Mayor Durkan regarding a 
court’s decision overturning an arbitrator’s finding in favor of reinstating an 
officer previously fired by Chief O’Toole for excessive force: “Judge McHale 
rightly recognized the arbitrator’s order for Mr. Shepherd’s reinstatement 
violated the public policy against excessive use of force in policing, … SPD 
should not be forced to employ an officer whose view of reasonable and 
necessary force is so immutable and so contrary to SPD’s policies and values” 
(Seattle Times, 8/17/2019b).917  
September 11, 2019 Statement regarding plan to recruit and retain officers: “As Seattle grows, we 
must make sure we are recruiting, hiring and retaining the most experienced 
officers who can provide public safety and are committed to lasting reform” 
(Seattle Times, 9/11/2019).918 
September 21, 2019 Mayoral staff statement responding to CPC accusations of Mayoral interference 
with panel: “As we expected, we reached a mutual agreement that resolved any 
initial misunderstanding about our past communications and collaboration, … 
We have deep respect for the CPC’s critical role in the accountability regime 
and their strong independence. The Mayor looks forward to our continued 
engagement on a wide range of policing issues” (Seattle Times, 9/21/2019). 
October 16, 2019 Joint Statement from Mayor and City Attorney regarding Court’s authorization 
for city to hire experts to conduct a “full, data-driven examination” of police 
accountability practices in other jurisdictions: “We are grateful that the Court 
agrees that this process could help further reform, … These national experts 
will help the parties to not only address the Court’s concerns, but further 
strengthen a culture of continuous reform and improvement, inform the parties 
of potential other best practices, and inform collective bargaining.” 
“Durkan and City Attorney Pete Holmes said they were ‘pleased’ the court 
authorized the city’s plan. They noted that Robart found the city to be ‘on track’ 
to be discharged in a few months from other requirements of the Consent 
Decree, like those related to use of force, crisis intervention and de-escalation” 
(Seattle Times, 10/16/2019).919 
 
917 Kamb, L. (2019, August 17). Judge overturns ruling reinstating Seattle Officer. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
918 Beekman, D. & Miletich, S. (2019, September 11). Plan to recruit, retain police officers. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
919 Miletich, S. (2019, October 16). City can consult experts on police policy. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
June 2, 2020 Addressing a crowd of protestors after the murder of George Floyd: “The chief 
and I and others will work on a plan, but the plan has to come from community 
voices, … That is going to be a process of honesty and healing, it will bring out 
anger and disillusionment, there will be disagreement and agreement … It will 
only be successful if we can find some mutual love and common humanity, … I 
know that has to be earned. That kind of trust isn’t here today, or you wouldn’t 
be in the streets marching … We have come too far in this city on police reform 
and we cannot shirk from an honest and transparent or review of any police 
actions.” (Seattle Times, 6/2/2020). 
June 3, 2020 “Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan said in a Seattle City Club interview Wednesday 
that she agreed with the decision to withdraw the city’s request [to terminate 
portions of the Consent Decree]. She had supported the motion last month and 
since then. But she said Wednesday, ‘We need to take a pause … With what’s 
going on right now, we need to engage more people …There’s a huge amount 
of distrust in the community, we’ve got to get better at de-escalating that’” 
(Seattle Times, 6/3/2020).920 
7.6.2. The City Attorney’s Perspective 
Seattle, unlike most other cities, has an elected City Attorney, which arguably 
makes the office more accountable to the public, but also comes with its own set of 
practical and ethical problems, particularly when the Mayor and the City Attorney are 
either political adversaries or have divergent philosophical ideals regarding the nature of 
their roles.921 City Attorney Pete Holmes took office on January 1, 2010, the same date 
as Mayor McGinn. Prior to being elected City Attorney, Holmes had served an original 
member of the Office of Professional Accountability Review Board (referred to as “SPD’s 
first civilian oversight body”) and served as its chair from 2003 to 2008.922 
 
920 Miletich, S., Beekman, D. & Hellmann, M. (2020, June 3). City will withdraw request that could 
lift federal oversight. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
921 In a letter to the City Council, dated October 22, 2019, Holmes wrote that “the City Attorney 
acts in the best interests of all citizens when counseling and zealously defending fellow public 
servants in the good-faith exercise of our duties” (Seattle Times Staff. (2009, November 5). City 
Attorney Holmes Starts with a Clean Slate. Seattle Times. Retrieved from Seattle City Attorney 
Holmes starts with a clean slate | The Seattle Times. 
However, the role of an elected City Attorney becomes more complex when the City Attorney 
believes that “the best interest of all citizens” is contrary to the policies or actions taken by the 
elected Mayor. 
922 See, http://www.seattle.gov/cityattorney/about-us/about-pete-holmes. 
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Holmes defeated the incumbent City Attorney, who was endorsed by the police 
union, by a wide margin in the November 2019 election running on a platform of “public 
safety, and transparency and accountability in city government.” 923  
It would be hard to describe the relationship between Mayor McGinn and City 
Attorney Holmes, as it related to the DOJ investigation and consent decree negotiations 
and implementation, as anything other than aggressive and confrontational. The first 
public evidence of conflict in this area arose in March, 2012, only a few months after the 
publication of the DOJ’s findings. On March 29, 2012, the Seattle Times reported that: 
“[a] ‘collaborative effort’ between the mayor, city attorney and City Council to create a 
unified response to a U.S. Department of Justice investigation into the use of force by 
Seattle police [had] unraveled.” The Times published portions of a letter to the Mayor 
from three City Council members who were critical of the Mayor’s failure to collaborate 
with the City Council and his opposition to the DOJ’s insistence of court oversight over 
any future Settlement Agreement. The Times reported that McGinn and Holmes had 
“previously clashed on a variety of issues” and that the letters signatories could “be seen 
as potential McGinn rivals in the 2013 mayoral race” (Seattle Times, 3/29/2012). 
By July, 2012, an internal feud between McGinn and Holmes was publicly 
disclosed when the City Attorney sent a 6-page letter to McGinn,924 described by the 
Times as “sharply worded” and critical of McGinn’s strategy in negotiating with the DOJ. 
Excerpts published by the Times included the following remarks: 
• Holmes wrote that the city had “relied too heavily” on the SPD in responding to 
the DOJ report;  
• “A troubling victim narrative has emerged at SPD, in which DOJ is cast as a 
‘bully’ seeking to impose a ‘shadow chief’ at an unverified and speculative 
cost.” 
 
923 McNerthney, C. (2009, November 2). Carr concedes city attorney race to Holmes 
Seattlepi.com. Retrieved from https://www.seattlepi.com. 
924 According to study participants associated with Mayor McGinn’s Office, this letter was hand 
delivered to the Mayor’s office shortly before formal mediation was to begin between the City and 
the DOJ. Although the letter was stamped “Attorney-Client privileged,” it was copied to so many 
people, there was little question that it would be leaked to the media. The Mayor’s Office 
reportedly felt “sandbagged by the letter;” when the Mayor confronted Holmes about that 
perception, Holmes reportedly replied: “Now you know how it feels,” reportedly referring to the 
Mayor’s prior release of his “20/20” plan without notice to the City Attorney or Council. 
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• According to the Times, Holmes believed that “the city has engaged in a 
narrow legal theory to rebut the Justice Department; missed key opportunities 
to shape and agreement; and rejected two proposed monitors who would 
oversee a court-ordered consent decree;” 
• Holmes criticized the Mayor’s 20/20 reform plan as “lack[ing] both substance 
and accountability;” 
• Holmes wrote that the city was at a “critical juncture” and that if the mediation 
were not successful the city would “face costly, burdensome, and risky 
litigation with the federal government.” 
• Holmes wrote that the city had an “unprecedented opportunity” to negotiate an 
agreement “greatly benefiting the City for generations to come … [b]ut the 
clock is running out on this reform opportunity…” 
• Holmes was critical of the Mayor’s rejection of Monitor candidate Merrick Bobb 
and criticized the Mayor for a “delay strategy” that likely resulted in the 
withdrawal of a candidate who had previously overseen the reform of the 
Cincinnati Police Department; 
• Holmes further criticized McGinn for relying on a narrow legal theory that 
suggested no city liability unless an official policy led to constitutional 
violations. Holmes suggested that standard “lowers our sights” and had 
resulted in “underestim[ations] [of] the City’s legal exposure in adversarial 
litigation with the DOJ.” 
• Holmes wrote that “[i]t is important that we not interpret DOJ’s retreating 
deadlines as evidence of bluffing, or conclude that DOJ cannot prevail in 
Court.” 
• Holmes argued that would be “critical to include measures designed to curb 
discriminatory policing and improve SPD’s accountability mechanism … in the 
Monitored consent decree;” 
• Holmes pushed McGinn to act as “Commander in Chief…Civilian control of 
SPD is the Seattle Way. And times like these required strong leadership and 
control of SPD” (Seattle Times, 7/17/2012). 
At the time of Holmes’ letter, however, according to study participants, the 
Mayor’s Office believed Holmes was engaging in conversations with the DOJ that were 
undermining the Mayor and SPD’s negotiating positions. Holmes, reportedly, would 
refuse to provide McGinn’s Office with information regarding private conversations he 
was having with the DOJ and, instead, accused McGinn of trying to “micromanage” the 
negotiations. 
While McGinn did, in fact, continue on his course of negotiating the Settlement 
Agreement without any formal collaboration with the City Council (as recommended by 
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City Attorney Holmes) and a Settlement Agreement was announced on July 29, 2012 
(Seattle Times, 7/29/2012b),925 further conflict between the City Attorney and City 
Council members on one side and Mayor McGinn on the other, broke out regarding the 
selection of the court-appointed Monitor. On October 17, 2012, Holmes and “four 
influential City Council Members” released a “blistering statement” relating to McGinn’s 
opposition to the selection of Merrick Bobb as Monitor. The statement accused the 
Mayor of, 
contribut[ing] confusion, doubt and mistrust, especially among our rank and 
file police officers who we believe are fully ready to embrace high-quality 
and professional improvements of the Police Department. … Unfortunately, 
the Mayor's statements today reveal a continuation of the obstruction and 
stall tactics we have seen from the beginning. 
The statement “chastised” Mayor McGinn for “undermin[ing] the candidate selection 
process” and making false statements regarding Bobb’s reputation (Seattle Times, 
10/18/2012). 
Ultimately, the Mayor was forced to bow to the will of the City Council who voted 
8 to 1 in favor of submitting Bobb’s name, along with the DOJ, to the court for 
appointment as Monitor (Seattle Times, 10/23/2012). Given that the Settlement 
Agreement called for “the Parties” to “jointly select a Monitor,”926 the City Council 
ultimately had the authority to make the final choice.927 
By February, 2013, the City Attorney and the Mayor were, once again, publicly 
clashing over the police reform process. This time, it was the Mayor’s counsel, accusing 
Holmes of undermining the SPD in its negotiations with the Monitor over the First Year 
Monitoring Plan:  
In a strongly worded email, McGinn’s legal counsel, Carl Marquardt, 
accused Holmes of an ethical breach of the attorney-client privilege as the 
city works to comply with a settlement agreement with the Department of 
 
925 Seven, R. (2012, July 29). Seattle, DOJ OK plan to reform police force. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
926 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 3-1, para. 169. 
927 According to study participants, Mayor McGinn’s negotiators failed to pre-plan for a conflict 
between Council and the Mayor on this issue; had they predicted a conflict, they would have 
negotiated with the DOJ for the Mayor to make the selection on behalf of the City. 
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Justice to curb excessive force and biased policing. (Seattle Times, 
2/27/2013) 
McGinn and Holmes disagreed on the role of the City Attorney in the process. 
Whereas Holmes believed that “as the independently elected City Attorney with 
supervisory control over litigation [I can] …communicate with the Monitor and the 
Department of Justice with the goal of protecting the City’s interests” (Seattle Times, 
2/27/2013); McGinn believed the City Attorney needed to represent and support the SPD 
and Mayor’s positions when it came to the negotiation of the Monitoring plan. Chief Diaz 
had argued that Bobb’s plan required more “clarity” and “guidance” and that the 
Monitor’s plan went “beyond the scope” of the Settlement Agreement and “disputed the 
findings of the DOJ investigation.” Holmes, apparently alarmed by Diaz’ response, sent a 
letter to Bobb and the DOJ representing that the draft plan “provides the starting point for 
collaboration” and offering an appendix to the plan to address any opposition from the 
SPD. McGinn’s council objected to Holmes submitting a response that was “materially 
different” from the proposal made by the SPD (Seattle Times, 2/27/2013, 3/1/2013); 
Holmes objected to the SPD continuing to argue against the DOJ’s findings, eight 
months after the Settlement Agreement had been filed and made enforceable by the 
Court. As observed by the City Attorney’s Civil Chief in a follow up email:  
We warned you that this strategy would backfire, but SPD nonetheless 
chose to communicate directly with the Monitor without even hearing us out 
directly … Our Client is the City. If a Department of the City insists on 
undercutting the City’s interests, it is the City Attorney’s duty to mitigate that 
harm. (Seattle Times, 3/1/2013, 3/6/2013)928 
On the SPD command side, at least towards the beginning of consent decree 
implementation, some believed that the City Attorney, who had previously served on the 
OPA Advisory Board “wanted to take down the SPD.” According to one member of the 
SPD command staff: “we had a city attorney that was supposed to defend us, but he did 
everything he could to get us under a Consent Decree.” Of course, this perception would 
be at odds with Attorney Holmes’ ethical requirements if, after evaluating the DOJ 
investigation and his knowledge of the SPD, he did, in fact, conclude that the SPD was 
 
928 Miletich, S. (2013, March 6). Officials’ fight over police escalates. Seattle Times. Retrieved 
from https://www.seattletimes.com. On the other hand, according to one study participant, the 
Mayor’s office believed that Holmes had his own agenda, “he was always cagy and noncommittal 
as to whether he would represent the executive or not … and feeding the other side [the DOJ and 
the Monitor].” 
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in need of externally driven reform in order to ensure Constitutional policing in Seattle. 
After reaching such a conclusion, Attorney Holmes would be ethically required to accept 
federal oversight, even if that conclusion were at odds with the wishes of SPD 
command. 
With respect to Mayor McGinn, some study participants suspected that part of 
the contentious nature of the relationship may have been based on McGinn’s concern 
that Holmes might run against him based on his long-standing interest in police reform. 
Given Holmes prior willingness to take on the McGinn administration, there is 
some question as to why he has not more publicly opposed the Durkan administration’s 
support for a police union contract that undermined the City’s Accountability Ordinance 
and ultimately resulted in a finding of non-compliance. Although Holmes did not strongly 
support the Mayor’s position in support of the contract (Seattle Times, 11/23/2017), and 
contradicted the Mayor when she suggested that the Court’s “out-of-compliance” finding 
was not a setback (Seattle Times, 5/15/2019), one might have expected a higher profile 
opposition to the contract from a City Attorney who was publicly critical of the McGinn 
administration’s approach to police reform. Research participants have suggested, 
however, that Holmes was in a less secure position politically to take on Mayor Durkan 
than he was with McGinn (who appeared to be a political loner). It has been suggested 
that Holmes, having been through a number of Mayors now, “is picking his battles” and 
though “he is not necessarily in alignment [with Durkan], he is tending to make decisions 
that will be more aligned with the Mayor.” 
Table 7.13. Public Statements by City Attorney Holmes 
Date Statement 
July 17, 2012 In a letter to Mayor McGinn: “A troubling victim narrative has emerged at SPD, 
in which DOJ is cast as a ‘bully’ seeking to impose a ‘shadow chief’ at an 
unverified, speculative cost; [the city has an] unprecedented opportunity [to 
reach agreement with the DOJ], greatly benefiting the City for generations to 
come … But the clock is running out on this reform opportunity, … It is 
important that we not interpret DOJ's retreating deadlines as evidence of 
bluffing, or conclude that DOJ cannot prevail in Court.” 
“Holmes also pushed McGinn to act as ‘Commander in Chief,’ adding, ‘Civilian 
control of SPD is the Seattle Way. And times like these require strong 
leadership and control of SPD’” (Seattle Times, 7/17/2012). 
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Date Statement 
December 17, 2012 In a joint statement with members of the City Council criticizing Mayor McGinn 
for rejecting Merrick Bobb as monitor: “Unfortunately, the Mayor's statements 
today contribute confusion, doubt and mistrust, especially among our rank and 
file police officers who we believe are fully ready to embrace high-quality and 
professional improvements of the Police Department” (Seattle Times, 
10/18/2012). 
February 26, 2013 In a letter to Monitor Bobb and the DOJ, commenting that the Monitor’s draft 
monitoring plan “provides the starting point for collaboration … if the Monitor 
would like to engage in discussions as suggested by SPD in Chief Diaz’s 
letter, our office will assist in that process. If, however, the Monitor is inclined 
to reject SPD’s approach, our office wanted to propose an alternative path for 
negotiation.” 
To a reporter while entering a meeting with the Monitor: “I am concerned about 
the city getting on board and doing the job of reform” (Seattle Times, 
2/27/2013). 
March 5, 2013 “Now is the time when City leaders should be working together to achieve 
lasting reform of our Police Department. Under the rules of ethics and my 
personal concern for the City’s best interests, I cannot comment in detail on 
the mayor’s counterproductive statements, except to say that this is a sad day 
for Seattle. It is especially sad for the women and men of SPD who want us all 
to move forward, together” (Seattle Times, 3/6/2013). 
April 9, 2013 Statement commenting on retirement of Chief Diaz: “He has helped prepare 
SPD for the reform effort now under way, and richly deserves some R&R 
before pursuing the next chapter in his life.” 
“Holmes said he looks forward to working with Pugel ‘to continue to advance 
these critical reforms and to ensure that public safety remains our first priority 
for Seattle’” (Seattle Times, 4/9/2013). 
April 16, 2014 Regarding Interim Chief Bailey: “I think he trusted people who were not worthy 
of his trust” (The Stranger, 4/16/2014). 
October 21, 2014 Commenting on the dismissal of an SPD-officer law suit over implementation 
of new use-of-force policies: “We are enormously gratified by [the court’s] 
ruling … [and will work with the Chief and Mayor] to help bring Seattle the 
safe, effective and efficient police department we all want and need” (Seattle 
Times, 10/21/2014). 
November 21, 2016 “Although the Consent Decree stemmed from an adversarial legal process, 
Holmes said, the relationship between the city and Justice Department has 
been ‘very much a partnership.’ The question now is whether that will change 
under Trump” (Seattle Times, 11/21/2016). 
May 18, 2017 In a letter to the City Council regarding the proposed Police Accountability 
Ordinance: “The legislation ... proposes a larger, less-focused and much more 
expensive CPC, which could undercut the reform progress made to date.”  
[“Arguing that the commission should be a ‘megaphone’ for community input”] 
… “this should be the CPC’s primary mission – not to ‘interpret’ community 
opinion, decide who are the ‘legitimate voices’ of the community, or tell the 
community what it believes” (Seattle Times, 5/18/2017). 
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Date Statement 
May 22, 2017 On City Council approval of Police Accountability ordinance: “This is a 
significant step towards ensuring for the next generations that our police 
department remains accountable to the public and focused on maintaining its 
dedication to constitutional policing. We still have a way to go” (Seattle Times, 
5/23/2017).929 
July 26, 2017 Regarding a police union complaint over an Executive Order requiring body 
worn cameras for SPD officers: “We look forward to defending the legality of 
the Executive Order before PERC [Public Employment Relations Commission] 
and, if necessary, the courts … The legal proceedings will likely highlight the 
overwhelming interest that the people of Seattle have in expeditious 
implementation of this body-worn video program, a program that protects 
everyone involved when SPD officers engage in difficult and dangerous 
encounters leading to the use of force” (Seattle Times, 7/26/2017).930 
September 30, 2017 In a news release after the City filed its motion to be found in “full and effective 
compliance” with the Consent Decree: “We will continue to work, through the 
Consent Decree and under continued oversight from the Monitor and Court, to 
sustain the important reforms that have already taken place, build upon them, 
and implement the City’s recent police-accountability ordinance to ensure that 
reform will continue long after the end of federal oversight” (Seattle Times, 
9/30/2017). 
November 23, 2017 Regarding the SPOG union contract: “Without weighing in on the advantages 
or disadvantages of this departure from the ordinance, I recognize that 
bargaining requires compromise” (Seattle Times, 11/23/2017). 
May 15, 2019 At a press conference with Mayor Durkan after the court found the city 
“partially out-of-compliance” with the Consent Decree: “City Attorney Pete 
Holmes, who represented the city at the hearing, contradicted the version 
presented to Durkan, saying it would be a ‘fair characterization’ to say Robart’s 
criticism of the guild amounted to an indictment” (Seattle Times, 5/15/2019). 
August 17, 2019 In a joint statement with Mayor Durkan, responding to a judge’s decision to 
overturn an arbitrator’s reversal of termination of an SPD officer for excessive 
force: “Judge McHale rightly recognized the arbitrator’s order for Mr. 
Shepherd’s reinstatement violated the public policy against excessive use of 
force in policing, … SPD should not be forced to employ an officer whose view 
of reasonable and necessary force is so immutable and so contrary to SPD’s 
policies and values” (Seattle Times, 8/17/2019b). 
October 16, 2019 In a joint statement with Mayor Durkan after the Court authorized the city to 
consult with experts on Seattle police accountability issues: ““We are grateful 
that the Court agrees that this process could help further reform, … These 
national experts will help the parties to not only address the Court’s concerns, 
but further strengthen a culture of continuous reform and improvement, inform 
the parties of potential other best practices, and inform collective bargaining” 
(Seattle Times, 10/16/2019). 
 
929 Miletich, S. (2017, May 23). City Council approves police oversight system with historic 8-0 
vote. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
930 Miletich, S. (2017, July 26). Police union complaint over body camera order. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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As the quotes in Table 7.13 show, after City Attorney Holmes’ initial conflicts with 
the McGinn administration, he appeared to be well aligned with Mayor Murray who took 
office with a pro-DOJ, pro-Monitor agenda. After Mayor Durkan took office, however, and 
once her administration began to support a union contract that did not appear to be 
consistent with the terms of the Consent Decree, Holmes did appear to try to maintain 
some distance on this issue by disagreeing with Durkan’s assessment of the court’s 
ruling of non-compliance. Even so, Holme’s overall strategy appeared to be more in 
accord with the traditional role of the City Attorney supporting the Mayor’s initiatives in 
court and in public, regardless of any personal concerns he may have harbored.  
7.6.3. The Seattle City Council 
The Seattle City Council, with authority over the City Budget, and the ability to 
pass police legislation binding SPD policy and practice, was an active stakeholder during 
the Consent Decree implementation process, particularly with respect to forcing the 
Mayor’s hand in choosing the federal monitor, in passing police accountability legislation 
and in enhancing the powers of the CPC and making it a permanent organization. 
Members of council were quite vocal when implementation issues became a matter of 
public concern. Members were particularly vocal immediately after the DOJ investigation 
results were announced by the DOJ, and rejected by the SPD, and over the course of 
settlement agreement negotiations and the appointment of the Monitor.  
In addition, City Council action was required when in early 2014, Mayor Murray 
was expected to bring in a new Chief and a statutory prohibition against bringing in 
command staff from outside the SPD could have been expected to inhibit reform. 
Subsequent to passing the Accountability Ordinance (AO), however, Council approved 
Mayor Durkan’s proposed contract with the police unions, even though there were 
significant differences between the contract and the Council-supported AO. After Judge 
Robart found the city out-of-compliance with the Consent Decree, some Council 
members entered the fray, supporting the amendment of the police contract agreements. 
Finally, in August 2019, it was a City Council resolution, in support of cutting funding to 
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the SPD and a reduction of command staff salaries, that resulted in the resignation of 
Chief Best (Seattle Times, 8/12/2020).931 
Table 7.14. Public Statements Made by Members of the Seattle City Council 
Date Statement 
September 3, 2011 City Council Member Tim Burgess [former SPD officer and Chair of Safety 
Committee]: “I think my general impression was that the department was 
resting on its laurels and had become disconnected, both from city elected 
leaders and … also from the community, … This insular attitude of, ‘We’re the 
experts and we know everything we need to know’ set in, … [as well as a] 
circle-the wagons mentality” (Seattle Times, 9/3/2011). 
December 17, 2011 Council Member Burgess: “[The DOJ investigation findings] confirm what 
many, including myself, have believed for some time — our Police 
Department can do better … Chief Diaz, the police command staff, every 
officer and civilian employee of the Seattle Police Department and the elected 
leaders of our city should embrace this informed, constructive criticism and 
work quickly to implement fundamental and sustainable reforms, … 
Rebuilding the public's trust and confidence in the Police Department is an 
essential and urgent obligation” (Seattle Times, 12/17/2011). 
December 22, 2011 Councilmember Bruce Harrell (Public Safety Chair-elect) commenting on the 
DOJ finding that 20 officers were responsible for 18% of the Department’s 
2010 use-of-force incidents: “If we can't identify the frequent fliers, that’s a 
huge problem. This has been an issue for the community for years. They 
know these officers by name” (Seattle Times, 12/22/2011). 
February 3, 2012 City Council President Sally Clark: “I was afraid they [the DOJ] were just 
going to come in and tell us what to do… That has not been what has 
happened” (Seattle Times, 2/3/2012). 
March 29, 2012 Letter from City Council President Clark & Councilmembers Burgess & Harrell 
(past and present Chairs of Council Safety Committee) to Mayor McGinn: 
“Our primary interest in initiating a collaboration with you and the city attorney 
was to seize this opportunity [to cooperate with the DOJ, quickly address the 
findings in the report and define a] broad set of reforms to improve policing in 
Seattle . . . Unfortunately, we were not successful in advancing this 
approach… While we appreciate the negotiations with the DOJ are sensitive, 
we feel strongly that they need not be adversarial, … We feel strongly that 
now is the time to advance a new vision for SPD that can be broadly 
supported by the city’s elected leadership, the people of Seattle, and the 
leadership and personnel of the police department.”  
Councilmember Harrell: “There were a lot of strong opinions on how we 
should proceed…” (Seattle Times, 3/29/2012). 
March 30, 2012 Council Safety Chair Harrell on the Mayor’s 20/20 plan: “[It was put together] 
without any real input from the City Council … One of my concerns is that this 
is a very top-down plan … I think we were hoping for a more holistic 
approach” (Seattle Times, 3/30/2012). 
 
931 Beekman, D. (2020, August 12). Best: Budget cuts, disrespect drove her decision. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
May 11, 2012 Councilmember Burgess: “The primary focus should be on providing the most 
effective and professional policing that garners the highest trust and 
confidence of the people … The cost issues should follow, not the other way 
around” (Seattle Times, 5/11/2012). 
May 15, 2012 According to the Seattle Times: “Council President Sally Clark said a ‘shadow 
chief’ or ‘shadow mayor’ would not be an outcome of negotiations with the 
DOJ. ‘That’s not what DOJ wants and not what we want.” 
“There will be costs … [but] [w]e have a responsibility to maintain the services 
people expect. One of those services is a well-functioning Police Department” 
(Seattle Times, 5/15/2012). 
May 18, 2012 Council Safety Chair Harrell on the City’s negotiating strategy: “We were not 
required to make a response on biased policing. We can, however, voluntarily 
address the issue, … At this point, however, the strategy has to be to narrow 
the demands on the city from the DOJ, not expand them.” 
Council Member Nick Licata: “From my reading of the initial DOJ report, 
biased policing is very important to remodeling our Police Department, … I 
don't see any downside to addressing it in a consent agreement” (Seattle 
Times, 5/18/2012). 
May 25, 2012 Council Safety Chair Harrell on the DOJ’s response to the City’s negotiation 
strategy: “When we entered into these negotiations, we had two goals, 
[addressing the necessary SPD reforms & dealing with the deep mistrust of 
the SPD that has grown among the city’s minority community], I’m not 
convinced we are doing either” (Seattle Times, 5/25/2012).932 
July 18, 2012 Councilmember Burgess: “We attempted early on to collaborate with the 
mayor so the city would have a unified response to DOJ, … Unfortunately, 
that did not pan out.”  
Council Safety Chair Harrell: “The mayor, yes, I guess he has blown certain 
opportunities when it comes to working strongly with the community, with the 
council, with Councilmember Burgess and myself and (with) ... business 
leaders. We are not under the tent, so to speak, on these negotiations, and 
that is an opportunity lost” (Seattle Times, 7/18/2012). 
July 27, 2012 Councilmember Burgess on the City & DOJ settlement agreement: “great 
process has been made” (Seattle Times, 7/27/2012).933 
July 28, 2012 Council Safety Chair Harrell on the DOJ settlement agreement: “I remain 
concerned over whether the Police Department and the community will 
embrace the Consent Decree, given how it was negotiated, [without 
involvement by police or Council]” (Seattle Times, 7/28/2012).934 
 
932 Miletich, S. & Carter, M. (2012, May 25). Fed’s mad over city’s cop reform response. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
933 Carter, M. & Miletich, S. (2012, July 27). City, DOJ reach deal on police. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 




October 22, 2012 Council Public Safety Committee Chair Harrell upon passing ordinance 
creating the Citizen Police Commission: “This is a time when building trust 
between the Police Department, the Office of Professional Accountability and 
the public is a priority and we must demonstrate this by our action; not simply 
our talk, … This ordinance demonstrates that the Council takes seriously its 
obligations to listen to the public faithfully and effectuate positive police 
reform.”  
Councilmember Nick Licata: “The Community Police Commission will provide 
our citizens with a seat at the table in reforming our police department. I 
expect it will represent our city's ethnic diversity, and involve those who have 
direct interactions with our police, as well as professionals practicing in the 
justice system” (Council Connection, 10/22/2012).935 
October 23, 2012 Councilmember Burgess: “Reform will be especially more difficult if the mayor 
keeps saying it will be difficult” (Seattle Times, 10/23/2012). 
November 21, 2013 Councilmember Burgess, welcoming the hiring of a consultant by Mayor-elect 
Murray who will provide a “fresh perspective, … [his wide-ranging experience 
will] gain the confidence of our officers and the people of Seattle” (Seattle 
Times, 11/21/2013). 
February 22, 2014 Councilmember Burgess email to Interim Chief Bailey: “As my questions 
indicated, I’m concerned that your review of prior cases, all fully investigated 
with final dispositions reached, will send a message that I don’t believe you 
intend and that is that you are reversing previous Police Chief findings merely 
because you don’t personally agree with the outcomes…” (Seattle Times, 
2/22/2014).936 
April 4, 2014 Council President Burgess regarding a 10-page memorandum from the 
Monitor regarding SPD’s lack of compliance with respect to a data platform: 
“The opening paragraphs of this memorandum are a stunning indictment of 
current practices and systems … The Seattle Police Department (‘SPD’) 
currently lacks data to access officer performance; manage constitutional 
violations; identify misconduct; manage the risk of litigation and liability; hold 
supervisors and managers accountable; and identify and reward those who 
are best at community-based policing, communication, and constitutional, 
respectful, and effective law enforcement ... Furthermore, SPD’s existing 
database platforms make data retrieval and analysis time-consuming and 
frequently unreliable… For such a high-tech city, this is unacceptable. It 
reflects a major failure of the Police Department’s leadership for many, many 
years.” 
 (Seattle Times, 4/4/2014). 
 
935Harrell, B. (2012, October 22). Seattle City Council Passes Ordinance to Create Community 
Police Commission. Council Connection. Retrieved from Council Connection » Seattle City 
Council passes ordinance to create Community Police Commission. 
936 Miletich, S. (2014, February 22). Mayor Backs SPD Chief’s Misconduct Findings. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
501 
Date Statement 
June 4, 2014 Council President Burgees on sponsoring legislation to allow the Police Chief 
to hire command staff from outside the SPD: “The police chief’s ability to hire 
the best candidates for her command staff is a central part of our new 
approach to management of the police department, … The status quo is not 
acceptable. We expect significant change and it begins with the command 
staff. The new chief faces huge issues, … The culture of the police 
department is stagnant. Basic management systems and protocols are 
lacking. Management accountability and core business practices are not well 
defined. Data systems are severely lacking. There are significant questions 
about use of resources and deployment of officers. The new Chief will need 
very experienced and seasoned managers to create and sustain the change 
we want” (Seattle Times, 6/4/2014). 
June 25, 2015 Council Safety Chair Harrell on the Monitor’s request to hold off on 
Accountability legislation: “I have a sense of urgency and we will begin 
working on this immediately, … But we’ll certainly comply with instruction 
from the Monitor and other parties” (Seattle Times, 6/25/2015). 
December 1, 2015 Councilmember M. Lorena González regarding conflicts between the CPC 
and the Monitor: “It’s a stark example of the disconnect between the Federal 
Judge’s and the Monitor’s opinion on the progress made by SPD, as opposed 
to the community’s experience and interpretation of that progress” (Seattle 
Times, 12/1/2015).937 
July 8, 2016 Councilmember (and former Seattle PD officer) Burgess on the Seattle Police 
union: “I think sometimes the police union leadership are their own worst 
enemies. They fire off these statements and then take them down. It’s 
terrible, because it reflects an inner cycle of thinking that is very negative and 
disrespectful. Sometimes I find it disgusting... They’re harming themselves... 
it reflects an immaturity and an insensitivity to the issues we're dealing with” 
(The Stranger, 7/8/2016). 
April 7, 2017 Council Safety Committee Chair M. Lorena González commenting on 
Monitor’s assessment report regarding SPD use-of-force: “Today’s report 
proves the efficacy and importance of consent decrees.” 
Councilmember Burgess: “Changing culture is slow-going and hard work, but 
our city’s efforts are bearing real, positive results. The officers who are on the 
street every day deserve all the credit” (Seattle Times, 4/7/2017a). 
May 22, 2017 Council Safety Committee Chair M. Lorena González commenting on 
Council’s passage of the Police Accountability Ordinance: “Today’s vote 
crystallizes my vision for Seattle’s police accountability framework and our 
ongoing efforts to reform the Seattle Police Department” (Seattle Times, 
5/23/2017). 
 
937 Miletich, S. & Beekman, D. (2015, December 1). Coalition wants quicker reforms in SPD. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
July 18, 2017 Council Safety Committee Chair M. Lorena González: “We had hoped that 
today would be the final thumbs-up from Judge Robart to allow us to continue 
to move forward with the implementation of the accountability legislation, … 
And obviously we did not get that final approval. But we understand that 
Judge Robart is extremely concerned as we are about ... the possible 
negative implications that our collective-bargaining process could have on the 
ultimate goal of making sure this accountability legislation establishes 
constitutional policing.” 
Council Safety Committee Vice-Chair Tim Burgess: “[It’s] another step in a 
long, sometimes tedious process toward the final outcomes that we're looking 
for … We will not be deterred in achieving that goal … I was particularly 
impressed and appreciative of the judge's comment that the Constitution 
trumps everything, … That is so true and that is, in fact, our guiding star” 
(Seattle Times, 7/19/2017b). 
September 30, 2017 Then-Interim Mayor Burgess commenting on the City of Seattle’s motion to 
be found in full compliance with the Consent Decree: “While we welcome this 
good news, we will not stop in our efforts to assure that all Seattleites feel 
safe and secure and have a relationship of trust with their police,” (Seattle 
Times, 9/30/2017). 
January 11, 2018 Former Councilmember Burgess on news that the City was found in full 
compliance: “This is such wonderful news. Lots of people deserve credit, 
especially the officers, detectives and civilian employees of SPD” (Seattle 
Times, 1/11/2018). 
May 15, 2019 Councilmember M. Lorena González: “I acknowledge that a signal by the 
Court that we may be partially out of compliance with the Consent Decree is 
not an ideal outcome. This is a message that we should all take to heart while 
we eagerly await Judge Robart’s written court order. When it comes to 




July 15, 2019 Joint letter from Council members González, Herbold and Mosqueda, 
regarding out-of-compliance finding by Judge Robart, urging Mayor Durkan 
to: “exhaust all efforts to reach an agreement with SPOG to jointly reopen 
negotiations [to enact various components of the accountability ordinance]” 
(K5 News, 7/15/2019; 938 Seattle City Council Insight, 7/15/2019).  
Council Member González: “If we miss the mark, the price we pay is 
community trust…I think the best thing for morale at the City of Seattle and 
the Seattle Police Department is to get out from under the Consent 
Decree….” (K-5 news, 7/15/2019).  
“I believe good officers want to be held to higher standards, and I also believe 
the good officers want the bad officers to be held accountable, … This is to 
our mutual benefit … … (MyNorthwest.com, 7/16/2019).939  
“Asking for additional police reform is fundamentally not anti-cop or anti-labor 
… Centering our work on … the voices of people who have lost brothers and 
sisters and other relatives to police violence – is what will ultimately lead to 
transformation of this system” (NPR, 7/15/2019).940 
June 3, 2020 Council President González, supporting decision by City to withdrawal motion 
for partial dismissal of consent decree: “The sheer volume of … complaints 
that are flowing from the Police Department’s response and management of 
these demonstrations is reason enough for the city to take a step back” 
(Seattle Times, 6/3/2020). 
On the whole, it was the members of the Council’s Public Safety Committee who 
spoke as to consent decree issues. At the beginning of the process, the Council 
members were aligned with City Attorney Holmes against the McGinn administration. 
Once Mayor Murray took office, the Mayor and Council’s agendas appeared to become 
more aligned; and the City Council’s attention became drawn towards the need for City-
initiated reforms in the area of police accountability. Even though the Council did not 
give the CPC everything it wanted in the AO, Council was clearly aligned with the CPC 
in general. Council became more publicly engaged after the finding of non-compliance 
with respect to the union contract (which they approved) and ultimately supported the 
City’s decision to withdraw its motion for partial dismissal of the decree. 
 
938 K5 News (2018, July 15). The War of Words over Police Accountability heats up in City Hall. 
K5 News. Retrieved from https://www.king5.com/video/news/local/seattle-city-council-
disappointed-in-mayors-approach-to-police-reform/281-74bb7be0-ce36-405e-98d1-
41cbc011e793.. 
939 Bowman, N. (2019, July 16). City Council Members call on City to renegotiate police contract. 
MyNorthwest.com. Retrieved from https://mynorthwest.com/1451386/seattle-police-contract-
renegotiation-consent-decree/. 
940 McNichols, J. (2019, July 15). Seattle Police Reform could backslide if steps not taken, critics 
say. KUOW NPR. Retrieved from https://kuow.org/stories/seattlepolice-reform. 
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7.6.4. Seattle Politics & the Political Landscape 
There is little doubt that Seattle politics impacted the implementation of the 
Consent Decree from day one and throughout the entirety of the process. The political 
actors were many, ranging from the Mayor and the Chief, to the City Council and its 
Safety Committee, the City Attorney, members of the Community Police Commission, 
high profile members of the civil rights community, and the leadership of both Seattle 
police unions (the Seattle Police Officer’s Guild (SPOG), representing the rank and file, 
and the Seattle Police Management Association (SPMA), representing front line 
supervisors. 
One participant, particularly well versed in Seattle politics compared the McGinn 
and Murray administrations as follows: 
There were issues regarding both McGinn’s failure to be willing to 
cooperate with the DOJ and his political relationship with council and the 
city attorney. He came in as an urbanist, not opposed to social justice, 
but not attuned to it either. McGinn was inconsistent at times, with good 
rhetoric, but his actions almost seemed random – he was not trying to 
be deceptive but he was also not experienced in the political 
environment. Murray, on the other hand, knew how to say things that 
people could interpret the way they wanted to hear. Murray was able to 
frame his concerns amongst McGinn’s supporters for them to 
understand. Murray was more consistent and better understood what 
was going on. People felt they were getting something more solid with 
Murray. Murray outflanked McGinn on the framing of the issues by 
appearing to be more receptive to community input and forcing police 
to be more responsive to community. McGinn hesitated and people lost 
faith. McGinn was too focused on winning the election through the 
establishment, even though he ran against the establishment and won 
the first time. McGinn probably thought if he could keep police 
management happy, they would not attack him… 
As one might expect, the different political players had different visions of what 
police reform needed to look like. Some believed that “the DOJ needed to use whatever 
force was necessary to get the job done,” believing Jenny Durkan to be “a straight 
shooter;” with others believing that Durkan and the DOJ were, in fact, not aggressive 
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enough; and yet others believing the DOJ intervention was simply unnecessary and no 
more than a politically motivated “hit job.”941 
Participants observed that in Seattle, where all but one members of Council 
currently identify as Democrats (and the lone dissenter identifies as a socialist), a 
tremendous amount of the political banter is “personality driven” with big personalities 
“and even bigger egos” driving various agendas. When Merrick Bobb stepped down as 
Monitor, he specifically commented on “the endless squabbling at the top of Seattle 
leadership” and noted that “the Mayor, City Council, City Attorney, the CPC, and other 
community groups and organizations must really try to work together and not a cross 
purposes.” He concluded by commenting that “I will not miss the endless jockeying and 
some runaway egos” (Bobb, 2020, p. 10). 
On the DOJ, Monitoring Team side, there was speculation that “Mayor McGinn 
was resisting the DOJ-initiated reform because he thought Jenny Durkan was stealing 
the show from him and putting herself in a position to kick him out of office.”  
More than one study participant described Seattle politics as “a snake pit” and 
“contentious and nasty” where city officials “are constantly internally forever back biting 
and back stabbing,” with one participant going to far as to say that: “they are all a bunch 
of out-of-control egos trying to best each other with few adults in the scheme.” The City 
was described by outsiders as “being like a multi-headed hydra, the City Attorney, 
Mayor, SPD, CPC and City Council – all with different views and agendas and 
sometimes completely at odds with each other.” 
As perceived by one member of the McGinn administration: 
Everything was contentious and dysfunctional anyways, and then you 
had the pressure of the Consent Decree and the pressure to come 
together as a City – even where everyone was trying to shoot each other 
down as it was unfolding. … It was very stressful and very messy. 
This participant also commented that: 
the DOJ had a great brand, everyone assumes they are fair … So, in a 
progressive city like Seattle, if DOJ says you are wrong you would be 
 
941 One participant suggested that if Mayor McGinn had been part of the “club” [the Democratic 
establishment of Seattle] and not an “outsider,” Durkan would never have come after him in such 
an aggressive manner. 
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hard pressed to disagree … We would have had to have a very cohesive 
city structure to really stand up to the DOJ at that point … In retrospect, 
we should have just rolled over … we were pretty self-righteous and 
outraged … we should have just realized it was just a political process 
and the police felt abandoned anyway… 
One political insider opined that the initial DOJ report “was absolutely necessary 
and could not have been avoided to enforce reform,” but believed that once that shot 
had been fired, it was time for collaboration as opposed to confrontation, but that the 
McGinn administration chose the latter. Other participants were surprised to see 
McGinn, “who held himself out as a progressive to be so stuck at the hip with the SPD,” 
believing them to be “strange bedfellows,” resulting in the SPD and McGinn “becoming 
an impediment to progress in the first years.” Some members of the SPD noted that 
“politics overturned the ‘win’ of the Consent Decree…the fighting against it never 
stopped.” 
From the community side, study participants described the political leadership, 
including the DOJ, as simply wanting “a political win” and as failing to set up any real 
collaboration with the community. The original effort to obtain DOJ intervention in Seattle 
has been represented as a “grass roots effort” with the City Council going along for the 
ride. 
7.7. Seattle Consent Decree Implementation – Community 
Voices 
In the winter of 2010, at approximately the same time that the ACLU facilitated 
the writing and sending of the community letter that started the Consent Decree process 
in Seattle, Law Professor Kami Simmons addressed the new framework that was then 
seen to underline the DOJ’s approach to consent decrees. According to Simmons, 
 The New Governance theoretical framework addresses “traditional policy 
needs but operat[es] outside the traditional, formal legal infrastructure” and 
is generally “characterized by the greater participation and collaboration of 
non-traditional players, the use of consensus building mechanisms, 
reliance on peer review and collaboration, and the integration of public-
private partnerships and research experiments into the formal policy-
making process.” Embracing characteristics of democratic 
experimentalism, such as stakeholder engagement and local 
experimentation, allows for much-needed federal oversight without 
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sacrificing local needs. (Simmons, 2010, p. 379, quoting Simpson, 2007-
2008)942 
Given this description of the new framework being used by the DOJ, and the 
creation of the Community Police Commission (CPC) as part of the Consent Decree 
implementation process, one would have expected the Seattle experience to have 
thoroughly engaged civil rights and community activists and reduced criticism from that 
perspective. In actuality, however, the gap between the DOJ, the Monitor, the SPD and 
“the community” seemed to grow and criticism over the handling of the Consent Decree, 
from a community perspective, continued unabated. 
Although some ACLU letter signatories advised that they had no real 
expectations regarding the letter that was sent to the DOJ asking for a §14141 
investigation, amongst community members who sought the decree, there was still 
disappointment that the DOJ failed to find a pattern and practice of biased policing. 
Biased policing was not only perceived to be the cause of much of the pattern and 
practice of excessive force, but was also believed to have been provable based on prior 
litigation and research conducted by sophisticated community stakeholders.943 Even so, 
community participants were supportive of DOJ intervention and pleased to see that 
racial based policing issues ended up being addressed in the settlement agreement. 
Community participants were also supportive of the creation of the Community Police 
Commission, although there were significant concerns that the community was “left out” 
of the Settlement Agreement negotiation process. Although the DOJ represented that 
they had conferred with many community members over the course of the investigation 
and believed that they could adequately represent community interests in the 
negotiations, there was a great deal of suspicion about what was perceived to be a 
“paternalistic” approach on the part of the DOJ. 
 
942 Simpson, C. (2007-2008). Policy as a Process: The Pedagogical Role of the EU in Health 
Care, 33 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 293, 302 (citations omitted). 
943 Community anger at the DOJ’s failure to make a finding on biased policing was identified in 
most of the community research interviews. One community leader observed that the Seattle 
Public Defender’s Association had previously litigated issues of racial disparity with success – 
“then the DOJ walks out and announces its findings on excessive force – which were so poorly 
founded – it was laughable. But with respect to racial disparity, they made no findings? This was, 
at best, extremely sloppy analysis, at worst, it appeared corrupt. It appeared that they simply did 
not want to make findings regarding racial disparity … perhaps it was that Chief Kerlikowski was 
Obama’s Drug Czar? Either they were bad at it or corrupt… the result was that the DOJ findings 
were founded on a lie.” 
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Community relationships with Mayor McGinn were described as “complicated.” It 
was Mayor McGinn who sought to exclude racially biased policing issues from the 
Settlement Agreement, at least initially, and his administration pursued the strategy of 
using a mediator, which led to confidential negotiations which left community members 
feeling disenfranchised from the process.944 
Research participants also identified “a lot of grumbling” amongst community 
members about having to pay for the reforms. As observed by more than one community 
member, “if the City Council and Mayor had just done their jobs, we would never have 
even needed DOJ intervention.”  
7.7.1. Community Perceptions of the SPD 
“SPD’s first line of defense was ‘let’s make it collaborative,’ but their 
definition of that was to keep a tight fist over all the information. They 
always offered to be cooperative and open, but, in the end, it just 
appeared to be a stalling tactic to wear people down.”  
Seattle Community Member 
 
The DOJ investigation was initiated by the aforementioned ACLU letter, signed 
by 35 signatories, identifying multiple instances of excessive force over a 16-month 
period. What seemed unusual about the request was that, at the time of the letter, 
Seattle had a robust and unique tripartite civilian oversight of law enforcement program, 
which included the civilian-led Office of Professional Accountability (OPA), an OPA 
Auditor and an OPA Review Board. This oversight program was created as a result of 
the 1999 Civilian Review Panel recommendations and was later enhanced by 
recommendations made in 2008 by the Police Accountability Review Panel. 
 
944 Both the Mayor’s office and the DOJ appeared to believe that having conferred with 
community representatives, that they were in a position to “represent” the community in the 
settlement negotiations and incorporate their voices into the settlement effort. Community 
members participating in this research, however, tended to disagree with that assessment. 
Notably, Chanin has suggested that “[p]articipating in negotiations can increase the legitimacy of 
the settlement in the eyes of potential opponents and would-be critics (Tyler, 2006; Tyler & De 
Cremer, 2005). It can also give key stakeholders a sense of ownership over both the process and 
the content of the agreement” (Chanin, 2017a, p. 266). How exactly to do that, however, appears 
to remain a challenge (but, see Patel, 2016, for arguments in favor of allowing “community” to be 
heard at “fairness hearings” before a federal court approves a Section 14141 settlement 
agreement). 
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According to the community-based research participants, however, the oversight 
program was “investigation-centric” and unable to “do some of the important, big work,” 
including issues relating to policy, training and police practices.945 According to one 
participant: “There were so many layers of accountability, it gave the SPD and the union 
‘a way out’ – saying that there was accountability when there was not.” And, according to 
virtually every research participant of color, even though Seattle views itself as a 
progressive place, “there is an undercurrent of racism within the City and the SPD that 
has never really been dealt with.” 
 “The ACLU had several goes at the City, trying to get changes, 
but to no effect.”  
ACLU Letter Signatory. 
 
Although participants reported that they had no real expectations when they 
signed onto the ACLU letter, some were not surprised DOJ “took on Seattle.” Because 
Jenny Durkan was a member of both of the panels examining SPD accountability, 
participants believed she felt “personally offended” that after all the work of the blue-
ribbon panels, police accountability concerns were still not being addressed. Participants 
believed Durkan saw an opportunity to use her position to say “come on in and we’ll 
show you how this can be done.” “She was tied into legal and political community. She 
not only brought in DOJ but also knew how to work with both the community and the 
police.” 
As to the criticism lodged by City and SPD personnel that the DOJ used 
“excessive and unnecessary force” in the implementation of the Consent Decree, there 
were divergent opinions amongst community research participants. While some 
participants spoke in terms of a need for the DOJ to have been more “holistic” in their 
approach,946 others spoke in passionate terms about the need for aggressive action to 
 
945 The OPA Auditor was given the authority to make policy recommendations. However, those 
recommendations tended to be ignored and remained generally unimplemented. As suggested by 
one community participant: “If the Department had just implemented the Auditor’s 
recommendations, the SPD could have fixed itself.” 
946 According to one participant: “A Consent Decree is unhelpful in setting up an environment for 
police community relationships that will move towards transformation. Not everything needs to be 
achieved by a boot on the neck. It is possible to change, but through a different set of skills than 
is used in a Consent Decree.” 
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change SPD behavior.947 On the whole, however, community members generally 
supported the concept that the necessary change would not have taken place without a 
consent decree. As explained by one community participant: 
I don’t think reform in accountability structures would have happened 
without the Consent Decree. For the first time, there had to be a more 
open process for development of policy. By having the Consent Decree 
pull all that stuff out of the SPD, it was all made more visible, and has 
resulted in improvements in accountability. There was a shock value to 
DOJ coming in that resulted in change that would not otherwise have 
happened. 
As argued by one well-placed community member, the suggestion that a consent 
decree was required to reform the SPD appeared justified by the conclusion that: 
the SPD, similar to a lot of police departments, has a culture of “justify 
and defend” – they would say “we are not LA/Detroit/etc., why are you 
coming down on us?” “We’re not that bad….” But what we saw was a 
culture of “that’s what they told you in the academy….” The FTO’s had 
a real attitude and it ended up being very detrimental to the community. 
In addition, although not as bad as Chicago or New Orleans, there was 
some thuggery – not unique to Seattle, but it was there. There was also 
an attitude of “we’ll do what we want to do…,” regardless of whether or 
not it was the right thing to do. 
Table 7.15. Public Statements by Community Activists Over the course of 
Implementation 
Date Statement 
September 3, 2011 Estela Ortega (ED, El Centro de la Raza): “From our perspective, El Centro de 
la Raza and other communities of color, police misconduct has been an issue 
for decades in our community” (Seattle Times, 9/3/2011). 
December 17, 2011 Estela Ortega: “This is what people have been saying all along, that police use 
excessive force, especially against people of color, … This gives our 
communities a lot of hope. I think John Diaz has a commitment to wanting his 
department to have good relationships with the communities, and this gives 
him the tools he needs to make the changes.” 
James Bible (President of the Seattle NAACP), “called on the Police 
Department to ‘clean house’ from top to bottom, ‘including Diaz.’ 
‘The Seattle-King County NAACP has been aware of the pattern of excessive 
force for the past 25 years, … Now, we need to take a step back and decide 
where to go from here’” (Seattle Times, 12/17/2011). 
 
947 Referring to police requests for “holistic change:” On participant argued: “Holistic change? The 
Community response would be ‘so sorry your feelings are being hurt, can you please bring my 
family member back to life?’” 
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Date Statement 
December 22, 2011 Nicole Gaines (President, Loren Miller Bar Association): “It's disappointing that 
it took community pressure to get [Mayor McGinn] to implement reforms. This 
is what he should have been saying originally. He only said it when it was clear 
the public was outraged … It seems more politically motivated than that it’s the 
right thing to do.” 
Kathleen Taylor (ED, Washington ACLU): “The Mayor’s statement embracing 
the DOJ's recommendations for reform is a welcome and positive 
development. The ACLU and other groups who wrote to the Mayor today look 
forward to working with City officials and the DOJ to bring about much-needed 
changes” (Seattle Times, 12/22/2011). 
February 2, 2012 Estela Ortega: “We felt that the process would be more inclusive, … We'll be 
seeking a little more time to make sure that occurs” (Seattle Times, 2/3/2012). 
March 30, 2012 Kathleen Taylor (ACLU): “We urge the city to speedily negotiate a consent 
decree with the DOJ that will include a monitor and court oversight, … Seattle 
cannot solve the longstanding problems of SPD culture and accountability 
without that assistance. A consent decree is critical to ensure that reforms are 
thoroughly implemented and are sustained for the long term” (Seattle Times, 
3/30/2012). 
May 10, 2012 Kathleen Taylor (ACLU): “[To] ensure that reforms to the Seattle Police 
Department are fully implemented and long-lasting, the city needs speedily to 
agree to a consent decree with the Department of Justice that includes a 
monitor and court oversight … The DOJ investigation and recommendations 
resulted from the SPD’s inability to curtail excessive and unconstitutional use 
of force by some of its officers, … It’s clear that the problems within the police 
department have been so ingrained that our city can't fix them without outside 
help” (Seattle Times, 5/11/2012). 
May 18, 2012 Jennifer Shaw (Deputy Director, ACLU): “I suspect [the groups representing 
communities of color who signed on to the original ACLU letter to the DOJ] will 
be quite upset if it's true that the city’s response does not address biased 
policing” (Seattle Times, 5/18/2012). 
June 22, 2012 Jennifer Shaw (ACLU): “If you're not at the table, you're on the menu … We've 
had a lot of ‘thank you for comings,’ and ‘We'll see you later,’ comments, … So 
I think now is the time we need to be invited and allowed to fully participate 
with both the city and the Department of Justice.” 
Jaime Garcia (ED, Consejo Counseling & Referral Services): “Let's be clear, it 
is a travesty of justice to lock out the very people most directly affected by 
police misconduct from taking part in the ongoing consent-decree negotiations, 
… We need to have a seat at the negotiating table with the Department of 
Justice and the city of Seattle” (Seattle Times, 6/22/2012). 
July 28, 2012 Doug Honig (ACLU spokesman): “What we have is a starting line, … But now 
the marathon begins. ... We have a lot of good words on paper, but what really 
is going to matter is how it’s implemented” (Seattle Times, 7/28/2012). 
July 29, 2012 Estela Ortega: “The fact is, we have a consent decree, we met the deadline 
and we have community involvement that can lead to meaningful discussions 
and other improvements” (Seattle Times, 7/29/2012a). 
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Date Statement 
January 18, 2014 Jennifer Shaw (ACLU) “called the bias and stop policies a ‘positive move’ 
toward ensuring constitutional policing in Seattle. ‘The next important step will 
be to train every officer on the new policies’” (Seattle Times, 1/18/2014). 
August 2015 CPC Member Jay Hollingsworth (member of the John T. Williams Organizing 
Committee): “The fifth anniversary of John’s death is on Sunday, and we'll be 
gathering at the totem pole, … People are still going to ask, ‘What really has 
changed in five years?’ Right now, I’m having a little bit of difficulty with 
explaining what’s happened. I mean, there have been positive changes in 
policies. And we’re looking to review them and looking for ways to confirm that 
these policies are working and are effective... however, I’m happy that we’re 
talking about working together and the judge has set forth a path for that to 
happen” (The Stranger, 8/26/2015).948 
November 30, 2015 “[N]early 50 community organizations sent a letter to Bobb saying further delay 
in moving forward with the [Police Accountability Ordinance proposal] ‘does 
not meet the expectations of our communities for substantive and timely 
reforms’” (Seattle Times, 12/21/2015). 
November 9, 2018 Michele Storms (Deputy Director, ACLU): joining with 23 other community 
groups opposing ratification of the tentative contract with SPOG: “Today the 
council stands at a critical juncture, whether to take the community a step 
backward on accountability or to vote no, and we are asking the council to 
reject [the police union contract]” (Seattle Times, 11/9/2018).949 
June 26, 2019 Michele Storms (ACLU): “We are disappointed with how the Mayor’s office 
characterized the status of the City’s compliance with the Consent Decree, … 
Judge Robart’s finding was clear: The City has partially fallen out of 
compliance with the federal consent decree with regard to discipline and 
accountability … Every denial creates delay and every delay in establishing a 
system of true and effective police accountability reduces public safety, erodes 
community trust in law enforcement, and most significantly, costs lives. Neither 
the City nor its communities can afford to bear the heavy costs of denial and 
delay” (Seattle Times, 6/26/2019). 
July 15, 2019 Andre Taylor (founder of Not This Time) “In 2018, when they [the Seattle 
Police Officers Guild] were asking for a pay increase... we said absolutely, 
SPOG should have a pay increase, … But we were asking for accountability 
back then. We agreed with their pay increase, but now they’re disagreeing with 
accountability. And that’s problematic” (KUOW, 7/15/2019).950 
August 17, 2019 Former CPC Commissioner Diane Narasaki: “Hiring new consultants and 
diverting attention away from the Court’s directive serves to undermine, rather 
than build, community trust” (Seattle Times, 8/17/2019a). 
 
948 Herz, A. (2016, August 25). Federal Judge calls The Stranger’s Reporting on SPD 
‘Inflammatory,’ but it’s clear he learned from it. The Stranger. Retrieved from 
https://www.thestranger.com. 
949 Miletich, S (2018, November 9). 24 Community groups urge council to reject Seattle police 
contract. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
950 McNicols, N. (2019, July 15). Seattle police reform could backslide if steps not taken, critics 
say. KUOW. Retrieved from https://kuow.org/stories/seattlepolice-reform. 
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Date Statement 
May 11, 2020 NAACP statement opposing dismissal of portions of the Consent Decree: “The 
SPD should not be released from oversight while its police union contract 
rejects accountability measures … The NAACP-SKC condemns the premature 
motion to end the Consent Decree and its police accountability oversight.”951 
June 12, 2020 Michele Storms (ACLU): “The City must allow for freedom of speech and 
freedom of assembly, and it must address police accountability and excessive 
use of force, … It is impossible to expect progress if the city continues to 
attempt to silence protester demands with excessive force” (Seattle Times, 
6/12/2020).952 
 
Community commentary of the status of the Consent Decree largely consisted of 
public statements made by members of the CPC, supplemented by statements made by 
leaders of community organizations that originally requested DOJ intervention – to 
include the ACLU and the NAACP. These community representatives consistently 
pushed for greater community involvement in the implementation of reform, strongly 
supported the establishment of a permanent CPC and an accountability ordinance that 
would ensure appropriate police discipline, and opposed any premature dismissal of the 
Consent Decree. 
7.7.2. Community Research Participant Thoughts with Respect to the 
Implementation of the Consent Decree 
Community participants were split between comments supportive of the Consent 
Decree implementation process and comments critical of the process. In many cases, 
community research participants themselves had mixed feelings with respect to the 
implementation process. Some of the supportive comments included that: 
• “For the first time, the SPD had to have a more open process for 
development of policy. By having the Consent Decree pull all that stuff 
out of the department, it made it more visible, which resulted in more 
accountability. The transparency of the process was an important part 
of overall success of the process. This was the first opportunity for 
 
951 NAACP (2020, May 11). President’s Statement read at Seattle City Council today on ending 
the Consent Decree. Retrieved from https://www.seattlekingcountynaacp.org/press-releases-and-
statements/presidents-statement-read-at-seattle-city-council-today-on-ending-the-consent-
decree. 
952 Carter, M. (2020, June 12). Judge bars Seattle police from using tear gas. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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‘outsiders’ to have an impact on SPD policy, training and practices and 
we could see what was going on and the push for positive change;” 
• “There was really a mix of stakeholders working together: the DOJ was 
like the ‘mom’ coming in when the siblings were fighting. There was a 
shock value to the DOJ coming in that resulted in change that would not 
otherwise have happened. Without community involvement, sustainable 
change would not have been possible;” 
• “It helped that the federal judge did not pull punches with anyone…;” 
• “The City Council had years of recommendations from the OPA auditor 
that they did nothing about. If the City had held the police accountable, 
we never would have needed the DOJ. Having Monitor and Court 
involvement has put a type of pressure on the Department that City 
Council has not done in the last 20 years;”  
• “I don’t think the reform in the accountability structures would have 
happened without the Consent Decree.”   
As previously noted, in some cases, participants provided mixed reviews: 
• “With Jenny [Durkan], we ran into some challenges with her getting 
frustrated at constantly being pushed by the community. There were 
times when she wanted the community to ‘back off.’ It got tense at 
times, but it was a healthy tension, generally combined with a mutual 
respect;”  
• “The use-of-force policy probably went overboard. It was drafted by 
attorneys without thinking of its impact on officers; ultimately it had to 
be amended and adjusted. Even though it was very ‘lawyerly,’ it was 
still such an improvement over what they had before. I know the police 
were really upset about the policy, but that was probably more the result 
of the Department’s failure to ‘roll it out’ appropriately;” 
• “Data collection has definitely been a success, but it is still difficult for 
outsiders to access and to understand how to use the information;” 
• “It was an iterative process - an evolution: At times the Monitor felt the 
he had specific boxes to check and he did not like being pushed by 
community members and it led to some very heated interactions. There 
were lots of battles over process. Because the Monitor had the ear of 
the Judge, there were things that the Judge did and said that seemed 
to indicate he believed the community was an adversary to the Monitor. 
But that did appear to change over time…” 
Some well-placed participants, however, had very negative perceptions of 
important components of the implementation process: 
• As stated publicly by Gerald Hankerson, the president of the local NAACP 
chapter that was part of the initial group that requested federal 
oversight of SPD, he had little confidence in the reform process: “The 
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community should have a chance to oversee the police, … I get so 
frustrated when I hear people say ‘we’re making progress.’ The consent 
decree created all kinds of ways of measuring improvement, but those 
are not reflected in a changed reality on the ground. This is a 
technocratic process to get the people to think there's reform; (The 
Stranger, 8/25/2015).”953 
• “Policing in Seattle has gotten better, but it’s largely despite the Consent 
Decree;” 
• “The consent decree was a trauma for this City; I have a high tolerance 
for difficulty and cannot remember giving up on anything in my years of 
work, except I have quit on this.” 
Some community members saved their greatest vitriol for the Monitor and his 
team; with others being critical of Judge Robart’s role as well as that of City Attorney 
Holmes: 
• “The City Attorney, the Monitor and the Judge were a triumvirate of 
inadequacy. We drew the wrong person at every turn. The Monitor and 
the Judge engaged in a mutual dance of arrogance. The Monitoring 
Team was working ‘pro bono’ at $200 an hour – which Judge Robart 
thought was a big concession, while community members were working 
for free. Attention was focused on a Judge who wouldn’t listen, a Monitor 
who knew better, and a Mayor involved in self-aggrandizement and self-
promotion;” 
• “When the CPC asked for help from the Monitor on race and 
accountability, Merrick would choose not to help, saying he ‘couldn’t.’ 
Then the CPC would come up with a strategy and the Monitor would 
move to stop it;” 
• “There was a motivation on the part of the Monitoring Team of 
arrogance, money, and creation of a racket of white male lawyers who 
believe they know everything and think they are critical to success in 
oversight;”  
• “The Monitor engaged in public posturing but not when it mattered. He 
did not protect people in the department who were doing great things.  
It has been a terrible experience: betrayal, great sacrifice by some and 
no action by Monitor. That is why the Consent Decree process is 
unhelpful and should be at the bottom of any list in police reform for 
bringing it back;” 
• “The Monitor: had a very non collaborative approach. He would walk in, 
tell you what was wrong and how to fix it, but in a very directed, 
paternalistic and disrespectful way;”  
 
953 Herz, A. (2015, August 25). Police Reform Advocates say Federal Oversight Hasn’t Gone Far 
Enough. The Stranger. Retrieved from https://www.thestranger.com. 
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• “The Judge and the Monitor were the wrong people: it wouldn’t have 
been as bad with a different Monitor and a different judge.” 
Overall, even though it was “the community” that called for, and recognized the 
need for DOJ intervention, it was the same community members who took umbridge at 
the DOJ, the Monitor and Judge Robart for their perceived “paternalistic” attitudes 
towards the public and community involvement in the federal reform effort. Community 
research participants would have likely been more satisfied with the type of intiiatives 
taken in the Portland, Oregon Consent Decree process as described in Section 3.3.3. 
This was even though the CPD received amicus status in the Seattle consent decree 
litigation, an enhanced level of status not normally given to community organizations by 
courts outside of Seattle. 
7.7.3. The Community Police Commission 
“You don’t own the community, …And you are not the only people 
getting community input.”  
U.S. Attorney Jenny Durkan in response to criticism from the 
Community Police Commission, December 12, 2013 
 
At the time of its Creation, as part of the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the DOJ and Seattle,954 the Citizen Police Commission was perceived by 
community members to have been “a brilliant move” on the part of Mayor McGinn and 
the DOJ. One of the more challenging aspects of the Commission, was the decision to 
include both community activists as well as representatives of the two police unions, 
SPOG and SPMA.955 
 
954 “The [Seattle] MOU specifies five policy issues for which the CPC is responsible: community 
engagement, accountability, investigatory stops and data collection, officer assistance and 
support, and transparency and public reporting. For each of the enumerated areas of reform, the 
CPC is specifically charged with providing input as the reforms are developed, ensuring support 
and guidance in the implementation phase, and reviewing all reports and recommendations put 
forth by the court's monitor. The CPC issues its own reports, holds regular public meetings, and 
gathers a broad array of public input to achieve its mandate. It is also required to maintain regular 
contact with the city and post its reports publicly on the city’s website. The CPC has published 
several reports based on community-driven data collection and focus groups with 
recommendations for topics covered in the Consent Decree, such as bias-based policing, 
performance mentoring, Terry stops, and use of force” (Patel, 2016, pp. 821-822). 
955 The ordinance by which the CPC was established (Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124021 (Oct. 
22, 2012) defined the number of members on the commission and specified mechanisms by 
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Members described the CPC’s initial work as “collaborative:” as represented by 
one CPC member, “it was pretty remarkable about how well things worked… there was 
minimal finger pointing and accusations … the concept of ‘Seattle nice’ worked in our 
favor.” Even so, CPC members noted that the CPC was created as a temporary body, to 
be disbanded upon the dismissal of the Consent Decree and reliant on the Mayor’s 
office for its budget. According to one member: “the joke was that the CPC was given all 
of the problems that neither the City, SPD or Monitor wanted to solve.” 
And Mayor McGinn made sure to put his imprimatur on the body, appointing 
members who had previously served on a community body (the MEDC [Minority 
Executive Directors Coalition] which he counted as part of his constituency.956 
CPC members noted that, at the outset, the CPC and the Monitor had difficultly 
“getting along.” There was a perception on the part of the CPC that the Monitor was 
prepared to diminish the CPC’s role and his silence on the issues the CPC was created 
to address “was indicative of a lack of prioritization of the CPC’s work.” In addition, the 
Monitoring Team brought in its own measurements for community satisfaction and 
conducted its own outreach – whereas the CPC believed that they should have been 
accepted “as a vehicle of the community” and should have been engaged more in the 
Monitor’s outreach to the community. 
Members of the Commission believed themselves to bring a lot to the table with 
respect to their knowledge of the SPD and its challenges in dealing with the community. 
Some considered themselves to be “experts” and were offended in not being recognized 
as such by either the Monitor, the City or the DOJ. At the same time, many in the SPD, 
the City and the Monitoring Team were concerned that many of the members of the CPC 
had their own political and personal agendas, that they were unwilling to go along with 
SPD or Monitor-identified “best practices,” and too willing to take positions contrary to 
the parties. 
 
which the selection of members would ensure the diversity of the Commission. The members of 
the CPC were appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the City Council. The commission was 
required to include one rank-and-file officer and one mid-level manager from the SPD to be 
chosen by SPOG and the SPMA, respectively. 
956 According to one participant, five of the first fifteen members of the CPC were previously 
members of the MEDC. 
518 
The conflict first came to a head in the Summer of 2013, while the parties were 
trying to finalize a new use-of-force policy for the SPD. The issue of the CPC’s role in the 
process became controversial when the parties proceeded ahead with the preparation of 
the new policy without the participation of the CPC, as the policy was not one of the 
enumerated policies put under the CPC’s jurisdiction in the MOU; the CPC, however, 
objected.957 By August 2013, the CPC was asking Judge Robart to delay the 
implementation of the new policy to give the CPC the opportunity to “garner community 
input” and “provide…formal feedback.”958 And, in the end, the parties relented. 
By October 2013, the CPC was attempting to intervene in the Settlement 
Agreement, against the wishes of both the City and the DOJ.959 While the CPC’s motion 
to intervene was denied, they were granted amicus status and allowed to submit briefs in 
the Consent Decree litigation. According to one CPC member: “We got amicus status 
because we were bad assess…. We threatened to all quit, including the two police 
officer members … We felt frustrated and believed that parties were attempting to 
interfere in our work.”960 CPC members believed that the Monitoring Team and DOJ 
“loved us until they disagreed with us and then, suddenly, we needed to be silenced.” 
 
957 “Because SPD's use-of-force tactics and the deaths of unarmed persons drove advocates’ 
initial request to the DOJ to investigate the SPD, the CPC interpreted the MOU not to foreclose its 
involvement in the development and evaluation of a new use-of-force policy” (Patel, 2016, p. 822, 
citing Walker, 2015). 
958 U.S. v. Seattle, Document 82, filed August 20, 2013. 
959 U.S. v. Seattle, Document 90, filed October 24, 2013. 
960 As reported in The Stranger in August 2015: “In the summer of 2013, CPC commissioners 
unanimously threatened to resign unless they were allowed a larger hand in the overhauling of 
Seattle's use-of-force policies. According to police expert Sam Walker, who recounted this history 
in a new article for Criminal Justice Review, the federal monitor initially rejected their requests, 
but conceded after all 15 commissioners communicated their intent to resign (The Stranger, 
(8/25/2015). See also Walker, 2018, p. 1813 [“The Seattle settlement went further than any 
previous ones with regard to community input by requiring the creation of a Community Police 
Commission, a broadly representative body that would have a formal role in the development of 
police department policies …The MOU did not, however, give the CPC the authority to review 
police department policies, an issue that became a matter of conflict in the early history of the 
CPC. CPC members demanded to have a voice in the development of the new police department 
use of force policy. The result was a stand-off between the CPC and the Monitor, the U.S. 
Attorney, and city officials. The CPC members stood their ground and, at one point, threatened to 
resign en masse, with some arguing that if they were denied a voice in the critical issue of use of 
force it would reduce the CPC to ‘window dressing.’ The other side then relented, not willing to 
risk a mass resignation, which could have jeopardized the entire consent decree implementation. 
As a result, the CPC participated in the development of the new use of force policy”]. See also, 
Walker, 2017, p. 22; Walker 2018, p. 1817 [discussing the union representatives’ alignment with 
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CPC members believed it was “important to bring external community concerns 
into the mix…” The goal was for the city “to resource the CPC to have a community 
engagement and education role and bring it into collaboration with the Inspector General 
and the OPA.” According to one of the original members of the CPC: “for me, the CPC 
held the promise of meaningful community engagement that would be necessary to 
create and sustain a change in policing culture…” 
Oft recognized as one of CPC’s most significant projects was the creation of the 
Police Accountability Ordinance which was later passed by Council and resulted in 
making the CPC a permanent body. Although undermined by the eventual SPOG 
contract, the CPC went on to be the one holdout amongst the parties and within the City 
to call for the City to be found out-of-compliance with the Consent Decree based on the 
contract with the union. 
By that time, however, with the Durkan administration lobbying members to 
support the SPOG contact, original members of the CPC believed that the Mayor was 
attempting to “stack” the CPC with her new appointments and had discussed “going 
back to the old ways – using the media to embarrass the SPD as an accountability 
measure.” 
One influential member of the CPC, however, had a different take on the conflicts 
between the CPC the Monitor and other City agencies (to include the SPD):  
If there were no conflict between Monitor and CPC, then you should 
worry.  Talking about a community group fighting for power was not 
actually a bad thing.  SPD and the CPC have not always agreed, but 
Seattle needs various voices – if everyone marched in unison, you would 
not need the CPC, the IG, the OPA, or the Monitor. However, a 
partnership is only meaningful if the actors have enough respect for 
each other that you can voice your opinions without fear of being 
marginalized. 
According to another CPC participant, the Seattle CPC model was a necessary, 
albeit difficult way to achieve police reform:  
The CPC is a model of how you get to the solution, not what the solution 
is. How you get to the solution is by talking to a broad spectrum of the 
community and bringing them to the table and having difficult 
 
civilian CPC members on the issue of the CPC’s authority to evaluate the new use-of-force 
policy]. 
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conversations. Seattle was ready to have police officers and the police 
union on the board – even if that is not necessarily the right choice for 
all cities. 
CPC members suggested that if the City were to have actually added up the 
number of uncompensated hours of work provided by its members, the value of the 
Commission was “unimaginable:” “The problem was that we had other jobs and had bills 
to pay – the fatigue of the work is just not sustainable.” 
According to one original member,  
the CPC was a brilliant move on the part of the DOJ and Mayor. When I 
was first told about this volunteer body with two members from police 
union – I thought it would do nothing, just perpetually fight. And there 
was tension until we all agreed “we are here to make things better.” 
According to this member, the philosophy of “Seattle nice,” even though sometimes 
involving “passive aggressiveness,” worked in the CPC’s favor and resulted in many 
unanimous decisions on the part of the Board. 
“Without community, sustainable change would not have been 
possible. Long term change comes only with power being given back 
to community.”  
CPC Member 
 
Patel (2016) extensively discussed the Seattle CPC in his article, Toward 
democratic police reform – a vision for community provisions in consent decrees:  
According to Patel, 
The 2012 policing consent decree in Seattle highlights several 
shortcomings and opportunities found in the community engagement 
process, such as contestation over the scope of community members’ 
involvement, both in terms of the type and form of input. The court has 
taken a rigid approach to its role in reforming the police department and 
has suggested that nonparties, including the city council and the 
Community Police Commission (“CPC”) created under the Consent 
Decree, should limit police-reform efforts to the Consent Decree process. 
The parties and community members have disagreed over allocation of the 
city's resources and priorities for reform. (p. 818) 
Ultimately, in late 2014, the CPC made recommendations for police reform that 
would eventually be adopted by the City Council within the Police Accountability 
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Ordinance. That package, however, ended up resulting in Judge Robart interpreting the 
reforms, including a provision to make the CPC a permanent body, as a “power grab” 
meant to alter the provisions of the Settlement Agreement and the MOU. Although they 
were eventually successful (except for those provisions impacted by the 2018 SPOG 
contract), the entire process left CPC members “feeling frustrated and ‘shut out’ of the 
police-reform process” (Patel, 2016, p. 824). 
CPC members interviewed confirmed Patel’s findings that “[t]oday, members of 
the CPC question the DOJ’s motives in creating the oversight body and worry their 
function is to rubber stamp the parties’ reforms, rather than engage in community-driven 
decision making to effect a long-term shift in power between police and communities 
subject to police practices.” As noted by Patel “role confusion, frustration and lack of 
alignment regarding how and when the CPC can inject itself into the reform process” 
remain as barriers to the success of the community engagement provisions of the 
Seattle MOU as envisioned when the CPC program was first created (Patel, 2016, p. 
824).961 
Table 7.16 includes public statements made by representatives of the CPC over 
the course of the Consent Decree litigation. In their statements, the CPC consistently 
expressed concern over its “place at the table” when it came to DOJ-driven police reform 
efforts. In general, CPC members felt unheard and disrespected. At times, however, the 
CPC appeared to feel engaged, but only temporarily; over time, it appeared that the 
CPC would take positions adversarial to the City and/or the parties, in large part, to 




961 Patel concluded with the finding that “[i]n sum, despite praise from scholars and positive 
reports regarding the Seattle CPC's involvement in shaping the direction of the policies 
implemented as part of the Consent Decree reform process, genuine concerns remain regarding 
the actual power granted to communities to shape police policies” (Patel, 2016, p. 825). 
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Table 7.16. Community Police Commission Public Statements 
Date Statement 
January 14, 2013 Upon appointment to the CPC, CPC co-chair Lisa Daugaard “said the 
commission would be different from past panels that looked into police 
accountability, which were weighted toward people with ‘generic’ civic-policy 
backgrounds in contrast to those with specific expertise on the issues the 
commission will tackle” (Seattle Times, 1/15/2013).962 
August 20, 2013 Letter from CPC acting director Betsy Graef to Judge Robart: “We are deeply 
concerned that the time allotted is insufficient to ensure our considered review 
and will not serve the reform effort or the intent of the Court in establishing the 
CPC as a vehicle for community input.”963 
CPC co-chair Diane Narasaki: “We just don’t think this is enough time for us to 
go through this and ensure the community has an adequate chance to respond 
… The use of force is the very reason the DOJ investigated, and that is what 
led to the formation of the CPC, … It doesn’t make sense for us not to review 
the policy that is key to the reason we are here in the first place.” (Seattle 
Times, 8/22/2013). 
December 11, 2013 In discussion with U.S. Attorney Durkan on the role of the CPC, CPC co-chair 
Daugaard “argued that the CPC’s role is ‘crucial’ to ensuring community ‘buy-in’ 
to the reforms. She said that, without CPC involvement, the communities aren’t 
being adequately heard” (Seattle Times, 12/12/2013). 
April 16, 2014 CPC Co-chair Daugaard: “There are still many talented women and men of 
good-will and good intentions in SPD doing their best to make things better, 
[but] many I speak with are demoralized by some of the recent changes, 
because leadership in this area to date has been penalized, not rewarded, 
while resistance has been rewarded, not penalized. They can read the writing 
on the wall” (The Stranger, 4/16/2014). 
November 12, 2014 CPC Statement regarding Mayor Murray’s plan to reform the police 
accountability system and make the CPC a permanent body: “[The plan] puts 
the city on the right road to reforming the police accountability system, but 
much remains to be done in the collective bargaining process, in making 
reforms permanent in law, and in ensuring practices are in place in SPD and in 
other city offices to support the intended reforms” (Seattle Times, 11/13/2014). 
June 10, 2015 CPC co-Chair Daugaard: “The CPC is seen nationally as a new model for 
ensuring a strong, effective community voice in police reform, … That’s the job 
we all signed up for. We worked for many months to get to achieve consensus 
between civil rights leaders, public safety advocates and police employees 
about how to strengthen the accountability system and increase its 
independence. Our obligation to the communities we represent now is to 
ensure those changes are made” (Seattle Times, 6/10/2015). 
 
962 Miletich, S. (2013, January 15). Mayor names 15 to new SPD commission. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com.  
963 U.S v. Seattle, Document No. 82, filed August 20, 2013. 
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Date Statement 
June 25, 2015 CPC co-chair Daugaard: “We’ve voted to hold off on sending our proposed 
legislative package to the council until Monday, … Deputy Mayor Kate Joncas 
came to the commission today and asked us to engage in further discussions to 
see if we can reach alignment on a joint package — and we agreed to do that” 
(Seattle Times, 6/25/2015). 
June 30, 2015 CPC co-chair Harriett Walden, commenting on agreement of Mayor, Chief and 
CPC to proceed with Police Accountability Legislation: “Credit is due to the 
years of community activism to demand Constitutional policing for the people of 
Seattle” (Seattle Times, 6/30/2015).964 
August 25, 2015 CPC co-Chair Daugaard: “It isn't going to work for the community voice to be 
just one of many at the table, and in many ways, the least empowered voice, … 
Local participants and activists are going to have the best information about 
both what is wrong and what needs to happen to make things better” (The 
Stranger, 8/25/2015). 
September 23, 2015 CPC Member Enrique Gonzalez (El Centro de la Raza) to DOJ representative: 
“There have been challenges, there have been roadblocks and there have been 
difficulties that we’ve encountered … Historically, [making police accountable] 
has not been done in a courtroom, …It has been done on the streets, it’s been 
done protesting.” 
CPC Member Aaron Williams (Senior Pastor, Mt. Zion Baptist Church): “It was 
the community’s voice that brought the DOJ here [to investigate the Seattle 
Police Department], … And for them to say that the CPC doesn’t have a place 
at the table is really saying that the community doesn’t have a place at the 
table. So I think it’s important that if we‘re going to be a model for other cities, 
that this kind of mentality has to be dealt with. The community is the victim and 
they need to be heard.” 
CPC co-chair Lisa Daugaard: “We could all be working on these issues in other 
capacities, … If we do this to no avail, then it won't be very obvious why people 
should sign on to this style of work.” 
Melinda Giovengo (Executive Director, YouthCare): “There has to be some real 
skin in the game, or stake set out by the decree itself that gives the CPC a 
formal role in the process. Not just as a nice head nod or a token system.”  
(Seattle Times, 9/24/2015; The Stranger, 9/24/2015). 
December 20, 2015 CPC Statement regarding DOJ review of police accountability system proposal: 
“After vigorous debate this spring and summer, the City of Seattle and the CPC 
came together behind a comprehensive plan to strengthen community oversight 
over police practices and the accountability system. The Justice Department 
has not yet had a chance to take a formal position on that package, but soon 
will. This will be an important test of whether our communities will be left with 
real power or just the illusion of oversight” (Seattle Times, 12/21/2015). 
 
964 Miletich, S. (2015, June 30). Accord reached on SPD accountability measures. Seattle Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
524 
Date Statement 
August 2, 2016 In a letter to Judge Robart: “We believe the City Council must be free to 
consider and legislate additional measures to ensure Seattle puts in place a 
highly effective police accountability system, with political independence and a 
robust community oversight structure.”965 
August 9, 2016 Statement from CPC regarding order of Judge Robart requiring court-review of 
Police Accountability Ordinance: “The City’s police accountability reform efforts 
have been in a holding pattern for a year. Although we appreciate that the order 
allows the city to start moving again, we are now looking at a long-drawn-out 
process that has no realistic chance of producing legislative results until 2017, 
at the earliest. By then it will have been five years since the Consent Decree 
and three years since the CPC’s original accountability recommendations” 
(Seattle Times, 8/10/2016). 
May 17, 2017 Seattle Times guest editorial by CPC Board Members, Rev. Harriett Walden, 
Enrique Gonzalez & Isaac Ruiz arguing for Council to pass ordinance giving the 
CPC the authority to formally evaluate the OPA Director & Inspector General: 
““It is essential that the police-accountability system and police services reflect 
community priorities and values. This requires a community board, representing 
community interests, to exercise system oversight, which will provide legitimacy 
for the accountability system and give the public greater confidence in SPD” 
(Seattle Times, 5/18/2017). 
October 17, 2018 CPC votes against City Council adoption of SPOG contract negotiated by 
Durkan administration. 
CPC Member Jay Hollingsworth: “The union doesn’t want to give up power … 
They cannot be trusted…” (Seattle Times, 10/18/2018). 
August 7, 2019 CPC votes to reject Durkan administration proposal to address deficiencies in 
police-accountability system (Seattle Times, 8/9/2019). 
August 9, 2019 CPC Chair Daugaard: “Our battle was about ensuring there was a strong 
community voice and that the work wasn’t turned over to what we call the 
police-accountability-industrial-complex – an emerging professional class 
dominated by White men…” (Seattle Times, 8/9/2018).966 
June 13, 2020 Former CPC Chair, Daugaard, noting that the SPD failed to follow CPC 
recommendation to suspend the use of flash-bang grenades to disperse 
protestors until policies could be reviewed: “We are used to 100 percent of our 
recommendations being ignored” (New York Times, 6/13/2020). 
 
The CPC found itself in a unique position in Consent Decree history when, not 
only did it receive “amicus” status from the Court, but it also, on occasion, found its 
position used by Judge Robart to find against the parties when the CPC took a politically 
unpalatable position (such as finding the City partially out of compliance with the 
Consent Decree). Table 7.17 identifies CPC correspondence and pleadings filed 
 
965 U.S v. Seattle, Document No. 304, filed August 3, 2016 
966 Beekman D. (2018, August 9). Lopez guides community group. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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between August 2013 and June 2020. Significantly, in addition to obtaining amicus 
status, the CPC was successful in gaining an extension of time for consideration of the 
SPD use-of-force policy, and successfully argued that the police accountability system 
was deficient and in need of reform as a part of the Consent Decree litigation process. 
Table 7.17. The Community Police Commission Involvement in the Reform 
Process 
Date Event Author/Reference 
March 18, 2013 Appointment and Confirmation of CPC by 
City Council. 
Seattle City Council (per 
Monitor’s 1st Semi-annual Report, 
p. 4).  
August 20, 2013 CPC Letter requesting extension of time 
for Monitor to approve SPD use-of-force 
policy. (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 82). 
Betsy Graef, Acting Director 
October 24, 2013 CPC Motion to Intervene for Purpose of 
Proposing Modifications to [Monitoring 
Plan] Deadlines. (U.S. v. Seattle, 
Document No. 90). 
CAO on behalf of CPC 
November 26, 2013 Court denies CPC Motion to Intervene – 
CPC granted amicus curiae status. 
(U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 106). 
Judge James Robart 
December 3, 2013 CPC submission of proposed Use-of-
Force Policy. (US. V Seattle, Document, 
No. 108-1). 
Lisa Daugaard, Co-Chair 
Diane Narasaki, Co-Chair 
March 13, 2014 CPC’s Initial Assessment of SPD’s 
Community Outreach Efforts. (U.S. v. 
Seattle, No. Document 126). 
CAO on behalf of CPC 
July 31, 2014 CPC’s Follow-Up Assessment of SPD’s 
Community Outreach Efforts. (U.S. v 
Seattle, Document No. 164) 
CAO on behalf of CPC 
May 18, 2015 CPC’s Amicus Curiae Submission 
Regarding Use of Force policies. (U.S. v. 
Seattle, Document No. 206). 
Lisa Daugaard, Co-Chair 
Harriet Walden, Co-Chair 
October 16, 2015 CPC’s Amicus Curiae Submission 
Regarding approaches for SPD 
accountability and review systems. (U.S. 
v. Seattle, Document No. 240). 
CAO on behalf of CPC 
January 2016 CPC Report: “An Assessment of the 
Seattle Police Department’s Community 
Engagement.”967 
Community Police Commission 
(CPC) 
 
967 Retrieved from CPC_Report_on_SPD_Community_Engagement.pdf (seattle.gov). 
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Date Event Author/Reference 
February 1, 2016 CPC’s Response to Monitor’s OPA 
Assessment. (U.S. v. Seattle, Documents 
264, 267).968 
CPC Comment regarding contract 
negotiations. (U.S. v. Seattle, Document 
No. 268-1).969 
CAO on behalf of CPC 
 
 
Lisa Daugaard, Co-Chair 
Harriet Walden, Co-Chair 
Fe Lopez, Executive Director 
May 23, 2016 CPC’s Amicus Curiae Submission 
regarding SPD’s Accountability System 
Review. (U.S. v. Seattle, Document Nos. 
290 & 290-1).970 
Lisa Daugaard, Co-Chair 
Harriet Walden, Co-Chair 
Fe Lopez, Executive Director 
August 3, 2016 Letter from CPC to Court Re: 
Accountability Proposal. (U.S. v. Seattle, 
Document No. 304). 
Lisa Daugaard, Co-Chair 
Harriet Walden, Co-Chair 
 
October 27, 2016 CPC’s Amicus Curiae Submission 
regarding Draft Legislation Submitted by 
the City of Seattle. (U.S. v. Seattle, 
Document Nos. 325 & 325-1).971 
Lisa Daugaard, Co-Chair 
Harriet Walden, Co-Chair 
Fe Lopez, Executive Director 
 
968 In this court filing, the CPC called into question the need for an Inspector General; an office 
which was strongly supported by the Monitor (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 267, pp. 9-10). 
969 In its comment, the CPC stated the following position regarding Court intervention in the 
collective bargaining process: “the CPC believes that it is neither necessary nor advisable for the 
Court to take the proposed step of forestalling implementation of a hypothetical duly-negotiated 
disciplinary appeal procedure. There is no evidence that the collective bargaining negotiations 
currently underway in Seattle are being used in a way that violates the civil rights of any person or 
group of people, which might make such a step necessary. Using the Consent Decree to override 
duly bargained contract terms could cause unnecessary resentment and resistance that would 
not otherwise exist, and thus have unintended and enduring negative consequences for the 
reform process that could outweigh any possible benefits in taking that step at this juncture” (U.S. 
v. Seattle, Document No. 268-1, Attachment 1 p. 1). 
970 In its brief, the CPC argued that it had expertise in the area of police accountability: 
“Collectively, the CPC has substantial expertise on police accountability matters. For example, 
five of its original commissioners served on the Minority Executive Directors Coalition Multiracial 
Task Force on Police Accountability. CPC staff and commissioners have included 10 signatories 
to the December 2010 letter sent by 35 community organizations asking the U.S. Attorney's 
Office for the Western District of Washington and the DOD's Civil Rights Division to conduct a 
pattern and practice investigation of excessive force by SPD; one original CPC member served 
on the 2008 Blue Ribbon Task Force on police accountability reform; two served on the Mayor's 
2001 Racial Profiling Task Force; and one current member was on the selection panel for the 
present OPA Director” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 290-1, p. 9). 
971 In this filing, the CPC requested that the court approve the City’s draft accountability legislation 
be presented to the City Council: “The CPC hopes that the Court will clear the draft legislation for 
presentation to the City Council. Within the bounds established by the Court, our elected 
representatives can hear what all City stakeholders, and most important our community 
members, believe are the most critical requirements for our police accountability system” (U.S v. 
Seattle, Document No. 325-1, p. 4). 
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Date Event Author/Reference 
November 15 2016 CPC’s Amicus Curiae Response to United 
States Brief regarding Draft Legislation. 
(U.S. v. Seattle, Document Nos. 332 & 
332-1).972 
Lisa Daugaard, Co-Chair 
Harriet Walden, Co-Chair 
 
December 30, 2016 CPC Brief Regarding Seattle Police 
Management Association Unfair Labor 
Practice Complaint. (U.S. v. Seattle, 
Document Nos. 346 & 346-1).973 
Lisa Daugaard, Co-Chair 
Harriet Walden, Co-Chair 
March 24, 2017 CPC Brief Regarding SPD Body-Worn 
Camera Policy. (U.S. v. Seattle, Document 
Nos. 377 & 377-1).974 
Harriett Walden, Co-Chair 
Isaac Ruiz, Co-Chair 
Enrique Gonzalez, Co-Chair 
July 10, 2017 CPC Brief Regarding Seattle’s 
Accountability Ordinance. (U.S. v. Seattle, 
Document No. 402).975 
Harriett Walden, Co-Chair 
Isaac Ruiz, Co-Chair 
Enrique Gonzalez, Co-Chair 
 
972 The CPC responded to the DOJ’s concerns regarding two aspects of the draft Accountability 
Ordinance: “The first pertains to prioritizing the CPC's obligations under the Consent Decree. … 
The second pertains to the proposal that the CPC conduct performance assessments of the 
Office of Inspector General (OIG)” (U.S. v Seattle, Document No. 332-1, p. 1). The CPC 
presented the following arguments: “A. There is no one-size-fits-all model for accountability. 
Every community should make decisions about what works best.” “B. The CPC is prepared to 
meet its responsibilities under the Consent Decree.” “C. The community has a meaningful role to 
perform in civilian oversight.” “D. CPC evaluation of the OIG's performance is consistent with the 
aims of reform.” The CPC concluded that: “The CPC worked assiduously over the last two years 
to reach common ground with all stakeholders in the accountability system. In doing so, the CPC 
agreed to some softening of language pertaining to the authority of the CPC that was preferred by 
other stakeholders, while holding the line on certain key points. Any further dilution of the CPC's 
authority is of deep concern. It cannot be optional for SPD, OPA or the OIG to engage with the 
CPC, and the CPC’s system oversight role must be clearly spelled out in law to send that 
message and ensure it actually happens. An accountability structure which does not give 
authority to the community based oversight entity to evaluate the professional-based oversight 
system is out of step with the national direction and the sentiment of communities, and may harm 
the perceived legitimacy of the system. In sum, a community-based oversight body that that is 
purely advisory, provides only “input” to other decision-makers, and has no formal role in policy 
development or in evaluating the efficacy of the accountability system and its components would 
fall well short of community expectations and be out of step with practices elsewhere in the 
nation” (Document No. 332-1, p. 7). 
973 In its brief, the CPC argued that “[p]reparation and adoption of the proposed accountability 
reform legislation does not in itself compromise collective bargaining. The City can defend this 
approach successfully before PERC [Public Employment Relations Commission],” and 
recommended that “The Court should monitor the PERC proceedings to guard against conflicts 
with the Consent Decree process” (U.S. v Seattle, Document No. 346-1, p. 3 & 5). 
974 The CPC expressed concerns about the proffered Body Worn Camera policy in two areas: 1) 
the Commission agreed with the Monitor that “officers should not be allowed to view BWC video 
prior to giving a statement or interview about what transpired in cases that involve the use of 
force” and 2) the CPC recommended that the policy “be revised to not allow BWC recording of 
questioning of victims, suspects, or witnesses” (U.S v. Seattle, Document No. 377-1, p. 1). 
975 The CPC asked the Court to approve the City’s new Accountability Ordinance. “The CPC 
respectfully requests that the Court issue an order holding that nothing in the ordinance is 
inconsistent with the Consent Decree. The ordinance is a major improvement in Seattle’s 
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Date Event Author/Reference 
October 13, 2017 CPC Response to City’s Motion to Declare 
It in Full and Effective Compliance and to 
Monitor’s Compliance Status Report. (U.S. 
v. Seattle, Document No. 421).976 
Harriett Walden, Co-Chair 
Isaac Ruiz, Co-Chair 
Enrique Gonzalez, Co-Chair 
December 8, 2017 CPC Letter to Judge Robart Regarding 
Force Review Board findings in shooting 
of Charleena Lyles and agreement 
between the City of Seattle and the Seattle 
Police Management Association (SPMA), 
specifically concerning arbitration. (U.S. v. 
Seattle, Document Nos. 435 & 435-1).977 
Harriett Walden, Co-Chair 
Isaac Ruiz, Co-Chair 
Enrique Gonzalez, Co-Chair 
October 30, 2018 CPC Letter to Judge Robart arguing that 
the SPOG Tentative Agreement (contract) 
was not in compliance with the Consent 
Decree. (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 
493-1). 
Harriett Walden, Co-Chair 
Isaac Ruiz, Co-Chair 
Enrique Gonzalez, Co-Chair 
February 20, 2019 CPC Response to Order to Show Cause. 
(U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 531).978 
David Perez, Esq. on behalf of 
the CPC 
 
accountability system and passes the “three levels of scrutiny” identified by the Court in that it 
moves the City toward policing (1) that complies with the Constitution; (2) that allows police to be 
effective; and (3) that the people of the community can have confidence in” (U.S. v. Seattle, 
Document No. 402, pp. 2-3). 
976 The CPC supported the City’s Motion to be Found in Compliance and put on record the need 
for the SPD to “move[] beyond what was required by the Consent Decree in existing areas of 
work” to include “Enforcement Patterns in Stops and Detentions in Certain Enforcement 
Practices. … Opening the Agenda of the Crisis Intervention Committee to Community-Identified 
Concerns, … Critically Examine Training on Taser Use and on Engaging Individuals Armed with 
Knives. … [and] Explore Alternatives to Internal Investigation of Serious Uses of Force.” The CPC 
also identified the need for the SPD to address additional areas to include, secondary 
employment, the “complainant appeal process,” demonstration policing issues, “being responsive 
to emergent community issues,” “coercive interrogation techniques, and “Compliance with Court 
Rule 3.1 on Access to Counsel for Individuals in Custody.” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 421). 
The CPC was quite prescient when it came to being concerned about “demonstration policing 
issues,” which was, in fact, the issue that derailed the SPD from even pursuing its 2020 motion to 
dismiss portions of the Consent Decree. 
977 The CPC was invited by the Judge to comment on these issues. The CPC recommended the 
City still be found in full compliance, although it expressed an interest in an external review 
process for police shootings and noted that the SPMA contract was not completely consistent 
with the Accountability Ordinance: “The SPMA contract differs in some important respects from 
the accountability ordinance. However, we were glad to see that it incorporates certain core 
components of the ordinance, particularly those that touch on SPMA’s ‘body of work,’ accepting 
the transfer of all supervisory positions in the Office of Police Accountability (OPA) from sworn 
officers to civilians” (U.S v. Seattle, Document No. 435-1, pp. 1-2). 
978 The CPC recommended that the City be found out-of-compliance with the Consent Decree, 
requesting that “[t]he Court [] make clear that fixing what has gone off track with the CBAs, and 
undoing the impediments they embed to the intended reform of Seattle’s police accountability 
system, is a necessary precondition to a successful resolution of the Consent Decree process” 
(U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 531, p. 26). 
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Date Event Author/Reference 
August 19, 2019 CPC’s Response to City’s Stipulated 
Motion to Approve Proposed 
Accountability Methodology. (U.S. v 
Seattle, Document No. 581).979 
David Perez, Esq. on behalf of 
the CPC 
January 6, 2020  CPC’s Response to 21CP’s Assessment 
of Police Accountability. (U.S. v Seattle, 
Document No. 602).980 
David Perez, Esq. on behalf of 
the CPC 
June 9, 2020 Motion by CPC for Order to Show Cause 
why City should not be found “further out 
of compliance” with Consent Decree. (U.S. 
v. Seattle, Document 622).981 
CPC 
 
7.7.4. Police Accountability 
Virtually all participants agreed that the police accountability system was, is and 
always has been broken in one way or another. And in fact, there was also general 
recognition that the reform process would likely have gone better if police accountability 
issues had been included in the Consent Decree. Although Judge Robart eventually 
ruled that, in fact, SPD accountability systems were necessarily part of the Court’s 
 
979 The CPC was critical of the City’s methodology asserting that “the first part of the City’s 
proposal is redundant with past efforts and lacks the commitment necessary for the City to 
achieve real reform” and that “a nationwide survey is unnecessary and counterproductive. 
Equivalency to other cities is not a metric to determine compliance with the Consent Decree” 
(U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 581, pp. 5 & 7). 
980 The CPC was critical of the findings of the consultant group, hired by the City to evaluate its 
police accountability scheme: “According to the City, the 21CP Assessment ‘concludes that 
Seattle’s disciplinary and oversight system is working as intended,’ and that there may be some 
areas ‘in which the system could benefit from improvement.’ … The CPC disagrees. The City’s 
synopsis is contrary to the Court’s conclusion that there is a ‘critical need for reform to that 
[accountability] regime’” (U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 602, p. 2). 
981 The CPC agreed with the City’s motion to withdraw its request for the dismissal of portions of 
the Consent Decree. The CPC argued that “A) The Court found the City out of compliance on the 
issue of accountability … B) Over the past year, the City failed to formulate a methodology to 
achieve compliance on the issue of accountability. C) Ignoring its obligation to achieve 
compliance on accountability, the City moved to end federal oversight. Two weeks later, George 
Floyd was murdered, and widespread protests ensued. … This is not the time to end federal 
oversight of policing in Seattle.” Further, the CPC argued that: “Paragraphs 69-168 cannot be 
terminated while the City remains out of compliance on accountability because they remain 
important for the Court’s analysis of accountability changes.” 
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assessment of overall compliance with the Consent Decree (although over the objection 
of the City and the DOJ),982 the road to get to that point was, once again, rocky. 
Ongoing problems with police accountability resulted in the creation of the 1999 
Citizen Review Panel which recommended the creation of the Office of Police 
Accountability (OPA) and the 2008 Police Accountability Review Panel which 
recommended improvements to the OPA system. Problems were further highlighted 
when in February 2014, incoming interim Chief Harry Bailey reversed the discipline 
previously imposed by interim Chief Pugel in seven cases (Seattle Times, 2/27/2014). 
Eventually, however, it was the act of an arbitrator, overturning of the termination of an 
officer ordered by Chief O’Toole in a videotaped excessive force case that resulted in 
the City being found partially out-of-compliance with the Consent Decree. At one point in 
time, the staff of Mayor Murray reported spending most of their time on police 
disciplinary issues. 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the implementation process, as it 
related to the CPC, was with respect to police accountability. The CPC was given the job 
of evaluating Seattle’s oversight program and coming up with recommendations for any 
necessary changes to the accountability system. However, as noted by more than one 
participant, a negative result of failing to include accountability in the Settlement 
Agreement was the relegation of this issue to the status of “the bastard step-child of the 
reform family.” While the SPD and the City spent its energy on consent decree 
compliance, work on the accountability structures was left behind. Then, when the CPC 
came forward with an Accountability Ordinance, “suddenly, the Monitor and the Court 
showed interest in the issue” and “the wheels feel off the bus.” Even after the 
Accountability Ordinance was approved, significant portions were undermined during the 
negotiations of the new SPOG contract. With Judge Robart’s finding of non-compliance 
on May 21, 2019, the status of consent decree compliance overall now remains an 
unresolved issue. 
 
982 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 562, filed 5/21/2019. “Order finding City of Seattle Partially Out 
of Compliance with the Consent Decree.” 
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7.8. Seattle Consent Decree Implementation – The Police 
Unions 
“Police officers also bring an important voice to the reform process. 
Their views, whether presented through their labor organizations or 
through other channels, should inform the development of the reform 
effort and its implementation.”  
Seattle Consent Decree, paragraph 5. 
  
7.8.1. Seattle Police Union Issues 
The involvement of the Seattle Police Officer’s Guild (SPOG) in hindering and 
opposing police accountability efforts is replete in the history of the SPD. While the 
history of consent decree implementation as impacted by the SPD unions has already 
been discussed in prior chapters, the words of the union representatives and study 
participants, as they relate to union involvement in the reform efforts, provide a complex 
picture of rank-and-file engagement in the Consent Decree process. 
In his first semi-annual report, filed with the court on April 26 2013,983 the Monitor 
noted that the police unions “thus far have failed to play a constructive role in word and 
deed” and that “[a] part of the SPD, mostly but not exclusively within the union-organized 
ranks, remains ‘dug in’ and continues to resist the force and implications of the Settle 
Agreements” (Seattle Monitor, 1st Semi-annual Report, pp. 2-3, 5).  
By June, 2013, however, the Seattle Times was reporting that SPOG appeared 
to be “striking a [more] conciliatory tone” with “the head of the Seattle police union urging 
members to accept federally mandated police reforms, saying it was time to put aside 
complaints and ‘move forward’ with the changes” (Seattle Times, 6/20/2013).984 This 
new tone appeared to coincide with the resignation of Chief Diaz and the appointment of 
Interim Chief Jim Pugel who was appointed by Mayor McGinn, effective April 8, 2013 
(Seattle Times, 4/11/2013). 
 
983 U.S. v. Seattle, Document No. 71. 
984 Miletich, S. (2013, June 20). Let’s Move on Reforms. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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According to the Times, the SPOG President, Rich O’Neill, wrote an article to the 
membership in the June issue of the union’s newsletter telling his membership that: “Our 
job is to adapt to the change in a healthy way so we can remain safe and not turn into an 
old grump who only wants to talk about ‘the good old days.’” Interestingly, this was only 
two months after O’Neill referred to the union’s “need to survive ‘DOJ Dark Days” in the 
April version of the newsletter: “At that time, he asserted the Justice Department 
investigation that led to the settlement had proved to be false and ‘lacks credibility’” 
(Seattle Times, 6/20/2013). O’Neill who had been SPOG president since 2006,985 was 
known for his outspoken ways and controversial statements, his “tumultuous relationship 
with City leaders,” (Seattle Times, 4/16/2015) and his willingness to stand behind officers 
who had committed misconduct (The Stranger, 4/6/2011). In addition, however, O’Neill 
was also known for his willingness to “accept reforms in exchange for more money for 
his members” (Seattle Times, 1/30/2019).986 
At that same time that O’Neill began offering a more conciliatory tone, SPOG 
was also exerting “enormous” pressure on Pugel to overturn discipline previously 
imposed in a number of cases by Chief Diaz (The Stranger, 4/16/2014). And, when 
Mayor Murray demoted Chief Pugel in January 2014 and replaced him with retired 
Assistant Chief Harry Bailey, research participants described the Bailey tenure as a “hay 
day” for the union, which saw discipline overturned and union supporters promoted 
amongst the command staff. 
By early 2014, however, O’Neill retired, leaving Ron Smith as the new SPOG 
President.987 Smith quickly became known for his collaborative approach to union-
management issues and his approach appeared to work particularly well with Chief 
O’Toole. After O’Toole was appointed in June 2014, Smith appeared to have developed 
a strong working relationship with her, to the point that he had to withstand criticism from 
 
985 See, https://seattlepoliceofficers.org/thank-you/spog-past-presidents/. 
986 Miletich, S. (2019, January 30). Controversial Seattle Police Union Leader to Retire, then 
Return in Bigger Role. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com.  
987 O’Neill retired from the SPD in January 2019, and then joined SPOG as a civilian to “handle 
the union’s most critical duties: overseeing news media inquiries, grievances filed with the 
department, disciplinary appeals and future contract negotiations” (Seattle Times, 1/30/19). 
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other officers for his collaborative approach (Seattle Times, 4/16/2015).988 According to 
Smith, however, 
I would be a fool to waste the opportunity to try and work with the very first 
police chief in decades willing to sit down with labor. When she pisses me 
off or does something wrong, I’ll be the first to stand up against her … My 
predecessor, and those before him, had no opportunity to work with the 
chiefs of police because they marginalized the union. They were forced to 
do nothing other than file grievances and unfair labor practices … Chief 
O’Toole has a different way of doing business; she is collaborative. (Seattle 
Times, 4/16/2015) 
By February 2015, Smith was being quoted as saying that officers who had 
problems with Seattle politics “had the option to ‘leave and go to a place that serves your 
worldview’” (The Stranger, 2/18/2015;989 Seattle Times, 4/16/2015). 
Study participants described the period of Smith’s tenure, from April 2014 
through July 2016 as one of unprecedented cooperation between police management 
and the union.990 Unfortunately for Smith, in July 2016, he wrote what became a 
controversial Facebook post about the shooting of five Dallas officers.991 Smith resigned 
from his position shortly thereafter. According to Smith, however, he believed he was 
forced out of his position by the SPOG Board due to “his pragmatic approach to federally 
mandate reforms, his collaborative relationship with Police Chief Kathleen O’Toole and 
his acceptance of accountability measures as part of a tentative contract with the city” 
 
988 As reported by the Times: “During his meetings with officers he represents as the leader of the 
Seattle Police Officers’ Guild, Sgt. Ron Smith has become all too familiar with criticism of his 
dealings with department leadership. ‘Bootlicker’ is how one officer described his relationship with 
Police Chief Kathleen O’Toole at a guild meeting earlier this spring.” 
989 Herz, A. (2015, February 18). Seattle Police Union President to Cops: Get with the Times or 
Get Out of the City. The Stranger. Retrieved from https://www.thestranger.com. 
990 Even so, in September 2015, The Stranger newspaper was reporting on articles in The 
Guardian, the SPOG newsletter that were “racist and anti-reform.” It was also reported that “[i]n 
the March issue of The Guardian, former SPOG president Rich O'Neill wrote that SPOG 
president Ron Smith's comments about the need for a culture change within SPD to The Stranger 
were ‘completely taken out of context’” (The Stranger, 9/23/2015). 
991 The post read: “Dallas PD and their officers are in our thoughts and prayers.... The hatred of 
law enforcement by a minority movement is disgusting... Heads in swivels brothers and 




(Seattle Times, 7/15/2016).992 The SPOG Board contradicted that claim in their news 
release announcing Smith’s removal, stating that, 
Detective Smith was not removed from office because the board of 
directors is against reform in the Seattle Police Department. This 
misrepresentation of facts may have led the Guild Membership and the 
Seattle Community to believe that the Guild is against reform. The Seattle 
Police Officers’ Guild has always and will continue to work collaboratively 
with the Seattle Police Department and the City of Seattle in the reform 
process. (Seattle Times, 7/15/2016) 
According to a number of research participants, however, SPOG Board members were 
simply “lying in wait,” looking for an opportunity to oust Smith, who was, in fact, 
perceived as being “in bed” with Chief O’Toole and who were motivated to “take back” 
the union from his collaborative leadership model.993 
Smith was replaced by the Union Vice President, Kevin Stuckey, who filled out 
his term and served as the SPOG President until he was ousted by a “hardline” 
candidate, Mike Solan, in early 2020. Stuckey became known for fostering SPOG’s 
relationship with other unions and engendering their support for SPOG contract 
negotiations. However, prior SPOG President Rich O’Neill continued to serve in the 
union as its Vice President where, according to research participants, he exerted power 
behind the scenes and led the union’s contract negotiations. 
How far SPOG’s willingness to participate in the reform effort swung back from 
the collaboration of Ron Smith to its new President Mike Solan is probably best identified 
by comparing the ads posted on You Tube by Stuckey and Solan during their race for 
 
992 Lee, J. (2016, July 15). Police guild votes to oust president now. Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.seattletimes.com. 
993 According to one community member participant: “The police union actually behaved well at 
the beginning. Mayor McGinn was resisting, Chief Diaz was resisting, community activists were 
resistant, and the DOJ was being ridiculous. But Ron Smith, the leader of the Guild was a 
visionary. He got turffed out…he ended up being a tragic figure. Smith appointed Kevin Stuckey 
to the CPC. They were progressive change leaders within the police union. Ultimately after Dallas 
shooting, Smith made a comment that people shooting cops were part of a minority movement; 
there was a big attack from the left and an opportunistic move from the right to take advantage of 
it and take over. Since then, Stuckey has been puppet of Rich O’Neil, who is a throwback to the 
old days and it evolved into a resurgence of the thug culture. All of this happened with the Monitor 
and Judge Robart oblivious. They have treated SPAG the same since day one…” 
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the SPOG Presidency in early 2020. Stucky staked out a moderate position,994 while 
Solan painted himself as a hardline opponent to police reform efforts.995 
Some participants blamed the failure of the Department to send out positive 
messages, particularly before and after the tenure of Chief O’Toole, as a reason for the 
election of a “hardliner” as the union President, explaining that “there was no proactive, 
positive messaging going on.” Another participant put it in the form of a question:  
 
994 Stuckey’s YouTube Video, posted December 8, 2019, provided the following message to the 
SPOG membership: “I’m Kevin Stuckey. I’m President of the Seattle Police Officer’s guild. Today, 
I am announcing that I am running for re-election for the President of the Seattle Police Officer’s 
Guld. Now, the election is not until the end of the year, however I thought I would take a moment 
to tell you how important is it that we continue the stability that we have. When I took over 3 and a 
half years ago, it wasn’t easy. Our organization was in crisis and in need of bold leadership.  
Changes had to be made. I brought back Rich O’Neil and I brought back our long-time attorneys 
Vick, Julius, McClure who have worked on all our labor contracts. We sat down and renegotiated 
a contract that originally had the largest “no” vote in the history of our organization. And, within a 
few months, we turned that around into the largest “yes” vote in the history of our organization. 
Now, we’re again facing a new contract. However, with the team we’ve put together, I’m confident 
we can continue to make gains. But the only way we can do this is by continuing to build on the 
relationships I’ve built within the labor movement. The most important thing, as President of this 
organization, is for me to fight for your wages, your benefits and your working conditions. There’s 
nothing else that a union can do other than to get your contract and to defend it. I’m Kevin 
Stuckey and I would be honored to earn your vote. Honored to earn your vote and to continue 
doing the job that you already hired me to do.” Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3jkNRsOW3gE. 
995 Solan’s YouTube message to the SPOG membership, posted on November 6, 2019, 
contained the following message: “On February 7, 2019, two Seattle police officers were involved 
in a deadly shooting that resulted in the death of a suspect. In an unprecedented move, SPAG 
Vice President Mike Solan improvises a press conference at the scene supporting the officers’ 
actions and quickly capturing the narrative. This marks a new chapter in SPAG media relations, 
as Solan’s message is fully embraced by the SPAG membership, thwarting the anti-police activist 
agenda that is driving Seattle’s politics. I am Mike Solan and I am running for the SPAG 
Presidency to chart a much-needed new course of leadership in our police union. I believe the 
purpose of a police union is to fight: fight for your rights, fight for your respect and fight for your 
contract. Police officers now are being held to an unreasonable standard and the scrutiny is 
immense. My course of action will lead us to fundamentally change the activist narrative that 
negatively impacts our profession, not only locally but nationally. I will do this by driving our own 
narrative.  Our narrative will restore respect to our profession, protect our CBA and restore 
confidence within our membership so that we can all feel that our oath of service was indeed 
noble.” 
[0:52-0:56: shows black faced masked protesters holding sign that says: “#sayhername Black 
Lives Matter.”] 
[0:57-1:13: shows police officers in riot gear firing less lethal (shotguns and pepper spray 
canisters) at crowd of protestors, pushing protestors back with bikes and arresting protestors.] 
“Please help me and vote for Mike Solan as your next SPAG President.  It’s time to get serious.” 
Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6cJQ1XBH8M.  
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the union and the rank and file? How could they not be resistant where 
there was a lack of procedural justice and lack of transparency?996 How 
could they not be vocal and defensive and not defend their members when 
individual officers were under attack? 
From the union perspective, the Consent Decree implementation period was, 
 a difficult union environment. The Department had no flexibility to deal with 
any proposal the unions put forward – they got stonewalled – they were 
told “this is what the judge wants, … this is what the Monitoring Team 
wants” and there was always a legal defense to anything the Department 
wanted to do.  
Further, officers were described by union-oriented research participants as “weary … 
like a dog you keep hitting … eventually you raise your hand and they cower.” 
From a reformer’s perspective, however, it was believed that the police unions 
had too much power and that they “stood in the way of there being permanent progress 
in oversight;” participants believed that the unions needed (and still need) “to be brought 
to heel” with more than one participant suggesting that has not yet happened. In fact, 
numerous participants noted Mayor Durkan’s willingness to compromise on significant 
aspects of the Accountability Ordinance in her administration’s negotiations with the 
union and her willingness to paint the new contract as in compliance with the Consent 
Decree (when it was not) as a key indicator of the political powers of the police unions.  
In addition, the City Council, which voted to ratify Durkan’s police union 
contracts, was also in a difficult political position when it came to contract negotiations 
with the union. As observed by one political insider: 
the context of the contract negotiations made everything very politically 
charged; we were already several years behind, owed $40 million in 
backpay and subjected to a narrative that officers were leaving the 
department because not having a contract was demoralizing. There was 
political pressure to get the contract approved, which would require 
compromises be made; compromises that otherwise would not have been 
acceptable to anyone interested in actual police reform. 
The ongoing issue for Judge Robart, the DOJ, the Monitor, and the CPC related 
to the apparent ability of SPOG, over and over again, to resist reform through their 
 
996 Another SPD officer commented that “It was almost like the DOJ did not use the procedural 
justice that they insisted the police use…” 
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contract negotiations. As noted by the first OPA Director, Sam Pailca (who served in that 
capacity from 2001 through 2007) in a Facebook comment posted on September 21, 
2020: 
Over and over again, hard-fought and fundamental elements of 
accountability are rolled back, diluted, obstructed, or fully eviscerated in 
police union contracts. Accountability and effective discipline systems 
aren’t working conditions to be horse-traded in bargaining; they’re minimum 
requirements rightfully set by the community.997 
Issues relating to police union contract negotiations impeding police 
accountability are not limited to Seattle. As noted by Hardaway, police contract issues 
also impacted consent decree implementation in Portland, New Orleans, Cleveland and 
Baltimore (Hardaway, 2019, citing, Rushin, 2017b [“analyzing 178 police union contracts 
to illustrate how they impede accountability efforts”]. 
In Seattle in late 2014, however, SPOG, in a brilliant strategic move, joined the 
King County Labor Coalition, which subsequently “fought on [SPOG’s] behalf ever since. 
Labor council representatives even hosted a press conference in 2018, calling on the 
Seattle City Council to ratify a new contract with the police union” (Crosscut.com, 
6/4/2020). It was only after the April 2020 protests against police abuse gained traction, 
that SPOG was eventually kicked out of the King County Labor Coalition by a vote on 
June 17, 2020 (Crosscut.com, 6/17/2020).998 
Even so, study participants overwhelmingly believed that it would have been 
useful to have the unions involved early on.999 One participant suggested that  
 
997 Sam Pailca, Facebook Post, September 21, 2020. 
998 Kroman, D. (2020, June 17). King County Labor Council expels Seattle Police Union. 
Crosscut.com. [“The vote comes amid ongoing protests and weeks of pressure from community 
advocates and some union members”]. 
999 As previously noted, in Chapter 7.3.4, the DOJ has previously included police unions as 
parties in two Section 14141 actions (see, Amended Memorandum of Agreement Between the 
United States Department of Justice and the City of Buffalo, New York and the Buffalo Police 
Department, and the Police Benevolent Association, Inc. July 9, 2007. Retrieved from 
https://perma.cc/7WGA-RV2Q; and Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States 
Department of Justice, Montgomery County, Maryland, the Montgomery County Department of 
Police, and the Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc. Retrieved from 
https://perma.cc/44US-AELU. In general, however, the DOJ tends to oppose motions to intervene 
(Simmons, 2008, pp. 519-520). 
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if the Consent Decree had been negotiated with some union participation 
by reasonable people and the union’s concerns on the table and 
considered, perhaps we would not have had the craziness we experienced 
at the front end of the implementation effort. 
The issue of involving police unions in the early stages of §14141 actions has 
been the subject of substantial debate amongst academics and commentators. Early 
opinions expressed by Chiefs of Police of affected jurisdictions (particularly Pittsburgh 
and Washington D.C.) supported the concept of excluding unions from the process due 
to the potential for them to “delay” or “derail” the process (see Chanin, 2014, pp. 178, 
311; Chanin, 2017a, p. 264). However, academics have tended to support a more 
collaborative and cooperative vision, wherein union participation could have a positive 
overall impact on reform efforts, with particular note having been taken of Cincinnati’s 
collaborative effort in that regard (see, for example, Simmons, 2008; Chanin, 2014, p. 
47; Rushin 2015, p. 115; Rushin & Edwards, 2017, p. 773; and, Chanin, 2017a, p. 265 
[positively commenting on union participation in the negotiation and implementation 
process as it related to the Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement]).1000 In Chanin’s most 
recent publication on this issue, Chanin & Sheats (2018) recognized the positive 
potential for including rank and file officers in the 
early phases of DOJ intervention, including both the initial investigation and 
the negotiation of settlement terms [as] a worthwhile first step, [along with] 
the creation of a forum where affected officers may engage directly with 
DOJ staff and other relevant stakeholders. (p. 120) 
One city research participant did note that SPOG was invited to voluntarily 
participate in the Consent Decree hearings, but they declined, largely due to the concern 
that they would have “lost” in front of Judge Robart; the union believed it was in a much 
stronger position bargaining with the City than it would be by putting itself at the mercy of 
 
1000 Chanin (2017a) strongly argued for more inclusion of stakeholders in the negotiation of 
settlement agreements: “By formally including union and civil rights groups in the negotiation 
process, police management and jurisdictional political leaders would be forced to acknowledge 
and address opposition to the process before an agreement is in place, rather than during or after 
implementation. This makes much less likely the occurrence of two problems that have 
undermined efforts to reach sustainable change in places like Washington DC, where union 
groups continue to litigate in an effort to repeal parts of the settlement, and Pittsburgh, where 
members of the civil rights community lost sight of the reform effort to the detriment of lasting 
reform. What is more, the ability to participate in the implementation process, facilitated, for 
example, by an invitation to participate in regular status meetings, would provide these groups 
continued access to the reform effort while giving them a voice and the ability to shape the terms 
of compliance” (p. 266). 
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a federal judge.1001 It was also observed that Seattle City Attorney Pete Holmes had 
expressed, on numerous occasions, a desire to bring the union in as a party, with the 
hope that it would have reduced their ability to be disruptive of the reform effort, 
particularly through otherwise secret contract negotiations. In fact, study participants 
commented that Holmes got attacked by SPOG as a result, with a full-page newspaper 
advertisement, and that he lost the endorsement of the labor counsel in his next election 
campaign. 
Research participants also commented that there was “lots of misinformation out 
there” amongst the rank-and-file officers. Some pointed out that SPD command initially 
communicated issues relating to the Consent Decree to officers in either a poor manner 
or not at all. Only when Chief O’Toole took over did the communications become more 
positive and supportive. At the same time, however, some participants blamed the 
implementation process itself for ensuring rank and file officers would quickly become 
disenchanted with reforms:  
They just rolled out new program after new program, new policy after 
new policy – and the narrative became that it was just to make DOJ and 
the Monitor happy. So, instead of getting a full narrative, the rank and 
file would just become frustrated over time. 
Over the course of implementation, research participants observed that the 
Monitor and the DOJ argued that best practices in force reporting and investigations 
(and the existence of body-worn cameras) would inure to the benefit of good officers in 
that it would provide “a record” that would allow them to defend themselves against 
complaints and lead to credible exonerations when they followed their training and SPD 
policy. Numerous SPD research participants, however, dismissed that suggestion, 
pointing out that prior to such techniques being put into place, officers would seldom 
face discipline. With those tools in place, however, more officers would be disciplined; 
thereby suggesting that it would be impossible to convince line officers that any 
accountability-related reforms would actually benefit to them overall. 
 
1001 According to one participant, one of the reasons the union did not join or support the law suit 
filed by the group of officers fighting the implementation of the use-of-force policy, was the fear 
that doing so might result in the union being named a party in the Consent Decree litigation. 
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In addition, while the Monitor lauded the department for its increase in internal 
complaints against officers (4th Systemic Assessment, p. 21),1002 other study participants 
reported that “at one point 60% of the department was under investigation” which they 
perceived to be “evidence of a broken system.” 
One SPD participant suggested that reformists consistently underestimated the 
power of SPOG. As an example, the participant referred to the “leak” of information 
pertaining to a video that was embarrassing to Interim Chief Pugel, a perceived 
supporter of reform, by the union (Seattle Times, 4/26/2013). One well-placed SPD 
participant described it as a “shot over the bow,” by SPOG, indicating that they still had 
“the files.”  
Other research participants noted that at one point in the implementation 
process, the Training Division started sending out two-page training memos, that while 
received well by some, were ultimately “shut down by the union.” 
By July 2016, with SPOG President Ron Smith being forced to resign and the 
union membership resoundingly rejecting the contract negotiated by Smith’s 
administration (Seattle Times, 7/21/2016),1003 according to one City-insider: 
 the big unknown at the time was what to do about the police union and 
how it would impact the reform process … the union wanted to ‘stick it’ 
to the reform process and was looking to use the Consent Decree 
process as a way to do that. 
Later, it became clear to City insiders that SPOG President, Kevin Stuckey “could not 
deliver” on a new contract which would be consistent with the proposed Accountability 
Ordinance, approved by Council on May 21, 2017 (Seattle Times, 5/23/2017). In fact, 
one insider suggested that “the biggest failure was in not understanding how 
dysfunctional the police union was.” It was only when the membership rejected the 
 
1002 The Monitor reported that as of the writing of his report (January 2016) about 39% of OPA 
complaints were initiated from within the SPD, which was “a remarkable number given that, 
during DOJ’s 2011 investigation, internal complaints were ‘rare to non-existent’” (Fourth Systemic 
Assessment, p. 21). 
1003 “Only 156 police officers voted in favor of the contract offer, while 823 were opposed, a 
source said” (Seattle Times, 7/21/2016). According to research participants, and news articles, 
SPOG Vice-President, Rich O’Neil was largely responsible for organizing opposition to the 
proposed contract (see, Seattle Times, 1/30/2019). 
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proposed contract that City leadership realized the real challenges that would be 
involved in obtaining a new contract. 
It was also pointed out that the Accountability Ordinance put the union in a 
difficult position. According to one union insider: “There were things in the Accountability 
Ordinance that no police union in the country would agree to. Binding arbitration, all 
police agencies in Washington have it. How in the world could anyone expect the union 
to give that up?” The argument in favor of the city accepting the contract recognized that 
there were improvements in accountability as it related to the contract – “but if you put it 
against the CPC wish list, it looks a lot less satisfactory.” 
From the union perspective, for the first two years, “policies were seeming to 
change on almost a daily basis.” The rank and file were described as “feeling like 
everything was a witch hunt” with officers being expected to comply with policies after 
having only minimal training or notice. “We became the ills of the world … in order to 
solve racism in the City, we had to reform the police department.” Officers were 
described as being fatigued by the lack of public support and the “constant suggestions 
of the Monitor, the Judge and the DOJ that there was still a long way to go…” 
7.8.2. Seattle Police Union Involvement in the Implementation 
Process 
The two Seattle police unions, the Seattle Police Officer’s Guild (SPOG), 
representing officers and Sergeants, and the Seattle Police Management Association 
(SPMA), representing captains and lieutenants, have had (particularly through their 
contract negotiations with the City of Seattle) a significant impact on police accountability 
reform challenges identified over the years. In fact, virtually all study participants 
identified the police unions and their contracts as being a primary reason for the creation 
of a Seattle police culture that, ultimately, led to the DOJ investigation and the imposition 
of the Consent Decree. 
The 1999 Citizen Review Panel Report (authored, in part, by then-private 
attorney Jenny Durkan), addressed issues relating to the then-existing contract between 
SPOG and the City. The panel reported it’s “firm conviction that the investigation of 
police misconduct is one of the chief responsibilities of Department management and 
should be governed by the best investigative practices, not collective bargaining.” The 
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panel then went on to recommend twelve amendments to the SPOG contract to include 
such basic powers as the ability to interview officers face-to-face and to conduct 
investigations outside of the four corners of the original complaint.1004 
In the 2007 Police Accountability Review Board Report Final Report (which also 
included Jenny Durkan as an author), and which reviewed the Office of Professional 
 
1004 The Panel made the following specific recommendations for amendments to the SPOG 
contract: 
“In the course of any investigation, be the allegation a violation of Department regulation or a 
violation of law, the Department may, in the· discretion of the investigator, conduct a personal 
face-to-face interview of the subject employee and any potential witnesses” [Manual Section 
1.121.X.A and B; SPOGA Sec. 3.5]. 
“The Department will not be obligated to submit in advance to the employee the questions the 
investigator intends to ask during an interview” [Manual Section 1.121 .X.B; SPOGA Sec. 
3.7.D.2.]. 
“During the interview of an employee as part of an US investigation, the investigator will be 
authorized to inquire about any rule or law violation discovered during the course of the interview, 
regardless of whether it is related to the subject of the investigation” [Manual Section 1.121.X.C; 
SPOGA Sec. 3.7.D.3.]. 
“There shall be no limitation on the number of investigative complaints which would give rise to 
the initiation of an administrative review [SPOGA 3 .5). Department management shall be allowed 
to conduct an administrative review of an officer whenever it has reason to believe circumstances 
warrant.” 
“While the confidentiality of IIS [Internal Investigation Section] files during the course of an 
investigation must be maintained, it is in the public interest to treat these files as public records 
and to make them available to interested members of the public after redactions are made, 
pursuant the law set forth in Cowles Publishing v. State Patrol, 109 Wn2d 712, 748 P.2d 597 
(1988).” [SPOGA Sec. 3.7.J.). 
“Since IIS files are beneficial to the Department and the employee, they shall be maintained 
permanently” [SPOGA Sec. 3.7.K.] 
“Any voluntary, non-compelled statement made by a Department employee during any Complaint 
Hearing may he used against that employee in a criminal prosecution” [SPOGA 3.6.1.). 
“All employees will be expected and obligated to assist in any Department investigation and to 
answer all questions truthfully. Any false statement made by an employee should be the subject 
of discipline and, depending upon the circumstances, may be used against that employee.” 
“In the case of criminal investigation or prosecution of an employee, any disciplinary hearing 
should be deferred until the criminal matter is completed.” 
“Any employee who receives the discipline of suspension will not be allowed to exchange 
vacation, holiday or compensatory time for the suspension” [SPOGA Sec. 3.6.N.]. 
“For the sake of continuity, the citizen member appointed by the Mayor to Complaint Advisory 
Boards should be the same person. The employee should not use a peremptory challenge for 
that citizen member” [SPOGA Sec. 3.6.D.]. 
“Either the Department or the employee may record the Complaint Advisory Board hearing” 
[SPOGA Sec. 3.6.G.]. 
Citizen Review Panel Final Report. (1999, August 19). Recommendation No. 19, pp. 30-32. 
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Accountability structure (created as a result of the 1999 Citizen Review Panel Report), 
the police contract was mentioned only once; with a recommendation to allow the OPA 
(which replaced the SPD Internal Investigations Section) to complete investigations 
beyond the 180-day limit then required by the SPOG contract. 
As previously noted, in the Monitor’s first Semi-annual Report, filed with the Court 
on April 26, 2013, the Monitor commented that the police unions “thus far have failed to 
play a constructive role in word and deed” and invited the unions to join in the reform 
effort. In addition, the Monitor noted that “[a] part of the SPD, mostly but not exclusively 
within the union-organized ranks, remains ‘dug in’ and continues to resist the force and 
implications of the Settlement Agreement.” The Monitor suggested that “part of the 
cause of this resistance” could be attributed to a failure to adequately explain the 
Consent Decree to command and rank and file officers (1st Semi-annual Report, p. 5). In 
support of this conclusion, the Monitor stated that: “[s]tories and myths have been fed to 
rank-and-file officers without their having received counterbalancing messages from the 
command staff to understand reform as being in the long-term best interests of all 
officers and the Department.” As such, the Monitor made it clear that he expected SPD 
command staff to send a clear message to officers “that the Settlement Agreement is 
here to stay and is not going to be fed to the shredder” (1st Semi-annual Report, p. 6). 
In the Monitor’s 7th Systemic report, relating to force investigation and review and 
released in January 2017, the Monitor noted that a change in police union leadership 
had brought about the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between 
the City and the police unions. As reported by the Monitor, “[t]he new union leadership 
suggested that if there were more money for the rank-and-file, they might take a more 
flexible bargaining position. The Court has made clear that constitutional reforms would 
not be held hostage to monetary demands” (7th Systemic Assessment, p. 4). The Monitor 
also reported that the union representing police Lieutenants and Captains “took a 
different tack” by filing an unfair labor practice claim “that threatens to tie up the reform 
process in endless negotiations and proceedings ricocheting between the state labor 
board and the federal court” (7th Systemic Assessment, pp. 4-5). 
The Monitor concluded on a negative note:  
The Monitoring Team suggested almost a year ago that the SPD could 
reach full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree in late summer 
544 
or early fall 2017. At a status conference in early January 2017, the Court 
estimated that it might be 2018 or beyond before that point is reached – in 
no small part due to a lack of definitive action in the areas briefly described 
here. Indeed, describing the progress on issues related to body cameras, 
union agreements, and the prospective system of “accountability” in Seattle 
as glacial gives glaciers a bad name. (7th Systemic Assessment, p. 5) 
The two unions fought issue-specific battles as they related to various aspects of 
the police-reform agenda. These included the lawsuit filed by 126 Seattle officers 
attempting to halt the implementation of a new SPD use-of-force policy, an attempt by 
SPOG to stop the City from implementing a body-worn camera policy without first 
negotiating a pay increase for officers, an attempt to halt the implementation of the 
entirety of the City’s Police Accountability Ordinance, and an attempt by the SPMA to 
stop the implementation of a new City Ordinance, permitting the Chief of Police to 
appoint Assistant and Deputy Chiefs from outside the SPD. The Accountability 
Ordinance was heavily involved in the negotiation of the SPOG contract, which 
ultimately conflicted with the Ordinance in multiple ways. 
The ultimate death knell of the Court’s finding of “full and effective compliance” 
with the Consent Decree was the new contract with SPOG. As suggested by an article 
published in the progressive news website, Think Progress, “the mayor [gave] her police 
union a pocket veto over key provisions of a year-old overhaul of office discipline, 
prompting vigorous objections from reformers” (10/18/2018).1005 According to the 
Mayor’s Office, the new contract allowed for the creation of the new Inspector General’s 
Office, the elimination of a statute of limitations that restricted officer discipline and union 
buy-in to the new Wearable Camera program (see, Think Progress 10/18/2018; Seattle 
Times, 10/25/20181006). However, it was also pointed out that,  
there are numerous spots in the contract that either explicitly or subtly 
undermine or roll back provisions of the new Inspector General and OPA 
authorities over officers, and in some cases curtail police leadership’s own 
disciplinary authority as laid out in the city law. The 2017 reforms enshrined 
police leaders’ authority to reassign officers for either disciplinary or 
performance-based reasons. The contract pokes holes in that authority, 
forcing supervisors to both provide a formal written notice with evidence 
 
1005 Pyke, A. (2018, October 18). New Seattle police union contract overturns key tenets of police 
accountability law. Think Progress. Retrieved from https://thinkprogress.org/seattle-police-union-
mayor-durkan-police-accountability-law-f587a55e1b9a/. 
1006 Miletich, S. (2018, October 25). Federal Judge sets hearing on Seattle police-union contract. 
Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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supporting their belief an officer is underperforming or harming their unit’s 
work and to give the officer between 30 and 90 days to fix their deficiencies. 
Supervisors can’t move a problem cop outright, despite the city law saying 
they can do exactly that. (Think Progress, 10/18/2018) 
On November 5, 2018, Judge Robart found against the Mayor’s position, 
commenting, in court, that “[w]hen the city takes the position that there’s nothing in there 
that is inconsistent with the Consent Decree, I don’t believe that to be accurate” (The 
Stranger, 11/6/2018). 
7.8.3. The Union Speaks 
Union officials were quite vocal over the course of the DOJ investigation and 
consent decree implementation.1007 The extent of the union’s support or criticism for 
reform and the tone of its message appears to have been dependent on who was 
currently serving as President and his general philosophy of policing and community 
engagement.1008 While the union was initially in lock-step with the Chief and the Mayor in 
criticizing the DOJ investigation, it moved towards a more moderate, supportive public 
position under Chief’s Pugel and O’Toole and then reverted to a more confrontational 
and oppositional position with the election of its hard-line President in 2000:1009 
 
1007 As reported by the Seattle Times after Judge Robart found the City partially out-of-
compliance with the Consent Decree: “SPOG has complained about and fought many of the 
reforms, including the now-required use of body cameras, and bitterly criticized federal oversight 
and the civilian-led Office of Police Accountability (OPA)” (Seattle Times, 5/15/2019). 
1008 Although a constant presence in the union was former President Rich O’Neill, who also 
served as Vice-President and was hired after his retirement as an SPD Sergeant to work as a 
civilian employee of SPOG. As reported by the Seattle Times in June 2017: “During O’Neill’s 
tenure as guild president from 2006 to 2014, he garnered a reputation as a staunch defender of 
collective-bargaining rights who worked tirelessly for his members. But he alienated people in city 
government and the community with comments that excessive-force complaints had been 
overblown, and SPOG’s newspaper, The Guardian, published articles bitterly attacking the 
Justice Department. In 2013, after the federal reforms were agreed upon, O’Neill struck a more 
conciliatory tone, saying it was time to put aside complaints and “move forward” with the 
changes” (Seattle Times, 6/22/2017). 
1009 Regardless of the union’s public position, however, participants reported that its behind-the-
scenes negotiation strategy, managed throughout the entire period of implementation by Sgt. 
Rich O’Neill, always remained the same: insist on monetary compensation for any police 
accountability reforms (see, Seattle Times, 9/3/2011 [“The police guild went along with virtually all 
of the 29 changes in its 2008 contract with the city. In exchange, officers won hefty pay raises. 
But the union has continued to be a dissonant voice, even after Kerlikowske left and Diaz became 
chief”]). In addition, study participants observed that both police unions have always aggressively 
protected their members from the imposition of discipline through rigid interpretations of state 
labor protection rights and the aggressive filing of grievances and unfair labor practice claims. 
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As shown in Table 7.18, the union’s public comments primarily defended the right 
of officers to negotiate their working conditions, under state law, regardless of the 
existence of a consent decree. Union leadership would generally argue that externally 
mandated reforms were not really necessary, but that the union was not anti-reform. 
Articles written in the SPOG newsletter, the Guardian, however, would often showcase 
an anti-reform, anti-DOJ and anti-consent decree agenda on the part of active members 
of the union and leadership actions were consistently publicly perceived by the Judge, 
the Monitor, and sometimes the City as reactive and resistant to reform. 
Table 7.18. Public Statements by Seattle Police Unions Over the Course of the 
Consent Decree 
Date Statement 
August 20, 1999 J.D. Miller, Vice President of SPOG, in response to Citizens Review Panel 
Final Report: “said he was ‘pleased the panel spent a bunch of time’ looking 
into the department and concluded that corruption is not a rampant problem. 
As for its criticism of union practices, Miller noted that ‘We don't negotiate our 
contract with the panel’” (Seattle Times, 8/9/1999).1010 
2007-2008 “’We have a squeaky-clean Police Department compared to other big cities,’ 
Sgt. Rich O’Neill, president of the Seattle Police Officers’ Guild, said when the 
department was under scrutiny in 2007 and 2008 over its use of force. O’Neill 
said many of the complaints investigated by the department’s internal-
investigation unit ‘would be met with a dial tone if you called another big-city 
department’ … The investigation, O’Neill said, grew out of complaints from a 
small number of groups. ‘But that’s the way it works, the squeaky wheel gets 
the grease,’ he said … McGinn, Diaz and top police commanders failed to 
back officers when it was appropriate, O’Neill added, stressing he has been 
forced to fill the ‘void’ and speak out on officers’ behalf” (Seattle Times, 
9/3/2011). 
April 6, 2011 SPOG President Rich O’Neill in article in union newsletter The Guardian: “It is 
extremely frustrating when individuals with zero police training feel qualified to 
voice their opinions on police actions” (The Stranger, 4/6/2011). 
December 17, 2011 Statement of SPOG President Rich O’Neill: “It is my hope that the DOJ will be 
as cooperative as we have been and allow the police department to examine 
and study the data that helped them come to their conclusions. Officers are 
often put in very difficult and dangerous situations and all they want are clear 
and specific ground rules to guide them when making use of force decisions” 
(Seattle Times, 12/17/2011). 
 
1010 Miletich, S. & Carter, M. (1999, August 20). Citizen Panel Gives Mayor Chief Remedy for 
Seattle Police Problems. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
July 28, 2012 Responding to Settlement Agreement between City and DOJ: “The police 
officers' union, … said it was pleased with the agreement. Although the union 
‘had hoped that the city of Seattle would force the DOJ to go to court to prove 
their allegations, we understand the need to get this issue resolved,’ Sgt. Rich 
O'Neill, president of the Seattle Police Officers’ Guild, said in a statement” 
(Seattle Times, 7/28/2012). 
August 2012 “In the most recent issue of The Guardian, the newspaper published by the 
Seattle Police Officers’ Guild, the lead headline states: ‘Consent Decree does 
not trump labor law’” (Seattle Times, 8/25/2012). 
March 12, 2013 Upon filing for a declaration for injunctive relief in King County Superior Court 
in response to the proposed Monitoring Plan, in a joint news release by SPOG 
and SPMA: “This is about the rights of workers and should not be construed in 
any manner as opposition to police reforms” (Seattle Times, 3/12/2013). 
March 13, 2013 “We’re not trying to trump the reforms, we’re not trying to stand in the way of 
reforms, and many reforms don’t require bargaining, …We won’t be 
obstructionists ... but we have to defend our rights” (Seattle Times, 
3/13/2013a). 
April 2013 “The guild’s vice president, Sgt. Ty Elster, seized on the reports in a blistering 
Guardian article in April, accusing Bobb of ‘plowing ahead while racking up 
expenses to include booze and Egyptian cotton pillow cases for his luxury 
Seattle apartment.’” (Seattle Times, 6/20/2013).  
June 2013 “Striking a conciliatory tone, the head of the Seattle police union is urging 
members to accept federally mandated police reforms, saying it is time to put 
aside complaints and ‘move forward’ with the changes. ‘Our job is to adapt to 
the change in a healthy way so we can remain safe and not turn into an old 
grump who only wants to talk about ‘the good old days,’ Sgt. Rich O’Neill, 
president of the Seattle Police Officers’ Guild (SPOG), wrote in the current 
issue of the union’s newspaper, The Guardian.” 
“O’Neill, in his June column, conceded the expense stories [regarding the 
Monitor] were ‘not completely accurate’ and that the city had been reimbursed. 
‘Again, this monitoring team is not going anywhere and we need to work with 
them, so their work can be completed as quickly as possible,’ he wrote. 
‘Deciding to work together does not mean we agree on all issues, it just means 
we accept reality and need to move on!’ … We can argue all day over the 
original DOJ investigation and whether or not it could ever have held up under 
scrutiny in court. That train has left the station! The elected officials chose not 
to go that route’” (Seattle Times, 6/20/2013). 
October 2013 “In the October issue of the guild newspaper, The Guardian, O’Neill wrote that 
Murray represents the best chance to fix Seattle’s ‘dysfunctional’ government 
and wants to ‘get out from under the DOJ as quickly as possible’” (Seattle 
Times, 10/24/2013). 
August 28, 2014 Statement of SPOG President Ron Smith: “As I have stated before, there are 
severe flaws with the current Use of Force policy, but litigation is not the 
prudent route to achieve any changes to the policy. The review period for this 
policy is currently open, and input is being solicited from the rank and file on 
how to potentially improve the policy” (Seattle Times, 8/29/2014). 
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Date Statement 
February 2015 Posting by on SPOG Facebook Page attributed to SPOG President Ron 
Smith: “Times have changed and we must also change to adapt to societal 
expectations” (The Stranger, 2/18/2015). 
March 2015 “In the March issue, one month after the pathbreaking Stranger interview, 
former SPOG president Rich O'Neill took to the front page of The Guardian to 
defend Smith. ‘Some have questioned an interview he gave in one of the local 
tabloids (I won't dignify the rag by calling it by name). Did anyone ask Ron if 
they quoted him accurately? Soon after it was out he assured the board it was 
completely taken out of context.’ The article is headlined, ‘This Is The Time For 
Unity!’” (The Stranger, 9/23/2015). 
April 16, 2015 SPOG President Ron Smith: “I would be a fool to waste the opportunity to try 
and work with the very first police chief in decades willing to sit down with 
labor. When she pisses me off, or does something wrong, I’ll be the first to 
stand up against her, … My predecessor, and those before him, had no 
opportunity to work with the chiefs of police because they marginalized the 
union. They were forced to do nothing other than file grievances and unfair 
labor practices, … Chief O’Toole has a different way of doing business; she is 
collaborative … What I’ve learned is the rank-and-file are deeply impacted by 
these changing policies. They feel under attack from every corner all the time, 
… I believe we all want the same thing. We all want a better police department 
down the road, and I believe we all want to be done with the Consent Decree” 
(Seattle Times, 4/16/2015). 
June 2015 “In the June issue [of the Guardian newsletter], Virgil Macdonald … received 
front-page treatment, under the headline ‘The Culture Change' 
Needed/Demanded.’ He wrote, ‘Wow, according to the media and DOJ that 
sounds like our culture that we must change. The only part of our culture is the 
‘dangerous’ part as we must obey the rules of the game while the suspects we 
encounter make up their own.’ He concludes: ‘You cannot do my job until you 
have walked in my moccasins... But we, must change our culture as they are 
the omnipotent know it alls.’” (The Stranger, 9/23/2015). 
August 2015 SPOG President Ron Smith: “We have the best PD in the country! Hands 
down!” (The Stranger, 8/26/2015). 
In an article in The Guardian by President Smith: “The SPD is on the cutting 
edge of police ‘reform’ ... Keep up the good work and this assessment phase 
of the Consent Decree will be over before you know it.” 
“In another column, officer Tom McLaughlin, the editor of The Guardian, wrote 
dismissively of Department of Justice reforms: ‘I am just glad we have been 
‘re-educated’ and are now doing things correctly’” (The Stranger, 9/23/2015).  
August 9, 2016 In a letter to Judge Robart from SPOG and SPMA: “Our labor organizations 
have a long history of successfully negotiating changes to the accountability 
systems, … What both SPOG and SPMA oppose is any non-negotiated 
breach in its collective bargaining agreement or rights” (U.S. v. Seattle, 
Document No. 306). 
September 2016 SPOG Vice-President Rich O’Neill in article in The Guardian: “Listening to 
some involved in this process, they appear to want the city to ignore the MOA 
and the state law. They want to simply have the changes legislated or ordered” 
(Seattle Times, 9/28/2016). 
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Date Statement 
April 7, 2017 “In an interview this week on KUOW, Stuckey noted that since Seattle signed 
a consent decree in 2012 and instituted reforms, police now have a 72 percent 
approval rating among communities of color, have reduced their use of force 
55 percent and are going through unique and valuable bias-free policing 
training. … ‘We’ve had a culture change here in Seattle,’ Stuckey said.” 
(Seattle Times, 4/7/2017b).1011 
May 22, 2017 SPOG President Kevin Stuckey to the Seattle City Council before vote on 
Police Accountability Ordinance: “This is my community. I am ready to get to 
work … I’m just here to say let’s play by the rules” (Seattle Times, 5/23/2017). 
July 17, 2017 “Guild President Kevin Stuckey said Monday he was confused by the order, 
calling it unnecessary because both sides are still at the bargaining table. He 
said the guild has been bargaining in good faith toward a body-camera 
program, and that the mayor's action won't create a ‘sustainable program.’ 
Instead, it will lead to a program with ‘many different holes in it,’ Stuckey said. 
Stuckey said the filing of an unfair labor practice complaint is ‘something 
available to me.’ He declined to say whether the guild was seeking extra pay, 
citing confidentiality rules surrounding bargaining. But he said such 
compensation has occurred in other police departments around the country 
where body cameras are in use” (Seattle Times, 7/17/2017). 
January 2, 2018 “We’ve said all along, ‘Let’s sit down like grown-ups,’ …We don’t want to be a 
stumbling block to reforms. But you have to play by the rules.” (Seattle Times, 
1/3/2018). 
January 11, 2018 “SPOG President Kevin Stuckey, who attended the news conference [after 
Judge Robart found the City in full compliance] as a spectator, said he looked 
forward to working with the new city administration to resolve differences. ‘I’ve 
said this before and I’ll say it again, we do not wish to impede the progress,’ 
Stuckey said, adding that it was critical the city play by the collective-
bargaining rules” (Seattle Times, 1/11/2018). 
June 2018 Comments made by SPOG Vice-President Rich O’Neill to Q13 Fox TV 
(KCPQ): “I have never seen the number of officers who are leaving and the 
way they are leaving, … Less officers on the streets, less safe for the citizens 
— and when you have all these officers you have invested all this money in 
and they are leaving for Tacoma, Olympia, Pierce County and Snohomish 
County,” (Seattle Times, 7/10/2018). 
July 17, 2018 SPOG statement on appointment of Chief Best, “thanking Durkan for her 
decision and praising Best for her work ‘establishing relationships with the 
many diverse communities in the city as well as the rank and file officers’” 
(Seattle Times, 7/18/2018a). 
 
1011 Seattle Times Editorial Board (2017, April 7). Don’t undo progress in policing reforms. Seattle 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
September 20, 2018 Statement by SPOG Vice President Rich O’Neill announcing membership vote 
approving contract between SPOG and the City: “The contract ... illustrates, 
once again, that SPOG is willing to accept changes to the accountability 
system as long as that change is achieved at the bargaining table and both 
sides bargain in good faith.”  
Statement by SPOG President Kevin Stuckey: “SPOG would like to thank 
Mayor Jenny Durkan, who inherited this ‘contract mess’ from her two 
predecessors, who unfortunately, did not choose to respect the labor laws of 
Washington, … From the onset, Mayor Durkan made getting a new SPOG 
contract a top priority and her team followed her leadership and got the work 
done at the bargaining table.”  
“Stuckey also thanked Best, saying she was the first chief to attend numerous 
negotiation sessions, constantly urging both sides to reach an agreement” 
(Seattle Times, 9/21/2018). 
February 2019 Comments by Rich O’Neill, SPOG Director of Labor and Media Relationships, 
in interview with NPR radio: [referring to the Consent Decree]: “The incentive 
to get out and be a proactive officer I think has been damaged … And 
something the city cannot deny anymore is that we have had a real hit in 
recruiting—retaining officers … At the very start, officers were very frustrated 
… they didn’t know what was going on” (Seattle Times, 3/5/2019). 
August 17, 2019 Responding to a Superior Court Judge’s decision to overturn the reinstatement 
of an officer previously terminated by Chief O’Toole for excessive force: “Our 
hearts go out to the Shepherd family, who have been dragged through this 
process for nearly five years, … SPOG will be immediately appealing this 
decision as it will negatively impact all public sector union contracts” (Seattle 
Times, 8/17/2019b). 
November 6, 2019 SPOG Vice-President Mike Solan You-Tube video in support for his campaign 
to be elected SPOG President: “Police officers now are being held to an 
unreasonable standard and the scrutiny is immense … My course of action will 
lead us to fundamentally change the activist narrative that negatively impacts 
our profession, not only locally but nationally. I will do this by driving our own 
narrative. Our narrative will restore respect to our profession, protect our CBA 
and restore confidence within our membership so that we can all feel that our 
oath of service was indeed noble” (Mike Solan for SPOG President 2020, You 
Tube Video, 11/6/2019). 
 
The police unions’ public positioning on consent decree related issues, as well as 
publicity relating to articles in the union newsletter, often resulted in public comment, 
from community and political leaders, as well as op-ed articles from the local media. 
Almost exclusively, the public comment regarding the unions’ impact on the Consent 
Decree was negative. Comment was also often made of the apparent inability of either 
the Mayor or the City Council to “stand up” to the union and force reform through 
aggressive collective bargaining or legislation. 
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Table 7.19. Public Comment on the Seattle Police Unions’ Impact on the Reform 
Effort 
Date Statement 
August 20, 1999 More than a decade before the Consent Decree, then-SPD Chief Stamper 
“announced a 12-point plan to strengthen the department’s internal 
investigations.” Stamper’s “efforts…have bogged down in this year’s contract 
negotiations with the police union. Two weeks ago, he offered a terse 
statement saying the plan was a ‘work in progress’” (Seattle Times, 
8/20/1999).1012 
April 6, 2011 Nicole Gaines, President of the Loren Miller Bar Association: “Rich O‘Neill 
does a great deal of damage to the community’s perception of officers.”  
“Gains argues that O’Neill doesn’t just speak for officers – his rhetoric pits 
them against the public they’re sworn to protect” (The Stranger, 4/6/2011).  
April 16, 2014 According to former Chief Pugel: “The union ‘was unwilling to budge on any 
case … They would continually ask in different meetings if they could revisit 
this case or that case, … It was brought up to me at least once every two or 
three weeks…” (The Stranger, 4/16/2014). 
September 23, 2015 The Stranger newspaper reporting on a lack of commentary by public officials 
regarding the Seattle police unions: “But for some reason that no one has 
been able to explain to me, officials overseeing reforms at SPD are afraid to 
openly criticize the union for fulminating against reforms and publishing racist 
commentary. The union is currently renegotiating its 80-page contract with 
the city behind closed doors…. Mayor Ed Murray, who was endorsed by 
SPOG, Ron Smith, and the local division of the Department of Justice, did not 
respond to a request for comment [on SPOG newsletter articles and cartoons 
opposing police reform]. Nor did Council President Tim Burgess” (The 
Stranger, 9/23/2015). 
July 8, 2016 Councilmember Tim Burgess: ... “I think sometimes the police union 
leadership are their own worst enemies. They fire off these statements and 
then take them down. It’s terrible, because it reflects an inner cycle of thinking 
that is very negative and disrespectful” (The Stranger, 7/8/2016). 
May 15, 2019 “SPOG has complained about and fought many of the reforms, including the 
now-required use of body cameras, and bitterly criticized federal oversight 
and the civilian-led Office of Police Accountability (OPA)” (Seattle Times, 
5/15/2019). 
June 24, 2019 Email from King County Labor Council’s executive secretary-treasurer to City 
Council regarding CPC request for Council to reopen negotiations with SPD 
unions: “Collective bargaining is a fundamental right awarded to all workers 
… Unilaterally opening a collectively-bargained contract between a workers’ 
union and their employer undermines these rights and disrespects the entire 
collective bargaining process” (Seattle Times, 7/13/2019). 
 
1012 Miletich, S. & Carter, M. (1999, August 20). Citizen Panel Gives Mayor, Chief Remedy for 
Seattle Police Problems. Seattle Times. Retrieved from https://www.seattletimes.com. 
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Date Statement 
July 26, 2019 Letter from Seattle Coalition of City Unions (CCU) to City Council opposing 
reopening talks with SPOG: “The CCU wants to make it perfectly clear that 
we strongly disagree with any unilateral attempts to reopen SPOG’s current 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA), … The CBA was bargained in good 
faith over the course of several years and signed by the Mayor and Seattle 
City Council … Any and all efforts to put undue pressure on SPOG to reopen 
this agreement are inappropriate. The members of SPOG have the right to 
determine, on their own terms, what course of action they want to pursue” 
(Seattle Times, 8/9/2019). 
February 4, 2020 “Seattle police guild members overwhelmingly elected a hard-line candidate 
as their new president, the union announced Tuesday evening, signaling the 
city likely will face tough negotiations in upcoming contract talks considered 
key to resolving federal oversight of the police department” (Seattle Times, 
2/4/2020). 
June 4, 2020 “Lisa Daugaard, executive director of the Public Defenders Association, said 
there was a hopeful period where it looked like the cooperation [between 
SPOG and the Seattle community] was producing good results. ‘But by 2018 
that tentative relationship was in the trash heap, … It seemed as though 
SPOG suddenly devalued the relationship with the civil rights community and 
retreated to a more traditional view of their own self-interest. It was sad to see 
the window for partnership close after so much effort’” (Crosscut, 6/4/2020). 
 
Ultimately, the election of a hardline as the union president in 2020 showed the 
SPD membership’s thoughts on the ongoing consent decree. Whereas the previous 
union leadership had sent a message of conciliation and cooperation, the new union 
leadership was actively anti-reform. And, in fact, the union president ignored public calls 
for his resignation after he issued a statement blaming “the far left and Black Lives 
Matter activists” for the January 2021 insurrection at the Capitol in Washington D.C. 
According to the Seattle Times,  
“in an internal letter to members of the [union], Solan express[ed] regret for 
commenting on national politics but [said] his comments [had] been ‘spun 
intentionally for political reasons to hurt SPOG and limit our influence … I 
interpret the calls to tender my resignation as political rhetoric. I will never 
bend to cancel culture as I lead this union with conviction.”1013 
Solan’s refusal to resign and the executive board’s refusal to remove him stand 
in stark contrast to the previously mentioned actions of the executive board after reform-
 
1013 Gutman, D. (2021, Jan. 12). Seattle Police Union President won’t resign after Capitol attack 
remarks, blames ‘cancel culture.’ Seattle Times. 
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minded SPOG President Ron Smith made an unpopular comment regarding a police 
shooting in Texas. 
The question of the day rests with the next contract negotiation currently being 
conducted by the outgoing Durkan administration.1014 With the union positioning itself in 
an apparent entrenched anti-reform position, will the Durkan administration have the 
political will to stand up to the union and reform the SPD accountability structure in a 
way that will both satisfy Judge Robart and avoid an award against the City in the event 
the union takes the contract to arbitration? In oft stated terms, “only time will tell.”  
 
1014 On December 20, 2020, Mayor Durkan announced she would not run for re-election 
(Beekman, D. & Brunner, J. (2020, December 20) Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan won’t run for 
reelection. Seattle Times. Retrieved from Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan won’t run for reelection | 
The Seattle Times. As such, it is anticipated that the Deputy Chief, chosen as Interim Chief to 





Assessing the Sustainability of the Seattle Reform 
Effort 
The ultimate question, relating to the implementation of the Seattle consent 
decree, is: To what extent are the reforms that brought the SPD to compliance 
sustainable in the long term? (See, Davis, el. al., 2002; Chanin, 2012; Chanin, 2015; 
Chanin, 2016; Harmon, 2017). Given the costs of consent decree implementation, to 
include financial, emotional, and reputational, it would be reasonable to conclude that 
the implementation of short-term change only would signal a failure of the Consent 
Decree process (Walker, 2017). And, if police reform via consent decree is not 
achievable in Seattle, a progressive city with significant resources, the question 
becomes whether the Consent Decree process itself is worth the time, expense and 
resources needed to support this form of police reform. 
On its face, the Seattle consent decree appears to have created systems that 
would support long-term, sustainable reform, to include, 1) a strengthened civilian 
oversight program in the form of the OPA, CPC and Inspector General, 2) usable data 
platforms and technology to track patterns of police conduct and enhance supervision 
and accountability, 3) a more robust system of training (including crisis intervention 
training and de-escalation techniques), 4) enhanced use-of-force, de-escalation, “stop 
and frisk” and biased policing policies, and 5) a structured process for the investigation 
and evaluation of police uses-of-force. However, research participants still differed in 
their opinions as to whether Seattle could really sustain the reforms initially sought as a 
result of the DOJ investigation. And the concerns expressed by research participants 
highlighted the very areas that the literature has identified as essential to long-term 
reform: to include police and city leadership, ongoing investment of resources and, 
culture changes that would support a pattern and practice of Constitutional policing. 
If anything, this research has highlighted an important aspect of externally-driven 
police reform efforts: even if a strong foundation for success is built as the result of 
consent decree-driven reform, policing in a major urban area is an ongoing process that 
requires constant attention and the opportunity for backsliding will forever be present 
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(see, Walker, 2012; Chanin, 2015). As such, all that consent decree-driven reform as a 
temporary process can promise, is to increase the potential for future success. This 
conclusion supports the conclusion that a key weakness in the current DOJ §14141 
program is the lack of available resources and legal structure to revisit reforms once a 
§14141 action has been dismissed and the jurisdiction of the court has been terminated 
(see, Chanin, 2012; Chanin, 2014; Dukanovic, 2016; Rushin, 2017a). 
8.1 The Literature on Sustainability 
An abundance of academic discussion examines the issue of §14141 
sustainability, even though there may be a lack of empirical data and applied theory by 
which the long-term success or failure of §14141 consent decrees can be objectively 
evaluated. 
Theories of organizational change, as they relate to police organizations, 
abound. However, only a few commentators and academics have conducted deep dives 
into issues relating to evaluating the sustainability of consent decree related reforms.1015 
Specifically, only Chanin (2012, 2015 & 2016); and Walker (2010 [with Ikerd] & 2012) 
have offered specific criteria that they believe should be considered in evaluating and 
assessing the sustainability of these reforms.  
As recently as 2018, Walker commented that, “[p]olice experts have given very 
little attention to this problem, and we have no real understanding of the conditions 
necessary for major reforms to be sustained over the long haul.” This, even though “[t]he 
history of the American police over the last half century is littered with the bones of once-
 
1015 Walker (2012) reported that “[o]nly two publications to date have explored the issue of 
institutionalizing police reforms in detail. Rachel Boba and John Crank define institutionalization 
as ‘establishing as normal or making something a customary and accepted part of the 
organization.’  … Similarly, Trent Ikerd and this Author define institutionalization as occurring 
when a particular reform becomes ‘a way of regularly conducting police business,’ and ‘when 
certain norms, values, and structures are incorporated into an organization.’ …this can be 
achieved when the reform in question is incorporated into regular police practice, in department-
wide training, and in personnel practices including regular performance evaluations and 
promotions” (pp. 58-59). 
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celebrated reforms that simply withered away with time” (Walker, 2018, p. 1840; 
Dukanovic, 2016, pp. 926-927).1016 
Even so, Chanin’s 2012 dissertation, supplemented by his ongoing work in the 
evaluation of consent decree reform efforts in multiple cities, and Walker’s academic 
commentary, do seem to provide a good theoretical foundation for evaluating the 
potential for long-term success, and I have, thus, applied them to the Seattle experience 
in this Chapter.1017 I believe this theoretical foundation is usable, even though the 
ultimate answer as to whether the Seattle reforms are “hard baked” enough to stick, 
requires a prospective evaluation that belies any absolute conclusions.1018 Even so, the 
conclusion that Stone, el. al, reached, shortly before the LA consent decree was 
terminated, seems to apply as well in Seattle:1019  
 
1016 Chanin (2016) provided an explanation of the difficulties involved in predicting the 
sustainability of police reform initiatives: “In general, scholars know relatively little about the 
bureaucratic response to reform and thus remain somewhat ignorant about how and why 
innovations in policing continue to erode. This is not entirely surprising given the complexity of the 
issue. Comprehensive reform efforts resist the kinds of clear, simple terms that facilitate ex post 
evaluation. The process is defined by multiple goals, varying perspectives, and competing 
political, administrative, and legal motivations, all conspiring to form ‘a confusing and 
contradictory picture of change.’ The complexity of the process is only magnified by the intensity 
of the current political and social context and the contentiousness with which police officers 
confront changes to the organizational status quo” (p. 71, quoting, Peters & Savoie, eds., (1988). 
Canadian Ctr. For Mgmt. Dev., Taking Stock: Assessing Public Section Reforms, p. 6). 
1017 In addition, in their 2017 report on DOJ’s §14141 activities, the DOJ also provides some 
guidance on lessons learned regarding how to sustain otherwise short-term reforms achieved by 
consent decrees (USDOJ, 2017b). 
1018 Of course, it must be recognized that any attempt to assess the sustainability of the Seattle 
consent decree reforms at the current time, particularly when accountability-related programs are 
still works in progress and the Consent Decree has yet to be terminated, inherently involves 
speculation and guess-work. As an example of the premature nature of such an analysis, Chanin 
noted that “[s]ome scholars believe that analysis should begin after one year (e.g., NHS 
Modernization Agency 2002); others say institutionalization takes somewhere between five and 
ten years to manifest (e.g., Kotter 1995)” (Chanin, 2012, p. 207). At the same time, it has been 
over two years since the Seattle was initially found to be in full compliance, so there is certainly 
data that can be used to evaluate sustainability to date and predict potential future outcomes. 
1019 Similar to this study, the Stone et al., study, more commonly referred to as “the L.A. Harvard-
Kennedy School study,” was conducted while the Los Angeles Consent Decree reform process 
was still in progress. The L.A. consent decree was implemented in 2001 and five years into the 
reform process, the assigned federal judge found the city not yet in full compliance and extended 
the decree an additional three years. As of the writing of the Harvard-Kennedy School report 
(May, 2009), the judge was then considering the issue of full compliance (Stone et al., 2009, p. 
5). In fact, the LA consent decree was dismissed shortly thereafter, on July 17, 2009. However, 
even then a transitional agreement was put into place to allow the DOJ to bring the case back to 
the federal judge in case the reforms were not sustained (Rubin, J. (2009, July 18). U.S. ends 
oversight of L.A. police. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from U.S. ends oversight of L.A. police - 
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Will the management and oversight improvements persist if the Consent 
Decree ends? Better yet, will management and oversight become still 
stronger? While we cannot answer those questions in advance, the LAPD 
appears ready for that test … Time and again we heard police officers and 
community residents pose the question: will the improvements persist if the 
Consent Decree ends? Research cannot answer such a prospective 
question, but in our opinion the officers and residents with whom we spoke 
seem ready for that test. It is not that policing in Los Angeles is all that it 
can ever be, but the balance of local leadership and local oversight is 
healthy enough to carry the process of continuous improvement forward. 
(Stone et al., 2009, pp. ii, 68, emphasis added) 
As discussed by Walker (2003), a “new paradigm of police accountability” 
identified “the conditions necessary for achieving genuine accountability in policing.” 
Walker specifically identified the requirements as: a) the need for reform to “reach deep 
into the police organization, b) have some direct impact on the day-to-day behavior of 
police officers; and (c) ultimately change, or at least begin to change, the culture of 
police organizations” (p. 9; see also, Patel, 2016, pp. 870-871 [“It has long been 
understood that for law enforcement reforms to stick, law enforcement agencies must 
undergo a culture change”]; see also, USDOJ, 2017b, p. 37 [“Ultimately, the Division’s 
goal is for its reform agreements to leave a law enforcement agency with an enduring 
ability to self-correct when misconduct occurs and a culture that strongly supports 
constitutional and effective policing…”]). And ultimately, it is these questions that have to 
be answered with respect to the Seattle experience. Unfortunately, objectively evaluating 
the criteria identified by Walker, particularly as it relates to whether or not the SPD 
“culture” has changed, is inherently difficult, particularly given that identifying any police 
department’s specific culture is an amorphous exercise, at best. 
Commentators appear to agree that “organizational and culture change 
especially in insular organizations such as police departments, takes time and it takes 
leadership” (Jerome, 2004, p. 3). This concept is consistent with Professor Armacost’s 
theory that formal policy changes are insufficient to change a police culture, concluding 
that: “no legal strategy that ignores the power of the police organization will have any 
 
Los Angeles Times (latimes.com). The case was finally and permanently dismissed on May 16, 
2013 (Palta, R. (2013, May 16). Last of LA consent decree officially dismissed, Associated Press. 
Retrieved from UPDATE: Last of LAPD consent decree officially dismissed | 89.3 KPCC 
(scpr.org). 
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lasting success in addressing [Constitutional policing]” (Armacost, 2004, p. 521; see 
also, Walker & Macdonald, 2009, p. 529; Ikerd & Walker, 2010, p. 15). 
As such, the literature highlights two issues: first, the need for ongoing 
imaginative leadership (Chanin, 2012, pp. 214-215, 292-302; Chanin, 2014, p. 40), and 
second, the need to address culture change (Mollen Commission, 1994, p. 69 
[concluding that in order to address systemic corruption in the New York Police 
Department, “the department must transform [the] police culture”]; Walker, 2003; Chanin, 
2012, p. 244, Walker, 2012, pp. 66-67, 81; Chanin, 2014, p. 40). 
With respect to leadership, it is clear that sustainability becomes difficult after the 
tenure of the leader(s) who supported the reform effort have ended (Walker & 
Macdonald, 2009, p. 533) and, in fact, the tenure of U.S. chiefs of police is notoriously 
short (Jaio, 2020, p. 10; Los Angeles Times, 5/5/20021020). 
Both Walker and Chanin also appear to agree that “pervasive and ongoing 
communication between leaders and organization members is critical to successful 
institutionalization” (Chanin, 2012, p. citing Armenakis et al., 1999; Ikerd & Walker, 
2010). Also cited by Chanin in support of sustainability of reform is “(1) the existence of 
capable, supportive leadership; (2) consistency and continuity among agency 
leadership; and, (3) support for the reform among organizational middle management” 
(Chanin, 2012, p. 292). Chanin also argues in favor of the need for ensuring that reform-
related principles and philosophies “become part of [the] organization’s core mission … 
they must become the operating philosophy of the entire organization” (Chanin, 2012, p. 
226). Similarly, Chanin identified “the need for [the] chief to link reform-driven 
accountability with the department’s anti-crime efforts which is very much in line with 
theoretical research on the importance of goal congruence, [and which] must be 
communicated clearly and repeatedly to agency staff” (Chanin, 2012, p. 294, n. 54). 
With respect to changing the culture, Ikerd & Walker (2010) ascribed to the 
theory that culture change involves “win[ning] the hearts and minds of the officers in the 
department” and “resocializing” officers to accept new philosophies underlying 
constitutional policing (p. 15). Even so, Ikerd & Walker recognized, however, that 
 
1020 Leovy, J. (2002, May 5). Little Job Security in Being a Police Chief. Los Angeles Times. 
Retrieved from Little Job Security in Being a Police Chief - Los Angeles Times (latimes.com). 
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“recommendations for successful organizational change in policing … have not been 
tested previously to see how they affect the institutionalization process of police reform. 
As a result, there is no established framework for institutionalizing police reform” (p. 5). 
“Until new behaviors are rooted in social norms and shared values, 
they are subject to degradation as soon as the pressure for change is 
removed”  
(Chanin, 2012, p. 201, quoting,  
John P. Kotter, Harvard Business Review). 
 
Ikerd & Walker (2010) go on to suggest four elements that can be used to 
evaluate whether reforms have been institutionalized in a police department: 1) that 
officers know about and can describe the basic elements of the reform; 2) that officers 
are supportive of the reforms; 3) that officer behavior reflects the reform; and 4) that the 
reform has been incorporated into the department’s policies and procedures (pp. 13-14). 
Chanin (2012) went into great detail about issues relating to consent decree 
reform sustainability, suggesting different, but related metrics for determining the 
permanency of these reforms: 
(1) the extent to which a department perpetuates the policies and 
procedures established under the reform; (2) the extent to which an 
agency’s culture reflects the core values of the reform; and (3) the extent 
to which a department is able to maintain desirable levels of key outcomes 
related to the reform (pp. 203-204; see also, DOJ, 2017b).1021 
Chanin supplemented these metrics by recognizing the existence of “various 
management techniques thought to enhance [] sustainability, including a commitment to 
officer training and recruitment, as well as an effort to adjust both performance and 
promotional standards so as to reflect the reform initiative” (Chanin, 2012, pp. 208-209). 
Chanin (2016) revisited the sustainability issue, first noting that “sustainability of 
reform is undermined by the use of a transitory police solution – external oversight – to 
remedy what in many cases is a chronic organizational problem.” He concluded by 
 
1021 The DOJ also recognized the need for “policies incorporating each requirement of the reform 
agreement” to be put into place “to ensure that reforms become part of the fabric of the law 
enforcement agency, rather than viewed as changes specific to the particular chief in place when 
the reform agreement was implemented” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 30). 
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noting that “[i]n the absence of persistent external oversight and accountability, … the 
affected bureaucracy can, and perhaps must, revert to ex ante operating procedures” 
(Chanin, 2016, p. 72; see also, Chanin, 2012, pp. 282-286, 320; see also, Mollen 
Commission, 1994, p. 75 [noting that a lack of “institutional mechanism[s]” allowed for 
there to be a lack of accountability at the NYPD]). Chanin went on to summarize “four 
interrelated metrics” that could be used to “examine[] the sustainability of organizational 
reform: (1) staff knowledge of and compliance with new protocols; (2) the extent to which 
staff culture reflects reform values; (3) trend-based outcome data; and (4) the presence 
or absence of performance crises” (Chanin, 2016, p. 75). Chanin also identified “an 
organization’s ability to avoid large-scale performance crises” [such as “a police shooting 
or a particularly vicious use of force caught on tape”] as evidence of “an organization’s 
ability to sustain change” (Chanin, 2015, p. 168). 
Additional factors identified as being important to the sustainability of consent-
decree enforced reform efforts include: 
• Appropriate funding and resourcing for the agency, particularly after the 
Consent Decree has ended and the DOJ has “left town” (Chanin, 2012, p. 
220; USDOJ, 2017b, p. 37; Alpert et al., 2017, p. 246); 
• “Support for the initiative from jurisdictional political leaders as well as member 
of area civil society organizations” (Chanin, 2012, pp. 314, 320); 
• “Relevant outcomes, including data on citizen complaints; police use of force; 
department civil liability; and public opinion” (Chanin, 2012, pp. 31, 200); 
• “Compliance among mid-level staff” (Chanin, 2012, p. 189, Chanin, 2014, pp. 
301-302); 
•  The extent to which “policy and organizational changes - including, for 
example, use of force incident reporting; officer training; and use of 
department early warning systems – remain in place and fully operational” 
(Chanin, 2012, p. 225); 
• The extent to which police unions continue to oppose reform efforts (Chanin, 
2017a, p. 264); and,  
• The extent to which “properly designed” reform-related training is used “to 
improve officer receptivity to innovation and change” (Walker, 2012, p. 84). 
For a list of the most substantive measures suggested for use by Chanin and 
Walker, as applied to the Seattle process at this time, see, Table 8.1, infra. 
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“In the end, a city completes a consent decree, then the judge goes 
away, the Monitor goes away, … All cities are on their own, and then 
it’s dependent on the local community and local politics.”   
(Professor Samuel Walker, New York Times, April 9, 2017) 
 
8.2 Sustainability Issues in Other Cities 
Researchers and commentators have looked at sustainability issues with respect 
to a number of consent decrees, to include Pittsburgh, Washington D.C. and Cincinnati.  
8.2.1. Pittsburgh 
As previously discussed, the first post-consent decree evaluation study was 
conducted in Pittsburgh in 2005, three years after the termination of that city’s consent 
decree. That evaluation, by researchers from the Vera Institute of Justice, concluded 
that the federal action brought “lasting improvement to the Pittsburgh police department.” 
By 2009, Walker & Macdonald (2009) had identified “subsequent events that threatened 
the continuity of the [Pittsburgh] consent decree reforms.” They observed that the City 
had experienced “a serious budget crisis” as well as a subsequent city election wherein 
a new Mayor, elected with the support of the police union, “immediately fired the police 
chief who had been credited with successfully implementing the Consent Decree” (p. 
534). 
Three years after the Walker & Macdonald article, Chanin (2012) conducted his 
own evaluation study which included the Pittsburgh experience. Chanin concluded that, 
by that time, there appeared to be “an erosion of the accountability infrastructure [that 
had been] developed during the reform period,” potentially impacted by “[l]ongstanding 
and unaddressed tension between the police and minorities as well as shifts in economic 
and other sociological condition” (Chanin, 2012, p. 252).1022 Also, in 2012, Walker made 
 
1022 Chanin (2012) further found that “[a]s the experience in Pittsburgh demonstrates, the passage 
of time can threaten what appears to be a well--‐sustained reform effort. After all, in 2005, some 
three years after the Consent Decree terminated, Chief McNeilly remained in charge of a 
department committed to perpetuating the reform effort. Over the next several years, the political 
winds shifted, department leadership changed, and the community moved on. Today, the city and 
its police department are struggling to reacquire the accountability and community support 
generated by the Consent Decree” (p. 327). 
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additional comments exhibiting his concerns regarding the sustainability of the 
Pittsburgh reforms citing a number of cases where officers remained on duty even in the 
face of serious and numerous accusations and complaints. Walker (2012) observed that 
[a]ll of the cases cited here involve the kind of pattern of officer misconduct that the 
Consent Decree mandate reforms, and the early intervention systems [], are designed to 
track (p. 64). 
Most recently, Chanin (2015) concluded that:  
The PBP was not able to sustain organizational changes made under 
federal oversight. Key outcomes that remained flat during implementation, 
including officer injuries, use of force incidence, and allegations of 
misconduct, now trend upward. According to Pittsburgh Mayor Bill Peduto, 
a recent corruption scandal and several high-profile force-related incidents 
have the department “on the verge of another consent decree.” (pp. 182-
183, citing, Benzing, 2014; 1023 see also, Rushin, 2016; Rushin, 2017a, pp. 
241-242) 
8.2.2. Washington D.C. 
In Washington D.C., Chanin (2012)’s evaluation came four years after the 
termination of that city’s consent decree. Chanin observed a spike in citizen complaints 
one year after the settlement agreement termination, but noted “a different trend” with 
respect to civil litigation (p. 262). And while Chanin acknowledged that the MPD 
“boast[ed] of an award winning Force Investigation Team,” he also noted that in 2008 the 
MPD suffered “the highest number of fatal [police] shootings since 2004, when the DOJ 
intervened” (pp. 51 & 71). Overall, Chanin concluded that “[d]espite ups and downs 
during the five year implementation, the city and its police department appear to have 
benefited greatly from the federal intervention” (p. 60).  
Walker (2012) also looked at Washington D.C., commenting with concern about 
multiple arrests of MPD officers taking place in 2011 and 2012, suggesting that “the 
number of arrests … raises very serious questions about whether the accountability 
procedures instituted by the MOA are functioning at all” (p. 64). 
 
1023 Benzing, J. (2014, July 1). Pittsburgh police could face second federal consent decree, 
Peduto says. PublicSource. Retrieved 11/6/20 from, http://publicsource.org/from-the-
source/pittsburgh-police-could-face-second-federal-consent-decree-peduto-says. 
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Chanin (2015) spoke with more conservative language: 
The picture in Washington, DC is more difficult to interpret. Significant 
reductions in force-based civil litigation and related payouts since 2003 
suggest that both the frequency and severity of MPD misconduct has 
declined. A spike in allegations of misconduct complicates the picture, as 
does the startling number of MPD officers that have faced criminal charges 
in the postreform years. (p. 183) 
And by 2016, the former court-appointed Monitor prepared his own evaluation 
report of the MPD, evaluating its use of force data and investigations from 2008 to 
2015.1024 Although the Monitor identified some significant areas of issues and concerns, 
his findings were largely positive, as described in an opinion piece he published in 
Washington Post on January 29, 2016, 
In large measure, the D.C. police department’s use of force policies remain 
consistent with best practices in policing, and the data show that there has 
been no surge in any type of use of force, including firearms. The number 
of officer-involved shootings has remained low, and there is no evidence 
that excessive force has reemerged as a problem within the department. 
(Bromwich, Washington Post, 1/29/2016)1025 
8.2.3. Cincinnati 
In 2009, shortly after the conclusion of that City’s consent decree, the RAND 
Corporation, hired to conduct ongoing evaluations of Cincinnati police-community 
relations, commented that, 
the improvements that have been seen over the life of the collaborative 
agreement may be fragile. It will require a continued and concerted effort 
on the part of CPD and community leaders to maintain progress toward the 
goals stated in the collaborative agreement, as well as to prevent reversals 
in the positive trends that we observed while this agreement was in force. 
(Ridgeway, 2009, p. xiv) 
With respect to Cincinnati, Chanin (2012) observed that “[f]our years removed 
from DOJ and monitor oversight, [the CPD had] experienced little or no backsliding in 
 
1024 Walker (2017) referred to the Bromwich report as “[t]he best post-consent decree assessment 
of a department [conducted thus far]” (pp. 4-5). 
1025 Bromwich, M. (2016, January 29). DC is Proof that Police Reforms Can Work. Washington 
Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dc-is-proof-that-police-reforms-
can-work/2016/01/29/baa9fd62-c5bb-11e5-a4aa-f25866ba0dc6_story.html. 
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terms of its accountability infrastructure or its officer culture … In short, the reform effort 
in Cincinnati appears to have transformed the CPD” (p. 266). 
Chanin (2015) continued reporting on Cincinnati in a positive manner: 
The process seems to have had a sustained, positive effect in Cincinnati. 
Numbers of postreform citizen complaints against CPD officers continue to 
decline, as does use of force incidence, and the number of injuries 
sustained by CPD officers. Such progress has contributed to increasing 
trust in the Department among minority community members [citation 
omitted] and a sterling national reputation (Schuppe, 2014;1026 Vinik, 
20141027). (p. 183) 
Chanin (2016) continued with his positive conclusions regarding the Cincinnati 
reform effort: 
Six years removed from DOJ and monitor oversight, the CPB has 
experienced little or no discernable backsliding, a finding supported by 
consistent reductions in undesirable outcomes, including use of force 
incidence and allegations of abusive or unlawful behavior. In short, the 
reform effort in Cincinnati appears to have transformed the CPD. (p. 91) 
8.2.4. Prince George’s County Police Department 
Chanin (2012) evaluated the PGPD three years after its consent decree was 
terminated. After identifying numerous instances involving excessive force, misconduct 
and criminal conduct by PGPD officers, Chanin gently concluded that “even after five 
years under federal control PGPD remains a work in progress” (pp. 71-72). 
Four years later, Chanin (2016) expressed deep reservations regarding any 
progress the PGPD had made toward reform. He identified a substantial lack of 
transparency and publicly available information, as compared to Pittsburgh, Washington 
D.C. and Cincinnati and no willingness on the part of County or police to cooperate with 
any evaluation. Although Chanin noted that it was “hard to draw any definitive 
conclusions about the effectiveness or long-term viability of the reform effort” as there 
 
1026 Schuppe, J. (2014, August 30). Blueprint for peace: What Ferguson can learn from Cincinnati. 
NBC News. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michaelbrown-shooting/blueprint-
peace-what-ferguson-can-learn-cincinnati-n191911. 




was insufficient information available, he ultimately concluded that: “taken together, the 
existing quantitative and qualitative information seems to suggest a wide gulf between 
where Prince George’s County appears to be and where the Justice Department would 
have wanted them to be seven years after the MOA was signed” (p. 101). 
8.2.5. Los Angeles 
As previously noted, Harvard-Kenney School researchers, at the request of then-
Chief Bratton, conducted an evaluation of the LAPD shortly before the termination of that 
consent decree that concluded that the LAPD had the tools necessary “to carry the 
process of continuous improvement forward” (Stone et al., 2009, pp. ii, 68). 
Rushin (2015) referred to Los Angeles as a “best case” scenario commenting 
that “at the end of [the Consent Decree], the LAPD was a dramatically different 
department.” Rushin went on to conclude that “[v]irtually all empirical measures suggest 
that the LAPD is engage in less misconduct today than it was before federal 
intervention.” Ultimately, Rushan used quantitative analysis to demonstrate that “the 
LAPD showed dramatic improvement during the [consent decree] era” (pp. 116-136 & 
140).  
Only a year later, however, Rushin (2016) was more circumspect about the 
chances of LAPD reform being sustained. He identified a “sudden jump in officer-
involved shootings” in 2011, which he referred to as “a potentially discouraging 
development.” He ended up concluding that “[t]ime will tell whether Los Angeles will be 
able to sustain the improvements it has made over the last decade plus” (p. 131 & n. 
81). 
8.2.6. Variability between findings 
With respect to Pittsburgh, Washington D.C., Cincinnati and Prince George’s 
County, Chanin (2012) did note that in all four of the aforementioned jurisdictions, “many 
of the systems established under the [consent decree] process remain in place today.” 
Chanin, however, found himself unable to explain away the apparent variabilities 
between the sustainability in the decrees in the four jurisdictions, unable to identify any 
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“meaningful difference between the four settlement agreements” nor the implementation 
processes in each city (p. 291).1028 
8.3. Media Reports on Sustainability 
Numerous national media outlets have also reported on the use of §14141 
actions offering differing views on their usefulness and often addressing issues of the 
sustainability of the reform process. 
For example, in April, 2015, The Marshall Project published an article entitled: 
Policing the Police specifically discussing “the challenge of making [Section 14141] 
policing reforms last” and noting that even “where local leaders have embraced 
Washington’s prescriptions, Justice Department officials have increasingly found 
themselves returning to grapple a second time with problems they thought they had 
fixed.” The story identified Cleveland, Miami, New Orleans and the New Jersey State 
Police as departments that had been investigated before, “rais[ing] public expectations 
and sometimes fall[ing] short of lasting reforms.” With respect to Cleveland, which had 
been the subject of a prior investigation and settlement agreement, a Justice 
Department official acknowledged that “[o]bviously the reforms that were attempted 
there didn’t take hold.” And with respect to Miami, which had an earlier §14141 
investigation closed five years before (2006), the then-head of the Civil Rights Division 
documented in July 2013 that, “many of the systemic problems we believed were fixed 
have reoccurred, evidenced by a steady rise in officer-involved shootings” (Marshall 
Project, 4/23/2015). 
In May, 2015, Bloomberg, in an article entitled A Pattern or Practice of Violence 
in America, also reported that “[m]ixed outcomes are more common,” specifically 
observing that although the 2005 Vera Insititute study found “long-term improvements in 
police accountability” in Pittsburgh, “[s]ince then, Pittsburgh’s police department has 
made headlines involving violent incidents including the 2010 beating of an unarmed 
high school student.” The article also reported that “a former police chief, Nate 
 
1028 Although Chanin (2012) did speculate that “it [was] possible that marginal differences in 
process – e.g., five versus seven year implementation or the nature of one monitor’s approach 
versus another – may help to explain variability in the sustainability of change” (p. 291). 
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Harper,1029 is serving time in federal prison for conspiracy and fraud charges” 
(Bloomberg, 5/27/2015).1030 
In November 2015, Frontline published a report, Forcing Police to Reform, asking 
“whether such interventions work?” and noting that the DOJ had “not studied the long-
term outcomes at the law enforcement agencies it has targeted.” Frontline reported 
“mixed” results relating to incidents of use of force, offering that in half of the ten 
departments for which data was available, incidents of use of force “increased during 
and after the agreements.” Professor Jerrey Fagan, from Columbia Law School was 
quoted as saying “[t]he hard question – have you stopped doing the things that got you 
into court in the first place – is something that these consent decrees seem to have 
trouble answering.” The report honed in on Pittsburgh, where it was reported that police 
uses of force had increased nearly 44% between 2005 and 2013 and, according to the 
legal director of the Pennsylvania ACLU “turnover in the chief’s office and major violent 
incidents have made for uneven progress resulting in ‘a good amount of backsliding.’” 
The then-police chief commented that: 
[y]ou can gain compliance with policies and get people to stop engaging in 
dysfunctional behavior … but unless you change the way people feel about 
their job and start holding themselves responsible … the accountability will 
only last as long as I do. (Frontline, 11/13/2015)1031 
A Frontline story published one month after the November, 2015 story, was 
entitled: Policing the Police – Inside 20 years of federal police probes. That article, 
 
1029 Chief Harper served more than six years as the Chief of the Pittsburgh Police Department, 
from October 31, 2006 to February 20, 2013. “Prior to his appointment he was the long-time 
‘Assistant Chief in Charge’ of the Investigations Branch. He was, reportedly, asked to resign 
during the course of an FBI and IRS investigation and pled guilty to numerous felony charges 
approximately seven months after his resignation. See, Nathan Harper Wikipedia page, retrieved 
from, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nathan_Harper; Pittsburgh Action News 4. (2014, February 
25). Ex-Pittsburgh Police Chief Nate Harper sentenced to federal prison, Pittsburgh Action News 
4. Retrieved from, https://www.wtae.com/article/ex-pittsburgh-police-chief-nate-harper-sentenced-
to-federal-prison/7465096. 
1030 Stroud, M. & Rojanasakul, M. (2015, May 27). A Pattern or Practice of Violence in America. 
Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-doj-and-police-violence/. 
1031 McClay served as Chief of the Pittsburgh Police Department until November 18, 2016, for a 
period of two years (Bakalarski, A. & Brindle, E. (2016, November 4). Pittsburgh Chief of Police 
Cameron McLay resigns. The Pitt News. Retrieved from, 
https://pittnews.com/article/113167/news/pittsburgh-chief-police-cameron-mclay-resigns/. 
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again, noted how difficult it was to measure to what extent “those reforms have changed 
on-the-ground policing.” The article reported that, 
The Justice Department has said it’s been working to improve its process 
in recent years in order to evaluate whether reforms are working. In more 
recent agreements, with departments in Seattle, Cleveland and 
Albuquerque, N.M., it has built in new tests, including independent surveys 
of public perceptions of police, as well as requirements that independent 
monitors regularly analyze use-of-force data, stops, searches and arrests; 
and other metrics. All of these new agreements are still underway, so it will 
take time to know how effective the new approach will be. And reforming 
departments is a slow process. (Frontline, 12/14/2015) 
In 2017, the New York Times ran at least two articles on the sustainability (or 
lack thereof) of §14141 actions, the first in January, entitled Efforts to Curb Police 
Abuses Have Mixed Record, again, singling out Pittsburgh as having “backslid after 
changes in leadership,” citing the opinion of Professor Walker (New York Times, 
1/14/2017). In April, the Times conducted a deeper dive into Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh CD – 
It Did Not Stick, commenting on union opposition to the reform effort, and the impact of a 
new Mayor, who was elected in 2006 with union backing, four years after the termination 
of the Consent Decree and who “promptly dismissed” the police chief involved in the 
reform effort. The Times reported that “[o]ver time, various aspects of the Consent 
Decree fell out of use” and quoted Professor Sam Walker as saying: “[i]n the end, a city 
completes a consent decree, then the judge goes away, the Monitor goes away, … All 
cities are on their own, and then it’s dependent on the local community and local politics” 
(New York Times, 4/9/2017). 
On June 3, 2020, two academics and a retired chief published a 4,000-word 
opinion piece in the Atlantic, as the result of the George Floyd protests. The authors,1032 
commented on the DOJ enforcement actions, which were no longer being used by the 
Trump administration, commenting that, 
[w]hile the DOJ cannot intervene in the actions of the more than 18,000 
police agencies in the United States, Congress can instruct and empower 
it to offer technical assistance, identify conduct standards that can serve as 
references for courts in civil litigation, and provide a framework for 
 
1032 Seth W. Stoughton, a Professor of law at the University of South Carolina ; Jeffrey J. Noble, 
the former deputy chief of police at the Irvine Police Department in California, and Geoffrey P. 
Alpert, a Criminology professor at the University of South Carolina. 
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responsive and democratically accountable community collaboration, 
opening additional avenues of reform. (The Atlantic, 6/3/2020)1033 
Shortly thereafter, the New York Times once again reported on the challenges 
associated with consent decree-initiated reform, specifically focusing on the Ferguson, 
MO consent decree. The Times identified “significant obstacles” to reform “like state 
laws, union opposition and contractual protections for officers accused of misconduct.” 
On the positive side, the Times reported that  
[e]ven though only a tiny percentage of the nation’s 18,000 police 
departments ever came under a consent decree, they set a tone, 
established best practices and put police leaders on notice that they, too, 
could come under scrutiny if they showed a ‘pattern and practice’ of civil 
rights violations. 
The Times quoted a former head of the Special Litigation Section as saying, “[t]here is 
something irreplaceable about the leadership of the federal government and the 
Department of Justice.” The article went on to report that the Trump administration had 
ended the use of consent decrees as well as “the Collaborative Reform Initiative,” a 
voluntary program used to help departments avoid pattern or practice investigations. The 
Times observed that “[c]onsent decrees have often been frustratingly slow to carry out, 
with even minor changes like requiring officers to give people business cards meeting 
with opposition.” Even so, the Times did report positively on “tangible” results of consent 
decrees in San Francisco and Chicago, although both of those cities were the subject of 
State-initiated settlement agreements, after the Trump-DOJ refused to pursue §14141 
actions against those cities (New York Times, 6/13/2020).  
8.4. Divergent Opinions on Seattle Consent Decree 
Sustainability 
Even though the Seattle Consent Decree remains open as to issues of 
accountability and police discipline (and now, with respect to the investigation and 
adjudication of protest-related complaints), all the parties (to include the City, the DOJ, 
the Monitor, the CPC and the Court agreed that in January 2018, the SPD was then in 
full and effective compliance with the four corners of the document. The key question 
 
1033 Stoughton, S., Noble, J., & Alpert, G. (2020, June 3). How to Actually Fix America’s Police. 
The Atlantic. Retrieved from How to Actually Fix America's Police - The Atlantic. 
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then, relates to whether or not the changes that were implemented as part of the 
Consent Decree reform effort at that time were (or are sustainable). 
The complexity of the answer can be seen in the divergent opinions published by 
a former DOJ lawyer, now Superior Court Judge (in on Op-Ed article in the Seattle 
Times on June 30, 2020) and the court-appointed Monitor (in a “final report” issued at 
the time of his resignation on August 31, 2020). The two public statements were highly 
divergent in their ultimate conclusions as to the current status of the sustainability of the 
Consent Decree-initiated reforms. 
Judge Michael Diaz, previously assigned as a lead attorney for the local U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, strongly argued that substantial change had occurred and that the 
Community Police Commission was a key to sustainability of the reforms. Diaz agreed 
that “the work of reform” was not “done,” however, he painted a positive picture of the 
reform efforts and the ability of the SPD to move forward.1034 
 
1034 Judge Diaz’s Op-Ed, appeared in the June 30, 2020 edition of the Seattle Times and read as 
follows: 
“To those who say nothing has changed and the federal court process should be tossed aside: As 
the federal court’s independent monitor Merrick Bobb and Professor Jacqueline B. Helfgott at 
Seattle University, among others, have detailed: 
• Serious uses of force are down 60% from 2009, which means 700 fewer people each year since 
2016 were subject to force than were in 2009. That means nearly 3,000 people have avoided 
police violence because of reform. More broadly, between January and July 2018, there were 
103,553 police-resident interactions, but only 0.00369% (or around one-third of 1%) involved any 
force, 86% of which was “low level.”  
• Similarly, the use of force against those in active behavioral or mental-health crisis plummeted, 
from 70% of all force used to 15%. More broadly, between January 2017 and June 2018, of the 
15,995 crisis contacts reported, only 1.73% led to any force, the vast majority of which was again 
low level. 
• When misconduct does happen, the blue wall of silence has been breached. Complaints by 
SPD against SPD used to be “nonexistent” (as one officer admitted to me during the 
investigation). In 2017, internal complaints accounted for 20% of all complaints filed. This meant 
that SPD officers reported on each other more than 250 times that year. 
• And those complaints, as well as the 15,000-plus complaints related to the recent protests, will 
be investigated, not just by a civilian-led unit, but now by a civilian-run internal affairs unit, the 
Office of Police Accountability (OPA), which reports to a civilian inspector general, a position that 
didn’t exist in 2012. 
Of equal importance, the Community Police Commission (CPC) did not previously exist. This was 
the first consent decree in the nation to create a community body designed to bridge the gulf that 
had formed between large portions of the community and the SPD, and to give those members 
an effective forum where they could interact directly with SPD. 
And the CPC and other members of the community have been busy: from the development of 
binding use-of-force rules, where for the first time de-escalation was mandated and choke holds 
571 
Monitor Bobb, on the other hand was much more negative about the current 
state of the SPD, referring to it as at “a nadir,” damning Chief Best with faint praise, and 
declaring the need for an outside Chief to be appointed as a result of her resignation. 
Bobb challenged the SPD for engaging in biased policing and challenged City leaders 
for their “endless squabbling, … endless jockeying, and some runaway egos.” Bobb 
inferred that the SPD had become unable to sustain the reforms and argued that the 
 
effectively banned; to anti-bias training designed and actually conducted dozens of times by 
community members themselves; to crafting a new robust officer-discipline system, the vast 
majority of which was enshrined in city ordinance and labor agreements. 
The bridge the CPC created continues to be well-traveled. On June 3, I, along with dozens of 
other community members, virtually attended the CPC’s general meeting, where they bore 
witness, where they strategized, and where they had the ear of Chief Carmen Best and Mayor 
Jenny Durkan directly. One CPC commissioner — who told her story of being tear gassed the 
day before, picked herself up, dusted herself off and came to the meeting — still shaken — to 
share her experience and continue to do the hard work of reform. 
So to those who say nothing has changed, it’s simply factually wrong and a disservice to those 
community members, including the CPC, who have been marching, sweating and bleeding for 
this work, not just for the decade I’ve summarized but, for certain commissioners, for the last 
seven decades. 
And yet, is the work of reform “done?” Definitely not. As the monitor found, disparities exist as to 
whom force is used on, who is searched and what is found during those searches. These are not 
minor matters. And lest there be any suggestion to the contrary, every use of force matters, even 
“low level.” Indeed, any shooting rightly can destroy community confidence. The decree, however, 
was never meant to be the final word in reform. The decree doesn’t require such disparities to be 
eliminated before it can sunset. The decree doesn’t even contain words that are most pertinent 
now eight years later: “body cams,” “demonstration management” or even “officer discipline.” In 
some areas, the decree expressly relied on the community to develop solutions appropriate to it, 
outside the purview of the judge. In short, the decree did not swallow all of police reform whole for 
all time. 
So to those who are wondering, whether loudly or quietly: “Haven’t we dealt with this already?” or 
“When will things will go back to normal?” or are even skeptical of the motives of those in the 
streets and choose to focus on the few demonstrators who cause property damage: Things won’t, 
can’t and shouldn’t go back to “normal” simply because we have the decree. Just as in 2011 — 
when the community protested the killing of Williams and demanded the civil-rights investigation 
that triggered the Consent Decree — the passion behind today’s protests are as necessary to 
true reform as any shiny policy paper, any excellently-delivered training or any ruling by any 
federal judge. 
We need both the wisdom of the slow, steady and effective organized reform efforts, and the 
urgency of the protests. They should reinforce each other. For me, it’s a sign of our city’s 
strength, not a sign of weakness, that we can hold both ideas at once. It is a cause for hope, not 




Department required a new and aggressive Chief to put the Department back onto the 
path of reform.1035 
Even though the positions of Judge Diaz and Monitor Bobb appear, on their face, 
to be divergent, there may be more commonality than would initially be seen. In fact, 
many of the improvements cited by Judge Diaz are supported by the data collected 
herein. At the same time, Monitor Bobb’s assessment that the Department had 
backslided during the administration of Chief Best rings true. In actuality, it may be that 
the SPD needs another outside, reform-minded Chief in order to take it over the finish 
line and ensure that police accountability initiatives are successfully implemented. 
 
1035 Pertinent portions of Bobb’s “final report” read as follows: 
“For the Monitor and the Team, the acme of the last seven years was the Judge's finding that the 
SPD had achieved substantial compliance. This is thus the right time for my monitoring and this 
Monitoring Team to end. There are new challenges for a new team to assist Judge Robart.  
The SPD is at its nadir. It desperately needs a new chief from outside the organization to put it 
back together. It needs leadership. It can get back to the place where Kathy O'Toole left it and 
Carmen Best took over. Many of the same excellent people are still there. A wise chief of police 
will gather them up; empower them; bring in new good people, sworn and civilian, from around 
the country to leadership positions, like Chief O’Toole did with Mike Wagers; and get the job 
done. The SPD must move forward from the recent protests.   
There is undoubtably waste and inefficiency in the SPD that should be eliminated. There are roles 
that persons other than sworn officers can perform without a law enforcement orientation. But 50 
percent or even some lesser cuts to the police budget smack of ideology rather than the reality of 
maintaining the peace. Nonetheless, the SPD set itself up to criticism. 
Its performance during the recent demonstrations and protests betrayed a lack of adequate 
preparation and training, an apparent absence of an overall strategic plan or foreknowledge how 
to deal with violent interlopers without cutting off legitimate First Amendment activity by peaceful 
protesters, even if loud and challenging; inadequate subtlety and sophistication about the use of 
powerful and injurious nonlethal weaponry; a seeming lack at times of sensitivity to the First 
Amendment role of journalists and the moral and ethical role of medics; a willingness to call 
something a riot when it might have met some technical definition but was a far cry from a 
rebellion or stampede or even a melee merely so the SPD could use tear gas, a chemical agent 
banned for use in warfare after World War I … 
A final word about the endless squabbling at the top of Seattle leadership: As Rodney King said, 
"Can we all just get along?" The Mayor, City Council, City Attorney, CPC, and other community 
groups and organizations must really try to work together and not at cross purposes. I will not 
miss the endless jockeying and some runaway egos.” (Bobb, 2020). 
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8.5. SPD culture: Has it Changed (For the Better)? 
As previously noted, numerous commentators have discussed the importance of 
ensuring a police “culture that strongly supports constitutional and effective policing” as a 
factor impacting the sustainability of §14141 reform efforts (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 37).  
Although Seattle research participants repeatedly pointed to new updated 
systems and policies which would support the sustainability of the reform process, the 
question of whether the SPD culture had changed was the subject of controversy. While 
some participants believed that many of the basic concepts that would support reform 
sustainability had been “hard baked” into the police culture (specifically as they related to 
the need for effective supervision, use of force investigations and reviews, and up-to-
date policies and training), substantial concerns were expressed regarding the SPD 
culture. Specifically, it was questioned whether the Consent Decree effectively broke 
through the ‘us versus them’ and ‘warrior’ philosophies of policing that led the SPD 
towards federal intervention in the first place (see, PERF, 2015; Rahr & Rice, 2015).  
To that effect, many participants expressed concern as to whether the SPD’s 
culture had really changed: 
• “They have made good changes, they are now tracking uses of force 
and crisis interventions; there’s a lot more transparency, but the culture 
has not changed, the line staff hasn’t changed as to their feelings on 
how to treat people” (SPD civilian); 
• “We got so close to changing the culture, but some of the changes are 
now seen as not tactically sound and we’ve had budget cuts which have 
impacted training; and then we have some members of command staff 
who don’t believe in what we’ve done – they are just waiting…” (SPD 
command officer);  
• “Right now, it feels very transactional – the City just wants to get out 
from under the Consent Decree … If you have people who are not doing 
things for the right reason – will it change when the stick goes away?” 
(SPD outsider);   
• “We still have command staff going around saying it was all bullshit” 
(SPD officer); 
• “The Monitoring Team has no idea what is currently going on – they 
have no insight about the backsliding that is going on and the attitudes 
which are contrary to the intent of the reforms” (highly placed SPD 
official); 
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• “The SPD is still fighting; in the background, they are thinking ‘you may 
be able to force us to do what you want, but we will just do what we 
have to do to get you to go away” (SPD civilian); 
• “We are really good at making it look like there is change, but when you 
look under the cover, it hasn’t really changed at all. I don’t think the 
SPD was as broken as New Orleans, but it is at risk of getting there – 
I’m just not sure there is the political will to stop it…” (SPD officer); 
• “I don’t think the reforms will stick. As painful as it was, it was not 
painful enough. Our goal was just ‘we have to be compliant.’ The issue 
I see with sustainability is there are still a ton of people who have the 
idea of ‘it’s us versus them’ and some of those who have that attitude 
are now in charge” (SPD officer). 
The above-noted comments paint a very negative picture of sustainability based 
on a police culture that has not actually changed over the course of the Consent Decree. 
However, as indicated below, there is reason to believe that the implementation of 
certain “systems” and the longevity of the reform process will ultimately support 
sustainable change. 
8.6. Are the Seattle Reforms Ultimately Sustainable? 
Almost universally, participants did seem to recognize a difference in the 
Department’s attitudes regarding the reform effort when comparing the tenure of Chief 
O’Toole (an SPD “outsider”) to that of Chief Best (an SPD “insider”).  
• “Unfortunately [Chief Best] reverted back to people she had known for 
years and felt she could trust and reverted back to relying on sworn and 
not unsworn. Even so, so much was institutionalized that even a change 
in leadership won’t change the path forward – but there is an insular 
mentality right now that is problematic” (High ranked SPD official); 
• “Chief Best has the desire to keep the reforms going. But the ultimate 
question is does she have the buy-in of her officers? What does it say 
when they elect a ‘hard liner’ as the union president, instead of a 
‘reformer?’ They seem to be saying they are tired of the Consent Decree 
and tired of the extra scrutiny. So, I’m thinking it’s going to be hard to 
sustain the reform” (Seattle oversight professional); 
• “Unfortunately, within the current administration, we have at least one 
high ranking official who has not embraced the reforms in his heart. 
When command staff undermines a system that is in place, it can 
negatively impact sustainability. That being said, the Chief is aware of 
it, although I am not sure what she will do about it…” (SPD command 
officer). 
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While some participants bemoaned the differences between the O’Toole and 
Best administrations, on the whole, they generally believed that consent decree 
sustainability was a fait accompli based on the “systems” and policy changes that had 
been implemented over the past eight years:  
• “The rank and file have come a long way here, even perhaps 
unconsciously. Although some are questioning whether it is malicious 
compliance, it’s hard to bide your time for six years; this has been a 
mask that eats into the skin. They have been doing things right for the 
last six years, it would be hard to going back to doing it wrong. It’s 
become part of their reality” (SPD outsider); 
• “A lot of the reforms have stuck due to us now having systems in place; 
overall, some of the use of force investigation review recommendations 
which have resulted in new training initiatives –I think that’s the kind of 
thing that will sustain it overall” (SPD command officer); 
• “The SPD has so much a better picture of where they are and their ability 
to self-police. They also have the ability to present information to the 
public and make their work more transparent. That’s something that can 
outlive this process. I believe the community can be in the position to 
keep an eye on things” (SPD outsider); 
• “There is a responsiveness here – community wise – to continue to push 
reform forward that that should give a lot of optimism. There have been 
changing norms in the SPD where the SPD, as a department, now 
engages in critical self-analysis; that is something that can be expected 
to continue to go forward” (SPD outsider); 
• “The SPD’s training and policies have all been overhauled – it would take 
a dramatic Mayor/Chief combination to undue the systems that have 
been put in place – and the data systems themselves are remarkable. 
With this in mind, sustainability seems highly likely” (SPD outsider); 
• “‘Best practices’ have become the mantra. We are continuing to look at 
our policies and practices; absent complete changes at the top, we won’t 
backslide” (SPD officer);  
• “If Judge Robart holds the line – then this will be the success to which 
we aspired; regardless, I don’t think it’s reasonable not to expect there 
to be a drift backwards and a regression at some point after the DOJ 
leaves…” (SPD outsider). 
• “There are still some ‘die hards’ in the SPD who think they can wait this 
out, but they are not taking into account that even in the Academy, they 
have moved from a ‘warrior’ to a ‘guardian’ persona; we will benefit 
from the new demographics coming out of the academy: younger, more 
educated, and more diverse…” (SPD outsider) 
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Still, many participants were either unsure or expressed overall concern with 
respect to sustainability overall. And, many recognized the need for continued 
engagement on the part of the elected officials and the community to ensure the long-
term success of the reform effort. 
• “I have some concerns, but at this point we have some good structures 
in place that are not going anywhere, so they can’t just slip back into 
the ‘good old days.’ We will still need effective management and a good 
chief, however, to make sure that does not happen. So, what it really 
depends on is if there is a continued political will to demand an 
accountable police department” (Seattle city official); 
• “Sustainability all depends on how much the mayor and council are 
willing to hold the line with the police union. You can be assured that 
SPOG will continue to try to assist individual officers who should be fired” 
(SPD command officer); 
• “All of the elements are there for sustainable success, including the new 
records management system; for the first time, we have a 
comprehensive platform to see what officers are doing and the training 
is fantastic and sustainable; the problem is that you can give command 
staff what they need to successfully run the department, but you can’t 
force them to use the tools you provide – it’s the old adage: ‘you can 
lead a horse to water, but you can’t make him drink’” (SPD official); 
• “We gave the reformists the opportunity to effect a change with the new 
generation of officers coming in and with the driving of the old guard 
off. It remains to be seen if that will be lasting. But, at least, it gave the 
guys who wanted improvement the opportunity to be agents for change” 
(SPD outsider); 
• “Some of it will be sustainable…the processes used by the DOJ and the 
Monitoring team have been successful elsewhere, and there is no reason 
to believe that Seattle will be any different… However, I’m still worried 
about parts of it collapsing back into what it was before, given the most 
recent contract with the union …” (SPD outsider); 
• “The consent decree really addressed what was a lack of management 
and internal systems. In that sense, the SPD has moved in the right 
direction – but they have still not tackled some major issues – such as 
off duty work – which is really problematic.” (SPD outsider);  
• “It’s hard to say if we have seen evidence of malicious compliance with 
respect to the Consent Decree, but it does feel as though there has been 
some backsliding, particularly in how the SPD has reacted to 1st 
Amendment expression issues. With the pandemic, I have no idea where 
the resources will be going: but if we want sustainable change, we will 
need resources appropriately allocated.” (Seattle city official) 
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Some participants, however, had very negative perceptions of the reform effort 
overall. For example, one well place community participant believed that the Consent 
Decree reform process was “build on using shame, stigma and humiliation,” as opposed 
to collaboration and cooperation.1036 Some of the negative comments, however, also 
came from within the city and the SPD: 
• “SPD is still fighting, their internal mantra was ‘we are not changing, … 
we are not moving, … you may force us but we will just do what we have 
to do to get you to go away.’ Frankly it has been a very passive-
aggressive approach” (SPD civilian); 
• “By 2016, it seemed like ‘the fix’ was in and we started going back to 
the old ways.  Suddenly command staff were the only ones with access 
to the DOJ and the Monitoring Team. In order to speak with the 
Monitoring Team, we would have to go through layers of people who 
would wax-on philosophic about their thoughts on the whole process” 
(SPD officer involved in the reform process). 
• “The problem at the SPD has always been the management, and even 
after eight years, it still is” (City official); 
• “The SPD command staff never got over the 20% finding, there was an 
internal sense that ‘we are the best and how dare you criticize us.’ Due 
to the early resistance from Mayor McGinn, the opposition was allowed 
to coalesce under a shared narrative and that opposition has never gone 
away.” (SPD command officer). 
“At some point, you just need to declare victory and walk away.”  
Seattle Research Participant 
 
More than one participant highlighted the difficulties associated with the long-
term nature of the implementation effort (now in its eighth year). One highly placed 
participant commented that, 
significant and positive changes have come out of this, but there has to 
be some ability to get out of it for the rank and file. Morale has been 
slipping and there is an opportunity for backsliding, as far as 
Department culture goes, the longer the Consent Decree goes on. 
The participant further commented that “there must be an optimum time as to when 
changes take place,” and suggested that the optimum time period had already passed. 
 
1036 Obviously, the Monitor and the DOJ would disagree with that assessment, and the monitor’s 
reports consistently spoke in terms of collaboration and cooperation as key components for the 
success of the reform effort (see, Chapter 7.3.2, supra). 
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Other participants pointed to what they referred to as “consent decree fatigue” as being 
a potential danger of the reform process dragging on for much longer: “While there was 
a huge benefit in having the court-appointed monitor who was able to get the momentum 
going, there is still the potential to for the pendulum to swing back as a result of consent 
decree fatigue.” 
As observed by another SPD participant,  
we went through phases – first we fought them, then we embraced them 
– now we are at the part where we just want to get rid of them – we 
are all now thinking – ‘this is stupid,’ we just want to check the box and 
get them to go away. 
A third participant, intricately involved in the implementation process, suggested that “a 
consent decree needs to be like heart surgery; open and close, and then it’s up to the 
patient to maintain a healthy life style.” Instead, however, the Seattle consent decree has 
been more like a long-term rehabilitative hospital stay with some arguing that some 
providers have had an incentive to prolong the treatment. 
Utlimately, there are strong arguments for the “heart surgery” tactic as opposed 
to the “long-term rehabilitative hospital stay” strategy in consent decree implementation. 
However, the long-term strategy used in Seattle, while costly, has also provided the “gift 
of time” which would suggest that many of the structural reforms are now so well 
imbedded in the Department that they will not be lightly set aside. 
8.7. Civilian Oversight as a Key Component of 
Sustainability 
Although there was certainly criticism of the current civilian oversight structure, 
with many SPD affiliated participants believing that the tripartite system (involving the 
Community Police Commission (CPC), the Office of Professional Accountability (OPA) 
and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)) constitutes “oversight overkill,” it is largely 
believed that it is these structures that have the greatest ability to ensure the 
sustainability of the Consent Decree reforms. And, although there are critics on both 
sides with respect to the quality of the work of the CPC and the OPA, on the whole, the 
OIG seemed to have a high level of support from all sides of the police accountability 
debate. 
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With respect to the importance of oversight on the issue of sustainability, the 
following observations are representative of the viewpoints expressed by research study 
participants: 
• “It was important to us to ensure that the Inspector General had 
sufficient authority and resources to take on the responsibility of the 
court-appointed monitor. The IG is necessary, but not sufficient on its 
own, to ensure sustainability” (SPD outsider); 
• “Other systems, like the IG and the OPS will keep us on our toes. 
These, and other public partners (including the CPC) will ensure 
sustainability…” (SPD command officers); 
• “You need permanent oversight, otherwise it will back slide. It doesn’t 
have to be a monitor; it can be a combination of the IG and the CPC, 
as long as they are independent and have power” (Official involved in 
implementation process); 
• “The worry post-consent decree, is how do we avoid back sliding. The 
OIG program, if run properly, will be a key to our success” (SPD 
insider); 
• “The CPC, OPA and IG are the keys to sustainability. But, these 
agencies are person-dependent. The real question is, can you survive 
bad leadership in any or all of these organizations?” (SPD outsider); 
• “The destiny, if we are to believe history, is that this police reform 
effort will fail, unless there are people committed to making it work 
every day;” (SPD outsider); 
• “I’m hopeful as to the work of the OIG, but worried about whether or 
to what extent her recommendations will be enforced. If the SPD acts 
as it did before, we will be back to where we started” (Community 
member involved in reform effort). 
According to participants, the Inspector General’s Office was created with the 
intention of eventually replacing the court-appointed monitor and since the beginning of 
the “sustainment period,” it has been striving to “complement” the work of the DOJ and 
the Monitor and become “a second version” of the Monitoring function.1037 Participants 
observed, however, that the approaches of the IG and the court-appointed monitor are 
necessarily different. The Monitor has the ability to “come in and force change and 
 
1037 As of this writing, the OIG has conducted and published four audits, thus far: 1) a “Firearms 
Inventory Controls Review” (in response to an OPS case), issued on May 23, 2019, 2) an “Audit 
of SPD Compliance with Chapter 14.12 of Seattle Municipal Code, Collection of Information for 
Law Enforcement Purposes,” issued on June 21, 2019, 3) a “Force Review Board Assessment,” 
issued on July 31, 2019; and 4) an “Audit of SPD Patrol Canine Teams,” issued on June 24, 
2020. See OIG website, located at http://www.seattle.gov/oig/reports. 
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dictate the pace of the change,” the Inspector General, however, has to “cultivate 
relationships,” “get buy-in, and collaborate” in order to “avoid malicious compliance.” 
With respect to the CPC, there appeared to be general agreement that the 
commission was never given a clear process by which they would be “seriously engaged 
as a primary stakeholder” and even though the court granted the CPC amicus status in 
the DOJ §14141 law suit, the court’s pushback on the CPC attempting to become a 
permanent body “left a very bad taste in the mouths” of members of Seattle’s civil rights 
community (see, The Stranger, 6/30/2015; Seattle Times, 7/1/2015). One participant, 
actively involved in the implementation of the settlement agreement, aptly described the 
problem: “when you create a body like the CPC, it needs to be long-term, with a defined 
authority which requires the City to seriously engage with them so discussions can be 
about substance, rather than process and personality.” 
Utlimately, the tripartite structure of Accountability in Seattle, to include the 
Inspector General, the Office of Professional Accountability and the CPC, would seem to 
have created a strong foundation for future accountability. Although the organizational 
structure has the potential to increase the opportunities for conflict, they also have the 
potential to ensure that all points-of-view are heard before decisions are made – and that 
has been defined as “the Seattle Way” (See, Section 7.5.13, supra). 
8.8. Have the Seattle Police Reforms Become 
Institutionalized? 
According to most metrics, it would appear that the Consent Decree reforms 
forced upon the Seattle Police Department have become institutionalized. However, as 
with the other reform efforts, there is a constant and ongoing danger of backsliding. 
Even so, it does seem unlikely that the SPD will ever return to the way it was before the 
settlement agreement was filed with the court. 
In an attempt to objectively evaluate the extent to which consent decree-initiated 
reforms have been successfully implemented, such that they are likely to remain 
sustainable in the long term, I have applied the metrics suggested by Ikerd & Walker 
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(2010), entitled: Making Police Reform Endure: The Keys for Success.1038 I have also 
applied the metrics suggested by Chanin (2012) in his PhD dissertation, entitled, 
Negotiated Justice? The Legal, Administrative, and Policy Implications of ‘Pattern or 
Practice’ Police Misconduct Reform.1039 
With respect to Ikerd & Walker’s first element, that officers know about and can 
describe the basic elements of the reform, the evidence tends to suggest that SPD 
officers are fully aware of the basic elements of the reform effort, to include the need to 
de-escalate and minimize uses of force (particularly as to persons in crisis) and the 
expectation that such uses of force will be the subject of intense scrutiny by supervisors 
and civilian overseers. Officers are also aware of concerns about biased policing and the 
laws that apply to “stop and frisk,” to a point that they were clearly not aware prior to the 
Consent Decree (see, Seattle Monitor Assessment Reports, supra, Chapter 7.3.2). 
Second, Ikerd & Walker suggested that officers need to be supportive of the 
reforms. Although it is clear that many officers (and command staff) still believe that the 
DOJ investigation findings were not legitimate, research interviews did not disclose a 
strong current within the SPD who still want to “go back to the old days,” even though 
many participants identified a desire on the part of members of the SPD command staff 
to be rid of DOJ oversight and to be allowed to run the department on their own. 
Third, Ikerd & Walker suggest that officer behavior needs to reflect the reform. 
Extensive analysis on the part of the Monitoring Team appears to support that officer 
behavior has dramatically changed; even if there may have been “backsliding” with 
respect to the Department’s handling of recent protest activities (see Monitor 
Assessment Reports, supra, Chapter 7.3.2).  
 
1038 Ikerd & Walker (2013) suggested the following four elements be used to evaluate whether 
reforms have been institutionalized in a police department: 1) that officers know about and can 
describe the basic elements of the reform, 2) that officers are supportive of the reforms, 3) that 
officer behavior reflects the reform, and 4) that the department’s policies and procedures have 
incorporated reform philosophies and realities into the department’s decision-making and 
accountability processes (pp. 13-14). 
1039 Chanin (2012) suggested using the following three metrics to evaluate the sustainability of 
consent decree reforms: “1) the extent to which a department perpetuates the policies and 
procedures established under the reform, 2) the extent to which the department’s culture now 
reflects the core values of the reform, and 3) the extent to which a department is able to maintain 
desirable levels of key outcomes related to the reform” (pp. 203-204). 
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And even so, although the SPD may have recently suffered setbacks with 
respect to its crowd control efforts in response to the George Floyd protests, the fourth 
element wherein the department’s policies and procedures need to have incorporated 
reform philosophies and realities into the department’s decision-making and 
accountability processes seem to have been applied with rigorous oversight by the DOJ 
and the Monitor. 
With respect to Chanin’s recommended metrics, first, the SPD does appear to 
have perpetuated the policies and procedures established under the reform. The 
Department has accepted and implemented DOJ and Monitor-approved policies relating 
to use-of-force (including de-escalation), use-of-force investigations, crisis intervention, 
biased policing and search and seizure. The second metric, however is more 
problematic. The answer to the issue of: “to what extent the SPD’s culture now reflects 
the core values of the reform,” unfortunately depends on who you ask. However, there is 
certainly reason to believe that there has been enough transition in departmental staff (to 
include street level officers, Sergeants and command staff) that the old culture of the 
SPD would have a hard time returning back to pre-Consent Decree days. Third, with 
regard to the extent to which the department is able to maintain desirable levels of key 
outcomes related to the reform – the existence of a working data platform, the ability to 
better monitor officer performance and the keen eye of multiple external oversight 
agencies suggests that to the extent undesirable outcomes occur (primarily unnecessary 
force and/or searches), the City has the mechanisms necessary to identify and address 
them. 
8.9. Conclusions 
Overall, it appears that the question of sustainability of the reform effort will 
depend, to a large extent, on the new leadership of the SPD, which was anticipated to 
be quickly chosen by the Mayor, until the recent decision by Mayor Durkan not to run for 
re-election. Regardless of who is ultimately chosen to lead the SPD as its permanent 
chief, however, the continued existence of the civilian oversight functions and their 
impact on the SPD cannot be ignored. As long as the CPC continues to function and 
have the ability to influence police decision-making and community and elected official’s 
perceptions of the SPD, the opportunities for back sliding will be reduced. In addition, the 
Inspector General appears to be operating from a strong foundation and an enhanced 
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OPA is continuing its operations. There also remains an active and observant civil rights 
community who have the sophistication to put ongoing pressure on the Mayor and the 
City Council. And the rank & file police union, although it appears to have returned to a 
reactive stance with respect to oversight and reform, has lost some of its political power. 
As such, it seems unlikely that future contract negotiations will further impede 
accountability, particularly given the watchful eye of a new Monitor and Judge Robart, 
who clearly will not allow the Settlement Agreement to be terminated until accountability 
related issues have been fully addressed. 
In Table 8, I compile all the metrics suggested by Chanin and Ikerd & Walker to 
help visualize the current state of the SPD vis-à-vis the sustainability of the Seattle 
consent decree reform effort. In general, it does appear that the positive factors 
outweigh the negative and that, overall, the Seattle reform effort appears to have a good 
likelihood of future success. 
Table 8.1. Sustainability Metrics as Applied to the Seattle Police Department 
Sustainability Issue Status Impact 
Is there a capable, supportive 
leadership? (Chanin, 2012; Chanin, 
2014). 
Questions have been raised by research 
participants as to the ability of Chief Best to 
provide the leadership necessary to push 
forward reforms; it is currently unknown who will 
be chosen as Chief as a result of her 
resignation over conflicts with City Council over 
funding and command staff salaries. 
Unknown factor 
Has there been consistency and 
continuity among agency 
leadership? (Chanin, 2012, citing, 
Reiss & Bordua, 1967 & Murdaugh, 
2005). 
Yes and no. After Chief O’Toole, who was 
ultimately responsible for implementation, her 
Deputy Chief, Carmen Best took over as Interim 
Chief and then permanent Chief, resigning in 
September, 2020. Research participants have 
suggested that Chief Best did not have the 
ability to impact the SPD and push reforms 
forward as did Chief O’Toole. It is unknown 
whether an “outside Chief” will be appointed as 
suggested by Monitor Bobb or an “inside Chief” 





Sustainability Issue Status Impact 
Have there been pervasive and 
ongoing communication between 
leaders and organization 
members? (Armenakis et al., 1999; 
Ikerd & Walker, 2010; Chanin, 
2012). 
There has been significant criticism among 
research participants relating to how the 
command staff communicated reform efforts to 
the rank and file. Even under Chief O’Toole, it is 
reported that her message was sometimes 
filtered in a negative fashion by non-supportive 
members of command staff. Rank & file report 
mixed messages as a result of the conflicts over 
the union contacts and issues of accountability. 
Mixed 
experiences 
Is there a continuing commitment 
to officer training and recruitment? 
(Chanin, 2012). 
Research participants have suggested that the 
SPD has a continuing commitment to officer 
training and recruitment, but future financial 
support for training is unknown. 
Positive factor 
Unknown factor 
Has there been external support for 
the reform initiatives from 
jurisdictional political leaders and 
members of area civil society 
organizations? (Chanin, 2012). 
There is strong support for reform from a 
sophisticated civil rights community. 
 
While Mayor Durkan initiated the reform effort, 
her willingness to negotiate a union contract that 
resulted in a finding of partial non-compliance 
indicated a problematic support for reform. At 
the same time, the police union appears to have 
lost some of its political influence and a new 
contract is likely to be more accountability 
based. 
 
Continuing conflicts between the Mayor and the 
SPD on one side, and the City Council on the 
other side has the potential to negatively impact 














Does the department have 
adequate resources to support 
reform-related initiatives? (Chanin, 
2012; Chanin, 2014; USDOJ, 
2017b, p. 37; Alpert et al., 2017). 
Although the city has a strong tax base; 
pandemic and political issues regarding 
“defunding” the police, leave open questions as 
to future resourcing and funding that will be 
available for the SPD to sustain reform efforts, 




Do the officers know about and can 
they describe the basic elements of 
the reform effort? (Ikerd & Walker, 
2010). 
Research participants support the concept that 
officers are fully aware of the reform effort and 
what is expected of them – even though officers 
have a lack of understanding as to why the 




1040 See, Balk, G. (2020, November 9). Is the Seattle Police Department Understaffed? Here’s 
what the data shows. Seattle Times; Beekman, D. (2020, November 10). The Seattle City Council 
is proposing a package of changes to Mayor Jenny Durkan’s 2021 budget plan. Seattle Times 
[“The package would, among other moves, redirect tens of millions of dollars earmarked by 
Durkan, bolster the city’s emergency reserves and further trim the Police Department’s funding”]. 
585 
Sustainability Issue Status Impact 
To what extent is the police union 
leadership and rank & file officers 
supportive of the reforms? (Ikerd & 
Walker, 2010; Chanin, 2017a; 
Chanin, 2017b). 
There is evidence of continuing union opposition 
to reform efforts. In fact, in early 2020, the 
police union representing rank & file SPD 
officers elected a “hard-liner” as President of the 
union. 
Negative factor 
Is there support for the reform 
among organizational middle 
management? (Chanin, 2012; 
Chanin, 2014). 
Research participants offered differing opinions 
on support for reform by middle managers. 
Some suggested that some Sergeants and 
Lieutenants have “gone down the rabbit hole” 
created by command staff who remain resistant 
to federal intervention and reform-based 
initiatives. Some middle management 
participants, however, appeared to be fully 




Is there an accountability 
infrastructure in place that allows 
for a periodic continuation of the 
kind of review and analysis 
performed by the court-appointed 
monitor? (Chanin, 2012; Walker, 
2012; Chanin, 2016; Alpert et al., 
2017). 
There is a strong accountability structure in 
place, in the form of the CPC, the OPA and the 
Inspector General’s Office. 
Positive factor 
Have consent decree policies and 
procedures been perpetuated and 
likely to be in place for the long 
term? (Chanin, 2012; USDOJ, 
2017b; Jaio, 2020). 
Yes. There is no reason to believe that policies 
approved by the court will be substantively 
changed. 
Positive factor 
Has the collection and analysis of 
data become a part of the 
organization’s regular way of 
conducting business? (Ikerd & 
Walker, 2010; Chanin, 2012). 
According to research participants and 
monitoring reports, data collection and 
evaluation has become a normal part of SPD 
business operations. 
Positive factor 
Has the department been able to 
maintain desirable levels of key 
outcomes related to the reform? 
(Ikerd & Walker, 2010 [Does officer 
behavior reflect the reforms?]; 
Chanin, 2012). 
There have been recent criticisms of SPD 
protest related activities and evidence of 
continuing biased policing.  
 
Monitor assessments show a dramatic decrease 
in officer use-of-force, particularly against 






To what extent does the 
department culture reflect the core 
values of the reform? (Mollen 
Commission, 1984; Chanin, 2012; 
Chanin, 2014) 
Although some research participants have 
suggested that the SPD culture has not truly 
changed, outcome metrics support that officers 
are acting differently and it appears likely that a 
new “course of doing business” has impacted 




Sustainability Issue Status Impact 
Has the SPD been able to avoid 
large-scale performance crises? 
(Chanin, 2015, p. 168) 
No. A massive number of complaints was filed 
against the SPD as a result of their response to 




While Table 8.1 identifies a number of “negative factors,” “unknown factors” and 
“mixed experiences,” the “positive factors” appear to have established a sufficient 
foundation to give the SPD the tools necessary, to be used by a dedicated leadership, to 
sustain the reform effort. Specifically, the SPD’s ability to sustain a commitment to officer 
training, external support for reform efforts, a strong accountability infrastructure that can 
be expected to be improved through further monitoring and court intervention, the 
perpetuation of consent decree created policies on crisis intervention and use-of-force, 
and a robust data collection platform all suggest that success is possible if there is a 
committed and effective SPD leadership at the helm of the organization. 
Even so, the Seattle consent decree experience has identified the need for a 
more holistic approach to future federal reform efforts. The “lessons learned” and 
recommendations for future DOJ use of §14141 (now §12601) are described in Chapter 
9, infra. 
 
1041 Combos, L. (2020, June 1). 11,000 Complaints Allege Police Misconduct at Seattle Protests. 





Implications & Recommendations for Future Reform 
through DOJ Intervention 
Generally speaking, it would be fair to consider the Seattle consent decree 
reform process to have been a success, although all research participants agree that it 
has been a long, rocky and meandering road to compliance. And, of course, there is still 
a level of uncertainty as to when or whether true compliance has been, or will actually 
ever be, achieved. Regardless, there are lessons to be learned even if there are strong 
and differing perceptions and opinions of the experience among the various 
stakeholders. Even so, the following conclusions can be stated with respect to the 
overall experience: 
1. City officials and SPD command staff felt unfairly singled-out for a 
reform effort that included a formal consent decree and a court-
appointed monitor and believed that a less stringent form of federal 
intervention could have been used to support the SPD in achieving 
the goal of effective and Constitutional policing; 
2. City officials and SPD command staff believed (and still believe) that 
the DOJ investigation was faulty and lacked transparency and, as 
such, violated concepts of “procedural justice;” 
3. An initial lack of support for the reform effort, on the part of City and 
SPD leadership, had a negative impact on the views and perceptions 
of rank-and-file officers and interfered with the messaging necessary 
to inform and educate the rank and file with respect to the intent of the 
reform effort;1042  
4. The City’s process for the selection of the court-appointed monitor 
was unnecessarily contentious (involving public disagreements 
between the Mayor, the City Attorney and the City Council) and 
resulted in roadblocks for the Monitor at the beginning of the process 
and implementation delays;   
5. City politics and personal agendas involving multiple individuals and 
groups complicated the implementation process; 
 
1042 See, Chanin (2012), citing Armenakis et al., 1999, arguing “that pervasive and ongoing 
communication between leaders and organization members is critical to successful 
institutionalization” (p. 209). 
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6. CPC members and civil rights activists felt disrespected and left out of 
the overall process; 
7. Substantive issues relating to police discipline and accountability were 
left out of the Consent Decree and negatively impacted and 
complicated the reform process; and, 
8. Including the police union as a party to the §14141 litigation may have 
facilitated the reform process and avoided issues relating to police 
accountability from delaying and derailing the reform process. 
With the election of a new Democratic administration, and a likely return to the 
use of §14141 (now §12601) litigation as a form of police reform (Politico.com, 
6/29/2020), the time is ripe for the DOJ to learn from some of the lessons from the 
Seattle experience to better inform the future of this important tool in police reform. 
Interestingly, it appears that the DOJ has already learned from the problems 
associated with the above-noted finding involving the City’s perception that their 
procedural due process rights were violated by the DOJ. Even if the DOJ did not believe 
that perception to be reasonable, all stakeholder nonetheless agreed that it interfered 
with the progress of the reform effort, particularly during the first two years of 
implementation. As observed by one participant familiar with DOJ processes, 
In hindsight, Seattle was going to have a bad reaction to the DOJ’s 
findings given the timing of the DOJ’s notice to the City and the public 
release of the investigation report. DOJ now goes through their findings, 
more now than before, with the involved jurisdiction and gives more 
feedback over the course of the investigation. The DOJ has also tried to 
take steps to build-in collaboration. With direct briefings to Mayors, City 
Councils, and police command staff, a different way has been developed 
to do this than was done in Seattle. 
 That, coupled with the fact that, according to participants familiar with current DOJ 
techniques, cities now appear to better understand the need to “get ahead of” DOJ 
mandated reforms, it appears that the “procedural due process” issues seen in Seattle 
seem unlikely to reoccur. 
Many of the other problems associated with the implementation of the Seattle 
reform process appear to be tied to an otherwise intractable problem where city officials 
tend to react poorly to the “directive” nature of reform recommendations that are inherent 
in the Consent Decree process. As noted by Jaio (2020): 
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The nature of consent decrees is coercive. A consent decree is perhaps 
one of the most threatening vehicles for police reform. It poses threats to 
the entire police agency and the municipality because it is expensive and 
requires a herculean effort to resolve and a city has no option but to comply 
once a decree is issued (p. 9). 
The most effective solution for dealing with this problem is the recognition that, 
as identified in Chapter 1, DOJ oversight of local police falls squarely into the theoretical 
concepts associated with police use-of-force. Given that the DOJ, like officers in the 
field, has wide latitude in the amount of force it chooses to use, it can be difficult to 
identify whether excessive force has actually been used or whether a less aggressive 
option would have been successful. And, like in police use-of-force incidents, the DOJ 
would be well served by considering accepted police use-of-force force concepts, such 
as communication, de-escalation, crisis intervention, tactical repositioning, and 
alternative force options (PERF, 2015, p. 22) when deciding how to proceed against a 
local police agency. 
In addition, just like in policing, concepts associated with problem-oriented 
policing (Goldstein, 1990) and community-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1987), which 
often involve more holistic and collaborative approaches to law enforcement actions, and 
often involve more multi-disciplinary approaches to problem-solving are also easily 
transferable to DOJ police reform efforts. 
In fact, it appears that the DOJ has accepted these concepts implicitly in much of 
its work. Both the DOJ and some commentators have already spoken in terms of a 
“second generation” of consent decrees, which, in addition to better addressing 
sustainability, monitoring and outcome measure issues, have also addressed important 
issues relating to community and officer engagement and officer wellness as essential 
parts of any reform effort (USDOJ, 2017b; see also, Walker, 2018).1043 As recognized by 
Jaio (2020),  
 
1043 The DOJ report made multiple references to “the Division’s current generation of police 
reform agreements” and identified the areas where improvements had been made. According to 
the DOJ report, “In contrast to the first generation of police reform agreements, the current 
generation emphasizes:  
• Community engagement from the earliest stages of an investigation and throughout the 
course of a case, including incorporation of community engagement strategies and 
community-based solutions into reform agreements;  
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The publication of the PERF report (Police Executive Research Forum, 
2013) and the Michael Brown tragedy in August 2014 marked the beginning 
of the second generation of consent decrees. While excessive force 
remains front and center, community-oriented policing or problem-oriented 
policing and involvement of rank-and-file officers and their union 
representatives have been added to the decrees with detailed 
requirements in the form of outcome measures and compliance conditions 
for the police to meet. (p. 4, citing, Walker, 2018)  
In this regard, I would like to speak in terms of the first generation of consent 
decrees as “Section 14141, Version 1.0,” the “second generation” of consent decrees as 
“Section 14141, Version 2.0” and the opportunity for the post-Trump era of Section 
14141/12601 police reform as “Section 12601, Version 3.0.” 
With these thoughts in mind, I am recommending that the DOJ consider 
transferring the responsibilities associated with Section 14141 investigations and 
litigation from the Special Litigation Section (SLS), to a more holistic and multi-
disciplinary “Police Reform Section.” The Section would include DOJ lawyers and 
investigators with expertise in §14141 investigations and litigation, supplemented by 
current and prospective DOJ staff with experience in police training, policy development 
and collaborative reform initiatives.1044 In addition, knowledgeable staff would be 
required with experience, education and training in data collection and analysis, 
 
• Incorporating the input of rank-and-file officers at both the investigatory stage and in the 
development of reform agreements, through engagement with police labor organizations 
and face-to-face meetings with officers from all ranks, and recognizing the link between 
officer support and constitutional policing;  
• Issuing appropriately detailed findings letters or reports at the conclusion of every 
investigation, to publicly document the evidence obtained by the Division, explain the 
Division’s conclusions about the existence of a pattern or practice of police misconduct, 
and set a framework for negotiating a reform agreement;  
• Bringing diverse perspectives and real-world policing experience to the independent 
monitoring teams overseeing court-enforceable consent decrees; and, 
• Defined outcome measures to create objective, evidence-based benchmarks for 
assessing the value of reforms and the law enforcement agency’s compliance with the 
agreement” (DOJ, 2017b, p. 40). 
1044 See, Cole, et al, 2017; Collins, et al, 2017, for descriptions of the Collaborative Reform 
Initiative Process which was abandoned by the Trump administration after its successful use in 
Las Vegas and other cities. In disbanding the program, the Trump administration suggested that 
collaborative reform program “had evolved from a program that provided technical assistance on 
a specific issue to a broader adversarial assessment that incorporated critiques and deficiencies 
and monitored implementation of recommendations” (Noble, A. (2017, September 15). Justice 
Dept. overhauls program to tackle violent crime rather than police use-of-force concerns. 
Washington Times. Retrieved from DOJ overhauls COPS program to focus on violent crime 
rather than use-of-force concerns - Washington Times). 
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communication and transparency, organizational development, civilian oversight of law 
enforcement, and with the expertise and authority to obtain and deny police-related 
grants. If the DOJ were to create this new Police Reform Section within the Civil Rights 
Division, §14141 lawyers and investigators would have all of the tools necessary to 
conduct police reform in a holistic and collaborative way and still have the ability to “use 
force” as necessary by applying formal consent decrees against police agencies either 
unable or unwilling to engage in constitutional policing.1045 
Staff would need to liaison with policing groups, such as the Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF), the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the 
Major City Chiefs Association (MCAA), and civilian based think tanks, such as the Vera 
Institute of Justice, the Harvard-Kennedy School, and the Crime and Justice Institute 
(CJI) in order to provide policing agencies with the resources necessary to successfully 
avoid future Section 12601 litigation.1046 
Just like a police officer who is equipped with only a firearm, the SLS’ sole tool is 
a Section 12601 lawsuit, with the equivalent harms that are associated with costly and 
forced external reform. And while the SLS has reportedly already made great efforts to 
connect struggling police agencies with both technical and financial support on an ad 
hoc basis, it would be better for the DOJ to engage in a multidisciplinary approach where 
any struggling police agency can be systemically and seamlessly referred to cooperating 
agencies and organizations for an appropriate level of support.  
The new “Police Reform Section” would be able to engage in a more holistic 
approach to police reform, using the aforementioned use-of-force continuum theory, in 
identifying what form of federal intervention is best suited to each particular case. Staff in 
 
1045 One research participant, who worked closely with the DOJ’s Special Litigation Section during 
the Seattle reform process made the following observation, “DOJ needs to work more 
collaboratively to piece together a team with the skills needed on Section 14141 projects – a lot of 
the line attorneys from the local U.S. Attorney’s office have not worked with police departments 
before. If you are talking about improving the process, it would be aided by filling out the Special 
Litigation Section with people who really know this stuff.” 
1046 There is every reason to believe that these organizations would be interested in formalizing 
collaborative relationships with a new Police Reform Division. As recently as June 2020, the 
Executive Director of PERF was commenting on collaborative options for police reform: “Consent 
decrees are a method to deal with the most intransigent departments, …The one part of this 
process that is a tough pill to swallow is this notion that the department is under federal oversight, 
… Is there a way to build a model that accomplishes the same thing, but somehow gives police 
departments that sense that they’re making the changes?” (Politico.com, 6/29/2020). 
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this new section would also be able to emphasize on getting model policies and 
practices and “lessons learned” out to struggling or offending agencies as well as other 
policing professionals throughout the country. 
In some cases, the Police Reform Section might be able to assist a department 
in obtaining appropriate grants (see, Rushin, 2017a)1047 or could use the threat of refusal 
of federal funding as a deterrent to unconstitutional policing practices (see, Marshall 
Project, 2015).1048 In other cases, the Section might work with a generally cooperative 
police department by providing technical advice or by encouraging participation in a 
collaborative reform effort.1049 A team approach could also facilitate the re-visiting of 
agencies that were subject to prior consent decrees to determine to what extent the 
departments have continued on the path forward or identify areas where non-compliance 
has returned; and then address those issues with access to the aforementioned multiple 
support and enforcement tools. 
Simply put, a consent decree should not be the only tool in the DOJ’s tool belt – 
much more is needed, to include “less-than-lethal equipment” that will facilitate 
compliance with constitutional mandates without having to resort to the expensive and 
labor-intensive solution that is a §14141/12601 investigation or litigation. The Seattle 
experience suggests that the DOJ may want to try collaborative reform first, when there 
is reason to believe that an organization may be willing to reform under the watchful eye 
of the Police Reform Section or an appointed monitor, and only then revert to a consent 
decree if the collaborative effort does not succeed. The Seattle reform effort has, thus 
 
1047 As observed by Rushin, “The federal government has rarely subsidized and rewarded police 
departments for adopting cutting edge policies or technologies aims at combatting misconduct. 
Instead, it has provided penalties for police officers and police departments that are engaged in 
wrongdoing. Things could be different … In sum, the federal government could use its current 
grant-giving apparatuses to fund more police reform efforts” (Rushin, 2017a, p. 280). 
1048 In 2015, the Marshall Project observed that “[s]ome legal scholars and civil libertarians have 
argued that the costs of the refusing to change discriminatory police practices should be even 
higher. They have pressed the Justice Department to aggressively use of its authority under Title 
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which allows the department to cut off federal funds to any 
program or agency that is found to engage in discrimination.”  
1049 “There are several possible reasons for the provision of technical assistance over former 
intervention. The former is much cheaper and less involved for both the DOJ and the affected 
department. If the DOJ believes that department leadership is capable of implementing reforms 
on its own, it may be likely to give the department that opportunity, in the process saving the 
federal government time and money while providing a boost of public confidence for the police” 
(Chanin, 2012, pp. 355-356, at n. 93). 
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far, taken eight years. The length of the process itself suggests that not much time would 
have been lost if the DOJ had started first with a less intrusive means of reform. 
Table 9.1 shows potential tools for DOJ intervention, to include some types of 
intervention that do not currently exist in a formal way. In order to approach police reform 
in a more holistic way, the DOJ would need to use each intervention technique and 
apply them as needed in a coordinated effort.  
Table 9.1. Potential Tools for DOJ Intervention 
Classification of 
Intervention 
Type of Intervention 
Voluntary intervention Communication of expectations and best practices. 
Voluntary intervention Referrals to agencies engaging in best practices. 
Voluntary intervention Facilitation of new policy initiatives. 
Voluntary intervention Facilitation of new training initiatives. 
Voluntary intervention Federal Grant(s) in Support of Constitutional Policing Initiative 
Voluntary intervention Section 12601 investigation with technical assistance letter(s) and 
subsequent review to ensure compliance 
Voluntary intervention Section 12601 investigation & Collaborative Reform effort 
Involuntary intervention Denying federal grant(s) & subsequent review & technical assistance 
Involuntary intervention Section 12601 investigation and appointment of a federal monitor to 
report back to DOJ 
Involuntary intervention Section 12601 investigation & consent decree 
Involuntary intervention Court-appointed monitor & active monitoring of compliance by the DOJ 
and a federal judge. 
Post Intervention Periodic re-evaluations of compliance. 
Post Intervention Reliance on local municipal monitoring programs and reports back to 
DOJ. 
 
9.1. Approaching Police Reform in a Holistic Way 
As previously discussed, the DOJ team needs to be able to approach police 
reform in a holistic manner armed with multiple tools; including both the “stick and carrot” 
approaches to police reform, which would include variations of funding, collaborative 
agreements, training, collaboration with police professionals and social scientists and the 
use of collaborative agreements in lieu of, or as predecessors to, consent decrees. 
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Numerous Seattle research participants, after considering the Seattle consent 
decree process, suggested solutions along the lines of those proposed above. As noted 
by one research participant knowledgeable of the DOJ’s consent decree reform efforts: 
The DOJ has developed one tool and even though it is customized for 
each jurisdiction, it is a ‘one size fits all’ type of tool. However, it does 
not make sense to apply the same reform efforts in Seattle as you would 
use in New Orleans or Baltimore. In an ideal world, there should be a 
spectrum of reform packages – some kind of ‘consent decree-lite’ 
process – and then maybe something more significant where there is 
institutional or leadership resistance to reform … There is room for 
something more holistic. In jurisdictions where there is not a resource 
problem or structural problem – where problems are caused by deficient 
policies or training, there may be other solutions; maybe a solution that 
could be done more quickly and at less cost, or where perhaps a grant 
would have been of more assistance.  
Another research participant, who studied the Seattle implementation process, 
also supported the concept of a more holistic approach to DOJ involvement in police 
reform:  
The DOJ needs a systemic, sustainable plan, using all aspects of the DOJ 
and the federal government (including the NIJ and the COPS office) and 
other police-related programs and come up with a holistic way of dealing 
with the problems faced by local police. The DOJ tends to think of things 
in a legalistic format; they need to work with social scientists, funders, 
and policy wonks to ensure constitutional policing on a systemic level. 
One SPD official also suggested the need for the DOJ to develop organizational 
development expertise, commenting that, 
the Consent Decree process needs intentional change management in 
place before a consent decree is allowed to land. When it becomes a 
“you’re bad and I have to watch everything you do,” type of enterprise, 
the tendency is for people to become defensive and it can spiral 
downward into griping and grievance – which is exactly what took place 
in Seattle.1050 
This proposal supports a hybrid approach to the Consent Decree process when 
comparing the Bush Administration approach with the approach used early on by the 
Obama Administration and a more toned-down approach later professed by the Obama 
 
1050 Other Seattle participants commented on the need to “come up with a strategic plan before 
starting anything.” Other solutions included hiring the court-appointed monitor before negotiating 
the settlement agreement in order to ensure all stakeholders, including the monitor, have a full 
understanding of expectations and implementation plans before the implementation period 
begins. 
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DOJ (New York Times, 4/9/2017).1051 The Bush administration approach was well 
described by the then-Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division to the 
House Judiciary Committee in 2005, 
Rather than adopting a purely litigation-driven enforcement model, our 
experience demonstrates that a cooperative model produces much better 
and faster results. Accordingly, rather than husband findings of potential 
violations for use in court, we work hard to keep target agencies informed 
of our findings and progress, so that they can begin to develop and 
implement effective solutions. (Simmons, 2008, p. 510) 
If these concepts were to be used in conjunction with the Obama administration’s 
willingness to also engage via more aggressive approaches, as necessary, it would 
seem that many of the problems associated with the Seattle implementation process 
could be avoided in future DOJ enforcement actions. 
Within the Consent Decree evaluation literature, there are many references to 
the need for a more holistic and multidisciplinary approach to federal police reform 
efforts. In 2009, Harmon opined that, at that point in time, “§14141’s greatest potential 
has been overlooked.” Harmon identified that “§14141 had the potential to motivate 
proactive reform in more departments than the Justice Department can sue.” Harmon 
also recommended the creation of “a ‘safe harbor’ from suit for police departments that 
voluntarily adopt best practice reforms” (Harmon, 2009, p. 1). The concept of the 
granting of a “safe harbor” would seem much more consistent with a holistic Police 
Reform Section than it would be with a Special Litigation Section whose primary tool is 
investigation and litigation. Later, Harmon (2012) went on to suggest a form of 
 
1051 As reported by the Times, “Mr. Bush preferred voluntary arrangements, known as 
memorandums of agreement. Cleveland, Miami and New Orleans were all investigated by the 
Bush-era Justice Department, but none were required to enter into consent decrees. All three 
were reinvestigated by the Obama administration. President Barack Obama’s first civil rights 
division chief, Thomas Perez, came in determined to build on the work of the Clinton 
administration and consent decrees like that in Los Angeles, which had been hailed as a success 
in a Harvard study. But Mr. Perez’s hard-charging style drew the ire of union leaders, including 
James O. Pasco Jr., the national president of the Fraternal Order of Police. In an interview, Mr. 
Pasco accused Mr. Perez of waging “a virtual jihad against rank-and-file police officers.” Christy 
Lopez, a former Justice Department lawyer who worked on police abuse investigations during the 
Clinton and Obama administrations, said of Mr. Perez: “He represented a shift, and it was very 
hard for police officers. He was telling them things that no one really had the nerve to tell them 
before.” Mr. Perez’s successor, Vanita Gupta, sought to mend fences, but by then, many union 
leaders say, the relationship had been poisoned”. 
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“accreditation” from the DOJ, that would only be possible if the DOJ were to use a more 
multi-disciplinary team approach to its police reform efforts: 
Federal resources could also be used to increase the reputational and 
professional benefits for chiefs who adopt reform efforts. Accreditation 
provides reputational benefits to departments and chiefs that satisfy 
specific administrative and operational standards, and it could be a 
mechanism for further identifying and rewarding reform efforts. The 
Department of Justice could also increase professional benefits for civil 
rights initiatives informally, by holding prestigious invitation-only 
conferences for police chiefs with reputations as reformers. (p. 55) 
As early as 2010, the DOJ was describing its initial §14141 investigative work in 
a holistic way, as involving, information collection, collaboration and the provision of 
technical assistance. 
During an investigation, technical assistance may be provided, along with 
letters memorializing advice and suggestions, to enable the jurisdiction to 
make needed changes as soon as practicable. …  Investigative staff meet 
with all relevant stakeholders, including agency command staff, line 
officers, bargaining unit representatives, and members of community and 
advocacy groups. Investigators also observe trainings and participate in 
police patrol ride-alongs. (Clark, 2010, p. 3) 
However, as of 2014, the DOJ was being described as “rely[ing] on the language, goals 
and enforcement strategies typical of contractual enforcement, rather than policy 
implementation or organizational reform, to bring affected departments into compliance 
with the law” (Chanin, 2014, p. 50). And, in fact, that is exactly what would be expected 
of a section that relies primarily on lawyers in pursuing work in police reform. Chanin 
went on to conclude that, 
As a result, both the means and ends of pattern or practice reform are 
driven by legal concerns; the process is defined by the goal of creating an 
agency that complies with the law. This approach emphasizes process over 
substance and short-run compliance over long-term reform. Heavy weight 
is given to the symbolic value of the initiative; evaluation is a function of the 
presence or absence of mandated contractual changes, not the 
substantive value of the process, the functionality or sustainability of the 
new systems, the durability of agency priorities, changes in officer cultures, 
or any other policy-driven output performance-related outcome. The central 
assumption underlying this approach is that the presence of new policies 
and systems will automatically translate into desirable policy-related 
outcomes and a police culture respectful of civil liberties and legal values. 
In other words, embedded in the process is a definition of implementation 
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that conflates fidelity to the language of the policy with the depth of 
organizational change. 
Not only does this thinking ignore decades of research and practical 
experience warning against such assumptions, but it renders broader 
evaluation or analysis exceedingly difficult. (Chanin, p. 50) 
In 2020, at the height of the police accountability protests following the death of 
George Floyd, and after the Trump administration had wholly abandoned consent 
decrees as a form of police reform, Stoughton, Noble and Alpert wrote a 4,000-word 
essay in the Atlantic Magazine, which appears to support the concept of the creation of a 
holistically based Police Reform Section in the DOJ. The authors called for the federal 
government to “dedicate significantly more resources to supporting police training, local 
policy initiatives and administrative reviews.” The authors went on to recognize that while 
the DOJ did not have the resources to intervene with respect to all police agencies 
engaging in unconstitutional policing practices, “Congress can instruct and empower it to 
offer technical assistance, identify conduct standards that can serve as references for 
courts in civil litigation, and provide a framework for responsive and democratically 
accountable community collaboration, opening additional avenues of reform” (Atlantic, 
6/3/2020). I would suggest that there is no need for Congressional action in that regard; 
a change in how the DOJ manages and applies the powers and responsibilities it 
currently has is at the complete discretion of DOJ managers. 
And, in fact, as of 2017, the DOJ was already speaking in terms of their holistic 
reform efforts by noting that “[i]n some instances, the Division has drawn on other 
federal resources – such as the assistance of the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services (COPS) or the Office of Justice Programs (OJP)—to provide technical 
assistance or other support” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 15). What I am recommending, 
however, is that process become more seamless, by more formally incorporating these 
DOJ programs into one another with respect to police reform initiatives. 
“A consent decree is a blunt instrument that takes a huge amount of 
money and time – if I had my druthers, we would have gone the 
collaborative reform route – we should have started there, set up the 
benchmarks and then proceeded accordingly.” 
Seattle City Official 
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9.2. Reincorporating “Collaborative Reform” into the 
Federal Police Reform Effort 
To the chagrin of many at the DOJ (and police professionals as well), shortly 
after the Trump administration took office, the DOJ eliminated the Community Oriented 
Policing Section’s “Collaborative Reform Initiative” effort as it related to police reform 
(Walker, 2018, p. 1780; see also, Washington Times, 9/15/2017; New York Times, 
6/13/2020). The collaborative reform effort had been used as a voluntary process for 
police reform in multiple cities to include Las Vegas, Philadelphia, Milwaukee and San 
Francisco. As described by USDOJ (2017b), the “COPS Collaborative Reform Initiative 
advances police reforms by undertaking assessments of a law enforcement agency’s 
operations, providing recommendations for reform, and assisting the agency in 
implementing those reforms” (p. 50). There is simply no reason why this DOJ initiative 
should not be re-initiated under the auspices of a new Police Reform Section. The 
process, which does not involve the federal court, or the appointment of a monitor, is a 
means to achieve reform, cooperatively and collaboratively, in a more timely and cost-
effective way than can be achieved through a formal consent decree. Having the 
program managed within a newly re-invigorated Police Reform Section would allow for 
the type of “consent decree-lite” program called for by Seattle research participants and 
could allow for a more seamless transition between voluntary and aggressive reform 
initiatives.1052 In addition, creating a mission statement for the Police Reform Section that 
would include coordination amongst and between the Police Reform Division and other 
DOJ agencies with functions that could support police reform efforts would increase the 
potential for a holistic approach to the new Section’s work. 1053  
 
1052 In the Police Executive Research Forum’s report on a Summit it held on October 25, 2012, 
the Chief of the Missoula, Montana Police Department was quoted as saying: “The first thing that 
I said to Jonathan Smith [the head of the DOJ’s Special Litigation Section] when he came to my 
office was, “Why didn’t you talk to me about this issue before you announced an investigation?” 
When the Department of Justice announces an investigation into an agency, there is a significant 
impact on the agency’s reputation and credibility with the community. I believe that we could have 
quickly achieved a mutually desired outcome if the process were more collaborative” (PERF, 
2013, p. 39). 
1053 The January 2017 DOJ report, issued the same month that the Trump administration took 
office, also identified additional programs within the DOJ that provided assistance to police 
agencies, to include the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the Office of Justice Program’s 
(OJP) Diagnostic Center. The report noted that BJA programs have provided equipment, 
technology “and other resources for effective policing through millions of dollars in grants” to 
police agencies throughout the U.S. Numerous consent decree jurisdictions have been identified 
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“At a high level, the DOJ should regard a consent decree as the 
‘nuclear option,’ only to be used when all else has failed.” 
Seattle Research Participant 
 
According to one research participant, the Community Oriented Policing Section 
of the DOJ also used to manage an “Appreciative Inquiry Program” wherein DOJ staff 
would be brought in to evaluate conflicts between police and other stakeholders, and 
would conduct “deep dive interviews” and make recommendations on how to improve 
relationships. That type of program could also be managed within the Civil Rights 
Division’s Police Reform Section. The very fact that the Section would have the ability to 
“drop the bomb” and file a Section 12601 lawsuit, also means that the DOJ could 
publicly incentivize departments voluntarily coming forward to come up with solutions to 
problems if the potential for a consent decree looms in their future. 
“Command staff wouldn’t have been resistant to a more tailored and 
narrowly focused reform effort. No one would have resisted a more 
honest attempt to fix an actual wrong. But since that was not how it 
was presented, no one wanted to play ball on the Department side.” 
Seattle Police Department Supervisor 
 
In addition, the Police Reform Section would have the ability to rely on small 
“evaluation teams” who could operate prior to, or in lieu of, formal DOJ investigations 
and save substantial resources. The teams could work with University-based social 
scientists and policing experts to determine to what extent an intervention may be 
necessary and the teams could prepare evaluation instruments that could be shared with 
the affected police departments, thereby increasing the level of transparency as it relates 
to the initial review process. These evaluators would be able to review policies, training 
curriculum, department demographics, and use of force and complaint data, in 
 
as engaging in unconstitutional policing as the result of inadequacies in equipment and 
technology (e.g., Seattle, Cleveland and Baltimore, as per DOJ investigation reports in those 
jurisdictions). The Diagnostic Center was specifically identified as having “helped law 
enforcement agencies across the country with a variety of objectives,” to include “assessing and 
identifying weaknesses in officer supervision and discipline processes.” In addition, the Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR) at the OJP was reported as ensuring “that recipients of financial assistance 
from OJP, COPS, and the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) comply with federal laws 
that prohibit discrimination in … the delivery of services or benefits based on race, color, national 
origin, sex, religion, disability and age” (USDOJ, 2017b, pp. 50-51). 
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conjunction with conducting interviews of police and community stakeholders and use 
objective criteria in determining appropriate intervention techniques.  
The Police Reform Section would also be able to use another more collaborative 
tool in the form of a formal or informal diversion program. Such a program was described 
as “a recurring suggestion” made during the 2010 Roundtable on the §14141 Program, 
organized by the Civil Rights Division in conjunction with the Office of Justice Programs: 
Specifically, participants requested that the DOJ consider “some sort of diversion 
program whereby police agencies can avoid litigation if they make necessary changes 
and reforms.” In addition, participants “suggested the development of some sort of 
―continuum of litigation, wherein SPL would ―dial down in cases of cooperative, 
voluntary compliance and ―dial up intervention in cases where an agency is resistant or 
noncompliant” (Clark, 2010, pp. 4-5).1054 And while, as indicated in the DOJ’s response 
to these suggestions, it is clear that the DOJ has engaged in multiple levels of 
intervention, depending on the involved jurisdiction,1055 there seems to be no reason why 
the DOJ could not use additional tools such as a formalized diversion program, in 
conjunction with the previously recommended “use of force continuum” (see, Figure 1.2, 
supra),  a concept which would likely have had the support of the roundtable 
participants. 
 
1054 In response to these recommendations, the DOJ noted that the comments reflected a lack of 
understanding of then-DOJ practices: “By and large, comments regarding the need for early 
notice, diversion, negotiations, monitoring and follow-up may reflect a lack of appreciation for the 
role of, and process used [] in § 14141 cases. For instance, technical assistance, often 
documented in writing, is provided to the executive of the jurisdiction under investigation in most if 
not all cases. In this regard, it may be the role of the local executive — not the federal 
government — to make the police department aware of the situation and to involve other parties 
in the negotiation process. Most comments voiced at the meeting seemed to reflect a lack of 
understanding of the [] process related to diversionary or informal options in § 14141 cases. It is 
clear from the information provided by [the DOJ] that most investigations have been resolved 
without a court-enforceable agreement. Moreover, technical assistance is offered, if not provided, 
in many of these instances. How counsel chooses to proceed in handling a case when 
representing the local executive has more to do with the outcome than anything [DOJ] could 
provide by way of information or guidance to the local police department under investigation. The 
lack of understanding of the [] process points to the need for broadly disseminated information on 
the pattern or practice litigation process …” (Clark, 2010, p. 5). 
1055 For example, in the case of Columbus, Ohio, the DOJ agreed to terminate its investigation 
after the Columbus Police Department “made substantial alterations to many of the policies, 
procedures, and training that [the DOJ] sought to change through the lawsuit.” See USDOJ, 




Seattle participants repeatedly highlighted the need for the DOJ to have a more 
effective communication strategy, particularly as it related to SPD rank-and-file officers.  
Comments critical of the DOJ’s community and police engagement were made 
by numerous city officials, to include those highly supportive of reform efforts: 
• “One of the problems was that the rank and file didn’t know from Adam 
what was going on. They heard rumors and were told to stop being 
proactive. What happened in the North Precinct with 100 officers suing 
to stop the implementation of the new use-of-force policies, should 
never have happened. It’s not that the DOJ or the Monitoring Team did 
anything wrong, but there was never adequate communication to the 
rank & file as to what was going on. The early opposition by the McGinn 
administration resulted in no one learning about the positives of the 
Consent Decree – the attitude was so negative – it would have been 
good to have people in the DOJ or on the Monitoring Team who could 
communicate directly to the rank and file.” 
• “It was the SPD command staff who were the ones who were constantly 
dealing with the Monitor and they were the ones providing the narrative 
throughout the agency – a better system of communicating what was 
happening and why would have been good.” 
• “Although the DOJ and the Monitor were transparent and collaborative 
with the City, they did not get input from the officers on the street. The 
top-down nature of the communication has always been a flaw in the 
process and has been a challenge throughout implementation. It’s 
amazing how little new supervisors knew about the Consent Decree and 
the reasons behind policy decisions.” 
Interestingly, the January 2017 DOJ report on §14141 actions is replete with 
comments about the need for outreach to community and officers in the initial stages 
(specifically with respect to the investigation and negotiation), and also appears to 
suggest a recognition of the need to continue that outreach and communication 
throughout the implementation period (USDOJ, 2017b, pp. 11-12 [“The Role of the Law 
Enforcement Agency in Pattern-or-Practice Investigations”], pp. 13-14 [“The Role of the 
Community in Pattern-or-Practice Investigations”], pp. 29-30 [“Community 
Engagement”].  Even so, it does appear that the DOJ and the Monitoring team may have 
missed the mark in Seattle. I would suggest that a more holistic approach to consent 
decree implementation might improve the potential for DOJ community outreach 
specialists to be engaged in all aspects of DOJ interventions. 
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9.4. Adopting Prior Recommendations of Commentators & 
Academics 
It is also likely that if the DOJ were to approach police reform from a multi-
disciplinary team approach, a Police Reform Section of the Civil Rights Division would 
have the ability to engage in many of the activities previously recommended by other 
commentators and academics. Examples include recommendations relating to data 
collection and analysis, grants and federal funding, and education.: 
9.4.1 Data collection & analysis 
Numerous commentators have noted a “dearth” of available data by which the 
DOJ could identify departments engaging in abuse and have bemoaned what appears to 
be the necessarily required ad hoc response by the DOJ when selecting departments for 
intervention (Powell et al., 2017; Harmon, 2017; Rushin, 2017a). And Rushin, in 
particular, has discussed in length the type of data which Congress could order collected 
to assist the DOJ in identifying departments engaging in patterns or practices of 
constitutional violations (Rushin, 2017a, pp. 250-275).1056  
Rushin went on to propose that with the assistance of the aforementioned data, 
the DOJ could adopt a proposal previously made by Professor Rachel Harmon, arguing 
“that the DOJ could use data on local police behavior to create a national list of police 
departments that may be engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct.” Arguably, that 
national list could be used by the DOJ to engage with those police departments and 
pressure them to improve, in the face of potential DOJ action (Rushin, 2017a, pp. 271-
272, citing Harmon, 2009) and to prioritize §14141 actions based on such statistics. 
Rushin suggested that “[b]y publicly prioritizing litigation in such a way, the DOJ can 
create a race to the top, as departments try to avoid expensive and stigmatizing federal 
intervention” (Rushin, 2017a, pp. 268-269). 
My intention for this research project was, in part, to make recommendations that 
can be followed by the DOJ, without resorting to additional acts of Congress (except to 
 
1056 Rushin proposed a number of reforms to improve federal oversight of local police 
departments. His first proposal related to the need to “collect better data on local police behavior,” 
to include officer involved shootings, citizen complaints, and information pertaining to civil law 
suits filed against local departments (Rushin, 2017a, pp. 19-20).  
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the extent that the DOJ might need to request additional resources or budget to fund an 
effective Police Reform Section). Regardless, even without Congressional action 
requiring the creation of data bases which would assist the DOJ in better identifying 
pattern or practice violations, it would seem likely that the inclusion of personnel with the 
ability to collect and evaluate data in a Police Reform Section would increase its overall 
ability to effectively and fairly enforce the Police Reform Section’s responsibilities. 
9.4.2. Grants & federal funding 
One of the most significant benefits of a multi-disciplinary approach to police 
reform would be to more closely align the work of the Civil Rights Division and other 
sections of the DOJ as it relates to federal subsidies and grants provided to law 
enforcement throughout the country. As suggested by Rushin (2017a):  
it is time for the federal government to move from reactive to proactive 
regulation of local police departments. One way to accomplish this would 
be for the federal government to tie federal funding to local police 
departments to the enactment of reforms aimed at curbing police 
misconduct (Rushin, 2017a, pp 20-21; 248-249).  
Similarly, Harmon suggested the creation of a federal grant program “designed to 
subsidize cost-effective remedial measures for preventing key forms of misconduct” 
(Harmon, 2012, p. 54). And more recently, Powell & Worrall (2021) have suggested that 
there would be public support for the creation of a “police reform fund, … whose money 
[would be] reserved strictly for consent decrees” (p. 1). 
The costs attributed to the enforcement and implementation of consent decrees 
has been a continuing concern to all involved. As suggested by Ross & Parke, “Startup 
and maintenance costs linked with successful compliance of consent decrees are 
enormous … Without financial assistance from either the state or the federal 
government, municipalities will be unable to implement or maintain the requirements of 
the Consent Decree” (Ross & Parke, 2009, p. 204). A multi-disciplinary team which 
includes personnel experienced in grant funding would have the means to explore how 
to lower the costs of a reform effort for a struggling municipality (see also, Harmon 2012, 
p. 56 [suggesting that “new energy” be “devote[d] to exploring federal means of lowering 
the costs and increasing the benefits of reform”]). 
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The issue of the DOJ assisting in covering costs was also mentioned by 
numerous Seattle research participants, although it was acknowledged that if a city finds 
itself in the DOJ’s cross hairs as a result of a failure to adequately fund its police, there 
may be recalcitrance in “bailing out” the jurisdiction of a problem of its own creation: 
“Fiscal prudence should not be equated to opposition to constitutional 
policing – poor communities should not have to sacrifice themselves at 
the altar of police reform.”  
Seattle Community Member 
 
It certainly appears clear that many of the agencies that have come under DOJ 
scrutiny have not availed themselves of some of the funding schemes that could have 
helped them meet constitutional norms. And, research participants with knowledge of 
consent decrees in other jurisdictions have advised that the DOJ has assisted agencies 
in writing requests for grants in that regard.  An enhanced Police Reform Section, 
however, would likely be able to better link up struggling jurisdictions with Body Worn 
Camera funding, peer-to-peer exchanges, Bureau of Justice Assistance and COPS 
support programs and identify those resources to departments in need. 
9.4.3. Education 
Particularly as reflected in its symposium work the Office of Justice Programs 
(Clark, 2010),1057 the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF, 2013), and the DOJ’s 
2017 publications (USDOJ, 2017a; USDOJ, 2017b), the Civil Rights Division has made 
efforts to learn more about issues and concerns relating to its §14141 enforcement 
program and educate law enforcement and the pubic on its work.1058 Certainly, the 
 
1057 Over the course of the June 2010 Roundtable, “[a] recurring theme [] was the need for DOJ to 
provide a proactive program of education for law enforcement officials and others involved in local 
criminal justice systems on issues related to § 14141 litigation, evidence-based policies and 
practices, and other technical assistance to prevent police misconduct. As one chief suggested, 
‘DOJ needs to educate us as to what is the right thing to do!’ A comment offered by another 
police chief seemed to further suggest that ‘the development and dissemination of guidelines for 
constitutional policing would be of great assistance to local law enforcement’” (Clark, 2010, p. 10). 
1058 Even before 2010, the DOJ made efforts to publicize their reform work, to include the January 
2001 publication: Principles for Promoting Police Integrity. Retrieved on 11/12/2020 at, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojp/186189.pdf; and, funding a book by the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police “highlighting potential departmental deficiencies and 
recommending the Justice Department core functions as a means of promoting civil rights” 
(Harmon, 2009, p 56, citing, Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Protecting Civil Rights: A Leadership 
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expectation early-on was that the DOJ’s enforcement of §14141 would have a positive 
impact in articulating and disseminating national best practices in constitutional policing 
(Miller, 1998; Livingston, 1999). As suggested by Harmon, “research on policing best 
practices is the foundation for lowering the information costs of reform for police 
departments, and that research would be improved by the [collection of] §14141 data” 
(Harmon, 2009, p. 49). As observed by Walker, “[a] major contribution of the [§14141] 
program has been the development of a relatively short list of ‘best practices’ related to 
constitutional policing, which have become a part of the New Conversation and the 
roadmap for police reform” (Walker, 2018, p. 1823; see also, Walker & Macdonald, 
2009; Walker, 2017, p. 30, [concluding that “[p]rior to the DOJ program, there was no 
equivalent list of accountability-related best practices in policing”]). 
A holistic and multi-disciplinary approach to police reform would enhance the 
DOJ’s ability to educate police agencies nationwide in police reform and potentially allow 
it to “fashion a blueprint for a model police institutional structure” (Miller, 1998, p. 185). 
And, as recommended by Harmon, the DOJ could then use its resources “to refine and 
disseminate information about institutional deficiencies that breed police misconduct, 
remedial measures that will reduce misconduct, and means for effectively implementing 
those measures” (Harmon, 2009, p.7). In 2017, Harmon suggested the publication of a 
“best practices guide” for police departments, as well as “a biannual guide describing the 
institutional conditions [the DOJ] considers most worrying and the reforms it views as 
most promising for police departments.” Harmon also recommended the DOJ “work[] 
with social scientists to develop and test tools for measuring specific forms of 
misconduct and the effectiveness of the reforms it promotes” (Harmon, 2017 p. 624). All 
these recommendations would be much easier to enact with a Police Reform Section 
that would be armed with a wide variety of tools to achieve systemic police reform. 
“If your only tool is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail.” 
Attributed to Abraham Moslow, 19661059 
 
Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement, 6-9 (2006). Retrieved from 
https://www.theiacp.org/resources/document/protecting-civil-rights-a-leadership-guide-for-state-
local-and-tribal-law. 
1059 Retrieved 11/12/2020 from, https://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/05/08/hammer-nail/ 
606 
9.5. Sustaining Reform 
As suggested by a number of commentators, the DOJ’s litigation approach to 
police reform tends to ignore issues of “sustainability or durability of reform” except in 
those few cases where the DOJ has put into place transition agreements (e.g., Los 
Angeles) and, even then, there is no subsequent evaluation of the success or failure of 
the reform effort in the long term: 
… the DOJ’s legal approach limits the analysis to the timeframe of the 
settlement agreement itself. Once the department is found to be in 
compliance, the reform process is terminated and with it all external 
oversight. In other words, what happens after the oversight process 
appears to be irrelevant. Substantial compliance, then, is wholly unrelated 
to the sustainability or durability of the reform. (Chanin, 2014, p. 51) 
The literature is replete with recommendations that the DOJ come up with some 
form of performance monitoring, post-termination audits or follow-up teams to ensure 
that reforms made during the pendency of a consent decree or MOA are, in fact, 
sustained (Simmons, 2010, p. 418; Chanin, 2012;1060 Dukanovic, 2016, p. 927; Alpert et 
al., 2017, p. 243; Rushin, 2017a1061). Although, as noted below, there is also a strong 
argument for the DOJ putting some form of internal auditing function (Jaio, 2020) or 
external oversight (Dukanovic, 2016) into place with the belief that sustaining change 
should be a local matter and not the business of the federal government (Clark, 2010, p. 
5).1062 Arguments have also been made that the DOJ should ensure independent 
evaluations are conducted by other departments within the DOJ, such as the National 
Institute of Justice (Walker, 2017, p. 23). 
  
 
1060 However, as observed by Chanin (2012), even “[t]hough such a solution [post-termination 
audits of affected police departments] would have the effect of promoting sustainability, 
perpetuating DOJ involvement would likely raise federalism concerns and stretch beyond 
capacity limited [DOJ] resources” (p. 348).  
1061 After recognizing the inherent danger of police agencies reverting to poor practices after a 
consent decree has been terminated, Rushin (2017a) commented that “[n]evertheless, it appears 
that federal intervention is neither necessary nor sufficient for constitutional reform. Federal 
intervention is not a silver bullet. Real, long-lasting police reform requires local cooperation and 
dedication to succeed” (p. 166). 
1062 See Clark, 2010, p. 5, for a description of the differing positions on how to best sustain 
reforms upon the conclusion of a consent decree.  
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“Discussing the results of his qualitative research, Rushin mentioned 
that the one prominent request DOJ officials had when asked how 
§14141 reform could be improved was the institution of follow-up 
teams. These teams would return to departments that underwent 
federal intervention to ensure reform is maintained by local leaders 
and front-line officers.”  
(Dukanovic, 2016, p. 927, citing interview with Professor Rushin) 
9.5.1. Sustainability: involvement of stakeholders in settlement 
negotiations & implementation 
In Seattle, the research suggests that involvement of the union as a party may 
have helped avoid what the Monitor referred to as the “glacial” pace of reform, 
particularly as it related to police accountability (including the implementation of body-
worn cameras and reform of the police discipline system). In addition, even though 
Seattle’s MOA provided a specific framework by which community and the police unions 
could be involved in the implementation effort, the process ended up being publicly 
criticized by both members of the Community Police Commission (CPC) and the police 
unions. 
CPC members and SPD officials alike were critical of federal judges who are 
“removed from the community” taking matters out of local control and leaving local 
officials and community members without leverage in resolving policing related 
issues.1063 And study participants involved in consent decree implementation efforts 
nation-wide noted that “increasingly both communities and police departments are 
skeptical of how consent decrees will work.” 
The question of how to engage the community and rank and file officers in the 
Consent Decree process has been an area of continuing controversy. Chanin (2012) 
recommended including “union representatives and key civil rights organizations in the 
settlement negotiation process” (p. 351; see also, Chanin, 2017a, pp. 264-266) and he 
recommended the use of “focus groups and outreach with city residents to develop 
 
1063 One prominent community member was particularly passionate about the problems revolving 
around the Consent Decree process as a tool of externally mandated reform: “There’s a 
motivation that includes arrogance and money; the Consent Decree process is the creation of a 
racket of white male lawyers who believe they know everything and think they are critical to 
success in police oversight. That is why the Consent Decree process is unhelpful and should be 
at the bottom of any list in police reform in bringing it back.” 
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settlement content.” In addition, Chanin argued in favor of including “union and 
community group representatives in the implementation process by inviting group 
leaders to regular status meetings” (Chanin, 2012, p. 351).1064 As early as 2010, policing 
executives were suggesting that the overall reform process “should involve police 
officials, subject-matter experts, labor unions and community representatives as well as 
all other relevant parties” (Clark, 2010, p. 4).  
These recommendations were not new. The second evaluation of the Pittsburgh 
consent decree found that “[m]ore engagement of citizens and greater participation of 
front-line officers might have made a good process even better” (Davis, et. al, 2005, 
Executive Summary; see also, Simmons, 2008, pp. 528-531 [arguing that all 
stakeholders should be given a formal role in negotiating the terms of a consent decree]; 
and, Simmons, 2010, p. 416, [arguing that “policymakers should craft reforms that 
restore political legitimacy by encouraging deliberation among stakeholders”]).1065 
Since the time that the Seattle settlement agreement was first reached, the DOJ 
and the courts in other cities have taken further steps to incorporate public feedback into 
the creation of settlement agreements. In the case of Portland, Oregon, in February 
2014 “the court conducted a fairness hearing to determine whether the settlement 
agreement was ‘fair, adequate, and reasonable’” (Patel, 2016, p. 842). Patel referred to 
the Portland fairness hearing as “hailed by some as historic for its inclusion of so many 
community voices,” and identified the hearing as having provided an “opportunity … for a 
bottom-up approach to police reform.” According to Patel: “[t]hrough community input, 
this process did more than increase the police's legitimacy within the community; it also 
respected and acknowledged the wisdom of those on the ground, and therefore, further 
promoted individual self-determination within the policing context” (Patel, 2016, pp. 842-
 
1064 The DOJ appeared to partially incorporate this suggestion into its Newark consent decree, 
where it required the court-appointed “monitor to hold regular meetings with representatives of 
rank-and-file officers, further ensuring that the monitor remains responsive to a broad range of 
critical stakeholders in reform” (USDOJ, 2017b, p. 23). 
1065 In Seattle, the DOJ did make efforts to solicit input from community and officers to use during 
the ensuing Consent Decree negotiations and agreed to the creation of a Community Police 
Commission (CPC) to provide both community and union input into the implementation process. 
Even so, the CPC made an effort to intervene as a party and openly criticized the DOJ and the 
City for minimizing their role in the process. On the other side, rank and file officers and the police 
unions opposed Consent Decree implementation at various stages in the process (See Chapters 
7.3.2 (Seattle Consent Decree Implementation), 7.7.3 (the Community Police Commission & 7.8 
(Seattle Consent Decree Implementation – The Police Unions)) 
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844). Patel went on to laud the DOJ for taking “a great step forward by including 
community engagement as a central component of most consent decrees during 
President Obama’s administration,” and supported Portland as providing an example of 
the “parties agreeing to a non-party, yet enhanced, status for a group representing 
community interests” (Patel, 2016, pp. 867, 869). 
With respect to the inclusion of police unions, however, it has been recognized 
that the DOJ  
may not be inclined to include police unions in its negotiations [where there 
is concern] that [the] police unions [will be] more concerned about 
enhancing working conditions for their members than striking the 
appropriate balance of accountability measures to ensure constitutionally 
acceptable policing practices. (Rushin & Edwards, 2017, p. 775) 
As also recognized by Rushin and Edwards, “this sort of cooperative rulemaking may [] 
produce inferior reforms” (Rushin & Edwards, 2017, p. 775). There is also always the 
danger that a police union may not negotiate in good faith, with the intent of attempting 
to block any reform that may increase accountability “or otherwise burden frontline police 
officers” (Rushin, 2017a, pp. 138-139). 
Even so, in Cincinnati, as repeatedly recognized by Chanin, the collaborative 
reform effort, which included “the police union, relevant civil rights organizations, and 
members of the public more broadly, created minimal delays and only led to a small 
number of setbacks during either negotiation or implementation.” Chanin (2017a) went 
on to concluded that Cincinnati’s “inclusive approach continues to pay dividends in terms 
of the depth of the reform and the sustainability of change” (p. 266; see also, Chanin, 
2014, p. 47).  
9.5.2. Sustainability through civilian oversight 
Sustainability through the creation of civilian oversight of law enforcement 
mechanisms has become a key feature of the DOJ’s attempts toward ensuring 
sustainability of reform. In Los Angeles, the Consent Decree left a stronger oversight 
function in the form of the Police Commission and the Inspector General’s Office (Stone 
et al., 2009). In Seattle, the CPC, OPA and Inspector General have all been part of the 
attempt to ensure sustainable reform. 
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And support for civilian oversight in support of long-term sustainability has been 
supported in the academic literature:  
Given how tenuous these reforms appear to be and how unpopular they 
remain among the rank-and-file, the goals of the initiative would likely be 
better served by ongoing external oversight of the affected department. 
Periodic external checkups designed to promote independent post 
termination oversight, whether conducted by DOJ attorneys or a public 
agency similar to the one created by the State of New Jersey, would be a 
worthwhile investment. (Chanin, 2015, p. 185, citing Megerian, 2009;1066 
see also, Chanin, 2016, p. 111; Walker, 2018) 
As such, a DOJ multi-disciplinary team approach should include police oversight 
professionals who can assess oversight programs, facilitate conversations within the 
community and assist in identifying the most appropriate form of oversight for that 
community, depending on its particular needs (DeAngelis, et. al., 2018). 
9.6. Research Questions Answered 
As mentioned in Chapter 1.1, this research project began with five research 
questions which formed the basis for my research collection efforts: 
The first question asked: what are the potential and limitations of externally-
imposed reform efforts on police departments in the United States? The Seattle 
experience turned out to be an excellent laboratory for evaluating the potential and 
limitations of Section 14141 reform efforts. It showed that there is, in fact, great potential 
for the DOJ to assist (and sometimes force) reform to ensure Constitutional policing on 
the local level. While the data suggest that it might have behooved the DOJ to use a 
lesser degree of force on the City of Seattle at the outset of the reform effort, it also 
made clear that there were times when a heavy hand was required to move along reform 
efforts. Even so, the limitations of externally-imposed reform efforts are many. The SPD 
(and the Seattle police unions) showed remarkable resilience in their ability to resist 
reform at various points of time and it is clear that a lack of pro-reform leadership (up 
and down the chain-of-comment) can constitute an impenetrable barrier to reform. The 
data also suggest that “consent decree fatique” can have a negative effect on reform 
 
1066 Chris Megerian (2009, August 27). Gov. Corzine signs racial profiling reforms into law. 
NJ.com. Retrieved 11/12/2020 from, 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/08/gov_corzine_signs_racial_profi.html. 
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efforts over time and that a fundamental principle of economics, the “law of diminishing 
returns” can be readily applied to police reform efforts.1067  
The next research question asked: are formal Consent Decrees and Settlement 
Agreements an effective tool for facilitating significant and sutainable reform in United 
States police departments? The Seattle experience suggests that these formal 
agreements, particularly when combined with a court-appointed monitor can be an 
effective tool in support of sustainable reform. Even though there were criticisms of the 
Monitor, with respect to his personal approach to the reform effort, his priorities, and the 
inherent conflict of interest associated with the significant renumeration received by the 
Monitor for his efforts, overall, the Monitoring reports and the work of the Monitoring 
Team overall clearly kept the process moving forward over time. The appointment of a 
new Monitor in 2020 likely provided for a fresh start as it relates to the continuing need 
for reform in the SPD’s accountability structures. 
The third research question asked: to what extent has the Seattle Police 
Department has been able to achieve desirable reform outcomes as a result of the 
adoption of the federal Consent Decree, despite a police culture that did not reflect core 
reform values? The data suggest that desirable reform outcomes were achieved, even in 
the face of resistance from the command staff, many front-line supervisors and some 
members of the rank-and-file. Regardless, the culture of the Department (which can be 
amorphous and often difficult to identify) certainly threw impediments in the way of 
reform. In the case of Seattle, resistance from the union representing officers and 
Sergeants (SPOG) continues to this day. It remains to be seen to what extent the City 
will muster the political will to overcome this resistance while also remaining in 
compliance with Washington law relating to collective bargaining with public employees. 
The fourth research question asked: does it appear that substantive, sustainable 
reform has been achieved as the result of the adoption of the federal Consent Decree 
between the City of Seattle, Washington and the United States Department of Justice 
and at what cost? As indicated above, it does appear that substantive, sustainable 
 
1067 The law of diminishing returns states that there will be a diminishing effect where each input 
contributes less in proportion to the overall production output (See, Samuelson, Paul A.; 
Nordhaus, William D. (2001). Microeconomics (17th ed.). McGraw-Hill, 
p. 110. ISBN 0071180664). 
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reform has been achieved in Seattle, but as shown by the much-criticized response of 
the SPD to the 2020 police protests, the reforms are fragile and the need for a strong 
Mayor and a strong Chief, who are committed to the reform effort, is required to ensure 
sustainability in the long-term. As previously discussed, the cost of the reform effort has 
been substantial in terms of financial, reputational and emotional costs. At the same 
time, however, the costs of a department engaging in unconstitutional policing practices 
and providing policing services contrary to the expectations of its community, involve 
extraordinary costs that oftentimes cannot be quantified. As such, it is hard to suggest 
that the costs associated with the Seattle police reform effort were, in fact, overly 
excessive, even if some of the costs may not have been absolutely necessary. 
Finally, the last research question asked: to what extent have the views of police 
stakeholders and the perceptions of community stakeholders changed over the course 
of the Seattle Consent decree? This question ended up being difficult to answer due to 
the wide-ranging personalities and agendas of the various participants. While overall, 
police stakeholders appeared to be initially resistive and mocking of the DOJ’s findings 
and early reform efforts, there was a time when a critical mass of the SPD leadership 
accepted and endorsed the reform effort. However, as previously discussed, “consent 
decree fatigue” does appear to have set in and police stakeholders appear to be 
currently exhausted and frustrated by the SPD’s inability to get out from under the 
federal court’s supervision. On the community side, while community activists welcomed 
federal intervention at the start, many were frustrated by the DOJ’s failure to positively 
find that the SPD had engaged in a pattern of biased policing. In addition, community 
activists were originally suspicious of the ability of the CPC to have an impact on the 
reform effort, but overtime became empowered and then subsequently became 
disenchanted with the City’s (and sometimes the DOJ and Monitor’s) reactions and 
responses to CPC initiatives. At the current time, there appears to be a “wait and see” 
attitude that has developed among police and community stakeholders with respect to 
the accountability issues that remain outstanding. 
As discussed in Chapter 2.7, however, there are limitations to these findings. 
Although there was a wide variety of stakeholders who participated in this research 
project, there were additional stakeholders, mostly current City officials, who declined to 
participate given that the Consent Decree was still in effect at the time of the data 
collection. In addition, there were other stakeholders (particularly with respect to 
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currently serving elected and appointed officials) who may have been hesitatant to 
provide their honest appraisals of the process, given that it was still ongoing. Finally, my 
inability to publicly identify participants and their potential interests or biases when 
presenting their perceptions or points-of-view further limits the ability of the reader to 
objectively assess some of the conclusions I have reached. 
9.7. Final Thoughts 
By the end of the Obama administration, the DOJ had moved towards what could 
be most aptly described as Version 2.0 of the “Pattern or Practice” investigation program 
with a high level of attention being given to stakeholder engagement (on the part of the 
community and the police). And, in fact, the DOJ had already adopted a more holistic 
approach to all parts of the process, to include the conduct of their investigations, 
negotiations and even the implementation of reform. The recommendation here, 
however, is that under the incoming Biden administration, the DOJ move even more in 
the direction of holistic and multi-disciplinary approaches to police reform and implement 
a new “Version 3.0” of the §12601 program to support police reform efforts in a more 
systemic way throughout the country and in accord with public expectations as a result 
of the murder of George Floyd. 
One of the most important lessons learned from Seattle is that litigation-based 
police reform strategies will invariably result in a high level of suspicion from both police 
and community members, who will be concerned with the resulting loss of local control 
over policing in their jurisdiction and the potential for their voices not to be heard by DOJ 
lawyers and an appointed federal judge and monitor. To the extent that the DOJ can 
move away from a litigation-based approach to police reform, by applying some of the 
solutions suggested herein, the ability of the federal government to engage local 
stakeholders in a sustainable reform effort should be enhanced. 
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• Pittsburgh Police Department (1997)  
• Steubenville Police Department (1997) 
• New Jersey State Police (1999) 
• Los Angeles Police Department (2001),  
• Detroit Police Department (2003),  
• Prince George’s County Police Department (2004),  
• Virgin Islands Police Department (2009),  
• Warren OH Police Department (2012),  
• Seattle Police Department (2012),  
• East Haven CT Police Department (2012),  
• New Orleans Police Department (2013),  
• Puerto Rico Police Department (2013),  
• Portland Police Bureau (2014),  
• Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department – Antelope Valley (2015),  
• Albuquerque Police Department (2015),  
• Cleveland Division of Police (2015) 
• Maricopa County AZ Sheriff’s Department (2015) 
• Ferguson MO Police Department (2016) 
• Newark Police Department (2016) 




Memorandum of Understandings & Agreements 
• Montgomery County Police Department (2000) 
• Highland Park Police Department (2001) 
• District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (2001) 
• Buffalo Police Department (2002) 
• Cincinnati Police Department (2002) 
• Columbus OH Police Department (2002) 
• Mt Prospect IL Police Department (2003) 
• Villa Rica GA Police Department (2003) 
• Cleveland Division of Police (2004) 
• Easton PA Police Department (2010) 
• Orange County FL Sheriff’s Department (2010) 
• Beacon NY Police Department (2010) 
• University of Montana Office of Public Safety (2013) 
• Missoula MT Police Department (2013) 
• Suffolk County NY Police Department (2014) 
• City of Meridian, County of Lauderdale, MS (2015) 
• Miami Police Department (2016) 
• Alamance County NC Sheriff’s Department (2016) 
• Yonkers NY Police Department (2016) 




Participant Interview Protocol Questions 
1) Please explain your involvement in the Seattle Consent Decree process. 
2) How well or poorly do you believe the process played out?  Did it change over time? 
3) What do you think went well and why? 
4) What do you think went poorly and why? 
5) Do you believe the SPD was in need of reform at the time of the DOJ investigation? 
a) If so, do you believe the CD process was the most promising means to 
implement such reform? 
b) If so, how do you think the SPD ended up in a position to need reform? 
c) If not, what impact did the implementation of the CD have on the Department? 
6) To what extent do you believe the process appropriately or inappropriately engaged 
community input and was such effort successful or unsuccessful?  
7) Similarly, to what extent do you believe the process appropriately or inappropriately 
engaged police union and rank and file input and was such effort successful or 
unsuccessful? 
8) Policy writing and implementation: To what extent do you believe “best practices” 
were followed?  
a) To what extent do you believe CD imposed policy changes have or will improve 
the SPD? 
b) Discuss any weaknesses you saw in policy writing/content and implementation. 
9) To what extent did the leadership of the Police Department or the City have an 
impact on the success or challenges faced during the implementation of the Consent 
Decree? 
10) To what extent did the existence or lack of resources impact the implementation of 
the Consent Decree? 
11) To what extent did the culture of the SPD or the City of Seattle impact the 
implementation of the Consent Decree?  
12) Do you believe the CD had an impact on the culture of the Department? If so, how? 
13) What do you think were the most significant challenges faced? 
14) Where there were successes – what do you think were the causes of those 
successes? 
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15) Do you believe that the changes implemented by the Consent Decree are 
sustainable?  
a) If not, why not? 
b) If yes, why do you believe that and what was done to ensure sustainability of the 
reforms? 
c) If not, what could be done (or needs to be done) to ensure sustainability of the 
reforms? 
16) How would you evaluate the importance of the various stakeholders in achieving full 
compliance?  
a) The Monitor?   
b) Police Leadership?  
c) City Leadership?  
d) The DOJ?  
e) The Court?  
f) The Union/Rank & File?  
g) The Community? 
17) What was the most significant success associated with the Consent Decree? 
18) What was the most significant failure associated with the Consent Decree? 
19) To what extent do you believe there were alternative ways to approach the Seattle 
reform effort either through less expensive or less intrusive means? 
20) Are there any comments you would like to add? 
21) Are there any other stakeholders that you believe it would be important to contact? 
22) Are there any documents you believe should be reviewed to effectively evaluate the 





Research Project Review Nodes 
Consent Decree Literature Review Nodes 
• 14141 Legislation & Leg History 
• 14141 References to Actual Litigation Against Lawsuit 
• Alamance County Sheriff 
• Albuquerque CD 
• Alternative Reform Tools 
• Amendments Proposed to 14141 
• Arguments Against 14141 
• Arguments For 14141 
• Baltimore CD 
• Best Practices 
• Biased Policing – Racial Profiling 
• Case Law 
• Causes of Police Misconduct 
• Challenges in Police Reform 
• Chicago CD 
• Cincinnati RAND Corp Study 
• Cincinnati CD 
• Citizen Complaints 
• City & Police Leadership 
• Civil Liability 
• Cleveland CD 
• Code of Silence 
• COLE Issues 
• Columbus CD 
• Commission Reports 
• Community Engagement – Outreach 
• Community Policing Theory 
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• Community-Constituency Involvement in SRL 
• Consequences of Police Misconduct 
• Costs 
• Criminal Prosecutions of Police 
• Criticism of Application of 14141 
• Data Issues 
• DC Bromwich UOF Study 
• DC Consent Decree 
• Definitions – CD, MOU 
• De-Policing 
• Deterrence Theory 
• Detroit CD 
• DOJ collaboration with Police 
• DOJ resource allocation 
• DOJ statements 
• Early Intervention System 
• Evaluation Studies 
• Evaluation Metrics 
• Federal enforcement of civil rights and police reform 
• Ferguson CD 
• Future Research 
• Hiring & Retention Issues 
• History of Police Misconduct – Reform 
• History of SRL 
• History of Use of 14141 
• History of 14141 investigations & CD’s 
• Implementation of 14141 & challenges 
• Importance of Police Reform 
• Judicial Reform Theory 
• LA-Harvard Study 
• LAPD – LASD 
• Legal Issue re SRL 
• Limits to SRL & 14141 
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• Los Angeles CD 
• Maricopa County CD 
• Methodology 
• Monitoring Team – Composition – Role 
• Negotiated Justice 
• New Jersey CD 
• New Orleans CD 
• Oakland CD 
• Organizational Change 
• Organizational-Procedural Justice 
• Pittsburgh CD 
• Pittsburgh Vera Study 
• Police Bias 
• Police Culture 
• Police Discipline 
• Police Executive Perspectives 
• Police Morale 
• Police Reform Literature Status 
• Police Reform Theory 
• Police Training Issues 
• Police Unions 
• Policy Change 
• Politics 
• Portland CD 
• Predictions as to Success of SRL 
• Prince George’s County CD 
• Puerto Rico CD 
• Recommendations to improve application of 14141 
• Risk Management 
• San Francisco PD Collaborative Agreement 
• Scope of consent decrees 
• Seattle CD 
• Selecting Departments for Intervention 
629 
• Solutions for Police Misconduct 
• Special Litigation Section – Best Practices 
• Steubenville CD 
• Success Stories 
• Survey Data 
• Sustainability of Reform 
• Systemic Nature of Police Misconduct 
• Theory 
• Training 
• Trump Administration 
• US police officer population – statistics 
• Use of force policy & excessive force 
Organizational Change Literature (Nodes) 
• 14141 Legislation & Leg History 
• 14141 References to Actual Litigation Against Lawsuit 
• Amendments Proposed to 14141 
• Arguments Against 14141 
• Arguments For 14141 
• Case law 
• Causes of Police Misconduct 
• Challenges in Police Reform 
• Challenges to 14141 Implementation 
• Citizen Complaints 
• Civil Remedies 
• Code of Silence 
• COLE issues 
• Columbus CD 
• Commission Reports 
• Community Confidence Surveys 
• Community Involvement in SRL’s 
• Community Policing Theory 
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• Consequences of Police Misconduct 
• Criminal Prosecutions of Police 
• Criticism of Application of 14141 
• Data Needs 
• DC Consent Decree 
• DOJ Resource Allocation 
• DOJ Statements 
• Federal enforcement of civil rights & police reform 
• Future Research 
• Hiring issues 
• History of Police Corruption 
• History of SRL 
• Importance of Police Reform 
• Judicial Reform Theory 
• LAPD- LASD 
• Legal Issues re: SRL 
• Limits to SRL 
• Los Angeles CD 
• Negotiated Justice 
• Organizational Change – Sustainable Change 
• Organizational Justice 
• Pittsburgh CD 
• Police culture 
• Police discipline 
• Police Reform Theory 
• Police Training Issues 
• Police Unions 
• Politics 
• Predications as to success of SRL 
• Risk Management 
• Solutions for Police Misconduct 
• Steubenville CD 
• Success Stories 
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• Systemic Nature of Police Misconduct 
Seattle Court Documents Referenced to Consent Decree 
(Nodes) 
• City Leadership 
• City Position on Findings 
• City-SPD Cooperation & Collaboration 
• Community Engagement 
• Compliance Bureau 
• Costs 
• Court Comments 




• DOJ Comments 
• FIT 
• Full & Effective Compliance 
• Garrity Issues 
• In Car Video & BWC 
• IT & Data Needs 
• Monitoring Team Roles & Responsibilities 
• MOU para 12-14 CPC Community Engagement 
• MOU para 15 CPC Review of OPA - OPA Structure 
• MOU para 16 OPA reduction of inv timelines 
• MOU para 17-18 Public Education 
• MOU para 19 Investigatory Stops & Data Collection 
• MOU para 20 Officer Assistance & Support 
• MOU para 21-22 Transparency & Public Reporting 
• MOU para 23-25 Crisis Intervention Committee 
• MOU para 3-10 CPC 
• Para 100-106 UOF Reporting & Investigation 
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• Para 107-111 Type II Report Review by Chain of Command 
• Para 112-118 FIT Investigations 
• Para 119-125 UOF Committees 
• Para 1-2 Structure of Agreements 
• Para 127-129 UOF Training 
• Para 130-137 Crisis Intervention 
• Para 140-141 Stop & Detention Policy 
• Para 142-143 Stop & Detention Training 
• Para 144 Stop & Detention Supervision 
• Para 146 Bias-Free Policing Policies 
• Para 147-149 Bias Free Policing Training 
• Para 150-152 Bias Free Policing Supervision  
• Para 153-156 Supervision Generally 
• Para 157-163 Early Intervention System 
• Para 164 OPA 
• Para 165-166 Reporting Misconduct & Retaliation 
• Para 167 OPA Manual 
• Para 168 OPA Liaison Officers 
• Para 190 Annual Community Survey 
• Para 3-12 CPC 
• Para 69-73 UOF Policy – Principles 
• Para 78 Firearm Policies 
• Para 79-83 CED Policies 
• Para 84-87 OC Spray Policies 
• Para 88-90 Impact Weapon policies 
• Para 91-99 Use of Force Reporting & Investigation 
• Police Leadership 
• Police Union – Rank & File 
• Policy Work 
• Surveys 
• Sustainability of Reform 
• Training 
• Use of Force in Practice 
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Seattle News Articles (Nodes) 
• 2017 Police Accountability Statute 
• Chief Statements 
• City Counselor Statements 
• City Leadership Opinions 
• Command Staff 
• Community Police Commission 
• Community Quotations 
• Compliance 
• Criticism of application of 14141 
• Criticism of DOJ 
• Criticism of Mayor 
• Criticism of Monitor 
• De-Policing 
• History of SPD 
• Mayor Statements 
• Monitor Selection 
• Police Morale 
• Police Union 
• Quotes – ACLU 
• Quotes – Bailey Interim Chief 
• Quotes-Best Chief 
• Quotes – Bobb Monitor 
• Quotes – Burgess, Council 
• Quotes – City Council 
• Quotes – Consejo Counseling 
• Quotes – CPC 
• Quotes – Daugaard – CPC 
• Quotes – Diaz Chief 
• Quotes – DOJ 
• Quotes – Durkan 
• Quotes – Harrell, Bruce – Council 
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• Quotes – Holmes, City Attorney 
• Quotes – Levinson, Auditor 
• Quotes – Licata – Council 
• Quotes – Loren Miller Bar Association 
• Quotes – McGinn, Mayor’s Office 
• Quotes – Monitor Reports 
• Quotes – Monitoring Team 
• Quotes – Murray, Ed, Mayor 
• Quotes – NAACP 
• Quotes – Narasaki, Diane CPC 
• Quotes – Officers 
• Quotes – Ortega, Estela CPC 
• Quotes – O’Toole, Chief 
• Quotes – Perez, Tom DOJ 
• Quotes – Pugel Interim Chief 
• Quotes – Robart, Judge 
• Quotes – Seattle Human Rights Commission 
• Quotes – SPD Command 
• Quotes – SPOG 
• Quotes – Walden, Rev. CPC 
• Quotes – Walker, Sam Prof. 
• Quotes – NAACP 
• SPD Guild Contract 
• SPD Police Discipline – Accountability Ordinance 
• SPD Reports 
• SPMA 
• Survey Results 
• Training Issues 
National News Articles (Nodes) 
• Academics Critical of 14141 
• Academic Quotes for 14141 
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• Challenges to Police Reform 
• City Official Quotes Against 14141 
• City Official Quotes Supporting 14141 
• Collaborative Reform 
• Community Quotes Critical of 14141 
• Community Quotes Supportive of 14141 
• Costs 
• Criticisms of application of 14141 
• De-policing 
• DOJ Quotations 
• DOJ Resource Allocation 
• History of Use of 14141 
• Independent Monitors 
• Legislative History of 14141 
• Police Chief quotes supporting 14141 
• Police Chief quotes opposing 14141 
• Police Morale 
• Police Union Statements 
• Politics and statements of Politicians 
• Success Stories 
• Survey Results 
• Sustainability of Police Reform 
Evaluation Studies (Nodes) 
• Challenges Faced 
• City Opposition to DOJ 
• Community Engagement 
• Community Policing 
• Costs 
• De-Policing 
• DOJ Statements 
• EWS Implementation 
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• Factors for Success 
• History of Use of 14141 
• Impact of CD 
• Leadership 
• Legislative History 
• Lessons Learned 
• Literature Status 
• Methodology 
• Police Chief Involvement Perspective 
• Police Culture 
• Police Morale 
• Reasons for Settlement by City 
• Selection of Monitor 
• Suggestions for Improvement 
• Survey Results 
• Sustainability of Reform 
• Systemic Nature of Misconduct 
• Theory 
• Union Participation – Opposition 
Seattle Participant Interviews (Nodes): 
• Arguments Against CD 
• Arguments for CD 
• Challenges to CD implementation 
• CIT 
• City Attorney 
• City Compliance 
• City Council 
• City Leadership 
• Civilian Oversight 
• Collaborative Reform 
• Community Engagement 
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• COPS Programs 
• Costs-Benefits 
• CPC 
• Criticism of DOJ 
• Data Systems Issues 
• De-policing 
• DOJ Investigation 
• Failures of CD 
• Force Review 
• Inspector General 
• Judge Robart 
• Mayoral Leadership 
• Media 
• Monitor – Bobb 
• Monitoring Team 
• Negotiated Justice 
• Organizational Change 
• Police Accountability 
• Police Culture 
• Police Leadership 
• Police Misconduct – SPD 
• Policy Change 
• Politics 
• Resistance to CD 
• Successes of CD 
• Suggestions for Improvement 
• Sustainable Change 
• Systemic Nature of Misconduct 
• Training 
• Trauma 
• Unions – Rank & File 




Seattle City Archive Police Accountability Timeline 
(1995-2020) 
Date Event 
1955-1966 Mayor's Advisory Committee on Police Practices meets and formulates 
recommendations. 
November 16, 1964 ACLU files petition requesting police review panel because of allegations of 
police brutality. 
January 22, 1965 City Council holds hearing regarding ACLU request for police review panel. 
February 19, 1965 Second hearing regarding ACLU request. 
February 20, 1965 Council committee votes not to recommend police review panel. 
March 15, 1965 Full Council votes unanimously not to establish police review board. 
June 20, 1965 Robert Reese (40) killed by an off-duty policeman in Seattle's International 
District as he was fleeing as a passenger in a car. His death was found to be an 
"excusable homicide." 
August 25, 1965 Mayor Braman meets with the Central Area Youth Action Council (CAYAC) after 
they sat outside his for several days requesting a meeting. The mayor denied 
their requests for a trial for the police officers involved in Reese's death and for a 
police review board to be established. 
November 30, 1966 Eddie Ray Lincoln (19) fatally shot while fleeing Seattle police. 
January 1967 Freshman State Representative Edward Heavey introduces legislation in the 
House to establish a Police Commission in Seattle to oversee operations of the 
police force. It does not pass. 
January 1967 Mayor Braman appoints a three-person committee to investigate reports of 
payoffs in SPD and recommend any needed changes in police procedures. 
April 1967 The Urban League assessed race relations for the previous year at their annual 
meeting, stating "tensions in the community will continue to grow toward 
explosive proportions unless genuine progress is made to improve police-
community relations and provide fair housing, employment and educational 
opportunities for the nonwhite citizens of the community." 
August 14, 1967 Five members of WE of the Grass Roots Committee meet with Mayor Braman 
on August 14, 1967, to ask for an information center in the Central Area, 
upgrading of Garfield playground and a police review board. 
1968 Central Area Mothers for Peace and Integration (CAMPI) is founded with 275 
members. 
February 15, 1968 Councilmember Sam Smith writes to Chief of Police Frank Ramon and Mayor 
Braman with a suggestion of creating Dialog Sessions which he stated would be 
"...to improve relationship [sic] with the Police Department of our City, Civil 
Rights Activists, Militants, Black Power Advocates and the General 
Community...[and] to open Communication Channels between the Police who 




April 19, 1968 Seattle City Council passes legislation prohibiting discrimination in the sale, 
rental and financing of houses. The legislation was amended in 1975 to include 
prohibitions against discrimination based on sex, marital status, sexual 
orientation, and political ideology; and in 1979 to include age and parental 
status. In 1986, creed and disability were added as prohibitions on 
discrimination, and in 1999 gender identity was added. Seattle did not pass 
legislation regarding employment discrimination based on age, sex, race, creed, 
color or national origin until 1972. 
June 1968 The International Association of Chiefs of Police completes its report on the 
Seattle Police Department after a six-month study. 
July 1968 Police Liaison Committee is formed. Its purpose was to improve relations 
between the Police Department and area residents as well as receive 
complaints about police actions. 
July 29, 1968 Protest rally at Garfield Playfield on behalf of the arrest of two Black Panther 
members in Seattle marked by fire bombs and tear gas. 
July 30, 1968 About 30 people come to the police chief's office to protest police action in the 
Central District on the previous day, including use of tear gas. 
January 14, 1969 Seattle Crime Prevention Advisory Commission is established. 
June 19, 1969 Concerned Central Area Citizens meet with City officials at Mount Zion Baptist 
Church. They make ten demands, including an external review system that 
could handle complaints against the Police Department. The City was 
represented by Deputy Mayor Ed Devine, City Councilmembers Don Wright, Tim 
Hill, Phyllis Lamphere and Charles Carroll and three assistant police chiefs, 
including Tony Gustin. 
1969 Seize the Time for Oppressed People (STOP) forms. 
January 1970 The Seattle Police Officers Guild charges the Human Rights Commission with 
attempting to set itself up as a police review board. 
February 17, 1970 Violence breaks out at a demonstration led by the Seattle Liberation Front at the 
Federal Courthouse in Seattle protesting citations against the "Chicago Seven" 
who were charged with conspiring to plan a riot during the August 1968 
Democratic Party in Chicago. 
May 5, 1970 A protest of the Vietnam War including over 6,000 University of Washington 
students march onto the freeway and head to the federal courthouse after four 
students were shot by National Guard troops at Kent State University. 
May 15, 1970 Larry Ward (22) shot by police after fleeing Hardcastle Real Estate Co. (24th 
Ave and E Union) where he attempted to set off a bomb. 
May 29, 1970 May Silent Majority demonstration at Public Safety Building in support of Seattle 
police. 
March 21, 1971 Leslie Allen Black (21) killed by police after he was stopped for a missing front 
license plate. 
March 29, 1971 Black United Clergy for Action write Police Chief Tielsch about the shooting of 
Leslie Allen Black. "It appears that no crime was committed by Mr. Black. 
However, if there was a crime perpetrated, the punishment was far more 
extreme than the crime and the officers involved should not only be dismissed, 
but charges filed against them as well." 
April 16, 1971 Louis Alton Jones (27) killed by police after he ran a stop sign. 
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Date Event 
April 20, 197 Demonstrators march from Garfield High School to the Municipal Building to 
occupy City Council chambers. 
April 1971l Seattle Human Rights Commission recommends City Council establish a 
Citizens Review Board; the Central Seattle Community Council writes in support 
of their recommendation. 
1973 Seize the Time for Oppressed People (STOP) circulates a petition to establish a 
civilian review board to investigate complaints against police. 
March 1974 Jon Bisha accuses an officer of beating him in the police garage and files a 
$100,000 damage suit against the City. The president of the Police Guild stated 
that the police backed the officer and that if he was disciplined, the officers were 
prepared to "walk out." The officer was fired, rehired on the recommendation of 
the Police Disciplinary Review Board, and then successfully defended himself 
against Bisha's allegations. The episode led indirectly to the departure of Police 
Chief Tielsch. 
October 1974 Police Department policy changes to allow citizen observers on the Disciplinary 
Hearing Panel (later the Complaint Advisory Board). 
February 15, 1975 Joseph L Hebert, Jr. (23) shot by police officer after being stopped for a 
suspected stolen car and fleeing on foot in the Central Area. 
1975 Group "Justice for Joe" forms, represented by Larry Gossett. 
August 12, 1975 John Newell Baker (25) shot and killed by the same officer who shot Joseph 
Hebert after robbing a Black Angus Restaurant on Aurora and 12th. 
November 1975 Seize the Time for Oppressed People (STOP) requests creation of civilian police 
review unit and cessation of intelligence files on those who had not committed a 
crime. 
November 1975 Chief Hanson appoints a committee to review police intelligence activities. 
August 22, 1977 Manual Medina (26) shot and killed after he robbed a Rainier Valley Safeway 
store. He had been hiding in blackberry bushes for almost an hour after the 
robbery; he was shot at least twelve times. 
August 30, 1977 Protests outside City Hall include Roberto Maestas and members of the ACLU 
and the Coalition to Stop Police Abuses. 
September 25, 1977 Gary Krueger (29) shot and killed by police on Queen Anne Hill; holding a knife, 
he was questioned as a suspected prowler. 
August 19, 1978 John Alfred Rodney (26) shot as he was fleeing over a fence from a burglary, 
unarmed. 
November 1978 Initiative 15 passes, sponsored by the Seattle Police Officers Guild. Its passage 
overturned City Council policy regarding use of force. 
July 19, 1981 William Jonathan Bensen (25) shot and killed on 3400 block of Beach Dr SW; he 
was armed with a gun and suffered from mental illness. 
October 26, 1981 Martin William McCune (28) shot and killed by police at 2410 Third Avenue. 
McCune had a history of mental illness and was holding a knife, having 
wounded his mother with the knife hours earlier. An inquest jury ruled the 
shooting was justified. 
January 1984 Allen LeRoy Raymond (40) shot and killed by police while robbing a Georgetown 
restaurant; he was armed. 
641 
Date Event 
March 28, 1984 Robert Baldwin (42) kills a King County officer who served him an eviction notice 
for being $110 overdue on his rent. After a 17-hour stand-off with the Seattle 
police, he is shot 21 times in the back at his Yesler Terrace housing project 
apartment. 
January 5, 1985 Roland B. Clayton killed by a Seattle police officer after robbing mini-mart on 
Aurora in North Seattle. 
February 2, 1988 William M. Tucker (44) shot and killed when an officer serving a search warrant 
at his Central Area house on 23rd Avenue tripped and his gun went off 
accidentally. 
February 16, 1988 Johnny Lee McElroy (41) shot in the Wedgwood neighborhood after an 
attempted bank robbery. An inquest jury ruled the police acted properly and the 
King County prosecutor did not file charges against the officer. 
February 17, 1988  Erdman Bascomb (41) shot during a drug raid on his apartment in Rainier Valley 
on 36th Ave South. He pointed a remote control at police after they opened his 
door with a battering ram. The inquest jury ruled in April that the police were 
justified. 
July 10, 1988 Shawn Robert McDowell (29) shot at a grocery store at 15th Ave NE and NE 
145th St after an attempted robbery. An inquest jury ruled the shooting was 
justified. 
November 21, 1988 Lynn Brooks (34) shot in Ballard by a police officer issuing a traffic citation to the 
woman driving the vehicle in which he was a passenger. Brooks pulled a 
weapon after the vehicle was stopped. He died the next day. 
1990 Mothers Against Police Harassment is formed by Rev. Harriett Walden. 
March 28, 1991 After the beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles was videotaped and shown on 
national television, public focus on the police intensified. Over 250 people 
attended a hearing on police accountability. The mayor was reluctant to endorse 
any kind of civilian review. 
1991 Puget Sound Coalition for Police Accountability is formed. 
1991 Human Rights Commission study finds "a deep and disturbing lack of trust of the 
police," particularly among minority groups. 
December 17, 1991 Internal Investigations Auditor position authorized with Ordinance 115975. 
January 1992 Coalition to Demand Civil Justice forms. 
January 25, 1992 400-person protest march against fascism, racism and sexism results in 
confrontation by police. 
February 21, 1992 Two police officers stake out a frequently robbed mini-mart at 1701 E. Madison 
in the Central Area and shoot Anthony Miggale Lyons (24) when he attempted to 
rob the store. Lyons had a pistol which he pointed at the officers; each shot him 
once. 
February 25, 1992 100 protesters at the Public Safety Building ask for an investigation into police 
actions at the January 25th protest march. 
February 28, 1992 John Bernard McDonald (70) shot and killed by police at his Seattle Housing 
Authority apartment located at 4544 Seventh Ave NE after confronting police 
with a knife. 
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March 16, 1992 Terrence Carroll, a former King County Judge, is confirmed by City Council as 
Police Auditor to review the way Seattle police handle individual complaints of 
excessive force against officers. The Auditor had the authority to recommend 
further investigations. 
March 20, 1992 75 people rally on the anniversary of the beating of Rodney King. 
July 1992 ACLU urges creation of civilian review board for police conduct. 
December 14, 1992 City Council approves (6-3) federal Weed and Seed program to finance law 
enforcement and social programs in Central Area. 
April 22, 1995 Antonio Dunsmore (31) shot and killed at Garfield Community Center after police 
respond to calls about a man with threatening behavior; what police thought was 
a gun was a clear plastic squirt gun. Dunsmore had more than 19 bullets fired at 
him; his mother filed a wrongful death lawsuit in 1998 in the U.S. District Court in 
Seattle. 
January 15, 1996 Edward Anderson shot by police responding to a domestic violence call. 
October 1, 1996 Bodegard Mitchell (84) shot and killed by police after barricading himself in his 
South Seattle apartment. One of the police officers on the scene was later 
accused of stealing $10,000 from Mitchell's apartment. 
February 3, 1997 Citizen Observer ordinance passes, allowing a Citizen Observer to observe and 
make recommendations regarding the Firearms Review Board. 
December 29, 1998 Michael Ealy (35) dies while being restrained by Seattle police and paramedics. 
April 1999 200 people attend a National Day of Protest Against Police Violence in Denny 
Park. 
1999 Citizens Review Panel convened by Mayor Paul Schell to study SPD's policies 
and procedures relating to accountability and the reporting of police misconduct. 
April 12, 2000 David John Walker (40) shot in lower Queen Anne after he shoplifted from a 
local supermarket and left with a gun and a knife. He had a history of mental 
illness. His family files a $5 million claim for damages with the City. 
May 31, 2001 Aaron Roberts (36) stopped and killed by the police after he drove away from a 
traffic stop at 23rd Avenue and East Union Street in the Central District. The 
SPD Firearms Review Board and the internal review board found the shooting 
justified. The King County prosecutor did not pursue charges against the police 
officers. 
June 1, 2001 Protesters march from 23rd Avenue and East Union to Westlake Center to 
protest Roberts' death. 
August 14, 2001 Devon Jackson (20) killed by police after he fatally shot a friend in South Seattle 
and beat a 2-year-old boy to death.  
November 28, 2001 Anthony James Shuster (23) shot and killed in Lake City after police responded 
to a call that he was attempting suicide with a knife. 
2002 Office of Professional Accountability (OPA) is formed within the Police 
Department to receive and review complaints of misconduct by Seattle Police 
Department personnel. 
2002 Three-member OPA Review Board is created to review quality of complaint-
handling process and advise on policies and practices. 
2007 OPA Review Board membership expands to seven; OPA Auditor role expanded. 
2007 The Mayor and City Council each convene police accountability review panels. 
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Date Event 
January 29, 2008 Police Accountability Review Panel Final Report submitted. 
July 7, 2008 City Council Police Accountability Panel Final Report submitted. 
August 30, 2010 John T. Williams (50), Native American wood carver, shot four times by a police 
officer because he was carrying a penknife. The shooting was ruled "unjustified" 
by the Firearms Review Board. No charges were filed against the officer. 
December 3, 2010 35 civil rights and community-based organizations request the Civil Rights 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Attorney to 
investigate whether SPD had engaged in a pattern or practice of violations of 
civil rights. 
December 16, 2011 DOJ completes investigation finding a pattern and practice of excessive force 
and concerns about biased policing; based on its findings DOJ initiates a lawsuit 
against the City of Seattle. 
July 27, 2012 City of Seattle enters settlement agreement or "consent decree" with DOJ that 
includes federal court oversight. 
October 29, 2012 Community Police Commission is created. 
February 21, 2016 Che Taylor (47) shot and killed in Wedgwood when Seattle police were 
conducting an undercover drug operation. A wrongful death lawsuit was filed. 
June 1, 2017 New legislation passes overhauling Seattle's police accountability system. It 
implements a new Office of Inspector General for Public Safety and a permanent 
Community Police Commission. 
June 18, 2017 Charleena Lyles (30) shot and killed by Seattle police at her transitional housing 
apartment in Sand Point after she called to report a burglary. She had a knife 
and suffered from mental health issues. 
January 31, 2018 Iosia Falteogo (36) shot near Aurora and Northgate after a traffic stop. The 
police internal investigation section concluded that the officer involved acted 
reasonably and within training and policy. 
May 7, 2020 City files motion to terminate all independent monitoring of compliance with the 
consent decree. 
May 19, 2020 Terry J. Caver (57) shot by police at the intersection of West Harrison Street and 
Elliott Avenue West after 911 calls stated he was carrying a knife. Caver 
suffered from mental health issues. 
May 29, 2020 Killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis triggers national movement for 
accountability and restructuring of police departments. 
June 3, 2020 City withdraws motion to terminate independent monitoring of compliance with 






Seattle Police Reform Timeline 
Date Event Reference/Author(s) 
August 19, 1999 Citizens Review Panel Final Report Johnson, C.; Durkan, J.; McKay, M.; 
Pasenelli, B (FBI). 
January 29, 2008 Final Report of Police Accountability 
Review Panel 
Chair, Judge Terrence Carroll; 
Boruchowitz, B.; Durkan, J.; Gonzalez, 
M.L.; Jayapal, P.; Locke, G.; Krebs, J.; 
McKay, M.; Rice, N.; Shaw, J. 
January 1, 2010 Mayor McGinn and City Attorney 
Holmes take office 
 
December 3, 2010 ACLU Letter requesting federal 
investigation 
Taylor, K. & 35 other signatories. 
March 31, 2011 DOJ Announcement of “full-scale 
civil-rights investigation of the SPD. 
USDOJ Civil Rights Division, USAO, 
Western District of Washington 
November 23, 2011 DOJ Technical Assistance Letter 
regarding officer “Garrity” 
Protections 
J. Smith, Chief, Special Litigation Section 
DOJ, J. Durkan, U.S. Attorney, Western 
District WA 
December 16, 2011 DOJ Report: “Investigation of the 
Seattle Police Department” 
USDOJ Civil Rights Division; USAO, 
Western District of Washington 
July 27, 2012 Settlement Agreement & 
Memorandum of Understanding 
between City of Seattle and USDOJ 
Signed by Thomas Perez, Assistant AG, 
Civil Rights Division; Jenny Durkan, US 
Attorney, Western District of Washington; 
Mayor Michael McGinn & City Attorney 
Peter Holmes 
August 30, 2012 Court Order Provisionally Approving 
Consent Decree 
Judge James Robart 
September 21, 2012 Court Order Entering Preliminary 
Approval of Consent Decree 
Judge James Robart 
October 30, 2012 Independent Monitor appointed by 
the Court 
Monitor: Merrick Bobb, Police Assessment 
Resource Center 
December 2012 Analysis of DOJ investigation: 
“Police Use of Force in Seattle, 
January 2009-March 2011” 
Professor Matthew Hickman, Seattle 
University 
March 5, 2013 Monitoring Plan for the First Year Seattle Monitoring Team 
March 12, 2013 Court Hearing (“Federal Judge ok’s 
blueprint). (Bobb present). 
Court Video (1/10) 
https://www.uscourts.gov/cameras-
courts/united-states-america-v-city-seattle 
March 18, 2013 Appointment and Confirmation of 
CPC by City Council 
Seattle City Council (per Monitor’s 1st 
Semi-annual Report, at 4).  
April 8, 2013 Jim Pugel named as Interim Chief of 
SPD. 
Appointed by Mayor Mike McGinn 
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Date Event Reference/Author(s) 
April 26, 2013 First Semi-Annual Report Seattle Police Monitor 
August 20, 2013 CPC Letter requesting extension of 
time for Monitor to approve SPD 
use-of-force policy. 
Betsy Graef, Acting Director 
November 26, 2013 Court denies CPC motion to 
interview – CPC granted amicus 
curiae status 
Judge James Robart 
December 13, 2013 Second Semi-Annual Report Seattle Police Monitor 
December 17, 2013 Court approves SPD Use of Force 
policies 
Judge James Robart 
January 1, 2014 Term of Mayor Ed Murray begins  
January 8, 2014 Harry Bailey appointed as Interim 
Chief 
 
January 17, 2014 Court approves SPD policies on 
“Terry Stops” and Bias Free Policing 
Judge James Robart 
February 10, 2014 Court approves SPD Crisis 
Intervention Policy 
Judge James Robart 
March 24, 2014 Court approves Second Year 
Monitoring Plan 
Seattle Police Monitor; Judge James 
Robart 
May 28, 2014 Filing of Civil Rights Complaint by 
126 Seattle Police Officers 
regarding proposed Seattle PD UOF 
policy. 
126 Seattle Police Officers – Pro Se 
June 10, 2014 Court approves Crisis Intervention 
Training & Instructional System 
Design Model for Use of Force 
Training 
Judge James Robart 
June 13, 2014 Court approves Force Investigation 
Team Training Curriculum  
Judge James Robart 
June 16, 2014 Third Semi-Annual Report Seattle Police Monitor 
June 23, 2014 Kathleen O’Toole confirmed as 
Chief of Police 
Appointed by Mayor Ed Murray 
June 30, 2014 Filing of Office of Professional 
Accountability Internal Operations & 
Training Manual & related SPD 
policies. 
OPS 
July 10, 2014 Court approves OPS Internal 
Operations & Training Manual; 
Court incorporates span-of-control 
milestones into Second Year 
Monitoring Plan. 
City of Seattle; Judge James Robart 
August 14, 2014 Court approves Use-of-Force 
Training Curriculum 
Judge James Robart 
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Date Event Reference/Author(s) 
August 19, 2014 Court Hearing (Judge “scolds” SPD) 
(Chief O’Toole attends; Bobb & 
Barge & Ehrlicman & Ward attend) 
 
Court Video (2/10) 
https://www.uscourts.gov/cameras-
courts/united-states-america-v-city-seattle 
September 21, 2014 Court approves Advanced Crisis 
Intervention Training Curriculum & 
Strategy 
Judge James Robart 
September 22, 2014 Court approves Instructional System 
Design Model for Search & Seizure 
and Bias-Free policing training 
Judge James Robart 
December 15, 2014 Fourth Semi-Annual Report Seattle Police Monitor 
February 10, 2015 Court approves SPD 2015 Training 
Program 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
March 19, 2015 Court approves Third Year 
Monitoring Plan 
Seattle Police Monitor; Judge James 
Robart 
April 15, 2015 Court approves SPD 2015 Tactical 
De-escalation & Individual Firearms 
Training 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
May 11, 2015 Court approves SPD revised Early 
Intervention System Policy 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
June 15, 2015 Fifth Semi-Annual Report Seattle Police Monitor 
June 4, 2015 Court approves revised Crisis 
Intervention Policy 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
June 11, 2015 Court approves revised Bias-Free 
policing policy & Voluntary Contacts 
Terry Stops and Detention policy 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
June 30, 2015 Court hearing (judge critical of CPC 
“attempt to grab power”) (Bobb & 
Barge present) (O’Toole present + 
command staff). 
Court Video (3/10) 
https://www.uscourts.gov/cameras-
courts/united-states-america-v-city-seattle 
July 27, 2015 Court Order approving updated SPD 
Use-of-Force policies 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
August 26, 2015 Court hearing (Bobb and other MT 
members present). 
Court Video (4/10) 
https://www.uscourts.gov/cameras-
courts/united-states-america-v-city-seattle 
August 27, 2015 Scheduled Date for SPD to establish 
“Full & Effective Compliance” 
Per SPD Monitor Timeline (as of 11/30/12) 
September 24, 2015 First Systemic Assessment: Force 
Investigation & Reporting 
Seattle Police Monitor 
October 1, 2015 Court approves Updates to Third 
Year Monitoring Plan 
Seattle Police Monitor; Judge James 
Robart 
November 24, 2015 Second Systemic Assessment: 
Force Review Board 
Seattle Police Monitor 
December 15, 2015 Sixth Semi-Annual Report Seattle Police Monitor 
647 
Date Event Reference/Author(s) 
January 20, 2016 Court Order Seeking Input into 
proposed revisions to OPS Policy 
Manual 
Judge James Robart 
January 22, 2016 Fourth Systemic Assessment: Office 
of Professional Accountability (OPA) 
Seattle Police Monitor 
January 27, 2016 Third Systemic Assessment: 
Community Confidence 
Seattle Police Monitor 
January 2016 CPC Report: “An Assessment of the 
Seattle Police Department’s 
Community Engagement” 
Community Police Commission (CPC) 
February 16, 2016 Fifth Systemic Assessment: Crisis 
Intervention 
Seattle Police Monitor 
February 25, 2016 Court Order approving Plan for 
Assessment of SPD Accountability 
Processes 
Judge James Robart 
March 16, 2016 Order approving Revisions to OPS 
Manual “With One Exception” 
Judge James Robart 
June 6, 2016 Minute Order Scheduling Status 
Conference Re: SPD Accountability 
Systems Review 
Judge James Robart 
July 14, 2016 Court Order approving Fourth Year 
Monitoring Plan 
Seattle Police Monitor; Judge James 
Robart 
July 21, 2016 SPOG reported as “overwhelmingly” 
rejecting proposed police contract. 
Seattle Times, 7/21/2016. 
August 9, 2016 Court Order Authorizing City to Draft 
Legislation concerning SPD’s 
Accountability Systems 
Judge James Robart 
August 15, 2016 Court Hearing (Comments re: SPOG 
“holding city hostage”) (Bobb 
present – per Judge: “part of the 
court team”) 
Court Video (5/10) 
https://www.uscourts.gov/cameras-
courts/united-states-america-v-city-seattle 
September 26, 2016 Compliance Status & Seventh Semi-
Annual Report 
Seattle Police Monitor 
October 20, 2016 Unfair Labor Practice Complaint filed 
by Seattle Police Management 
Association (SPMA) alleging Police 
Accountability reforms in violation of 
contract 
Seattle Police Management Association 
(SPMA) 
December 13, 2016 Court order approving SPD Force 
Investigation Unit Procedural 
Manual 
SPD FIT; Judge James Robart 
December 31, 2016 Sixth Systemic Assessment -
Supervision 
Seattle Police Monitor 
January 3, 2017 Court approves 2017 SPD Training 
Plan 
Judge James Robart 
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Date Event Reference/Author(s) 
January 4, 2017 Status Conference Re: SPMA Unfair 
Labor Practice Complaint (Bobb not 
present) 
Court Video (6/10) 
https://www.uscourts.gov/cameras-
courts/united-states-america-v-city-seattle 
January 6, 2017 Court Order Regarding 
Accountability Legislation 
Judge James Robart 
January 27, 2017 Seventh Systemic Assessment: 
Type II Force Investigation & 
Review Re-Assessment. 
Seattle Police Monitor 
February 7, 2017 Court order approving SPD Crowd 
Management Policy 
Judge James Robart 
March 23, 2017 Eighth Systemic Assessment: Early 
Intervention System (EIS) 
Seattle Police Monitor 
March 24, 2017 Declaration of Chief of Police in 
Support of SPD Body-Worn Camera 
Policy 
Chief Kathleen O’Toole 
April 6, 2017 Ninth Systemic Assessment: Use of 
Force 
Seattle Police Monitor 
May 3, 2017 Court Order approving SPD Draft 
Body Worn Video Policy 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
May 21, 2017 City Council approves Police 
Accountability Ordinance 
Seattle City Council 
June 18, 2017 Tenth Systemic Assessment: Stops, 
Search, & Seizure 
Seattle Police Monitor 
June 23, 2017 Court Order Directing Briefing and 
Scheduling a Status Conference 
Regarding Court Review of 
Accountability Ordinance 
Judge James Robart 
July 17, 2017 Seattle Executive Order 2017-03: 
Implementing Body-Worn Camera 
Program 
Mayor Ed Murray 
July 18, 2017 Court Hearing (Judge declines to 
approve PA legislation) (Bobb not 
present) 
Court Video (7/10) 
https://www.uscourts.gov/cameras-
courts/united-states-america-v-city-seattle 
August 1, 2017 Memorandum to Chief of Police: 
“Analysis re: ‘Full & Effective’ 
Compliance with the Consent 
Decree 
Rebecca Boatright, Chief Legal Officer, 
SPD 
Brian Maxey, Chief Operating Officer, 
SPD 
September 7, 2017 Court Order Approving Portions of 
Accountability Ordinance 
Judge James Robart 
September 12, 2017 Mayor Ed Murray Resigns By City Council 
September 13, 2017 Burce Harrell appointed Interim 
Mayor 
By City Council 
September 18, 2017 Tim Burgess appointed Interim 
Mayor 
By City Council after resignation of Bruce 
Harrell 
November 28, 2017 Term of Mayor Jenny Durkan begins   
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December 31, 2017 Chief O’Toole resigns  
January 1, 2018 Carmen Best appointed as Interim 
Chief 
 
January 10, 2018 Order Finding Initial Compliance 
with Consent Decree 
US District Judge James Robart 
March 13, 2018 Court Order Approving Phase II 
Sustainment Period Plan 
Seattle Police Monitor; Judge James 
Robart 
June 18, 2018 Court approval of Revisions to SPD 
Bias-Free Policing & Crisis 
Intervention Policies 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
July 9, 2018 Court Hearing (Mayor Durkan 
appears/Bobb present) 
Court Video (8/10) 
https://www.uscourts.gov/cameras-
courts/united-states-america-v-city-seattle 
August 13, 2018 Carmen Best confirmed as SPD 
Chief 
Appointed by Mayor Durkan 
August 14, 2018 Court approval of SPD Revisions to 
Use-of-Force Policy 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
October 23, 2018 
October 26, 2018 
Orders Scheduling a Status 
Conference regarding Police Union 
(SPOG) Contract 
Judge James Robart 
November 5, 2018 Court Hearing (Police Union 
contract) (Bobb appears) 
Court Video (9/10) 
https://www.uscourts.gov/cameras-
courts/united-states-america-v-city-seattle 
November 19, 2018 Court Order approving revisions to 
SPD Voluntary Contacts, Terry 
Stops and Voluntary Detention 
policies 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
December 3, 2018 Order to Show Cause Whether the 
Court Should Find that the City has 
Failed to Maintain Full and Effective 
Compliance with the Consent 
Decree 
US District Judge James Robart 
December 12, 2018 Order approving revisions to SPD 
Use-of-Force policy 
US District Judge James Robart 
December 17, 2018 Order approving revisions to SPD 
Early Intervention System policy 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
January 2, 2019 Order Holding Case in Abeyance 
and Modifying Deadlines Until 
USDOJ Appropriations are Restored 
USDOJ; Judge James Robart 
January 29, 2019 Order Lifting Stay and Extending 
Deadlines 
Judge James Robart 
April 19, 2019 Order Scheduling Status 
Conference Re: OSC 
Judge James Robart 
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Date Event Reference/Author(s) 
May 15, 2019 Court Hearing – Court finds City 
Partially Out of Compliance (Bobb 
not present) 
Court Video (10/10) 
https://www.uscourts.gov/cameras-
courts/united-states-america-v-city-seattle 
May 21, 2019 Order Finding City of Seattle 
Partially Out of Compliance with the 
Consent Decree; Order to Parties to 
Formulate a Methodology for 
Assessing Accountability Regime to 
Achieve Consent Decree 
Compliance 
US District Judge James Robart 
May 23, 2019 Court Order approving revisions to 
SPD Crisis Intervention, Bias-Free 
Policing & Employee Conduct 
Policies 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
July 2019 City retains 21CP Consultants to 
review Accountability Systems 
Seattle Mayor’s Office 
August 16, 2019 Court Order approving revisions to 
SPD Use-of-Force policy. 
Judge James Robart 
October 15, 2019 Order Regarding City’s Motion to 
Approve its Accountability 
Methodology [including order to 
parties to submit joint proposal 
regarding Monitor’s role in 
assessing compliance on 
Accountability] 
Judge James Robart 
November 15, 2019 Order approving revisions to SPD 
Voluntary Contacts, Terry Stops and 
Detention policies 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
December 13, 2019 “An Assessment of the City of 
Seattle’s Police Accountability 
System” 
21CP Consultants 
January 21, 2020 Court Order approving revisions to 
SPD Early Intervention System 
policy 
SPD; Judge James Robart 
May 7, 2020 Parties Stipulated Joint Motion to 
Terminate Paragraphs 68-168 of the 
Consent Decree  
DOJ; City of Seattle 
May 11, 2020 NAACP Opposition Declaration to 
Motion to Dismiss Consent Decree 
NAACP King County President Carolyn 
Riley-Payne 
May 25, 2020 Murder of George Floyd by 
Minneapolis Police Department 
officers 
 
May 29, 2020 Seattle Police Accountability 
Protests Begin 
Bush, E. (2020, June 6). Timeline of 
demonstrations over the police killing of 
George Floyd. Seattle Times. 
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Date Event Reference/Author(s) 
June 1, 2020 OPA announces processing of 
“12,000 individual complaints 
concerning the Seattle Police 
Department’s (SPD) response to this 
weekend’s demonstrations” and 
identifying 10 specific incidents 
“which received the most 
complaints.” 
Office of Professional Accountability Press 
Release (6/1/2020). 
June 4, 2020 Motion to Withdrawal City of 
Seattle’s Pending Motion to Dismiss 
Consent Decree 
City of Seattle 
June 4, 2020 King County Labor Council Motion 
on SPOG to acknowledge systemic 
racism in SPD and negotiate police 
accountability. 
King County Labor Council 
June 9, 2020 Motion by CPC for Order to Show 
Cause why City should not be found 
“further out of compliance” with 
Consent Decree 
CPC 
August 31, 2020 Monitor Bobb Resigns Merrick Bobb 
September 2, 2020 Chief Best retires. Crosscut.com, 8/10/2020. 
September 3, 2020 SPD Deputy Chief Adrian Diaz takes 
office as Interim Chief 
Seattle Times, 8/11/2020.1068  
September 9, 2020 New Monitor appointed Dr. Antonio M. Oftelie 
September 21, 2020 Monitor Report on Crowd Control Merrick Bobb 
December 7, 2020 Mayor Durkan announces she will 
not run for re-election. 
Seattle Times, 12/20/2020 
February 4, 2021 First Status Conference since 
appointment of New Monitor, Dr. 
Antonio Oftelie & Hearing on 2021 
Monitoring Plan. 
Dr. Antonio M. Oftelie ; United States of 




1068 Derrick, A. (2020, August 11). Chief of Police Carmen Best Announces her Decision to Retire, 
Mayor Durkan Appoints Adrian Diaz as Chief of Police. Seattle Times. Retrieved from Chief of 
Police Carmen Best Announces Her Decision to Retire, Mayor Durkan Appoints Adrian Diaz as 
Interim Chief - Office of the Mayor (seattle.gov). 
